“[I]t is to be presumed that a cause lies outside [the Court’s] limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.”
How later courts described this case
- “[I]t is to be presumed that a cause lies outside [the Court’s] limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.”
- applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
OLALEKAN SHERIFF RAJA,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 2:21-cv-5588
Judge Sarah D. Morrison
Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura
ROYAL AIR MAROC,
Defendant.
ORDER and REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, Olalekan Sheriff Raja, an Ohio resident proceeding without the assistance of
counsel, has submitted a request to file a civil action in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 1.) The Court
GRANTS Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis. All judicial officers who render
services in this action shall do so as if the costs had been prepaid. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).
This matter is also before the Court for the initial screen of Plaintiff’s Complaint under
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) to identify cognizable claims and to recommend dismissal of Plaintiff’s
Complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Having performed the initial screen, for the reasons that follow,
it is RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS this action for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) WITHOUT
PREJUDICE to filing the state-law claims in state court.
I.
Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to
“lower judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992).
In doing so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are
assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from
filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490
U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e), which
provides in pertinent part as follows:
(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid,
the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that--
* * *
(B) the action or appeal--
(i) is frivolous or malicious;
(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or . . . .
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii); Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. Thus, § 1915(e) requires sua sponte
dismissal of an action upon the Court’s determination that the action is frivolous or malicious, or
upon determination that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Further, to properly state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must
satisfy the basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a).
See also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Under
Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a) “imposes legal and factual
demands on the authors of complaints.” 16630 Southfield Ltd., P’Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B.,
727 F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013).
Although this pleading standard does not require “‘detailed factual allegations,’ . . . [a]
pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action,’” is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A complaint will not “suffice if it tenders ‘naked
assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
Instead, to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), “a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Facial plausibility is established “when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The plausibility of an inference depends on
a host of considerations, including common sense and the strength of competing explanations for
the defendant’s conduct.” Flagstar Bank , 727 F.3d at 504 (citations omitted). Further, the
Court holds pro se complaints “‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.’” Garrett v. Belmont Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 374 F. App’x 612, 614 (6th Cir. 2010)
(quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). This lenient treatment, however, has
limits; “courts should not have to guess at the nature of the claim asserted.” Frengler v. Gen.
Motors, 482 F. App’x 975, 976–77 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594
(6th Cir. 1989)).
II.
According to Plaintiff’s Complaint, in July 2020, he purchased a flight ticket for $931
from Defendant, Royal Air Maroc (“RAM”), through CheapAir.com, so that he could travel to
Nigeria to attend a friend’s wedding. Plaintiff alleges that RAM cancelled his flight without
consulting him. Although CheapAir.com refunded Plaintiff the agent’s portion of his fees,
Defendant RAM gave him only a $777 flight credit. Although RAM promised in an October
2021 email to refund his money, it has not yet issued a refund. Because RAM did not have
flights to Nigeria that coincided with when Plaintiff wanted to travel, he purchased a ticket on
another airline. Due to travel delays attributable to coronavirus restrictions, Plaintiff ultimately
missed his friend’s wedding. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages.
III.
Plaintiff’s allegations fail to provide a basis for a claim over which this Court has
jurisdiction. “The basic statutory grants of federal court subject-matter jurisdiction are contained
in 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which provides for ‘[f]ederal-question’ jurisdiction, and § 1332, which
provides for ‘[d]iversity of citizenship’ jurisdiction.” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 501
(2006). Federal-question jurisdiction is invoked when a plaintiff pleads a claim “arising under”
the federal laws or the United States Constitution. Id. (citation omitted). For a federal court to
have diversity jurisdiction pursuant to § 1332(a), there must be complete diversity, which means
that each plaintiff must be a citizen of a different state than each defendant, and the amount in
controversy must exceed $75,000. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(1) requires a pleading to contain “a short plain
statement of the grounds for jurisdiction.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, “a plaintiff seeking
diversity jurisdiction [must] set forth the factual basis on which that jurisdiction is predicated.”
Farmer v. Fisher, 386 F. App’x 554, 556 (6th Cir. 2010); see also Kokkonen v. Guardian Life
Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) ( “[I]t is to be presumed that a cause lies outside [the
Court’s] limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party
asserting jurisdiction.”). Although this pleading standard does not require “‘detailed factual
allegations,’ a complaint will not “suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further
factual enhancement.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 557 (2007)).
In the instant case, it appears that Plaintiff seeks to have this Court exercise diversity
jurisdiction under § 1332(a) in light of the fact that he brings only state-law breach-of-contract or
fraud claims. Even assuming that the parties are diverse, Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to
support diversity jurisdiction because he has not plausibly alleged that the amount in controversy
exceeds $75,000. Instead, it appears that the dispute centers around whether RAM was required
to issue Plaintiff a refund for $777 rather than a flight credit in this amount. Even assuming
Plaintiff is entitled to recover $777 from RAM, he has failed to plausibly allege facts upon which
the Court could rely to conclude that he is owed an additional $74,223.
In summary, because Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege facts upon which this Court
could rely to conclude that the requisite amount in controversy is satisfied, it is
RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS this action for failure to assert any claim over
which this Court has subject matter jurisdiction WITHOUT PREJUDICE to filing the state-law
claims in state court.
IV.
Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (ECF No. 1) is GRANTED.
For the reasons set forth above, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff’s
Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) WITHOUT PREJUDICE to filing the state-law
claims in state court.
PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS
If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen
(14) days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those
specific proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made, together with
supporting authority for the objection(s). A Judge of this Court shall make a de novo
determination of those portions of the Report or specified proposed findings or recommendations
to which objection is made. Upon proper objections, a Judge of this Court may accept, reject, or
modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive further
evidence or may recommit this matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1).
The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and
Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the District Judge review the Report
and Recommendation de novo, and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of
the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140
(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Chelsey M. Vascura
CHELSEY M. VASCURA
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE