The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
TODD J. BRUSEAU,
Case No. 2:20-cv-2843
Plaintiff, Chief Judge Algenon L. Marbley
Magistrate Judge Kimberly A. Jolson
v.
FRANKLIN COUNTY CORRECTION OFFICERS, et al.,
Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma
pauperis (Doc. 1). Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED. All judicial
officers who render services in this action shall do so as if the costs had been prepaid. 28 U.S.C .
§ 1915(a). However, having performed an initial screen and for the reasons that follow, it is
RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff’s claims.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff has brought suit against “Franklin County Employees/Jail”; Napa Care Nurse”;
and Nazi Holicaust [sic] Chair.” (Doc. 1-1 at 2). While not entirely clear, Plaintiff’s claims seem
to stem from his time in custody in November 2017 at Franklin County Correctional Center. (See
generally id.). Specifically, he alleges that he had an altercation with two inmates. (Id. at 5). He
claims that he was subsequently transferred to a “disciplinary lock down holding cell” where he
allegedly used a razor to “split[] [his] forarm [sic] six times.” (Id. at 6). According to Plaintiff, a
guard took him to receive medical treatment, and a “nappa-care” nurse “started running hot water
over [his] cuts” and “started slapping [his] forearm” while “a nother [sic] female in the room []
was video recording the back of [his] head.” (Id. at 7). He “said ‘what are you looking at bitch’
[and] the nurse from nappa-care said ‘what are you a fagget? So [he] turned around and spit on
her!” (Id.).
At that point, “seven female cops” allegedly “grabbed [him] by the back of [his] neck and
bent [him] over and buckled [his] legs in, then spread [his] feet and handcuffed [his] hands tightly
behind [him] [and] dragged [him] out of the room, down the hall to another room with a table and
a sharp cornered metal filing cabinet right in the middle of the large room, tight up against the
wall.” (Id.). The “seven females” allegedly “yanked up [his] arm and crossed [his] left leg behind
[his] right one, picked [him] up off the floor and slammed the left side of [his] chest right on [his]
ribs.” (Id. at 8). Plaintiff further alleges “[t]he next thing [he] know [sic], [he was] being slammed
backwards into holocaust chair [and] [his] hands were still tightly squeezed into handcuffs with
[his] thumbs backwards.” (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that he does not know how long he was in the
“toucher [sic] chair” but “that [he] woke up in the glass observation room completely naked on the
floor, bleeding from [his] arm, [] nose, [] lip and had a white substance coming [sic] from [his]
eyes.” (Id. at 8–9). For relief, Plaintiff seeks “740,000.00 in a personell [sic] check the day that
[he] win[s] in court.” (Id. at 4).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must dismiss the Complaint,
or any portion of it, that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2). In reviewing a complaint, the Court must construe it in Plaintiff’s favor, accept all
well-pleaded factual allegations as true, and evaluate whether it contains “enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). In sum, although pro se
complaints are to be construed liberally, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), “basic
pleading essentials” are still required, Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989).
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff’s Complaint must be dismissed for two primary reasons. First, Plaintiff’s case is
barred by the statute of limitations. Further, Plaintiff has failed to name a single Defendant in this
case, and his Complaint fails to state a claim for relief as a result.
A. Statute of Limitations
“[A]lthough the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, a complaint may be
dismissed as frivolous on initial screening if the allegations of the complaint on their face
demonstrate that the claim would be barred by the applicable statute of limitations.” Blue v. City
of Lakewood, Ohio, No. 1:19 CV 2851, 2020 WL 2747964, at *2 (N.D. Ohio May 27, 2020) (citing
Fraley v. Ohio Gallia Cty., No. 97-3564, 1998 WL 789385 *2 (6th Cir. Oct. 30, 1998)). It is
apparent on the face of Plaintiff’s Complaint that his action is time barred. “For § 1983 claims
arising in Ohio, the statute of limitations is two years.” Blue, 2020 WL 2747964, at *2 (citing
Browning v. Pendleton, 869 F.2d 989, 999 (6th Cir. 1989)). Plaintiff’s allegations stem from
alleged incidents in “early November 2017,” (Doc. 1-1 at 5), which is more than two years before
he filed this lawsuit on June 2, 2020. Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations as
a result. See Blue, 2020 WL 2747964, at *2 (screening plaintiff’s complaint because the alleged
conduct occurred more than two years before she filed her complaint).
B. Failure to State a Claim
Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts that, if accepted as true, would state
a facially plausible claim. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Plaintiff cannot seek monetary relief from
a “nazi chair,” or, what the Undersigned understands to be a restraint chair. Nor can he seek relief,
collectively, from all “Franklin Country Correction Officers.” Indeed, he has failed to name a
single Defendant in this case. “It is a basic pleading essential that a plaintiff attribute factual
allegations to particular defendants.” Young v. Cady, No. 1:10-CV-1209, 2011 WL 201828, at *2
(W.D. Mich. Jan. 18, 2011) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544). The purpose of this requirement
is to provide defendants fair notice of the claim. Young, 2011 WL 201828, at *2 (citing Twombly,
550 U.S. at 544). Failure to meet this basic pleading requirement warrants dismissal “even under
the liberal construction afforded to pro se complaints.” Young, 2011 WL 201828, at *2 (collecting
cases and noting that, because “[p]laintiff d[id] not name any Defendant in the body of his
complaint or indicate who was involved in what allegedly unconstitutional conduct[,] [h]is
complaint therefore f[ell] far short of the minimal pleading standards under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8”);
see also Johnson v. Madison Cty., No. 19-1048-JDT-CGC, 2019 WL 5566534, at *4 (W.D. Tenn.
Oct. 28, 2019) (dismissing complaint where plaintiff “d[id] not name any individual responsible
for the[] alleged violations”). And because Plaintiff failed to name any Defendant responsible for
the alleged conduct, his Complaint fails to state a relief and must be dismissed.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Undersigned GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to
Proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 1) and RECOMMENDS that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff’s
Complaint.
Procedure on Objections
If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen
(14) days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those specific
proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made, together with supporting
authority for the objection(s). A judge of this Court shall make a de novo determination of those
portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is
made. Upon proper objections, a judge of this Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in
part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive further evidence or may recommit
this matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Failure to object to
the Report and Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the district judge review
the Report and Recommendation de novo, and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the
decision of the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474
U.S. 140, 152–53 (1985).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: June 10, 2020 /s/Kimberly A. Jolson
KIMBERLY A. JOLSON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE