Schoonover v. Rogers

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

BRENDON SCHOONOVER,

Plaintiff

Case No. 1:18–cv–302

v. JUDGE DOUGLAS R. COLE

SHERIFF K.R. ROGERS, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

This cause is before the Court pursuant to Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment (Doc. 49). The Court held oral argument on that Motion on May 6, 2021.

In this action, Schoonover claims that Defendants are liable for injuries that

Schoonover suffered as a result of a jail-cell assault committed by other inmates. The

question before the Court at the summary judgment stage, though, is whether

Schoonover raises a genuine dispute of material fact that requires jury resolution.

For the reasons discussed more fully below, the Court concludes that he does not.

Thus the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion (Doc. 49).

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This case concerns injuries that Brendon Schoonover suffered while

imprisoned in the Adams County Jail. In April 2016, Schoonover was serving a 90-

day sentence for committing criminal damaging in violation of Ohio Revised Code

§ 2909.06. (Def. Statement of Proposed Undisputed Facts (“SPUF”), Doc. 49-1,

#1337).1 That offense, however, was not Schoonover’s first run-in with the legal

system, a relevant fact for reasons addressed below. (Id.). In 2005, Schoonover had

been convicted of sexual battery in violation of Ohio Revised Code § 2907.03(B). (Id.).

That earlier offense involved a young girl (approximately fifteen years old at the

time), who was residing with Schoonover and his then-wife (the victim’s legal

guardian). (Id.). Schoonover served no jail time for the sexual battery offense, but had

to complete a six-month residential sex-offender treatment program, along with a

five-year term of community control and registration as a sex offender. (Id.). During

that five-year term, Schoonover also was convicted (in 2009) for failure to register as

a sex offender. (Id. at #1338). Four years after that, in 2013, Schoonover was convicted

of failing to notify the Sheriff about a change of address, and he received a year-long

prison sentence on that charge. (Id.). Also in 2013, Plaintiff pled guilty to a theft

offense and received a 15-month prison sentence. (Id.).

When Schoonover arrived at the Adams County Jail on April 4, 2016, Officer

Alexa McClanahan oversaw Schoonover’s intake process. (Id. at #1337). After

Schoonover filled out the requisite paperwork, Officer McClanahan assigned

Schoonover to “the Middle 4 cell” on the Adams County Jail’s second floor. (Id. at

#1338). At the time, the corrections facility staff typically attempted to house sex

offenders in smaller cells, like the “Middle 4 cell,” at least when possible. (Id.; see also

1 Defendants attached a Statement of Proposed Undisputed Facts to their Motion for

Summary Judgment (Doc. 49-1). Plaintiff filed a response (Doc. 57-1) admitting (albeit with

some commentary) to all but three of the proposed facts. Unless otherwise indicated, the

Court’s citations to Defendants’ Statement of Proposed Undisputed Facts only encompass

facts to which Plaintiff admitted.

Pl. Resp. to Def. Proposed Undisputed Facts, Doc. 57-1, #1954). The next day, Adams

County Jail staff relocated Schoonover (along with other inmates) to the Shelby

County Jail. (SPUF, Doc. 49-1, #1338). Schoonover remained at that facility from

April 5, 2016, until May 8, 2016, when he returned to the Adams County Jail. (Id.).

This time corrections officers placed Schoonover in the “End 4” cell, which is another

type of smaller cell that corrections officers use for sex offenders, among other types

of prisoners. (Id.; see also Pl. Resp. to Def. Proposed Undisputed Facts, Doc. 57-1,

#1955). On May 13, 2016, Corrections Officer Kate Arnold reassigned Schoonover

back to the Middle 4 cell in which he previously had resided. Inmate Clinton Waters

also inhabited that cell. (SPUF, Doc. 49-1, #1339). Schoonover and Waters shared the

cell without incident for five days. (Id.).

Then, on May 18, 2016, female inmates housed in a different cell at the Adams

County Jail engaged in a physical altercation. As a result of that skirmish, corrections

staff rearranged the housing assignments for prisoners of both sexes in order to

separate the female inmates involved in the fight. (Id. at #1339). They did so because

jail policy required that inmates involved in a fight be separated and placed in

different cells. (Id.).

In undertaking the rearrangement, jail staff also had to account for

overcrowding. The Adams County Jail has a stated capacity of 38 inmates, but held

over 60 inmates at the time of the incident. (Id. at #1343; Rogers Dep., Doc. 47-24,

#966). Prior to Schoonover’s 2016 incarceration, the County had received reports

about the jail’s overcrowded condition, and the Adams County Sheriff, K.R. Rogers,

had explored and implemented various policy changes to address the longstanding

overcrowding. (Id.). But overcrowding at the Adams County Jail still persisted, at

least as of May 2016.

The Adams County Jail also followed a policy directing corrections personnel

to consider, at least informally, offender characteristics in the re-housing process. To

be clear, the Adams County Jail did not employ a formal classification system, i.e.,

one that sorts inmates by their propensity for violence or the nature of their offenses.

(See Rogers Depo., Doc. 47-24, #957). Although the Jail Administrator, Lieutenant

Micah Poe, had devised a draft classification system, the Adams County Jail never

implemented a formal policy. (See Poe Depo., Doc. 47-22, #815–19). That being said,

corrections officers used a system of informally separating at-risk inmates, such as

sex offenders, from the general prison population when possible. (Id. at #834).

As a result of the altercation on May 18, 2016, jail officials decided to use the

Middle 4 cell to house female prisoners. That meant the residents of the Middle 4 cell,

including Schoonover and Waters, had to be relocated to a different cell. (SPUF, Doc.

49-1, #1339). Eventually, at approximately 9:30 a.m. that day, Defendant Deputy

Corrill moved Schoonover into the Middle 8 cell on the jail’s third floor. (Id.). At

roughly that same time, Corrill reassigned Waters to the Middle 8 cell, as well. (Id.).

As its name suggests, that cell contained eight bunks. (Id.). Due to overcrowding,

however, the Middle 8 cell housed thirteen inmates after the reassignment process

concluded. As a result, Schoonover was not assigned to a bunk, but was provided a

mat to sleep on. (Id. at #1340).

Schoonover’s relocation to the Middle 8 cell seemed to be working at first. For

example, Schoonover received and ate his lunch inside the Middle 8 cell sometime in

the early afternoon that day without incident. (Id.). But, around lunchtime, Steven

Sturgill, another inmate housed in the Middle 8 cell, participated in a telephone call

that dramatically impacted the course of events. During that call he apparently

learned about, or at least discussed, Schoonover’s prior sex offenses. (Id. at #1339).

That is when the trouble began.

After returning to the Middle 8 cell from his telephone call, Sturgill referred to

Schoonover as a “sex offender” and a “child molester.” (Id.). Then someone, perhaps

Sturgill, perhaps Waters, or perhaps another inmate, moved Schoonover’s mat to a

location near the Middle 8 cell’s toilet, which placed the mat outside the view of the

surveillance camera. (Id. at #1340). After that, Sturgill, Waters, and other inmates

physically assaulted Schoonover at various times throughout the day. (Id.). The

perpetrator inmates, including Waters, were later criminally prosecuted for that

abuse. (Id.).

It appears that Waters initiated the violence against Schoonover. Waters

struck his first blow after the corrections officers passed out dinner trays to inmates,

which occurred at or around 4:38 p.m. (Id. at #1341). Sometime after the inmates

finished eating that meal, Waters jumped from a picnic table in the cell onto

Schoonover. (Id.). That attack occurred near the toilet area, outside the view of

surveillance cameras. (Id.). Then Schoonover moved (or his cellmates moved him) to

the shower, where various inmates punched him, fracturing Schoonover’s jaw in the

process. (Id.).

Notably, this was not the first time Waters was involved in violence while

incarcerated at the Adams County Jail, nor was it the first time he assaulted a fellow

inmate with a sex offender history. Waters testified that he had been in at least three

prison fights with sex offender inmates, and that he told Adams County Jail staff

about those incidents. (Waters Depo., Doc. 47-4, #338). Indeed, Waters stated that

just two days before the attack on Schoonover, Waters “hurt [inmate] Michael Sapp

real bad for being a sex offender,” and the corrections officers “knew it.” (Id. at #339).

Even so, Waters and Schoonover had resided together for five days without a hitch

before they were assigned to the Middle 8 cell.

Regarding the attack on Schoonover, Schoonover estimated that he spent

about two hours in the shower and testified that, from that position, he could not tell

whether corrections officers conducted their scheduled observation checks. (SPUF,

Doc. 49-1, #1341; Schoonover Dep., Doc. 47-1, #229). Adams County Jail policy

required its corrections officers to conduct such checks every sixty minutes. (SPUF,

Doc. 49-1, #1343). Defendant Deputy Corrill was on duty that day and had

responsibility for the observation checks. (Id. at #1342).

Another inmate in the Middle 8 cell testified that the inmates attacked

Schoonover in “spurts.” (Mason Depo., Doc. 47-10, #510). When they heard corrections

officers approaching, they would “hide [Schoonover] away” and commanded him not

to alert the guards. (Id.). In short, the inmates did their best to hide their attack on

Schoonover from the Adams County Jail staff.

Instead of alerting guards or other jail staff, Schoonover admits he resigned

himself to “just suffer through” the beating without making “much noise.” (SPUF,

Doc. 49-1, #1341; Schoonover Dep., Doc. 47-1, #232). Even so, Schoonover cites

Waters’ testimony that, at certain points during the attack, Schoonover was

“screaming for his life.” (Pl. Resp. to Def. Proposed Undisputed Facts, Doc. 57-1,

#1955 (citing Waters Dep., Doc. 47-4, #308)). Eventually prison staff removed

Schoonover from the cell around 7:40 p.m. that evening. (SPUF, Doc. 49-1, #1341).

They did so after a prisoner tipped off a corrections officer, Kate Arnold, about the

assault on Schoonover. (Id. at #1341–42).

After Schoonover’s removal from the Middle 8 cell, corrections officers

transferred him to the Adams County Regional Medical Center, and then the

University of Cincinnati Medical Center, to receive treatment. (Id. at #1342). The

University of Cincinnati Medical Center discharged him the next day on May 19,

2016, and Defendant Deputy Kenny Corrill transported Schoonover back to the

Adams County Jail. (Id.).

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In his Complaint, Schoonover asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against

various employees of the Adams County Sheriff’s Office. This suit named Sheriff

Rogers in his individual and official capacities, and the employees of the Sheriff’s

office in their individual capacities only. (Compl., Doc. 1, #2). Schoonover alleges that

Defendants failed to protect him while he was in their custody in the Adams County

Jail, and he also claims that the Sheriff’s policies and practices regarding prison

staffing and inmate classification resulted in his injuries. (Id. at #6). Specifically,

Schoonover claims that Sheriff Rogers adopted a policy and practice of (1) “operating

a jail with a thoroughly deficient classification system that fails to separate inmates

by, among other things, propensity for violence, and assign them to cell locations that

protect inmate safety”; (2) operating an overcrowded jail; (3) employing a “deficient

system of monitoring inmates that would assure their safety, in particular monitoring

wholly inadequate for overcrowded cells”; and (4) understaffing the Adams County

Jail. (Id. at #5). As for the individual corrections officers, Schoonover contends they

were “reckless in their failure to protect Plaintiff Schoonover” because they failed to

prevent or intervene during the inmates’ attack on Schoonover. (Id. at #6). Based on

that, Schoonover asserts that Defendants violated his Due Process Clause rights

under the Fourteenth Amendment. After filing the Complaint, though, Schoonover

voluntarily dismissed all Defendants except Rogers and Corrill. (Doc. 36).

With discovery now closed, the two remaining Defendants have moved for

summary judgment on Schoonover’s § 1983 claim. First, they allege that Schoonover

failed to cite the Eighth Amendment in his Complaint, which means Schoonover

cannot assert an Eighth Amendment claim for the first time in response to

Defendants’ summary judgment motion. (Mot. for Summ. J., Doc. 49, #1328). Next,

Defendants assert that Schoonover cannot identify a dispute of material fact relating

to any Defendant’s individual liability. (Id. at #1329–32). Defendants argue that (1)

Rogers was not present in the Adams County Jail during the attack on Schoonover;

(2) Rogers did not implement policies resulting in a deprivation of Schoonover’s

constitutional rights; (3) no evidence shows that any inmate posed a serious threat to

Schoonover at the time of his assignment to the Middle 8 cell or that Corrill was

aware of such a threat, meaning Corrill did not act with deliberate indifference to

Schoonover’s safety; and (4) Corrill’s shift ended before at least some (if not all) of the

violence, and the inmates hid the attack from the correctional officers, meaning that

Corrill was not reckless in failing to protect Schoonover. (Id.).

