Watkins v. Ohio Dept. of Ed.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

STANLEY WATKINS, :

:

Plaintiff, :

: Case No. 2:21-cv-04482

v. :

: CHIEF JUDGE ALGENON L. MARBLEY

OHIO DEPARTMENT OF :

EDUCATION, et al. :

: MAGISTRATE JUDGE DEAVERS

Defendants. :

OPINION & ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction. (ECF No.

16). The hearing on this Motion was held on Wednesday, February 23, 2022, at 10:00 a.m. For

the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that the Younger abstention doctrine applies to this

case, and, as a result this case is STAYED. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion

for Preliminary Injunction (Id.).

I. BACKGROUND

A. Facts

Plaintiff is a former special education teacher previously employed with the Columbus City

Schools (“CCS”). (ECF No. 1 at 3). In 2015, the Ohio Department of Education (“ODE”) issued

Plaintiff a four-year alternative license, enabling him to teach children with disabilities. (Id.).

After being observed falling asleep during class, among other things, CCS terminated Plaintiff’s

employment. (Id. at 6). Following his termination, the ODE initiated an investigation concerning

Plaintiff’s license to teach. (Id. at 3).

Sometime in early 2017, Plaintiff was notified that he was being investigated by ODE.

(Id.). On March 20, 2017, Plaintiff contacted ODE requesting a copy of the “complaint.” (Id.).

Plaintiff alleges that ODE refused his request noting that it was unable to disclose such information

because it was confidential. (Id.). On March 26, 2018—about a year later, Plaintiff renewed his

request with ODE; the state agency again refused his request on the same grounds. (Id.).

Approximately two years after notifying Plaintiff of the investigation, ODE provided

Plaintiff with Notice of an Investigation Decision on January 23, 2019. (Id.). Attached to the

emailed Notice was a request that Plaintiff voluntarily surrender his teaching license and agree to

a permanent bar from subsequently applying. (Id. at 3–4). The same day Plaintiff received this

Notice, he requested a hearing. (Id. at 4). Plaintiff then twice attempted—once in February 2019

and then in July 2019—to apply for some sort of licensure update. (Id.). Because his four-year

license was set to expire on June 30, 2019, it is likely that at least one of these applications was

for a renewal, although Plaintiff is unclear on this point. (See id.).

Plaintiff complains that ODE accepted his application fees yet constructively suspended

his license in 2019; Plaintiff’s license continues to be suspended. (See id.).

B. Procedural

On February 6, 2019, Plaintiff filed his initial federal lawsuit arising from his termination

as a special education teacher. (ECF No. 9 at 2). There, he similarly asserted a § 1983 claim

alleging deprivation of his due process rights in that CCS failed to “properly notify him about his

pre-disciplinary hearing.” Watkins v. Columbus City Sch., No. 2:19-CV-394, 2020 WL 1290298,

at *1 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 18, 2020), aff’d, No. 20-3357, 2020 WL 9073357 (6th Cir. Nov. 10, 2020).

The Court ultimately found that Watkins’s claim was barred by the relevant statute of limitations.

Id. at *9.

In the same suit, Plaintiff attempted to remove the now complained of ODE proceedings

to federal court. See id. Plaintiff asserted that the Southern District of Ohio had jurisdiction

because the proceedings concerned a federal cause of action: a separate § 1983 claim. The Court

rejected this argument because the proceedings arose “under Chapter 19, Title 33 of the Ohio

Revised Code and Chapter 3301-73 of the Ohio Administrative Code, which allow the State Board

of Education to suspend, revoke, or deny a teaching license.” Id. Plaintiff also asserted that

because he presented a defense sounding in federal law that the proceedings were removable. Id.

at *10. The Court similarly rejected this argument noting that asserting “a federal defense is not

a basis for removal.” Id.

Watkins filed his Complaint (ECF No. 1) and Motion for Temporary Restraining Order

(ECF No. 2) against Defendants in the case sub judice on September 10, 2021. Defendants include

the State of Ohio, two state agencies, an agency board, and officials of those agencies. (ECF No.

