Mohamed v. Stratosphere Quality

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

MOHAMED ALI, :

:

Plaintiff, :

: Case No. 2:20-cv-5861

v. : Chief Judge Algenon L. Marbley

: Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P. Deavers

STRATOSPHERE QUALITY, LLC , :

:

Defendant. :

OPINION & ORDER

This matter is before this Court on Defendant Stratosphere Quality LLC’s (“Stratosphere”)

Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 45). For the following reasons, Defendant’s

Motion is GRANTED, and this case is hereby DISMISSED.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Mohamed Ali, a Black, Muslim man, is employed by Triad Staffing (“Triad”), a

temporary work agency. (ECF No. 41 at 1)1. On August 6, 2019, Triad assigned Plaintiff to work

for Stratosphere at the Honda2 Marysville Auto Plant (the “Marysville Plant”). (Id.). After arriving

at the Marysville Plant on August 12, 2019, Project Supervisor Geraldine Wick, informed Plaintiff

that Honda had not hired him to work that day. (Id.). Plaintiff believes the termination of his

assignment at Honda was discriminatory, citing Ms. Wick’s alleged description of employees from

Triad as “convicted felons,” “rapists,” and “stupid.” (Id. at 2). Thereafter, on December 13, 2019,

Plaintiff filed charges of discrimination with both the Ohio Civil Rights Commission (“OCRC”)

1 As detailed below, this Court dismissed Plaintiff’s initial Complaint (ECF No. 3) and granted him leave to file an

Amended Complaint (ECF No. 43). In this Amended Complaint, however, Plaintiff does not recite the factual

background of his action, but rather begins by asserting supplemental factual allegations. Accordingly, rather than

citing to that initial Complaint, this Court cites to its previous Opinion and Order to establish the factual background

of Plaintiff’s claims.

2 Honda Development & Manufacturing of America, LLC (“Honda”) remains an interested party in this action, after

successfully defeating Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel. (See ECF No. 59).

and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), alleging discrimination based on

race, gender, and religion. (Id.). Specifically, Plaintiff alleged Ms. Wick only accepted Caucasian

workers from Triad and sent Black Triad workers home. (Id.). The OCRC took the lead in

investigating the Charge and issued a “no probable cause” finding on June 4, 2020. (Id. at 5). The

EEOC issued the same finding. (ECF No. 45-1 at 2, n. 2).

Plaintiff originally sought relief pro se in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas,

alleging Stratosphere discriminated against him, but did not specify the statutory basis for his

claims. (ECF No. 41 at 2). After moving to dismiss in state court, on November 12, 2020,

Defendant filed a Notice of Removal asserting Plaintiff’s reference to Title VII in his response

brief empowered this Court to exercise federal-question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

(EFC No. 1). Thereafter, Defendant moved to dismiss.3 (ECF No. 17). While that Motion was

pending, Plaintiff filed two Motions for Default Judgement, which Defendant opposed. (ECF Nos.

16, 19, 24).

On July 26, 2021, this Court granted Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 8), but held

the dismissal in abeyance for 14 days to allow the Plaintiff the opportunity to amend his complaint.

(ECF No. 41). Therein, this Court directed Plaintiff to incorporate the factual allegations raised in

his responses and motions for default judgment into his amended complaint and to provide more

details of the alleged discriminatory conduct. (Id. at 9). This Court went so far as to suggest the

types of facts Plaintiff could include in his amended complaint that would satisfy the pleading

standard, including: whether other individuals were given assignments that day, the races or

3 On November 17, 2020, the Defendant sought an extension of time to respond to the Plaintiff’s complaint, in which

it noted that the Clerk of Court had deemed its original motion to dismiss mooted by removal. (ECF No. 4). This Court

granted that motion and returned that pending Motion to Dismiss to the docket on November 25, 2020. (ECF No. 6).

religions of those individuals, and any other specific instances where Defendant treated Plaintiff

differently from other similarly situated Triad workers. (Id. at 8–9).

On August 3, 2021, Plaintiff filed timely his Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 43).

Thereafter, on August 17, 2021, Defendant moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint for failure

to state a claim. (ECF No. 45). Plaintiff did not respond to the Motion. On November 4, 2021,

almost two months after the response deadline lapsed, Magistrate Judge Deavers ordered Plaintiff

to show cause, within fourteen (14) days, why he should be granted leave to file an untimely

response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 46). On November 12, 2021, Plaintiff

responded to the Court’s Order, generally stating that he has post-traumatic stress disorder related

to the events underlying this case, and that “[e]very time [he] receive[s] a letter from the defendant

. . . the trauma flashes back to the events of post August 12, 2019.” (ECF No. 48 at 2). Plaintiff

represented that providing information throughout the discovery period has been an “emotional[ly]

disturbing experience[.]” (Id.). Finding these allegations insufficient, on March 14, 2022,

Magistrate Judge Deavers held that Plaintiff had failed to show good cause to permit an untimely

response, and the Court would consider Defendant’s Motion unopposed and ripe for judicial

review. (ECF No. 61). Shortly after, seemingly in contravention of this Order, Plaintiff filed a

Notice of supplementary facts regarding the events of August 12, 2018. (ECF No. 64). This Court

addresses that filing below.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a complaint for a

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Likewise, under

Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a) “imposes legal and factual

demands on the authors of complaints.” 16630 Southfield Ltd., P’Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B.,

727 F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013). To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must allege facts

that, if accepted as true, are sufficient to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Hensley

Mfg. v. ProPride, Inc., 579 F.3d 603, 609 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). A complaint will not “suffice

if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement’” or “[t]hreadbare recitals

of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Although the court “must accept all well-pleaded factual

allegations in the complaint as true,” the court “need not accept as true a legal conclusion couched

as a factual allegation.” Hensley Mfg., 579 F.3d at 609 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)

(internal quotations omitted). In short, the plaintiff’s complaint “must be enough to raise a right to

relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

When a litigant is proceeding pro se, this Court holds his or her pleadings “to [a] less

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Garrett v. Belmont Cnty. Sheriff’s

Dep’t, 374 F. App’x 612, 614 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)).

This lenient treatment, however, has limits; “courts should not have to guess at the nature of the

claim asserted.” Frengler v. Gen. Motors, 482 F. App’x 975, 976–77 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Wells

v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989)).

III. LAW & ANALYSIS

Defendant argues Plaintiff has again failed to allege unlawful discrimination. (ECF No. 45-

1 at 4–6). It maintains that Plaintiff has not identified any white individuals who were given

temporary assignments or black individuals who were similarly sent home, nor does he include

any allegations to support an inference that his race, religion, or gender motivated Stratosphere to

end his assignment. (Id. at 4). Rather, says Defendant, Plaintiff attempts to assert an entirely new

theory: that Stratosphere terminated him because it thought he was another person. (Id.). Defendant

argues that the additional facts supporting this new theory still fail to show it was biased against

this mistakenly identified individual, let alone for any reason protected under Title VII. (Id. at 5).

Ultimately, Defendant maintains dismissal is appropriate given Plaintiff’s repeated failure to allege

any facts that would allow this Court to conclude that its decision to end Plaintiff’s temporary

assignment had anything to do with a protected status. (Id. at 6).

When this Court granted Defendant’s first Motion to Dismiss, it held that Plaintiff’s initial

complaint did not meet the plausibility standard set forth in Twombly. (ECF No. 41 at 9). In holding

that dismissal in abeyance pending the filing of an amended complaint, this Court clearly directed

Plaintiff to include facts that would allow him to meet Twombly’s plausibility standard. (See id at

9). Specifically, as Defendant highlights, this Court instructed Plaintiff to include facts on whether

other individuals were given assignments that day, the races and religions of those individuals, as

well as other specific instances where the Plaintiff was treated differently from other similarly

situated employees. (Id. at 8). Provided with these additional facts, this Court would be better

positioned to make the inference that the failure to provide Plaintiff an assignment was plausibly

related to his race and/or religion. (Id. at 9). Despite this instruction, Plaintiff’s Amended

Complaint fails to cure the deficiencies of his initial Complaint.

Title VII prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of an individual’s race, color,

religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(a). An unlawful employment practice includes

the failure to or refusal “to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against

any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.”

Id. It also prohibits the limiting, segregating, or classifying of employees “in any way which would

deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities . . . because of such

individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Id.

The Amended Complaint does not present additional facts showing an “unlawful

employment practice,” or that Defendant “limit[ed], segregat[ed], or classif[ied]” any Triad

workers based on a protected status. (See generally ECF No. 43). Rather, Plaintiff focuses on an

entirely new theory for his termination––a case of mistaken identity. (Id. at 3–4). In Plaintiff’s

allegations of mistaken identity, he makes no reference to specific instances of discrimination,

merely offering that his termination was due to retaliation intended for the “other Mohamed Ali.”

(Id. at 3). Plaintiff alleges “there was a big campaign, going on, to find [the] lost Mohamed Ali”

and that Stratosphere “reach[ed] the conclusion to terminate me, because I became the other

[M]ohamed Ali” it was looking for.” (Id. at 3-4).

Plaintiff’s new theory does not remedy the factual deficiencies of the dismissed complaint,

as it does not present facts that allow this court to draw a reasonable inference of discrimination in

violation of Title VII. As this Court previously held, a complaint alleging a pattern or practice of

discrimination must provide “several specific events” where a complainant was treated differently

than similarly situated non-protected employees, identifying key supervisors and other relevant

persons by race and name and/or title, and asserting that a member of a protected class received

adverse employment consequences, despite satisfactory job performance. (See ECF No. 41 at 7;

see also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002) (notice pleading satisfied where

complaint “detailed the events leading to his termination, provided relevant dates, and included

the ages and nationalities of at least some of the relevant persons involved with his termination”)).

Without any such factual support, Plaintiff’s amended complaint cannot survive a motion

to dismiss. See El-Hallani v. Huntington Nat’l Bank, 623 F. App’x 730, 735 (6th Cir. 2015)

(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678)) (“[F]actual allegations about discriminatory conduct that are

based on nothing more than the plaintiff’s belief are ‘naked assertions devoid of further factual

enhancement’ that are insufficient to state a claim.”); see also Brown v. City of Cincinnati, No.

1:18-cv-412, 2020 WL 3989169, at *7 (S.D. Ohio July 15, 2020) (plaintiff failed to satisfy notice

pleading where she merely “believed” discriminatory conduct was motivated by race and gender

and that she would have been treated differently if she were a different race). Moreover, the one

relevant fact Plaintiff does offer––that another Triad worker, Trina Corbin, was not sent home on

August 12, 2019––is unhelpful as Ms. Corbin, a Black woman, is not a non-protected employee.

While this Court is not required to consider it, as it was untimely, Plaintiff’s recently filed

Notice (ECF No. 64) proves similarly unhelpful. Therein, Plaintiff describes the events of August

12, 2018, but again does not provide sufficient factual details. (See generally id.). He alleges he is

a “helpless victim of discrimination and retaliation,” but offers no factual support for this

contention, let alone any that would allow this court to draw a reasonable inference of

discrimination. (Id. at 4–5). The only substantive factual allegation Plaintiff offers is that

Defendant allegedly “lied about [his] identity… lied about [his] vehicle… and lied about [the]

arrival time of Trina Corbin.” (Id.). As with those previously offered, this “naked assertion, devoid

of further factual enhancement” does not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Ultimately, even with the

lenient treatment afforded to pro se litigants, Plaintiff’s allegations are not enough to “raise a right

to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint

(ECF No. 45) is GRANTED, and this case is hereby DISMISSED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

ALGENON 2 MARBLE [es

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

DATED: March 28, 2022