Opinion

Sherwood Sensing Solutions, LLC v. Henny Penny Corporation

Court
District Court, S.D. Ohio
Filed
Dec 3, 2021
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 28.3%

“Several courts have held that a Rule 41(a)(2) award of fees [when a lawsuit is dismissed with prejudice] is appropriate only when there is independent statutory authority for such an award”

How later courts described this case

  • “Several courts have held that a Rule 41(a)(2) award of fees [when a lawsuit is dismissed with prejudice] is appropriate only when there is independent statutory authority for such an award”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON

SHERWOOD SENSING SOLUTIONS

LLC,

Plaintiff, Case No. 3:19-cv-366

VS.

HENNY PENNY CORPORATION, District Judge Michael J. Newman

Defendant.

ORDER: (1) GRANTING SHERWOOD’S MOTION TO VOLUNTARILY DISMISS ITS

COMPLAINT (DOC. NO. 37); (2) DISMISSING SHERWOOD’S COMPLAINT WITH

PREJUDICE; AND (3) ORDERING THE CLERK TO ENTER JUDGMENT

ACCORDINGLY

This patent infringement case is before the Court on Plaintiff Sherwood Sensing Solutions

LLC’s (“Sherwood’s”) motion to voluntarily dismiss its complaint with prejudice, under Fed. R.

Civ. P. 41(a)(2), contingent on each party bearing their own costs and fees. Doc. No. 37. The

motion is fully briefed and ripe for review. Doc. No. 39.

1.

This dispute arose from Sherwood’s claim that Defendant Henny Penny Corporation

(“Henny Penny”) was infringing on its patent to a novel food fryer. Doc. Nos. 1, 17. The merits

of that claim were resolved by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”) in an /nter Partes

Review (“IPR”) proceeding. Doc. No. 38-2.! Henny Penny prevailed. Jd. at PageID 519.

Sherwood concedes that the PTAB’s order moots the complaint filed herein and moves for

voluntary dismissal of its complaint with prejudice. Doc. No. 37 at PageID 444.

' U.S. District Judge Thomas M. Rose -- to whom this case was previously assigned -- stayed this matter

pending IPR. Doc. No. 24.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2) requires a plaintiff to seek a court order or obtain a stipulation to

voluntarily dismiss a complaint where the opposing party has answered. The Court retains

discretion over whether to grant voluntary dismissal. See, e.g., Grover ex rel. Grover v. Eli Lily,

Co., 33 F.3d 716, 718 (6th Cir. 1994). But it is an abuse of discretion not to dismiss a complaint

when the plaintiff requests it be done with prejudice. See, e.g., Smoot v. Fox, 340 F.2d 301, 303

(6th Cir. 1964); Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. London Music, U.K., 345 F. Supp. 2d 836, 841 (M.D.

Tenn. 2004). So the relevant question here is not whether Sherwood’s complaint should be

dismissed, but how. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2).

A dismissal with prejudice functions as an adjudication on the merits. See, e.g., Pedreira

v. Sunrise Children’s Servs., Inc., 802 F.3d 865, 870 (6th Cir. 2015). The prevailing party is

generally not entitled to attorney’s fees absent a fee shifting statute. See, e.g., Smoot v. Fox, 353

F.2d 830, 833 (6th Cir. 1965); see also Colombrito v. Kelly, 764 F.2d 122, 133 (2d Cir. 1985)

(“Several courts have held that a Rule 41(a)(2) award of fees [when a lawsuit is dismissed with

prejudice] is appropriate only when there is independent statutory authority for such an award”).

Henny Penny has one such provision potentially available: 35 U.S.C. § 285, which allows for

attorney’s fees “in exceptional cases.”

Anticipating Henny Penny will seek attorney’s fees, Sherwood requests a dismissal order

conditioned on each party bearing their own costs and fees. Doc. No. 37. Henny Penny opposes

this, noting that (1) it has not yet moved for a fee award, but (2) were it to, the Court should

conclude this case was “exceptional” under 35 U.S.C. § 285. Doc. No. 38.

The Court finds that the question of Henny Penny’s entitlement to attorney’s fees is not yet

ripe and expresses no opinion on the issue. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2) provides that a motion for an

award of attorney’s fees “must be filed no later than 14 days after the entry of judgment.” S.D.

Ohio Civ. R. 54.2(a) requires an attorney’s fee motion be filed no “later than forty-five days after

the entry of judgment.” Because judgment has not been entered in this case, Henny Penny, at this

time, has no basis to move for a fee award. Indeed, it acknowledges that it has yet to decide to so

move. Doc. No. 38 at PageID 451. Should Henny Penny do so, the Court anticipates addressing

the issues raised by the parties at that time.

Il.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court: (1) GRANTS Sherwood’s motion to voluntarily

dismiss its complaint; (2) DISMISSES Sherwood’s complaint WITH PREJUDICE; and (3)

ORDERS the Clerk to enter judgment accordingly.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: _December 3, 2021 s/Michael J. Newman

Hon. Michael J. Newman

United States District Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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