As for municipal liability, Defendants argue that Schoonover cannot hold

Adams County liable because none of its employees committed a constitutional

violation. (Id. at #1332). Additionally, Defendants assert that Schoonover cannot

identify a county custom or policy that caused the deprivation of Schoonover’s

constitutional rights. (Id. at #1332–35). In short, Defendants claim that the jail’s

policies regarding overcrowding, prisoner observation, and prisoner classification are

not so deficient as to violate the Eighth Amendment.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The burden is on the moving party to conclusively show

that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Lansing Dairy, Inc. v. Espy, 39 F.3d

1339, 1347 (6th Cir. 1994). Once the movant presents evidence to meet its burden,

the nonmoving party may not rest on its pleadings, but must come forward with

significant probative evidence to support its claim. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Lansing

Dairy, 39 F.3d at 1347.

This Court is not obliged to search the record sua sponte for genuine issues of

material fact. Betkerur v. Aultman Hosp. Ass’n, 78 F.3d 1079, 1087 (6th Cir. 1996);

Guarino v. Brookfield Twp. Trs., 980 F.2d 399, 404–06 (6th Cir. 1992). The burden

falls upon the nonmoving party to “designate specific facts or evidence in dispute.”

Jordan v. Kohl’s Dep’t Stores, Inc., 490 F. App’x 738, 741 (6th Cir. 2012) (quotation

omitted). If the nonmoving party fails to make the necessary showing for an element

upon which it bears the burden of proof, then the moving party is entitled to summary

judgment. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

Granting summary judgment depends upon “whether the evidence presents a

sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided

that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Amway Distribs. Benefits Ass’n v.

Northfield Ins. Co., 323 F.3d 386, 390 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251–52 (1986)). In sum, the nonmoving party, at this stage,

must present some “sufficient disagreement” that would necessitate submission to a

jury. See Moore v. Phillip Morris Cos., Inc., 8 F.3d 335, 340 (6th Cir. 1993) (quoting

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251–52). In making that determination, though, this Court

must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Cox v.

Ky. Dep’t of Transp., 53 F.3d 146, 150 (6th Cir. 1995) (“In arriving at a resolution, the

court must afford all reasonable inferences, and construe the evidence in the light

most favorable to the nonmoving party.”).

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Section 1983 does not create any substantive rights, but rather provides a

vehicle for remedying violations of other rights. More specifically, § 1983 allows a

party to bring “an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress,”

against any “person who, under color of [state law]” deprives the party of any rights

“secured by the Constitution and [federal] laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In other words, to

succeed in a § 1983 action, the plaintiff must show that a defendant violated a right

bestowed on the plaintiff by federal law, and that the defendant did so while acting

“under color of” state law.

A plaintiff can sue a defendant under § 1983 in that defendant’s individual

capacity, official capacity, or both. As the label suggests, an individual-capacity claim

is directed against the person him or herself, and the liability for the conduct extends

only to that person. An official-capacity claim under § 1983, by contrast, is really a

claim against the individual’s employer. Curtis v. Breathitt Cnty. Fiscal Ct., 756 F.

App’x 519, 525 (6th Cir. 2018) (“An official capacity claim filed against a public

employee generally represents another way of pleading an action against the public

entity that agent represents.”) (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985)).

So, for example, if a plaintiff were to sue a county law-enforcement officer in the

officer’s official capacity, that is for all intents and purposes a suit against the county

itself. Graham, 473 U.S. at 166 (“[A]n official-capacity suit is, in all respects other

than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity.”). Here, Schoonover raises three

distinct § 1983 claims: (1) against Corrill in his individual capacity; (2) against Rogers

in his individual capacity; and (3) against Rogers in his official capacity, which is

essentially a municipal liability claim against Adams County. The Court addresses

each of these in turn.

A. Schoonover Has Not Shown A Genuine Dispute Of Material Fact

Regarding His Individual Capacity Claims.

Schoonover attempts to hold Defendants Rogers and Corrill liable in their

individual capacities under § 1983. To survive summary judgment on those claims,

Schoonover “must set forth facts that, when construed favorably to him, establish

(1) the deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States

(2) caused by a person acting under the color of state law.” Phillips v. Roane Cnty.,

534 F.3d 531, 538 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Sigley v. City of Parma Heights, 437 F.3d

527, 533 (6th Cir. 2006)). Neither Rogers nor Corrill dispute that they were acting

under color of state law, given that Defendants were employees of the Adams County

Sheriff’s Office, and thus state actors for the purposes of § 1983. So that means

Schoonover need only show that the Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment

rights.2

“[T]he treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which

he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment.” Helling v.

2 Although Defendants rightfully point out that Schoonover failed to specify that his claims

come under the Eighth Amendment, his complaint makes clear that he seeks relief for

injuries caused by violence from other prisoners. And the Eighth Amendment permits such

relief. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994). Accordingly, the Court construes

Schoonover’s Complaint as seeking relief under the Eighth Amendment.

McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993). In addition to requiring officials to provide

“humane” conditions of confinement, the Eighth Amendment also “imposes duties”

on prison officials, such as requiring them to “take reasonable measures to guarantee

the safety of the inmates.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994) (quoting

Helling, 509 U.S. at 31–32). This includes a duty “to protect prisoners from violence

at the hands of other prisoners.” Id. at 833 (quoting Cortes–Quinones v. Jimenez–

Nettleship, 842 F.2d 556, 558 (1st Cir. 1988)). But not “every injury suffered by one

prisoner at the hands of another” results in constitutional liability for prison officials.

Id. at 834. Instead, liability for such injuries arises only in those instances when

officials are deliberately indifferent to a prisoner’s safety. Id. at 834. Schoonover’s

claim thus turns on whether he can show a genuine dispute of material fact as to

whether prison officials acted with that deliberate indifference.

