The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON
ROBERT B.,
Plaintiff, Case No. 3:17-cv-315
vs.
COMMISSIONER OF THE SOCIAL District Judge Michael J. Newman
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant.
ORDER AND ENTRY: (1) GRANTING THE UNOPPOSED MOTION BY PLAINTIFF’S
COUNSEL FOR AN ATTORNEY’S FEE AWARD UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) (DOC. NO.
22); (2) AWARDING PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL $5,950.00 IN FEES; AND (3)
DIRECTING COUNSEL TO REFUND TO PLAINTIFF, WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS,
THE $3,255.13 EAJA FEE PREVIOUSLY AWARDED TO COUNSEL
On September 23, 2019, the Court reversed the ALJ’s non-disability finding and remanded
this case to the Commissioner under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for an immediate award of benefits. Doc.
No. 18. Thereafter, Plaintiff's counsel sought, and was awarded in this Court, attorney’s fees in
the amount of $3,255.13 under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d).
Doc. Nos. 20, 21. Plaintiffs counsel now moves for an award of attorney’s fees in the amount of
$5,950.00 under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). Doc. No. 22. The Commissioner filed a response, indicating
that the Social Security Administration does not oppose Plaintiff's motion. Doc. No. 23.
In Social Security cases, the Court is authorized to award attorney’s fees following the
successful prosecution of a Social Security disability appeal. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 406(b)(1),
1383(d)(2). However, such fees may not exceed 25% of the past-due benefits the claimant receives
as a result of the appeal. /d. Furthermore, the attorney must show, and the Court must
affirmatively find, that a contingency fee sought, even one within the 25% cap, is reasonable for
the services rendered. Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 807 (2002).
The Social Security Act “does not displace contingen[cy]-fee agreements,” but rather □□□□□□
for court review of such arrangements as an independent check, to assure that they yield reasonable
results in particular cases.” Jd. A 25% contingency fee agreement “should be given the weight
ordinarily accorded a rebuttable presumption.” Rodriquez v. Brown, 865 F.2d 739, 746 (6th Cir.
1989). A reduction of a contingency fee award may be appropriate when counsel acts improperly
or provides ineffective assistance, or when “counsel would otherwise enjoy a windfall because of
either an inordinately large benefit award or from minimal effort expended.” /d. Such an award
is not improper merely because it results in an above-average hourly rate. Royzer v. Sec’y of Health
& Human Servs., 900 F.2d 981, 981-82 (6th Cir. 1990).
As the Sixth Circuit explained:
It is not at all unusual for contingent fees to translate into large hourly rates
if the rate is computed as the trial judge has computed it here [dividing the
hours worked into the amount of the requested fee]. In assessing the
reasonableness of a contingent fee award, we cannot ignore the fact that the
attorney will not prevail every time. The hourly rate in the next contingent
fee case will be zero, unless benefits are awarded. Contingent fees generally
overcompensate in some cases and undercompensate in others. It is the
nature of the beast.
Id. “A hypothetical hourly rate that is less than twice the standard rate is per se reasonable, and a
hypothetical hourly rate that is equal to or greater than twice the standard rate may well be
reasonable.” Hayes v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 923 F.2d 418, 422 (6th Cir. 1990).
Plaintiff's counsel worked a total of seventeen hours on this case. Doc. 22-4 at PageID
1426. This results in a hypothetical hourly rate of $350.00 ($5,950.00 + 17), which, in light of the
skills and experience of counsel, is less than twice the standard rate. See Finch v. Comm'r of Soc.
Sec. Admin., No. 3:16-cv-241, 2019 WL 6167087, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 20, 2019) (finding “the
standard hourly rate approaches $800.00 per hour” for counsel who has, like the counsel in this
case, more than 20 years of experience representing Social Security clients). Accordingly, the
Court finds -- without dispute and based upon the materials submitted in support of counsel’s
motion -- the requested fee and resulting hypothetical hourly rate are reasonable and not a windfall.
Based upon the foregoing: (1) counsel’s unopposed motion for a § 406(b) fee award (Doc.
No. 22) is GRANTED; (2) Plaintiffs counsel is AWARDED the requested sum of $5,950.00 in
attorney’s fees; (3) Plaintiffs counsel is ORDERED to reimburse to Plaintiff, within
FOURTEEN (14) DAYS, the EAJA fee previously awarded to counsel; and (4) as no further
matters remain pending for review, this case remains TERMINATED upon the docket.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
January 13, 2022 /s Michael J. Newman
Hon. Michael J. Newman
United States District Judge