Ball v. Kasich

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

PHYLLIS BALL, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

Civil Action 2:16-cev-282 □

Vv. Judge Edmund A. Sargus, Jr.

Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P. Deavers

JOHN KASICH, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs

Pursuant to Settlement Agreement (ECF No. 413), which is unopposed. For the reasons set forth

below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ Motion.

I.

On March 31, 2016, six individuals and the Ability Center of Greater Toledo

(“Plaintiffs”) filed this action seeking declarative and injunctive relief against the following in

their official capacities: the Governor of Ohio and the Directors of the Ohio Department of

Developmental Disabilities, the Ohio Department of Medicaid, and Opportunities for Ohioans

with Disabilities (“Defendants”).

In their complaint, Plaintiffs alleged that Ohio’s provision of services to people with

intellectual and developmental disabilities violated Title II of the Americans with Disabilities

Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12132 et seg., Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 794

et seq., and the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396n(c)(2)(B) and (C). Defendants denied

liability under any of these statutes.

On April 24, 2020, this Court issued an Opinion and Order approving the class action

settlement between Plaintiffs and Defendants, concluding:

For the reasons set forth above, in light of the factual, legal, practical, and

procedural considerations raised by this suit, the Court concludes that the Modified

Settlement Agreement is a fair, reasonable, and adequate resolution of the class

members’ claims, is in the public interest, and does not harm the rights of any non-

class members.

(ECF No. 473.)

In that decision, the Court set out in detail the procedural background of this litigation,

discovery, motion practice, settlement negotiations, and fairness hearing and will not restate that

information here. The Court also indicated that it would address Plaintiffs’ Motion for

Attorney’s Fees and Costs Pursuant to Settlement Agreement by separate order, which the Court

now considers.

Il.

Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a court to “award reasonable

attorney’s fees and nontaxable costs that are authorized by the parties’ agreement.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 23(h). “When evaluating a negotiated fee award in civil rights cases such as this, a court

should give weight to the agreement between the parties where there are no collusion concerns

and there have been months of arms-length negotiations.” Doe v. Ohio, 2:91-CV-00464, 2020

WL 728276, at *8 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 12, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, 2:91-CV-

464, 2020 WL 996561 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 2, 2020) (citing as an example Smith v. Ohio Dep't of

Rehab. & Correction, No. 2:08-CV-15, 2012 WL 1440254, at *18-19 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 26, 2012)

(approving settlement agreement reached after three years of litigation and two years of

settlement discussions); ¢f Gascho v. Global Fitness Holdings, LLC, 822 F.3d 269, 277 (6th Cir.

2016) (affirming district court’s determination that “two-and-a-half years of litigation, extensive

discovery, ongoing settlement negotiations, and formal mediation session all weighed against the

possibility of fraud or collusion”)).

In reviewing a fee award request in a settlement context, a court’s primary concern is the

award’s reasonableness. Geier v. Sundquist, 372 F.3d 784, 792 (6th Cir. 2004) (internal

quotation omitted); see also Fed R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2) (class action settlements should be approved

when they meet fair, reasonable, and adequate standard). In cases like this one, “where litigants

are vindicating a social grievance,” district courts should use the lodestar method rather than the

common fund doctrine to determine reasonable attorney’s fees. Geier, 372 F. 3d at 790. The

lodestar is calculated by multiplying a reasonable hourly rate by the proven number of hours

counsel reasonably spent on the case. Id. at 791 (citing Adcock-Ladd v. Sec’y of Treasury, 227

F.3d 343, 349 (6th Cir. 2000)).

iil.

Plaintiffs request $1.2 million in accordance with their settlement agreement with

Defendants, indicating that “[t]he requested award is only 21% of the fees and costs to which

Plaintiffs would otherwise be entitled” under the lodestar method of calculating attorney fees.

Complex civil rights cases like the instant litigation often require multiple attorneys with

specialized expertise. See, e.g., The Ne. Ohio Coal. forthe Homeless y. Husted, 831 F.3d 686,

704-05 (6th Cir. 2016). The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that the assembled litigation team was

necessary to litigate this case effectively, particularly in light of Defendants’ vigorous defense of

this case, which supports the reasonableness of the negotiated fee. See City of Riverside,

477U.8. 561, 580 n.11 (1986). Within their respective firms, lead counsel assigned litigation

roles and tasks. Class counsel guarded against inefficiencies, including duplication of effort, by

careful management and delegation of tasks among counsel and the various work groups.

(Declaration of Kerstin Sjoberg, ECF No. 413-1); (Declaration of Cathy Costanzo, ECF No. 413-

2); (Declaration of Neil Ellis, ECF No. 413-3); (Declaration of Samuel Bagenstos, ECF No. 413-

4).

A. Hourly Rates

“It is well-established that a district court has broad discretion to determine what

constitutes a reasonable hourly rate for an attorney.” Doe v. Ohio, 2020 WL 728276, at *10

(approving attorney fees for same plaintiff's counsel as in the instant action, Disability Rights

Ohio) (citing Am. Broad. Companies, Inc. v. Brunner, No. 1:04CV750, 2008 WL 11450441, at

*10 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 30, 2008) (citations and quotation marks omitted)). To determine the rates

at which counsel should be compensated, courts should look to prevailing market rates in the

relevant community for lawyers with comparable skill and experience. Id. (citing, inter alia,

Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984) (“A trial court, in calculating the ‘reasonable hourly

rate’ component of the lodestar computation, should initially assess the ‘prevailing market rate in

the relevant community.’”).

