The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
GERALD D. FIELDS,
Petitioner, : Case No. 2:21-cv-1877
- vs - District Judge Sarah D. Morrison
Magistrate Judge Michael R. Merz
JAY FORSHEY, Warden,
Noble Correctional Institution,
:
Respondent.
OPINION AND ORDER
This habeas corpus case is before the Court on Petitioner’s Objections (ECF
No. 23) to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendations (ECF No. 22)
recommending denial of Petitioner’s Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment (ECF
No. 21). A litigant who objects to a Magistrate Judge’s report is entitled to de novo
consideration by the District Judge of any substantial objection made to the report.
The Court has conducted that de novo review and includes her conclusions in this
Order.
Fields first objects to what he calls the Magistrate Judge’s “meddling” and asks
that the Report be stricken (Objections, ECF No. 23, PageID 902, relying on Bannister
v. Davis, 140 S. Ct. 1698 (2020). Fields argues:
In Banister, the High Court reasoned that a timely-filed motion
suspends the finality of the original judgment, which, in turns [sic],
renders it a matter solely for the judgment's creator - a judge. In habeas
relief, Rule 59(e) motions are special pleadings directed at a special
proceedings, and not of the species generalized by thee [sic] Magistrate.
Id. Consequently, it should be stricken.
(Objections, ECF No. 23, PageID 902).
In Bannister the Supreme Court held a motion to amend a judgment, brought
under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e), was proper in habeas corpus cases under the rules
applicable to such motions in all civil cases. In particular it held Rule 59(e) motions
are not “second or successive” habeas petitions requiring prior approval by the circuit
court under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b).
Justice Kagan’s opinion says nothing about the use of Magistrate Judges in
recommending decisions on Rule 59(e) motions. In general the Magistrates’ Act
distinguishes between “non-dispositive” matters which Magistrate Judges can decide
in the first instance, subject to appeal, and “dispositive” matters which require a
report and recommendations if assigned to a Magistrate Judge, but final decision by
an Article III District Judge. Examples of the former are pretrial motions for
discovery, extensions of time, and the like. Dispositive matters, on the other hand,
must be decided by an Article III judge.
However, the Magistrates’ Act expressly permits the reference to a Magistrate
Judge of dispositive matters for “proposed findings of fact and recommendations for
the disposition” of dispositive matters such as motions for injunction, for summary
judgment, to dismiss, or to suppress evidence in a criminal case. 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)(B).
That is what happened here. The Magistrate Judge did not purport to decide
the Rule 59(e) motion and expressly recognized “Because this is a post-judgment
motion, it requires a report and recommendations, rather than a decision, from a
Magistrate Judge to whom the case has been referred.” Rather than “meddling,” the
Magistrate Judge was complying with the General Order of Assignment and
Reference for this Court (General Order Col 14-01) which refers all habeas corpus
proceedings to Magistrate Judges from the date of filing and empowers them to:
conduct of all proceedings that may be conducted in such cases by
Magistrate Judges under 28 U.S.C. § 636. If any such motion is a matter
that a Magistrate Judge may not hear and determine in the first
instance under § 636(b)(l)(A), the Magistrate Judge may file a report and
recommendation on that matter without the need for a specific order of
reference.
Id. Regarding the Rule 59(e) Motion, the Magistrate Judge here proceeded in
accordance with General Order Col 14-01. The request to strike his Report and
Recommendations is denied.
In his Motion to Amend, Fields relied on a purported distinction between
evidence “adduced or presented at trial” and evidence “developed” at trial. The Report
rejected that distinction and found that it was no part of the analysis of sufficiency of
the evidence in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), the governing precedent.
Fields objects that the Supreme Court in Jackson “found that even a modicum of
circumstantial evidence did not support a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.”
(Objections, ECF No. 23, PageID 902). That is not part of the holding in Jackson.
There the Court held that a mere modicum of evidence – defined as some relevant
evidence – would not be enough to satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment. Instead the
Court held
[T]he relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt . . . . This familiar standard gives full play to the responsibility of
the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the
evidence and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate
facts.
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. at 319. The Court did not distinguish between direct
and circumstantial evidence or between physical and testimonial evidence. Instead,
a reviewing court must consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have convicted.
After adoption of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (Pub. L.
No 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214)(the "AEDPA"), a habeas court must defer to the decision
that the evidence was sufficient made by the trier of fact and then by the reviewing
state courts. Brown v. Konteh, 567 F.3d 191, 205 (6th Cir. 2009). In a sufficiency of
the evidence habeas corpus case, deference should be given to the trier-of-fact's
verdict under Jackson v. Virginia and then to the appellate court's consideration of
that verdict, as commanded by AEDPA. Tucker v. Palmer, 541 F.3d 652 (6th Cir.
2008); accord Davis v. Lafler, 658 F.3d 525, 531 (6th Cir. 2011)(en banc); Parker v.
Matthews, 567 U.S. 37, 43 (2012). Notably, “a court may sustain a conviction based
upon nothing more than circumstantial evidence.” Stewart v. Wolfenbarger, 595 F.3d
647, 656 (6th Cir. 2010).
The Court did not commit a manifest error of law in applying the Jackson
standard. Fields’ objection to the contrary is overruled.
In rejecting Fields’ Fourth and Fifth Grounds for Relief, the Court concluded
that failure to appoint new counsel for sentencing after Fields discharged his attorney
was at most harmless error (Opinion, ECF No. 19, PageID 888). Fields objects that
lack of counsel at that stage can never be harmless (Objections, ECF No. 23, PageID
903, citing Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977). Gardner was a capital case
in which the defendant was sentenced to death in part on the basis of confidential
information included in a presentence investigation report which was not disclosed
to counsel. The Court’s opinion was fractured, but the ultimate holding was that a
sentencing judge in a capital case could not rely on information not shared with
defense counsel. The case does not hold that absence of counsel at sentencing can
never be harmless. Fields’ per se argument aside, he has never suggested any harm
he suffered from the absence of counsel at sentencing.
Conclusion
Having considered de novo all of the objections made by Petitioner, the Court
finds they are without merit and are overruled. The Report is adopted and Petitioner
Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) Motion is denied.
_/s/ Sarah D. Morrison_________
Sarah D. Morrison
United States District Judge