Lane v. Warden, Noble Correctional Institution

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

NICHOLAS LANE, :

Plaintiff, : Case No. 2:20-cv-5492

v. : Chief Judge Algenon L. Marbley

WARDEN, NOBLE CORRECTIONAL : Magistrate Judge Kimberly A. Jolson

INSTITUTION, ef al, :

Defendants. :

AMENDED OPINION & ORDER

The following fully replaces the Court’s prior Opinion of September 3, 2021 (ECF

No. 7).!

This case is before the Court on the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation

(ECF No. 3) and Plaintiff's Objections thereto (ECF No. 11). For the following reasons, the

Court OVERRULES Plaintiff's Objections and AFFIRMS the Report and Recommendation.

Given this disposition, Plaintiff's Motion to Appoint Counsel (ECF No. 12) is MOOT.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, a pro se prisoner, brought this action against the Warden of the Noble

Correctional Institution, maintenance supervisor Warner, and inmate John Doe (together,

“Defendants”) for “wholly inadequate medical care, and Defendants’ deliberate indifference and

unnecessary infliction of pain, following almost being run over by a tractor.” (ECF No. 2).

' The prior Opinion had accepted the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation for lack of objection. (ECF

No. 7). Plaintiff did file timely objections, but they were not considered by the Court due to a docketing error. The

Court therefore granted Plaintiff's motion to alter or amend the judgment and wrote that an amended order would

issue following consideration of Plaintiff's objections. (ECF No. 10).

The Magistrate Judge derived the following from the attachments to the Complaint. See,

e.g., Spencer v Oldham, 2013 WL 3816620, at *1 (W.D. Tenn. July 22, 2013) (considering

attachments to pro se prisoner’s complaint for purposes of initial screen).

Plaintiff is hard of hearing. (Doc. 1-1 at 7). On June 11, 2020, Plaintiff was

exercising on the track while another inmate mowed the outfield’s lawn. (/d.).

Plaintiff alleges he did not hear the tractor “directly at full bore” behind him, and

he had to jump out of the way at the last second. (/d.). Plaintiff submitted an

internal grievance that day, asking the institutional officers to review camera

footage and urging them to do something to ensure the safety of inmates

exercising in the yard. The following day, Plaintiff received a note that video

footage revealed that the tractors were already in the area when Plaintiff arrived at

the track. (/d.). Consequently, Plaintiff should have been aware of his

surroundings. (/d.). Plaintiff responded that, while he was aware of tractors in the

outfield, he did not see them on the track until one drove up behind him. (/d.). He

also suggested that the tractors should have an airhorn or other device to warn

pedestrians. (/d.).

On June 17, 2020, Plaintiff received notice that, upon consultation with Defendant

Maintenance Supervisor Warner, all tractor operators received safety training.

(/d.). Notably, the inmate who operated the tractor on the day in question said that

an inmate had repeatedly stepped in front of the tractors, forcing the operators to

redirect the tractors to avoid hitting him. (/d.).

Plaintiff expressed his disagreement with these conclusions. (See id. at 8).

Specifically, he questioned why the maintenance boss, who was sitting in a golf

cart twenty yards behind the tractor operator, did not clear the path. Plaintiff

indicated that he had spoken to his mental health counselor about this incident,

noting that, as 40% Gulf War Veteran being treated for PTSD,” this incident

did “not help” his recovery. (/d.).

(ECF No. 3 at 3-4).

The Magistrate Judge first granted Plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma

pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and (2). (ECF No. 3 at 1-2). The Magistrate Judge

then recommended the Plaintiff's Complaint be dismissed because: (1) Plaintiff could not

proceed against inmate John Doe, as he is a private party (/d. at 5); (2) Plaintiff failed to allege

facts showing that Defendant Warner or the Warden were personally involved in the alleged

constitutional violation (/d. at 56); and (3) Plaintiff failed to allege facts satisfying the objective

and subjective components to an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim (/d. at 6-8). In

short, the Magistrate Judge concluded that Plaintiff had failed to identify any cognizable claims

upon which relief could be granted.

Plaintiff timely filed his objections to the Report and Recommendation, claiming this

court “would abuse its discretion by dismissing plaintiff's Eighth Amendment deliberate

indifference to medical needs complaint before it had evidence that plaintiff's psychiatric needs

were assessed in light of his mental illness.” (ECF No. 11 at 1 (emphasis removed)). Dismissing

the Complaint before receiving medical evidence, Plaintiff states, would require the Court “to

play two roles: one as a doctor, and one as a judge.” (/d.). Plaintiff also contends that “a jury

might conclude that his alleged traumatic psychological damage was not evaluated or treated by

a prison psychiatrist despite the prison having knowledge of his mental illnesses, his alleged

traumatic experience, and that ongoing treatment for his mental illness is required after his

release from prison.” (/d. at 3-4). For these reasons, Plaintiff asks that “this Court grant

Plaintiff's Complaint and allow him to proceed.” (/d. at 1 (emphasis removed)).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When proceeding in forma pauperis, a court is permitted to dismiss any portion of a

complaint that “‘(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). While detailed factual allegations are not necessary at the pleading

stage, mere “labels and conclusions” are insufficient to state a proper claim. Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007). Pro se complaints are to be construed liberally, but “basic

pleading essentials” still are required. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989). Thus,

to survive screening, a complaint must contain sufficient facts which, if accepted as true, would

plausibly state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

I. ANALYSIS

Here, Plaintiffs Complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to support an Eighth

Amendment claim against the three Defendants. To be clear, the Court is not passing medical

judgment Plaintiff's diagnosed conditions, nor is it minimizing the mental health setback he

alleges from the tractor incident. It is a different question—a purely legal one—whether Plaintiff

may recover for the alleged harm, against these Defendants. The answer to that question is no.

To maintain an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim, a plaintiff must

establish “‘a subjective component that demands a showing that the defendant acted with a

sufficiently culpable state of mind, i.e., deliberate indifference.” Williams v. Hodge, 2009 WL

47141, at *4 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 7, 2009) (citing Farmer v Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994)). Plaintiff

lacks sufficient factual and non-conclusory allegations as to how his situation might meet that

standard. He does not allege, for example, that any Defendant intentionally denied treatment for

known medical needs. On the contrary, Plaintiff does seem to be receiving care for his mental

health. See ECF No. 2 at 8 (“I’ve also spoken to my mental health counselor, Ms. Anderson

(RN), about this incident . . .”). Where care is being rendered, “federal courts are generally

reluctant to second guess medical judgments,” unless the care received was “so woefully

inadequate as to amount to no treatment at all.” Alspaugh v. McConnell, 643 F.3d 162, 169 (6th

Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff does not allege any deficiency in the

counseling he is receiving, so his Complaint does not clear this hurdle. As such, Plaintiff fails to

demonstrate how his treatment by Defendants rises to the level of deliberate indifference.

Plaintiff also has sued Defendants from whom he cannot recover. Neither the Warden nor

the maintenance supervisor was personally involved in the alleged constitutional violation, which

precludes liability under Section 1983. See, e.g., Green v. Barber, 310 F.3d 889, 899 (6th Cir.

2002) (supervisory liability “does not attach when it is premised on a mere failure to act”; rather,

defendant “must have played an active role in the alleged violations”). The only party personally

involved was inmate John Doe; but as a private party, he did not act under color of law and

therefore is outside the scope of Section 1983. See, e.g., Weser v. Goodson, 965 F.3d 507, 515-

16 (6th Cir. 2020) (“[A]s a general rule, § 1983 does not reach the conduct of private parties

acting in their individual capacities.”). This is an independent reason to dismiss the Complaint,

and it does not depend at all on any medical evidence Plaintiff might introduce, nor on how a

jury might evaluate that evidence.

IV. CONCLUSION

In summary, Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim is unviable as a matter of law. Because

his Complaint has failed to plead a cognizable claim, Plaintiff's Objections (ECF No. 11) are

OVERRULED, and the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 3) is

AFFIRMED. Plaintiff's Motion to Appoint Counsel (ECF No. 12) is DENIED AS MOOT.

This case is hereby DISMISSED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Le □□

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

DATED: January /f, 2022