Opinion

Raji v. Royal Air Maroc

Court
District Court, S.D. Ohio
Filed
Dec 8, 2021
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 28.3%

“[I]t is to be presumed that a cause lies outside [the Court’s] limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.”

How later courts described this case

  • “[I]t is to be presumed that a cause lies outside [the Court’s] limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.”
  • applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

OLALEKAN SHERIFF RAJA,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 2:21-cv-5588

Judge Sarah D. Morrison

Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura

ROYAL AIR MAROC,

Defendant.

ORDER and REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, Olalekan Sheriff Raja, an Ohio resident proceeding without the assistance of

counsel, has submitted a request to file a civil action in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 1.) The Court

GRANTS Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis. All judicial officers who render

services in this action shall do so as if the costs had been prepaid. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).

This matter is also before the Court for the initial screen of Plaintiff’s Complaint under

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) to identify cognizable claims and to recommend dismissal of Plaintiff’s

Complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such

relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Having performed the initial screen, for the reasons that follow,

it is RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS this action for failure to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) WITHOUT

PREJUDICE to filing the state-law claims in state court.

I.

Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to

“lower judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992).

In doing so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are

assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from

filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490

U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e), which

provides in pertinent part as follows:

(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid,

the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that--

* * *

(B) the action or appeal--

(i) is frivolous or malicious;

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or . . . .

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii); Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. Thus, § 1915(e) requires sua sponte

dismissal of an action upon the Court’s determination that the action is frivolous or malicious, or

upon determination that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Further, to properly state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must

satisfy the basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a).

See also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Under

Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a) “imposes legal and factual

demands on the authors of complaints.” 16630 Southfield Ltd., P’Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B.,

727 F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013).

Although this pleading standard does not require “‘detailed factual allegations,’ . . . [a]

pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause

of action,’” is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A complaint will not “suffice if it tenders ‘naked

assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

Instead, to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), “a

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on

its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Facial plausibility is established “when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The plausibility of an inference depends on

a host of considerations, including common sense and the strength of competing explanations for

the defendant’s conduct.” Flagstar Bank , 727 F.3d at 504 (citations omitted). Further, the

Court holds pro se complaints “‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by

lawyers.’” Garrett v. Belmont Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 374 F. App’x 612, 614 (6th Cir. 2010)

(quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). This lenient treatment, however, has

limits; “courts should not have to guess at the nature of the claim asserted.” Frengler v. Gen.

Motors, 482 F. App’x 975, 976–77 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594

(6th Cir. 1989)).

II.

According to Plaintiff’s Complaint, in July 2020, he purchased a flight ticket for $931

from Defendant, Royal Air Maroc (“RAM”), through CheapAir.com, so that he could travel to

Nigeria to attend a friend’s wedding. Plaintiff alleges that RAM cancelled his flight without

consulting him. Although CheapAir.com refunded Plaintiff the agent’s portion of his fees,

Defendant RAM gave him only a $777 flight credit. Although RAM promised in an October

2021 email to refund his money, it has not yet issued a refund. Because RAM did not have

flights to Nigeria that coincided with when Plaintiff wanted to travel, he purchased a ticket on

another airline. Due to travel delays attributable to coronavirus restrictions, Plaintiff ultimately

missed his friend’s wedding. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages.

III.

Plaintiff’s allegations fail to provide a basis for a claim over which this Court has

jurisdiction. “The basic statutory grants of federal court subject-matter jurisdiction are contained

in 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which provides for ‘[f]ederal-question’ jurisdiction, and § 1332, which

provides for ‘[d]iversity of citizenship’ jurisdiction.” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 501

(2006). Federal-question jurisdiction is invoked when a plaintiff pleads a claim “arising under”

the federal laws or the United States Constitution. Id. (citation omitted). For a federal court to

have diversity jurisdiction pursuant to § 1332(a), there must be complete diversity, which means

that each plaintiff must be a citizen of a different state than each defendant, and the amount in

controversy must exceed $75,000. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(1) requires a pleading to contain “a short plain

statement of the grounds for jurisdiction.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, “a plaintiff seeking

diversity jurisdiction [must] set forth the factual basis on which that jurisdiction is predicated.”

Farmer v. Fisher, 386 F. App’x 554, 556 (6th Cir. 2010); see also Kokkonen v. Guardian Life

Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) ( “[I]t is to be presumed that a cause lies outside [the

Court’s] limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party

asserting jurisdiction.”). Although this pleading standard does not require “‘detailed factual

allegations,’ a complaint will not “suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further

factual enhancement.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 557 (2007)).

In the instant case, it appears that Plaintiff seeks to have this Court exercise diversity

jurisdiction under § 1332(a) in light of the fact that he brings only state-law breach-of-contract or

fraud claims. Even assuming that the parties are diverse, Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to

support diversity jurisdiction because he has not plausibly alleged that the amount in controversy

exceeds $75,000. Instead, it appears that the dispute centers around whether RAM was required

to issue Plaintiff a refund for $777 rather than a flight credit in this amount. Even assuming

Plaintiff is entitled to recover $777 from RAM, he has failed to plausibly allege facts upon which

the Court could rely to conclude that he is owed an additional $74,223.

In summary, because Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege facts upon which this Court

could rely to conclude that the requisite amount in controversy is satisfied, it is

RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS this action for failure to assert any claim over

which this Court has subject matter jurisdiction WITHOUT PREJUDICE to filing the state-law

claims in state court.

IV.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (ECF No. 1) is GRANTED.

For the reasons set forth above, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff’s

Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) WITHOUT PREJUDICE to filing the state-law

claims in state court.

PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS

If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen

(14) days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those

specific proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made, together with

supporting authority for the objection(s). A Judge of this Court shall make a de novo

determination of those portions of the Report or specified proposed findings or recommendations

to which objection is made. Upon proper objections, a Judge of this Court may accept, reject, or

modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive further

evidence or may recommit this matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1).

The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and

Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the District Judge review the Report

and Recommendation de novo, and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of

the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140

(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Chelsey M. Vascura

CHELSEY M. VASCURA

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.