To establish deliberate indifference, prisoner-plaintiffs must clear two

hurdles—one objective and one subjective. As to the former, the deprivation that the

prisoner alleges “must be, objectively, ‘sufficiently serious.’” Id. (quoting Wilson v.

Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). In other words, the plaintiff must show that, as a

matter of fact, “he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious

harm.” Id.

The second hurdle requires a showing that the prison official acted with “a

‘sufficiently culpable state of mind.’” Id. at 833. (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 302)).

That subjective state of mind occurs when a prison official “knows of and disregards

an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Id. at 837. And where a prisoner-

plaintiff seeks to show such knowledge by inference, the plaintiff must establish that

the prison official is “both … aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn

that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,” and that the prison official “also dr[e]w

the inference.” Id. at 837. Thus, to mount a successful deliberate indifference claim

based on inferred knowledge, “the plaintiff must allege facts which, if true, would

show that the official being sued subjectively perceived facts from which to infer

substantial risk to the prisoner, that he did in fact draw the inference, and that he

then disregarded that risk.” Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 703 (6th Cir. 2001)

(citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837).

Another way of viewing the issue is that deliberate indifference’s subjective

element turns on the prison official’s state of mind during the alleged constitutional

violation. For instance, “[a] prison official is deliberately indifferent when he acts with

criminal recklessness, a state of mind that requires he act with a conscious disregard

[i.e., the subjective element] to a substantial risk [i.e., the objective element] of harm

to the prisoner.” Love v. Taft, 30 F. App’x 336, 338 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Farmer, 511

U.S. at 837). When evaluating the prison official’s subjective mindset, the “standard

is not whether there is something easy that the [defendant], with the benefit of

hindsight, could have done” but instead the Court is to assess the defendant’s “actions

based on the information that was available … at the time.” Burwell v. City of

Lansing, 7 F.4th 456, 466 (6th Cir. 2021) (first quoting Williams v. Mehra, 186 F.3d

685, 692 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc) and then quoting Rouster v. County of Saginaw,

749 F.3d 437, 453 (6th Cir. 2014)). What is more, even when prison officials fail to

remedy “an obvious risk of which they should have known but did not,” that does not

amount to deliberate indifference. Garreston v. City of Madison Heights, 407 F.3d

789, 797 (6th Cir. 2005). Putting that all together, a prison official must act with a

state of mind akin to criminal recklessness in response to a known risk, given the

information available during the incident, in order to exhibit deliberate indifference.3

Importantly, to make the necessary showing on deliberate indifference,

prisoner-plaintiffs must satisfy both the objective and subjective elements. Alspaugh

v. McConnell, 643 F.3d 162, 169 (6th Cir. 2011) (“A deliberate indifference claim has

both objective and subjective components.”). Failure on either front prevents a

prisoner from imposing liability on prison officials for harm the prisoner suffered

while incarcerated.

Schoonover seeks to hold the two Defendants liable for injuries he suffered

during the May 18, 2016, prison attack. He claims that the record provides evidence

showing a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Defendants knew that:

(1) sex offenders are often subjected to violent attacks in jail; (2) Schoonover was an

at-risk sex offender; and (3) Clinton Waters, one of Schoonover’s assailants, had a

history of violence against other inmates, especially sex offenders. (Pl. Resp., Doc. 57,

#1937–42). All of that together, according to Schoonover, shows both (1) that

3 True, there is some question about whether the Supreme Court’s decision in Kingsley v.

Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015), has lowered the bar such that plaintiffs “need only prove

that the officers should have known” about the risk of harm to an inmate when mounting a

deliberate indifference claim. Burwell, 7 F.4th at 465. But, as in the Sixth Circuit’s recent

opinion in Burwell, the Plaintiff did not raise that argument here. See id. at 466. Thus, the

Court declines to consider whether it should depart from the subjective analysis for deliberate

indifference, as articulated in Burwell and other Sixth Circuit cases, when neither party has

raised that issue.

Defendants exposed Schoonover to a substantial risk of serious harm, thereby

satisfying the objective element, and (2) that Defendants knew or should have known

about that risk when they placed Schoonover in the crowded cell with Waters and the

other inmate assailants, and yet consciously chose to disregard it, thereby satisfying

the subjective element.

1. Schoonover Fails To Show A Genuine Dispute Of Material Fact

Over Whether Corrill Acted With Deliberate Indifference.

Let’s start with the subjective prong and Defendant Corrill. Schoonover argues

that Corrill, an on-duty Adams County Jail officer, was aware that Schoonover faced

a substantial risk of serious harm while incarcerated. Specifically, Schoonover asserts

that Corrill knew about Schoonover’s sex offender status and ignored the

accompanying risks when he moved Schoonover to the Middle 8 cell on May 18, 2016.

(Id. at #1941). In support, Schoonover stresses that another corrections officer,

Lieutenant Poe, testified that Corrill knew about Schoonover’s sex offender status.

(Id. at #1940). Schoonover also contends that Corrill knew about Waters’ propensity

for attacking sex offenders, in part because Corrill had responded to a recent incident

where Waters victimized Michael Sapp, a different sex offender inmate, as well as

Waters’ general inclination towards violence against other inmates given Waters’

troubled track record at the Adams County Jail. (Id. at #1941).

Against this backdrop, Schoonover contends that Corrill either knew or should

have known about the risk created by moving a sex offender into an overcrowded cell,

especially considering that Waters would be his cellmate. (Id.). Thus, by ignoring that

risk and moving Schoonover into the Middle 8 cell, Corrill allegedly acted with

deliberate indifference towards Schoonover’s safety, in turn violating Schoonover’s

Eighth Amendment right. What is more, Schoonover stresses that Corrill was in

charge of monitoring the surveillance cameras and performing observation checks

during the incident. So Corrill, according to Schoonover, either knew or should have

known about the beating, especially given the visible injuries that Schoonover

sustained while Corrill was on duty. (Id. at 1941–42). According to Schoonover, that

means Corrill’s failure to intervene reflected deliberate indifference to the attack on

Schoonover and the resulting injury.

In analyzing Schoonover’s arguments, the Court starts from the proposition

that Corrill’s alleged knowledge that Schoonover was a sex offender, and thus at risk

of being attacked by other inmates, in and of itself, does not give rise to a heightened

duty to protect under the Eighth Amendment. Thomas v. Erdos, No. 1:16-cv-793, 2018

WL 3716894, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 3, 2018) (“The fact that prison officials considered

[a prisoner] … generally vulnerable to harm because of the nature of his crime, is not

sufficient in and of itself to give rise to a duty to protect under the Eighth

Amendment.”) (citing Kennedy v. Wilson, No. 10-CV-299-HRW, 2013 WL 5234435, at

*9 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 17, 2013); King v. Banks, No. 2:10-cv-852, 2012 WL 2891264, at *4

(S.D. Ohio July 13, 2012) (“[I]t is almost always the case that prison officials know

that sex offenders, especially those whose crimes involve children, may be targets of

assault for just that reason. But it is not the law that prison officials thereby become

liable every time such an inmate is assaulted.”). Rather, Schoonover must present

evidence of further circumstances to support an inference of deliberate indifference,

for example, that Schoonover “fit[] a profile of those especially vulnerable to attack”

or that the “prison guard [chose] to publicize the nature of [the] inmate’s crime and

admits knowing that such information, when spread to other jail residents, creates a

significant risk or attack [sic].” Id. That means prisoners who have committed a sex

crime, absent more, do not put their jailors on notice about a safety threat warranting

enhanced attention or protection under the Eighth Amendment.

In a similar vein, a corrections officer’s decision to house a prisoner with an

inmate known to be dangerous typically does not, in and of itself, satisfy the

subjective component of deliberate indifference. In Klebanowski v. Sheahan, 540 F.3d

633 (7th Cir. 2008), an inmate attacked a prisoner and that prisoner then informed

officers that he was afraid for his life. But that request for protection, even when

coupled with the officers’ knowledge of the first attack, did not show that the officers

subjectively knew about the risk of housing that prisoner and his former assailant

together. Id. at 639. According to the Seventh Circuit, absent indicia of future

violence, those officers were not deliberately indifferent in refusing the prisoner’s

request to be transferred. Id. More generally, the court reasoned that prisoners

cannot rely on previous jail-cell attacks to show officers’ knowledge that future

violence would likely occur. See King, 2012 WL 2891264, at *4.

True, there are some limited intake scenarios where prison officials may be

aware of a severe risk to the prisoner at the outset of incarceration and thus need to

take some protective action. See, e.g., Estate of Clark v. Walker, 865 F.3d 544, 553

(7th Cir. 2017) (holding that because “[r]isk of suicide is a serious medical need,” a

prison official’s decision to “do nothing” to protect an inmate with a “maximum risk

of suicide” amounted to deliberate indifference). In other words, there are some risks

that are so inherently obvious that “a factfinder may conclude that a prison official

knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious.” Rouster, 749

F.3d at 447. And in those cases, a risk’s obviousness can suffice to establish a prison

official’s deliberate indifference, at least for the purpose of surviving summary

judgment.

Even so, merely knowing that an inmate faced a risk of suffering harm does

not necessarily expose prison officials to liability, especially when they were “not

subjectively aware” of the prisoner’s “suffering.” Rouster, 749 F.3d at 450 (declining

to find officials deliberately indifferent when they knew the prisoner might be

suffering from alcohol withdrawal, but failed to respond to the prisoner’s complaints

leading up to his death from a perforated duodenal ulcer). That is why prison officials

who fail to take protective measures regarding at-risk inmates are typically not liable

for deliberate indifference, even when the at-risk inmate incurs serious harm. See,

e.g., Burwell, 7 F.4th at 470–71 (finding that corrections officer tasked with cell

checks was not deliberately indifferent by failing to (1) monitor the inmate’s health

status, despite the inmate being on the “watch closely list,” and (2) notice him lying

unconscious in vomit after suffering an overdose); Winkler v. Madison County, 893

F.3d 877, 898 (6th Cir. 2018) (rejecting plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim

against prison official who did not investigate why a prisoner failed to get up for

breakfast despite knowing the prisoner was withdrawing from drugs, because failing

to act was at most negligent and did “not reach the high standard of deliberate

indifference” absent “evidence that [the prison official] perceived a substantial risk of

serious harm to [the prisoner]”). All said, “an official’s failure to alleviate a significant

risk that he should have perceived but did not, while no cause for commendation,

cannot under our cases be condemned as the infliction of punishment” sufficient to

establish deliberate indifference. Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838). In other

words, a prison official is generally not liable, at least under the Eighth Amendment,

for failing to (1) predict potential risks or (2) remedy ongoing harms that befall

prisoners without the prison official’s knowledge, except perhaps in cases involving a

harm so obvious that to ignore it would be criminally reckless.

The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Taylor v. Mich. Dept. of Corrs., 69 F.3d 76, 83–

84 (6th Cir. 1995), provides an example of such an obvious risk. There, prison officials

were charged with knowledge that a “smaller, youthful prisoner” being moved into a

facility with a high incidence of rapes would create an obvious risk of rape. That result

followed because (1) a reasonable corrections officer would know that “smaller,

youthful prisoners” are generally at higher risk, and (2) the fact that a given prisoner

is “smaller” and appears “youthful” would be obvious to the other prisoners. Thus, in

placing the prisoner in the prison population, the risk is both inherent and obvious to

the guard.

But other conditions that create safety risks—unlike a small stature and

youthful appearance—do not announce themselves to other prisoners. Consider

Schoonover’s sex offender status. The fact that he was a sex offender is not what

created the risk. Rather, it is the other prisoners’ knowledge of that fact that would

put Schoonover at risk of harm. Thus, the question is not whether a prison guard

knew that Schoonover was a sex offender, but rather whether the guard had (or can

be charged with) the knowledge that other prisoners knew of Schoonover’s sex-

offender status that matters for deliberate indifference purposes.

Schoonover has failed to identify any evidence that shows that Corrill knew

that other prisoners learned of Schoonover’s sex-offender status, so actual knowledge

is a non-starter. Thus, Schoonover must point to record evidence showing that Corrill

should have known that other prisoners learned of Schoonover’s prior sex-offense

conviction. But Schoonover falls short there, as well. Indeed, the record facts support

the opposite conclusion. Start with the fact that Schoonover and Waters shared a cell

for five days without incident prior to their reassignment to the Middle 8 cell. Because

Schoonover and Waters had cohabitated peacefully for some time, Corrill had no

reason to believe Waters harbored malice towards Schoonover. So, unlike the known

suicide risk in Walker, the risk of harm from housing Corrill with Waters (and other

inmates who, like Waters, might have possessed a known or predictable animus

towards sex offenders) was not plainly ascertainable when Schoonover was

reassigned to the Middle 8 cell.

It appears that Sturgill learning about Schoonover’s sex offense history

through a phone call triggered the inmates’ attack on Schoonover. But Schoonover

does not allege that Corrill (1) knew about the details of Sturgill’s call, or (2) in any

way knew that inmates in Schoonover’s cell had learned about Schoonover’s sex

offense history, or (3) discovered that animosity towards Schoonover had permeated

throughout the Middle 8 cell. Thus the Court concludes that Corrill had no “actual

knowledge of a potential danger” facing Schoonover when placed in the cell with

Waters and other inmates aware of Schoonover’s sex offense history. See Farmer, 511

U.S. at 831 (internal quotation marks omitted).

The bottom line is this—even granting that Corrill knew (1) that Schoonover

was a sex offender, (2) that sex offenders generally face an increased risk of attack

when incarcerated as compared to other inmates, and (3) that Schoonover’s

temporary cell-mate, Clinton Waters, had recent violent incidents involving other sex

offenders, that combination fails to create a genuine dispute as to whether Corrill had

subjective knowledge that moving Schoonover to the Middle 8 cell created a

substantial risk of serious harm. In other words, when the Court focuses on what

Corrill’s “mental attitude actually was,” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 839, the Court fails to

see any evidence showing that (1) Corrill perceived the danger that Schoonover faced

when moved to the Middle 8 cell, i.e., that Corrill learned about Sturgill’s phone call

and the fallout, or (2) the risk of Schoonover being beaten based on his sex offense

history was obvious to Corrill.

True, perhaps Corrill did not embody the height of caution by housing

Schoonover in the general prison population or with oft-bellicose Waters, but at worst

that is the type of “significant risk that [Corrill] should have perceived but did not”

that does not amount to deliberate indifference. Winkler, 893 F.3d at 898 (quoting

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838). Even potentially negligent “cavalier treatment of

detainees,” whom Corrill, as a prison official, owed “an obligation to protect,” does not

establish deliberate indifference absent evidence that Corrill perceived the serious

risk caused by housing Schoonover with Waters and the other inmates. Burwell, 7

F.4th at 471.

In short, Schoonover has not shown any basis on which the Court could infer

that Corrill knew that other prisoners had learned of Schoonover’s past crime. As a

result, Schoonover is asking the Court to impose liability on Corrill based solely on

Corrill’s failure to predict that Schoonover’s sex offender status would lead to him

being attacked. But, as discussed above, prison officials have no heightened duty to

protect inmates with sex offense histories, even if those inmates tend to be more at

risk of jailhouse violence. In other words, Schoonover has failed to create a genuine

dispute over whether Corrill subjectively perceived and then consciously disregarded

that Schoonover was at a heightened risk of harm when housed in the Middle 8 cell.

Nor can Schoonover escape that problem by arguing that Corrill learned about

and ignored the attack while it occurred. That is not because the argument fails as a

legal matter. Rather, the problem is that Schoonover has not identified any evidence

showing that Corrill knew about Schoonover’s ongoing abuse while Corrill was on

duty. Failure to produce evidence showing Corrill observed any attack on Schoonover

or Schoonover’s resulting injuries cuts against Schoonover’s deliberate indifference

argument. See Young v. Campbell County, 846 F. App’x. 314, 329 (6th Cir. 2021)

(“[T]he evidence does not substantiate that Sergeant Mischell was in close enough

range to perceive Young’s injuries during her supervisory passes. Thus, the evidence

does not support a deliberate-indifference claim against her.”). Even granting

Schoonover’s assertion that Corrill was the officer on duty and thus responsible for

cell checks on the day of Schoonover’s injury, the lack of evidence that Corrill in fact

observed Schoonover’s distress means that Corrill was not deliberately indifferent to

Schoonover’s risk of serious injury while the attack was occurring. See Burwell, 7

F.4th at 470–76 (finding that the prison official on duty charged with performing cell

checks was not deliberately indifferent to a prisoner’s overdose despite failing to

perform a cell check because “she never witnessed [the inmate] in distress,” but

holding a different official liable for deliberate indifference because he “observed [the

inmate] unconscious in a pool of his own vomit not just once, but twice”).

All said, Schoonover fails to identify facts creating a genuine dispute about

Corrill’s subjective perception regarding the risk of moving Schoonover into the

Middle 8 cell, or about Corrill’s disregard of the events that occurred there. Even

taking the facts in the light most favorable to Schoonover, the Court finds that

Schoonover has failed to create a genuine dispute as to whether Corrill acted with

criminal recklessness, i.e. with a conscious disregard to a substantial risk of serious

harm, by moving Schoonover into the Middle 8 cell or when observing that cell while

on duty. Because Schoonover must show both the subjective and objective component

for deliberate indifference, his shortcoming on the subjective prong ends the inquiry.

Thus, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to

Schoonover’s individual capacity claim against Corrill.

2. Schoonover Fails To Show A Genuine Dispute Of Material Fact

Over Whether Rogers Acted With Deliberate Indifference.

As for Sheriff Rogers, Schoonover attempts to hold him liable for policies made

and implemented under Rogers’ authority as Adams County Sheriff per Ohio Revised

Code § 341.01. Schoonover asserts that Rogers (1) had a duty to prevent overcrowding

in the Adams County Jail, and (2) knew that sex offenders tend to suffer violence

while incarcerated, such that he had a duty to segregate sex offenders from the

general prison population. (Pl. Resp., Doc. 57, #1937–40). And, despite that

knowledge, Rogers purportedly failed to implement policies, such as a formal

classification policy that required segregating sex offenders from other inmates, to

protect at-risk prisoners like Schoonover. That failure to implement policies, in light

of those known risks, Schoonover argues, amounts to deliberate indifference.

Generally speaking, a prisoner “has no constitutional right to be held in a

specific security classification.” Merchant v. Hawk-Sawyer, 37 F. App’x 143, 145 (6th

Cir. 2002); see also Adams v. Hardin Cnty. Detention Center, 2016 WL 2858911, at *4

(W.D. Ky. May 16, 2016) (holding that prisoners have no constitutional right “to be

incarcerated in any particular institution, a particular part of an institution, or a

particular security classification, unless the state has created a liberty interest in

remaining at a particular institution”). Similarly, prisoners are not typically afforded

a constitutional right to reside in a prison free of overcrowding. Agramonte v. Shartle,

491 F. App’x 557, 560 (6th Cir. 2012) (concluding that “‘extreme deprivations’ must

be alleged in order to support a prison-overcrowding claim” under the Eighth

Amendment).

Even so, the Sixth Circuit has left open the possibility that failure to adopt a

classification system might pose an unconstitutional risk to prisoner safety in some

circumstances. In Thompson v. County of Medina, 29 F.3d 238 (6th Cir. 1994),

prisoners sued a jail for failing to (1) classify prisoners as felons and misdemeanants,

and (2) segregate those classes. The Sixth Circuit rejected that suit because the

prisoner-plaintiffs failed to show “a sufficient inferential connection between the

classification system and inmate violence to justify a reasonable fear for personal

safety.” Id. at 243. But, as the quote suggests, the Sixth Circuit rejected the argument

for factual shortcomings, leaving the legal question open.

To be sure, Defendants are correct in arguing that “a lack of a classification

system, alone,” does not give rise to deliberate indifference. (Mot. for Summ. J., Doc.

49, #1334). But that does not rule out Schoonover’s argument here. Schoonover claims

that the injuries he suffered occurred because (1) he was a sex offender, (2) sex

offenders are likely to be injured when housed with the general prison population,

and (3) the lack of a classification system led to his jail-cell attack. So he is not relying

solely on the county’s lack of a classification system. Rather, Schoonover says that the

absence of a classification system, plus the connection between the likelihood of

incarcerated sex offenders suffering violence and the attack Schoonover suffered, is

what gives rise to a claim. In other words, Schoonover argues that, given the known

risks facing sex offenders housed within the general prison population, prison officials

could infer that failure to classify and segregate sex offenders could put inmates with

sex offense histories at risk. So the Court agrees with Schoonover that Thompson

does not bar his claim.

Still, to hold Rogers liable in his individual capacity for the cumulative effect

of Rogers’ policymaking efforts, Schoonover must make “a showing that [Rogers]

encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly

participated in it.” Taylor, 69 F.3d at 81. In other words, Rogers must have “at least

implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced” in the misconduct that

resulted in Schoonover’s injuries. Harvey v. Campbell Cnty., 453 F. App’x 557, 563

(6th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). So the question becomes whether Rogers’ policy

decisions regarding overcrowding and prisoner classification amount to “personal

involvement” in the events that caused Schoonover’s injuries. Id. To that end, “the

correct inquiry is whether [Rogers] had knowledge about the substantial risk of

serious harm to a particular class of persons, not whether [Rogers] knew who the

particular victim turned out to be.” Taylor, 69 F.3d at 81. So this issue does not turn

on whether Rogers was present at the jail, as the parties suggest, or whether he knew

about the attack on Schoonover while it was ongoing, but instead depends on whether

Rogers possessed the “required knowledge of potential danger” in the Adams County

Jail and deliberately ignored that knowledge in his policymaking position. Id.

Schoonover reasons that because Rogers knew, or should have known, about

the dangers created by overcrowded prisons and failure to segregate sex offenders

from the prison population, Rogers’ failure to remedy those problems at the Adams

County Jail amounted to deliberate indifference. Yet, “it is almost always the case

that prison officials know that sex offenders, especially those whose crimes involve

children, may be targets of assault for just that reason. But it is not the law that

prison officials thereby become liable every time such an inmate is assaulted.” Banks,

2012 WL 2891264, at *4. Rather, to hold a policymaker liable for such an assault,

Schoonover must present “other evidence to support a claim of deliberate indifference,

such as where the inmate fits a profile of those especially vulnerable to attack, or

where a prison guard chooses to publicize the nature of an inmate's crime and admits

knowing that such information, when spread to other jail residents, creates a

significant risk or attack.” Id. (citations omitted).

True, perhaps Rogers had some general knowledge that sex offenders are at

higher risk of injury when housed in the general prison population, especially in an

overcrowded prison. But “[d]eliberate indifference is a stringent standard of fault.”

Miller v. Calhoun Cnty., 408 F.3d 803, 815 (6th Cir. 2005). Absent sufficient notice

about a safety threat, a prison official cannot operate with the “deliberate or callous

indifference caused either by actual intent or [criminal] recklessness.” Justice v.

Brown, No. 90-1239, 1991 WL 16460, at *1 (6th Cir. 1991). Here, Schoonover has not

shown that Rogers knew about any such additional factors suggesting that the Adams

County Jail had become especially dangerous for prisoners like Schoonover.

Accordingly, he “has failed to demonstrate that the [Adams County Jail’s] polices

were objectively inadequate, much less that [Rogers] was deliberately indifferent to

the obvious inadequacy of those policies.” Miller, 408 F.3d at 817.

All said, Schoonover fails to show that Rogers acted with deliberate

indifference towards Schoonover’s safety when making policy decisions affecting the

Adams County Jail. The Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment as it relates to Schoonover’s individual capacity claims against Rogers.

B. Schoonover Fails To Show A Custom Or Policy That Caused A

Violation Of His Constitutional Rights.

By suing Sheriff Rogers in his official capacity, Schoonover effectively brings a

municipal liability suit against Adams County. United Food & Comm. Workers Local

1099 v. City of Sidney, 364 F.3d 738, 752 (6th Cir. 2004) (“Appellants’ remaining

§ 1983 claim is against O’Leary in his official capacity as Shelby County Sheriff, and,

as the district court noted, this claim is really one against Shelby County itself.”).

Municipal liability under § 1983 “must be pursuant to a municipality’s ‘official

policy,’’’ “that is, acts which the municipality has officially sanctioned or ordered.”

Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479, 480 (1986). Those official policies

may be decisions, or even a “single decision,” made by a municipal policymaker. Id.

But not all policies that result in constitutional violations give rise to municipal

liability. That is, municipal liability arises only if “through its deliberate conduct” the

municipality was “the ‘moving force’ behind the injury alleged.” D’Ambrosio v.

Marino, 747 F.3d 378, 389 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Alman v. Reed, 703 F.3d 887, 903

(6th Cir. 2013)). To mount a successful § 1983 claim against a municipality, the

plaintiff must show both that the municipality acted “with the requisite degree of

culpability” and that action had a “causal link” to the alleged injury. Bd. of Cnty.

Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997).

Here, Schoonover seeks to hold Adams County liable for its policies relating to

inmate classification and jail overcrowding. To begin, he reasons that the

overcrowding and lack of formal classification system combined to cause his move to

the Middle 8 cell and the ensuing assault. (Pl. Resp., Doc. 57, #1943–45). But that

proposition quickly stumbles over a post hoc logical fallacy. That is to say, Schoonover

suggests that because prison officials moved him to the Middle 8 cell and he received

a beating after being subject to the jail’s cell-relocation policies (caused by

overcrowding and lack of a classification system), those policies caused the beating.

But an incident occurring after a defendant’s action under a particular policy does

not mean that the defendant’s action or policy caused the incident. And municipal

liability requires a “direct causal link between the municipal action and the

deprivation of federal rights.” Id. So Schoonover must do more than show his injuries

occurred after officials implemented the Adams County Jail’s cell-relocation policies.

Policies that cause jail overcrowding do not typically give rise to a

constitutional violation under the “deliberate conduct” or “moving force” analysis.

While crowded conditions can be restrictive and even harsh, they do not violate the

Eighth Amendment unless they deprive the inmate of the “minimal civilized measure

of life’s necessities.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Thus, as

mentioned above, only “extreme deprivations” can “support a prison-overcrowding

claim.” Shartle, 491 F. App’x at 560 (internal quotation marks omitted). Under that

standard, the Sixth Circuit has found that overcrowding is not a constitutional

violation unless it impedes on “such basic needs as food, shelter, or sanitation.” Id.

Because Schoonover has not alleged such an extreme deprivation, his overcrowding

argument falls short.

Similarly, as explained above, sex offenders are not entitled to enhanced

protections, such as a classification system that segregates sex offenders from the

general inmate population. What is more, the jail employed an informal classification

system that attempted to place sex offenders in the same cells. As Defendants note,

“[b]est efforts were made at the Adams County Jail to house sex offenders in either

the Middle 4 or End 4 cell.” (Def. Reply, Doc. 62, #1993). So, if anything, the

municipality enacted a policy that exceeded its obligations by separating sex

offenders from other prisoners when practicable. Thus, the Court rejects Schoonover’s

contention that Adams County is liable because its “decisionmakers were fully aware

that sex offenders were exposed to a substantial risk of serious harm, resulting from

the chronic overcrowding in the jail and the lack of a jail classification system, yet

disregarded that risk.” (Pl. Resp., Doc. 57, #1943). The County had a policy in place,

albeit a flexible and informal one, and Schoonover fails to support his claim that sex

offenders must be segregated from other prisoners at all times, or else the prison has

violated their Eighth Amendment right. Indeed, the law is clear that sex offenders

have no constitutional right to segregated incarceration, merely based on their

classification as such. See King, 2012 WL 2891264, at *4.

That leaves only Schoonover’s contention that Adams County is liable because

Rogers ratified his deputy’s conduct. Schoonover reasons that Rogers’ failure to

investigate Schoonover’s beating and its causes, as well as Rogers’ failure to discipline

Corrill for the incident, equates to endorsing the conduct. (Pl. Resp., Doc. 57, #1950–

52). To be sure, “if the authorized policymakers approve a subordinate’s decision and

the basis for it, their ratification would be chargeable to the municipality.” City of St.

Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988). And a policymaker’s failure to

investigate or punish subordinates can, in some scenarios, produce municipal

liability. Wright v. City of Euclid, 962 F.3d 852, 882 (6th Cir. 2020) (“A plaintiff can

establish municipal liability by showing that the municipality ratifies the

unconstitutional acts of its employees by failing to meaningfully investigate and

punish allegations of unconstitutional conduct.”).

But, to establish municipal liability under a theory that a supervisor’s failure

to investigate or punish amounted to ratification, a plaintiff must show that the

“failure to investigate and punish the officers involved in those uses of force led in

any way to [plaintiff’s] injuries.” Id. Schoonover does not allege that either Rogers or

Adams County had a policy of failing to investigate or punish correctional facilities

staff when prisoners suffered injuries at the hands of other incarcerated persons. So,

given the lack of similar incidents to Schoonover’s abuse, the Court cannot find that

Adams County had a policy of failing to investigate or punish correctional facilities

staff who violated their constitutional duty to protect prisoners. In addition, failure

to investigate or punish Adams County Jail staff for Schoonover’s incident necessarily

occurred after the attack on Schoonover, and thus could not have caused his injuries.

Finally, Schoonover does not address ratification, i.e., Rogers’ failure to

investigate or punish his subordinates, in his Complaint, and instead raises it for the

first time in his Response to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 57).

So even if Schoonover’s ratification theory carried water, it would fail as waived.

Tucker v. Union of Needletrades, Indus. & Textile Emps., 407 F.3d 784, 788 (6th Cir.

2005) (“A non-moving party plaintiff may not raise a new legal claim for the first time

in response to the opposing party's summary judgment motion. At the summary

judgment stage, the proper procedure for plaintiffs to assert a new claim is to amend

the complaint in accordance with Rule 15(a).”) (quoting 10A Charles Alan Wright,

Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2723 (3d ed.

Supp. 2005)).

Because Schoonover has not identified a genuine dispute of material fact that

a deliberate municipal policy caused the deprivation of his constitutional rights, his

official capacity claim against Rogers (and thus Adams County) cannot succeed. Thus,

the Court GRANTS summary judgment in Defendants’ favor on the official capacity

and municipal liability issues.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment (Doc. 49). The Court holds as a matter of law that Defendants are not liable

under § 1983 in their individual or official capacity. The Court directs the clerk to

enter judgment accordingly.

SO ORDERED.

September 30, 2021

DATE DOUGLAS R. COLE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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