1). The state agencies include the Ohio Department of Education (“ODE”) and the state Attorney

General’s Office (“AGO”). (Id.). Additionally, Plaintiff is suing the state Board of Education—

a decision-making body within ODE. (Id.). Finally, officials at the state agencies include

members of the Ohio Department of Education (Paola DeMaria, former Superintendent of Public

Instruction; Laura Kohler, President; Liza Dietrich, Staff Attorney; Samuel Dunsky, Staff

Attorney; and Aaron Ross, former Managing Attorney at the Office of Professional Conduct)

(“ODE Defendants” or “ODE”) and the Attorney General’s Office (Dave Yost, Ohio Attorney

General; Zoe Saadey, Associate Attorney General; and Ashley Barbone, Associate Attorney

General) (“AGO Defendants” or “AGO”). (Id.).

On September 14, 2021, the Court denied Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining

Order. (ECF No. 11). Plaintiff filed his Motion for Preliminary Injunction on October 4, 2021.

(ECF No. 16). In his motion for Preliminary Injunction, Plaintiff, in tandem with the complaint,

seeks an injunction to reinstate his teaching license while the Court considers the constitutionality

of the state administrative proceedings. (Id.). Moreover, Plaintiff also requests that the

Preliminary Injunction hearing be consolidated with a trial on the merits pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.

P. 65(a)(2). (Id.). ODE Defendants and AGO Defendants each filed their Response in Opposition

on October 12, 2021. (ECF Nos. 17, 18). On October 15, 2021, Plaintiff requested to appear

telephonically at the hearing or, in the alternative, to continue the hearing until February 2022.

(ECF No. 20). The Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion to Continue and ordered Plaintiff to file a

Reply brief addressing Younger abstention. (ECF No. 22). Plaintiff filed his Reply on January

24, 2022. (ECF No. 25).

At the Preliminary Injunction hearing, Plaintiff withdrew his request to consolidate the

hearing with the trial on the merits. The Court heard argument, primarily on Younger abstention.

No testimony nor exhibits were entered into evidence. This motion is ripe for adjudication.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The “purpose of a preliminary injunction is merely to preserve the relative positions of the

parties until a trial on the merits can be held.” Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395

(1981). In light of its “limited purpose,” a preliminary injunction is “customarily granted on the

basis of procedures that are less formal and evidence that is less complete than in a trial on the

merits.” Certified Restoration Dry Cleaning Network, L.L.C. v. Tenke Corp., 511 F.3d 535, 542

(6th Cir. 2007). Accordingly, a party need not prove her case in full at a preliminary injunction

hearing. Id. But see Leary v. Daeschner, 228 F.3d 729, 739 (6th Cir. 2000) (noting that the “proof

required for the plaintiff to obtain a preliminary injunction is much more stringent than the proof

required to survive a summary judgment motion”).

When considering a motion for preliminary injunction, a district court must balance four

factors: (1) whether the movant has a strong likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the

movant would suffer irreparable injury without the injunction; (3) whether issuance of the

injunction would cause substantial harm to others; and (4) whether the public interest would be

served by the issuance of the injunction. Ne. Ohio Coal. for the Homeless v. Husted, 696 F.3d

580, 590–91 (6th Cir. 2012). These four considerations are “factors to be balanced, not

prerequisites that must be met.” Certified Restoration, 511 F.3d at 542. Whether the combination

of the factors weighs in favor of issuing injunctive relief in a particular case is left to the discretion

of the district court. See Leary, 228 F.3d at 739.

Yet, “[w]hen faced with a threshold question of whether to apply the Younger abstention

doctrine, a court must first address the Younger issue prior to engaging in any analysis on the

merits of the case.” Kalniz v. Ohio State Dental Bd., 699 F. Supp. 2d 966, 970 (S.D. Ohio 2010)

(Marbley, J.) (citing Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 6, n. 4 (2005) and Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better

Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 100, n.3 (1998)); see also Lighthouse Cmty. Church of God v. City of

Southfield, 382 F. Supp. 2d 937, 939 (E.D. Mich. 2005); Doe v. Lee, No. 3:20-CV-00610, 2020

WL 4926607, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 21, 2020). Although “federal courts are not required to

abstain once they have undertaken “proceedings of substance on the merits,” this conclusion is not

supported when federal court proceedings have not progressed passed the “embryonic stage.” See

Cremeans v. Taczak, No. 2:19-CV-2703, 2019 WL 5420256, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 23, 2019)

(Marbley, J.) (internal quotations omitted).

III. LAW & ANALYSIS

Abstention is a judicially created doctrine that precludes federal courts from deciding some

matters before them, even if other jurisdictional and justiciability requirements are met. Indeed,

abstention doctrines exist “to promote harmony between the state and federal courts” and to reflect

the “belief that the state courts should be left to decide matters of unique importance to them.”

Summit Cty. Crisis Pregnancy Ctr., Inc. v. Fisher, 830 F. Supp. 1029, 1032 (N.D. Ohio 1993).

One variety of abstention doctrine, Younger, “cautions federal courts against exercising

jurisdiction in cases where they are asked to enjoin pending state proceedings.” Fowler v. Benson,

924 F.3d 247, 255 (6th Cir. 2019) (citing New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of New

Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 364 (1989)).

Specifically, Younger v. Harris held that federal courts may not enjoin pending state court

criminal proceedings if doing so would interfere with an ongoing state criminal prosecution or

detract from “proper respect for state functions.” 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971). Adhering to these

underlying principles, the Supreme Court extended the Younger abstention doctrine to include

certain state civil and administrative proceedings. Middlesex Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar

Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423 (1982); Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., 477

U.S. 619, 627 (1986); see also Squire v. Coughlan, 469 F.3d 551, 555−56 (6th Cir. 2006).

Nonetheless, “Younger abstention is limited to three exceptional categories of cases: (1) parallel,

pending state criminal proceeding[s]; (2) state civil proceedings that are akin to criminal

prosecutions; and (3) state civil proceedings that implicate a State’s interest in enforcing the orders

and judgments of its courts.” Mall v. Educ. Serv. Ctr. of Cent. Ohio, No. 2:19-CV-4795, 2020 WL

3173149, at *3 (S.D. Ohio June 15, 2020) (quoting Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69,

72–73 (2013) (internal quotations removed)).

Furthermore, “[t]he Supreme Court has recognized that ongoing state administrative

proceedings such as attorney disciplinary proceedings fall into the second exceptional category.”

Id. (citing Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 434–35 (1982)); see also Am. Family Prepaid Legal Corp. v.

Columbus Bar Ass’n, 498 F.3d 328, 335 (6th Cir. 2007) (state attorney disciplinary proceedings).

Accord Kalniz, 699 F. Supp. 2d at 970 (state dental board proceedings); Lundeen v. State Med. Bd.

of Ohio, No. 2:11-CV-1128, 2012 WL 1606654, at *1 (S.D. Ohio May 8, 2012), report and

recommendation adopted, No. 2:11-CV-1128, 2012 WL 2930836 (S.D. Ohio July 18, 2012) (state

medical board proceedings). Moreover, district courts have found that claims arising from state

board of education administrative proceedings concerning licensure similarly “falls into the second

“exceptional” category … such that abstention under Younger may be required.” Mall, 2020 WL

3173149, at *3; see also Durstein v. Alexander, No. 3:19-0029, 2019 WL 6833858, at *10

(S.D.W.V. Dec. 13, 2019). Accordingly, the federal action at issue here falls within the scope of

the Younger abstention doctrine. But before invoking abstention, the Court must consider the

Middlesex factors.

A. Younger Abstention

In determining whether to abstain from interfering in a state proceeding, courts must

employ “a three-factor test laid out in Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar

Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 102 (1982).” Aaron v. O’Connor, 914 F.3d 1010, 1018 (6th Cir. 2019). “If

(1) state proceedings are currently pending; (2) the proceedings involve an important state interest;

and (3) the state proceedings will provide the federal plaintiff with an adequate opportunity to raise

his constitutional claims,” abstention may be invoked. Id. (citing Doe v. Univ. of Kentucky, 860

F.3d 365, 369 (6th Cir. 2017) and Habich v. City of Dearborn, 331 F.3d 524, 530 (6th Cir. 2003));

see also Kalniz, 699 F. Supp. 2d at 970–71 (citing O’Neill v. Coughlan, 511 F.3d 638, 641 (6th

Cir. 2008) (“The Sixth Circuit has held that “[u]nder Younger abstention ... a federal court must

decline to interfere with pending state civil or criminal proceedings when important state interests

are involved.”).

AGO defendants contend that the district court must abstain from hearing Plaintiff’s claims

under the Younger abstention doctrine. (ECF No. 18 at 1). Because Plaintiff’s three claims are all

inextricably intertwined with a state administrative proceeding—the state board of education’s

determination of whether to impair or revoke Plaintiff’s teaching license, even absent argument on

this issue, all defendants would profit from the application of Younger. (See ECF Nos. 17, 18).

Although Plaintiff did not address this issue in his Motion for Preliminary Injunction, this Court

ordered Plaintiff to do so in his Reply brief (ECF No. 25). (See ECF No. 22). This Court will

consider each factor in succession.

1. Ongoing Judicial Proceeding

First, AGO defendants argue that there is an ongoing proceeding. (ECF No. 18 at 6). They

maintain that ODE’s proceedings—those that will ultimately render a decision about Plaintiff’s

teaching license—constitutes an ongoing proceeding under Younger. (Id.). For this proposition,

they cite no authority. (See id.). Although ODE Defendants do not cast this argument as one

supporting Younger, they do note that additional steps are pending in the administrative process.

(ECF No. 17 at 7). For example, after a report and recommendation is issued by the hearing

officer, along with any timely objections made by Plaintiff, “[t]he matter will then be submitted

for decision by the State Board of Education.” (Id.). Moreover, once a final order is issued by the

State Board of Education, ODE argues, Plaintiff may appeal that “decision to an Ohio common

pleas court.” (Id.) (citing Ohio Rev. Code §§ 119.12, 3319.31(B)).

Plaintiff rejoins by arguing that the proceedings are not within Younger, and even if they

were, the administrative proceedings are not ongoing. (See ECF No. 25 at 2, 7). To support his

first point, Plaintiff simply describes the underlying factual situation in Younger which involved a

state criminal proceeding. (Id. at 2). His argument here is simple: Younger involved a criminal

proceeding and the underlying state proceeding is not criminal; thus, the doctrine should not apply.

(Id.). For his second point, he cites no authority, but asserts that the “referee in re Watkins with

ODE has already recommended Watkins permanent denial of license.” (Id. at 7).

Despite Plaintiff’s contention that Younger does not apply because a state criminal

proceeding is not at issue, the application of Younger has long been expanded to include state

administrative matters other than criminal proceedings. See Middlesex County Ethics Committee

v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423 (1982).

Further, under Youssef v. Schuette, this prong is satisfied. No. 19-1225, 2019 WL

11753787, at *1 (6th Cir. Sept. 17, 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 617 (2019). There, a pro se

litigant sought “an injunction requiring the [the Board of Medicine] to reinstate his medical

license.” Id. He too asserted a §1983 claim. After he applied for reinstatement, attended a hearing

on the matter, but before the agency rendered a final decision, Youseff filed a complaint in federal

court. The Sixth Circuit found that the underlying state proceedings were ongoing for purposes of

Younger even though the Board rendered a decision just months after he filed his federal suit. Id.

at *2. (“First, proceedings were ongoing …. Before [the Board’s] decision, Youssef filed this suit

on November 11, 2018—in other words, while his state license reinstatement proceedings were

ongoing.”)

Similarly, here, Plaintiff has applied for renewal of his teaching license, and attended a

hearing on the matter; yet, the state Board of Education has not rendered a final decision. (ECF

Nos. 1, 7). Even if what Plaintiff asserts is true—that a hearing officer issued a report and

recommendation supporting permanent denial of Plaintiff’s license—the Board of Education’s

administrative process is not finished. Indeed, the plain language of the statute governing such

proceedings provides that “[n]o such recommendation shall be final until confirmed and approved

by the agency as indicated by the order entered on its record of proceedings.” Ohio Rev. Code §

119.09. Accordingly, “[t]he recommendation of the referee or examiner may be approved,

modified, or disapproved by the agency.” Ohio Rev. Code. § 119.09. Importantly, the agency

referred to in the excerpted statutory text is the Ohio Department of Education acting via the State

Board of Education, as elucidated by state regulations implementing the state statute. See Ohio

Admin. Code §§ 3301-73-03, 3301-73-20 (“State board under this chapter means the Ohio state

board of education.”); (“The state board may decide to accept, reject, or modify the report and

recommendation or remand the matter to the hearing officer. The state board shall memorialize the

decision on the report and recommendation through a written resolution and/or order.”). Absent

such final action by the agency, the matter is ongoing. Moreover, Plaintiff—just like the Plaintiff

in Youseff—filed a complaint in the intervening time. (See ECF No. 1). Thus, the relevant state

proceedings are ongoing for the purposes of Younger and the first prong is satisfied.

2. Important State Interest

To invoke Younger abstention, the state proceeding must “involve an important state

interest.” Aaron, 914 F.3d at 1018. Here, AGO Defendants, relying on Freshwater v. Mount

Vernon City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., No. 2:11-CV-190, 2011 WL 1303322, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Apr.

5, 2011), argue that deciding who is allowed to teach in Ohio’s schools is an important state

interest. (ECF No. 18 at 6). Put differently, such regulation involves the determination of fitness

to teach. (See id.). Plaintiff fails to respond to this point altogether. (See ECF No. 25).

As cited by AGO Defendants, Courts have found that such regulation involves an important

state interest. See Mall, 2020 WL 3173149, at *4; Durstein, 2019 WL 6833858, at *11. Thus, this

prong is satisfied.

3. Adequate Opportunity to Raise Constitutional Challenge

Finally, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that he lacks an adequate opportunity to raise

constitutional challenges. Plaintiff asserts that because he cannot raise a constitutional challenge

in the state board of education’s administrative proceeding, he is deprived of an adequate

opportunity to raise such challenges. (See ECF No. 25 at 4). AGO Defendants, relying on two

Ohio state cases, argue that Plaintiff will have a sufficient opportunity to raise constitutional

challenges in the state process because he can make those arguments upon judicial review of a

final order. (ECF No. 18 at 7) (citing Pivonka v. Corcoran, 162 Ohio St.3d 326, ¶ 24, 2020-Ohio-

3476, 165 N.E.3d 1098 (Ohio 2020) and State ex rel. Kingsley v. State Emp. Rels. Bd., 130 Ohio

St.3d 333, ¶ 18, 2011-Ohio-5519, 958 N.E.2d 169 (Ohio 2011). Thus, AGO Defendants maintain,

Plaintiff’s contentions about his inability to raise constitutional challenges within the

administrative proceeding does not constitute an absence of an adequate opportunity for purposes

of Younger. (ECF No. 18 at 7).

Although Plaintiff is correct that hearing officers may not decide constitutional questions,

“Ohio law allows him the opportunity to appeal that decision to the state courts.” Mall, 2020 WL

3173149, at *4 (citing Ohio Rev. Code §119.12).1 Moreover, this is all that the third prong under

Younger requires. In Watts v. Burkhart, the Sixth Circuit held that plaintiffs have an adequate

opportunity to raise a constitutional challenge provided they are able to do so “at some point in the

state proceedings,” including upon appeal of an order issued by a state administrative agency. See

Watts v. Burkhart, 854 F.2d 839, 848 (6th Cir. 1988) (citing Ohio Civil Rights Commission v.

Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., 477 U.S. 619 (1986) (“it is sufficient ... that constitutional claims

1 Specifically, Ohio Rev. Code §119.12 provides that “any party adversely affected by any order of an agency issued

pursuant to an adjudication … denying the … renewal … or revoking or suspending a license … may appeal … to

the court of common pleas.” Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 119.12.

may be raised in state court judicial review of the administrative proceeding.”). Accordingly, the

third prong is met. Thus, Younger abstention presumptively applies.

4. Exceptions to Younger Abstention Doctrine

Having determined that the three requirements for Younger abstention are met in this case,

the Court next must determine whether any of the exceptions to Younger applies. The Supreme

Court recognizes exceptions to the Younger abstention doctrine under three circumstances: “(1)

where the state proceeding is motivated by a desire to harass or is conducted in bad faith; (2) where

[a] challenged statute is flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions;

and (3) where there is an extraordinarily pressing need for immediate federal equitable relief.”

Schwab v. Kent Cty. Parole Dir., No. 1:20-CV-669, 2020 WL 5087881, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Aug.

28, 2020) (quoting Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 611 (1975); Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S.

415, 424 (1979); and Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 125 (1975)) (internal quotations and

citations omitted). “The exceptions to Younger have generally been interpreted narrowly by the

Supreme Court and the Sixth Circuit.” Kalniz, 699 F. Supp. 2d at 973 (citing Gorenc v. City of

Westland, 72 F. App’x 336, 338−39 (6th Cir. 2003)).

Although not clearly, Plaintiff appears to argue in his Reply that the exceptions to Younger

apply. In support, Plaintiff alleges that the state proceeding is the product of bad faith and

harassment by Defendants. (ECF No. 25 at 5–7). Beginning with bad faith, Plaintiff offers three

examples. (Id. at 5–6). First, he argues that his initial termination from the Columbus City

Schools—events that are not directly at issue in this litigation—was motivated by what he calls

“hidden retaliation” for his reporting of a building violation (i.e., he argues his classroom was

improperly on the second floor). (Id.). Next, he asserts that the Principal of his school forged a

document, enabling a pretextual reason for Plaintiff’s termination. (Id. at 6). Finally, Plaintiff

attempts to recast his statute of limitations argument—that the state proceedings regarding his

license were initiated too late—as additional evidence of bad faith. (Id.).

Additionally, Plaintiff argues that he is the victim of what he calls “Dombrowski

harassment.” (Id.). As a threshold matter, it is not clear what Plaintiff means when he asserts this

argument regarding Dombrowski. (See id.). That case involved a civil action by an organization

that sought to foster the civil rights for African Americans in Louisiana against “the Governor,

police and law enforcement officers, and the Chairman of the Legislative Joint Committee on Un-

American Activities in Louisiana.” Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 482 (1965). The

organization sought declaratory relief and an injunction “from prosecuting or threatening to

prosecute appellants for alleged violations of the Louisiana Subversive Activities and Communist

Control Law and the Communist Propaganda Control Law.” Id.

To be clear, it is difficult for the underlying conduct complained of in Dombrowski to be

more different than what Mr. Watkins alleges he experienced here. Indeed, in Dombrowski,

challengers were subjected to the following:

At gunpoint their homes and offices were raided and ransacked by

police officers and trustees from the House of Detention acting

under the direct supervision of the staff director and the counsel for

the State Un-American Activities Committee. The home and office

of the director of Southern Conference Educational Fund were also

raided. Among the dangerous articles removed was Thoreau's

Journal. A truckload of files, membership lists, subscription lists to

SCEF’s newspaper, correspondence, and records were removed

from SCEF’s office, destroying its capacity to function. At the time

of the arrests, Mr. Pfister, Chairman of the Committee, announced

to the press that the raids and arrest resulted from ‘racial agitation’.

Id. at 488 n.4 (1965). Thus, Plaintiff is essentially asserting that he is experiencing retaliation from

the State—much like the challengers in Dombrowski—for similarly discharging his duties as a

teacher: apparently to safeguard the rights of his students.

As a threshold matter, it is extremely unlikely that the Court would find, under this case’s

facts that any of the exceptions apply here. First, neither the Supreme Court nor the Sixth Circuit

“has ever authorized federal intervention under the bad faith or harassment exception.” O’Brien v.

Herold, No. 2:20-CV-02406, 2021 WL 364255, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 3, 2021) (Marbley, J.) (citing

Tindall v. Wayne Cty. Friend of the Court, 269 F.3d 533, 539 (6th Cir. 2001) and Kalniz, 699 F.

Supp. 2d at 973). Moreover, Plaintiff’s shocking comparison of his situation to that of civil rights

activists in Dombrowski does little to disturb this conclusion. While Plaintiff does not appear to

address the second and third exceptions to Younger, a brief review of those standards bolsters the

unlikelihood that they would apply.

With respect to “the flagrant unconstitutionality exception, a statute might be flagrantly

and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions in every clause, sentence and

paragraph, and in whatever manner and against whomever an effort might be made to apply it.”

Doe v. Univ. of Kentucky, 860 F.3d 365, 371 (6th Cir. 2017). Thus, demonstrating “such flagrant

unconstitutionality is a high bar” that requires the challenged policy to be facially unconstitutional

“as well as in application.” Id. Even absent argument, it is highly unlikely that Plaintiff can make

this showing regarding the state board of education’s administrative hearing procedures.

Finally, for the third exception to attach Plaintiff again faces an exceedingly demanding

task: he must show “such circumstances … [that are] ‘extraordinary’ in the sense of creating an

extraordinarily pressing need for immediate federal equitable relief, not merely in the sense of

presenting a highly unusual factual situation.” Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 433 (1979) (quoting

Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117 (1975)). In Sims, the district court found that “[t]he denial of

custody of the [appellees’] children pending any hearing regardless of the result of the hearing, is

in itself sufficient to prevent the application of Younger.” Sims v. State Dep’t of Pub. Welfare of

State of Tex., 438 F. Supp. 1179, 1187 (S.D. Tex. 1977), rev’d sub nom. Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S.

415 (1979). Yet even under these circumstances—where parents sought an injunction to reinstate

custody of their children (as opposed to a teaching license), the Supreme Court declined to invoke

this exception. Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 435 (1979).

Here, Plaintiff’s license has not yet been revoked. Indeed, ODE Defendants have argued

that under Ohio law, such a posture would technically allow the teacher to continue teaching during

the pendency of the proceedings. (ECF No. 17 at 5) (“The last paragraph of that statute allows

Watkins to continue to work on the license at issue until the ODE proceedings have resolved.”).

Thus, Plaintiff, at this time, cannot demonstrate that he has an “extraordinarily pressing need for

immediate federal equitable relief” under the current factual record. Taken together, no exception

disturbs the conclusion that Younger abstention applies.

B. Dismissal

Since Younger abstention is appropriate, the Court finally must determine the proper

procedural means of abstaining. The Sixth Circuit has instructed district courts to examine the

type of relief sought by the plaintiff to decide whether to dismiss or stay a case under Younger

abstention:

[T]he United States Supreme Court has held that “[u]nder our precedents, federal

courts have the power to dismiss or remand cases based on abstention principles

only where the relief being sought is equitable or otherwise discretionary.”....

Whether the plaintiffs seek legal versus an equitable remedy controls how the

district court disposes of the case after holding that the Younger doctrine applies to

it. If the plaintiffs seek equitable relief, such as an injunction, then the district court

may exercise its discretion and decide whether to dismiss the case, and we would

then review its decision for abuse of discretion. But where ... the plaintiffs seek

purely legal relief, in the form of damages, Quackenbush prevents the district court

from even exercising its discretion and deciding to dismiss the case.”

Nimer v. Litchfield Twp. Bd. of Trs., 707 F.3d 699, 702 (6th Cir. 2013) (internal citations omitted).

Further, when a plaintiff seeks both equitable and legal relief, many courts in the Sixth Circuit stay

the entire case rather than treat each form of requested relief differently. See, e.g., Jordan v. Union

Twp. Bd. of Trustees, No. 1:18-CV-53, 2019 WL 5576499, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 29, 2019) (staying

case when the plaintiff sought both equitable and legal relief); Huth v. Hubble, No. 5:14-cv-1215,

2015 WL 966307, at *10 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 4, 2015) (same); Schwab v. Kent Cty. Parole Dir., No.

1:20-CV-669, 2020 WL 5087881, at *4 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 28, 2020) (same).

Here, Plaintiff seeks both equitable relief (an injunction) and legal relief (damages) in this

action. (ECF No. 1). As a result, the Court STAYS the case pending resolution of the state

administrative proceedings in their entirety.

IV. CONCLUSION

Because the Court finds Younger abstention proper, the Court STAYS the current action.

Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction is DENIED (ECF No. 16). Moreover,

the Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 26, 27), are held in ABEYANCE until after the

State Proceeding is resolved. The parties are directed to file a joint status report at the conclusion

of the State Action apprising the Court whether any issues remain for adjudication here or whether

dismissal is appropriate. The parties should attach a copy of the final judgment and any dispositive

orders from the State Action as exhibits to the joint status report.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

—_—

Ls =e

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

DATED: March 7, 2022

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