“To avoid litigation over the appropriate ‘market rate’ for non-profit counsel, some

federal courts, including those in the Southern District of Ohio, have identified a set of

presumptive rates to be used in fee-shifting cases.” Jd. In the Southern District of Ohio, courts

have used the rates identified by the Rubin Committee in 1983, adjusted upward each year by

4% for inflation (“Rubin rates”). See, e.g., Gibson v. Forest Hills Sch. Dist., Bd. of Educ., No.

1:11-CV-329, 2014 WL 3530708, at *6 (S.D. Ohio, July 15, 2014) (“Judges in the Southern

District of Ohio have applied the Rubin Committee rate with a 4% annual cost-of-living

allowance to measure the reasonableness of fees requested.”) (citing Hunter v. Hamilton Cty. Bd.

of Elections, No. 1:10-CV-820, 2013 WL 5467751, at *17 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 30, 2013));

Schumacher v, AK Steel Corp, Ret. Acc. Pension Plan, 995 F. Supp. 2d 835, 844 (S.D. Ohio

2014).

Plaintiffs provided appropriate declarations supporting the reasonableness of the rates

utilized in this case, which are the same as those used by federal courts in counsels’ respective

markets as the presumptive market rates in fee-shifting cases. (Declaration of Shawn Organ,

ECF No. 413-5); (Declaration of Kerstin Sjoberg, ECF No. 413-1); (Declaration of Cathy

Costanzo, ECF No. 413-2); (Declaration of Neil Ellis, ECF No. 413-3); (Declaration of Samuel

Bagenstos, ECF No. 413-4). Plaintiffs utilized the Rubin rates and went outside of the

presumptively reasonable amounts only for its out of state counsel, whose rates were less than

what he has charged privately-paying clients and is consistent with the market rate for attorneys

with his years of experience under the reasonable rates awarded in his place of. See e.g., Miller

v. Holzmann, 575 F. Supp. 2d 2, 18 n.29 (D. D.C. 2008) (Laffey rates are the “benchmark for

reasonable rates” in D.C.).

Based on this evidence, the Court concludes that the rates are reasonable given the

amount and nature of the experience of Plaintiffs’ counsel, the complexity of this case, and the

results reached.

B. Number of Compensable Hours

The lodestar calculation is also based on hours reasonably expended. Dowling v. Litton

Loan Servicing, LP, No. 05-CV-098, 2008 WL 906042, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 31, 2009), aff'd,

320 F. App’x 442 (6th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). “Plaintiffs” attorney[s] should not recover

for hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” Jd. (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted). To determine whether hours expended are reasonable, the Court looks to

“whether a reasonable attorney would have believed the work to be reasonably expended in

pursuit of success at the point in time when the work was performed.” Jd. at *3 (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). “[TJhe fee applicant bears the burden of establishing

entitlement to an award and documenting the appropriate hours expended.”

As stated above, the Court agrees with counsel that this case was complex. It involved

the intersection of multiple, overlapping legal claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act,

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and federal Medicaid law. The scale of systemic relief

sought required multiple defendants and state agencies responsible for the administration,

funding and provision of services to thousands of individuals with intellectual and developmental

disabilities. Briefings on class certification were extensive and preceded by a protracted twelve-

month discovery process. Plaintiffs’ motions were opposed by State Defendants and two groups

of intervenors. Further complicating the litigation was Intervenor Guardians’ third-party

complaint against one of Plaintiffs’ counsel, and cross-claims filed against the State of Ohio.

As this Court previously explained, the terms of the final class action settlement

agreement were reached over months of arms-length negotiations. Importantly, Plaintiffs’

request is unopposed by Defendants who are represented by Larry James and the firm of Crabbe

Brown & James, LLP, who are sophisticated, learned, and experienced in representing Ohio in

civil litigation. Only after the substantive provisions of the agreement were negotiated did the

parties discuss reimbursing Plaintiffs for attorney’s fees and costs. Ultimately, State Defendants

agreed to pay Plaintiffs’ counsel $1.2 million—only 21% of the attorney’s fees and costs to

which Plaintiffs would otherwise be entitled. These agreed-upon fees and costs were then

incorporated into the larger, comprehensive settlement agreement, which provides substantial

relief for the certified class members, including expanded and enhanced options counseling and

increased funding for waivers, community housing, and integrated employment and day services.

Based on the evidence before the Court, it finds that Plaintiffs’ counsel’s hours were

reasonably expended in pursuit of Plaintiffs’ claims.

I.

Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs’ requested attorneys’ fees are

reasonable given the complexity of the case, the efforts taken to litigate the case efficiently,

counsel’s reasonable market-based rates, the arms-length negotiated settlement between

sophisticated counsel, the benefit obtained for the class, and awards in similar cases. The

negotiated award is far less than Plaintiffs’ reasonable lodestar, further supporting the

reasonableness of Plaintiffs’ request for an award of $1.2 million for fees and costs. Therefore,

the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs Pursuant to Settlement

Acreement. (ECF No. 413.)

IT IS SO ORDERED.

__-$" 2030 wap Socom

DATE EDM SARGUS, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE