Williams v. The Ohio State University

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

ROBERT E. WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff,

Civil Action 2:20-cv-463

v. Judge George C. Smith

Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura

THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY

OFFICE OF STUDENT LIFE,

Defendant.

ORDER and REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, Robert E. Williams, an Ohio resident who is proceeding without the assistance

of counsel, brings this employment discrimination action against Defendant, The Ohio State

University Office of Student Life. Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis is

GRANTED. (ECF No. 1.) All judicial officers who render services in this action shall do so as

if the costs had been prepaid. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). This matter before the Court for the initial

screen of Plaintiff’s Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) to identify cognizable claims and to

recommend dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious,

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant

who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Having performed the initial screen,

for the reasons that follow, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff’s

Complaint.

I.

Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to

“lower judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992).

In doing so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are

assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from

filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490

U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e), which

provides in pertinent part as follows:

(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been

paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that--

* * *

(B) the action or appeal--

(i) is frivolous or malicious;

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or . . . .

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii); Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. Thus, § 1915(e) requires sua sponte

dismissal of an action upon the Court’s determination that the action is frivolous or malicious, or

upon determination that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Further, to properly state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must

satisfy the basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a).

See also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Under

Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a) “imposes legal and factual

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demands on the authors of complaints.” 16630 Southfield Ltd., P’Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B.,

727 F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013).

Although this pleading standard does not require “‘detailed factual allegations,’ . . . [a]

pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause

of action,’” is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A complaint will not “suffice if it tenders ‘naked

assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

Instead, to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), “a

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on

its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Facial plausibility is established “when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The plausibility of an inference depends on

a host of considerations, including common sense and the strength of competing explanations for

the defendant’s conduct.” Flagstar Bank , 727 F.3d at 504 (citations omitted). Further, the

Court holds pro se complaints “‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by

lawyers.’” Garrett v. Belmont Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 374 F. App’x 612, 614 (6th Cir. 2010)

(quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). This lenient treatment, however, has

limits; “‘courts should not have to guess at the nature of the claim asserted.’” Frengler v. Gen.

Motors, 482 F. App’x 975, 976–77 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594

(6th Cir. 1989)).

II.

According to the Complaint, during his employment with Defendant, Plaintiff was

charged with three rules infractions, each of which prompted Defendant to hold “Corrective

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Action Hearings.” (Pl.’s Compl., ECF No. 1-4 at PAGEID # 12.) Plaintiff alleges that the first

Corrective Action Hearing took place in September 2018, after his supervisors charged him with

“being out of [his] assigned area.” (Id. at PAGEID # 13.) According to Plaintiff, the individuals

presiding over this first Corrective Action Hearing failed to sufficiently investigate why he was

outside of his assigned area and that if they had, “they would soon discover there was no

infraction of the rules at all.” (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that instead, the “presumptions” made “were

based on [his] race, age, color, religion [and] health conditions.” (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that the second Corrective Action Hearing took place in November 2018,

after he was charged with “insubordination [and] negligence of duty.” (Id.) Plaintiff maintains

that the charge arose because “management from [the] maintenance [department] . . . was spying

on [him and] forwarded [information] to [his] supervisors.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that “[t]hey . .

. moved with the same kind of bias [and] prejudice as the first time.” (Id.) He further alleges

that he “won [his] case” with respect to the charges that were the subject of the second

Corrective Action hearing. (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that the final Corrective Action Hearing took place in May 2019, after

his area supervisor took Plaintiff’s photo with a smartphone without Plaintiff’s knowledge.

According to Plaintiff, he was charged with “being insubordinate [and] negligent of duty.” (Id.

at PAGEID # 14.) Plaintiff alleges that management’s display of an “overly nice demeanor” was

part of “their subtle devious plan” and that they acted with “the same pattern of extreme

prejudice.” (Id.) Plaintiff represents that although he “had the facts to dispute the charges,” he

“opted for early [retirement] because of health reasons.” (Id.) He adds that he “was finding it

increasingly more difficult to work in that hostile work environment.” (Id.)

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Plaintiff attaches a Dismissal and Notice of Rights from the United States Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission to his Complaint. In terms of relief, Plaintiff seeks both

monetary damages and injunctive relief.

III.

Although Plaintiff’s Complaint lacks clarity, the undersigned construes his Complaint as

alleging that he was constructively discharged in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,

42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq. (“Title VII”).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently offered the following

discussion of the standards employed in assessing a constructive discharge claim under Title VII:

To demonstrate such a constructive discharge for Title VII purposes, a

plaintiff must show that the employer “‘[1] deliberately create[d] intolerable

working conditions, as perceived by a reasonable person,’ and [2] the employer

did so ‘with the intention of forcing the employee to quit.’” Logan v. Denny’s,

Inc., 259 F.3d 558, 568–69 (6th Cir. 2001) (alteration in original) (quoting Moore

v. KUKA Welding Sys., 171 F.3d 1073, 1080 (6th Cir. 1999)). “[U]nless

conditions are beyond ‘ordinary’ discrimination, a complaining employee is

expected to remain on the job while seeking redress.” Pa. State Police v. Suders,

542 U.S. 129, 147 (2004) (alteration in original) (quoting Perry v. Harris

Chernin, Inc., 126 F.3d 1010, 1015 (7th Cir. 1997)).

We evaluate both “the employer’s intent and the employee’s objective

feelings” to determine if there was a constructive discharge. Logan, 259 F.3d at

569 (quoting Moore, 171 F.3d at 1080). In addition, we consider several

nonexclusive factors, such as whether there was a

(1) demotion; (2) reduction in salary; (3) reduction in job

responsibilities; (4) reassignment to menial or degrading work; (5)

reassignment to work under a younger supervisor; (6) badgering,

harassment, or humiliation by the employer calculated to

encourage the employee’s resignation; or (7) offers of early

retirement or continued employment on terms less favorable than

the employee’s former status.

Id. (quoting Brown v. Bunge Corp., 207 F.3d 776, 782 (5th Cir. 2000)).

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Harper v. City of Cleveland, 781 F. App’x 389, 394 (6th Cir. 2019).

Applying the foregoing authority here, the undersigned concludes that Plaintiff has failed

to allege facts from which this Court could “draw the reasonable inference,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

678, that Defendant is liable for constructively discharging him in violation Title VII. First,

although Plaintiff personally draws the inference that the charges his supervisors made against

him were on account of his “race, age, color, religion [and] health conditions,” (Pl.’s Compl.,

ECF No. 1-4 at PAGEID # 13), he offers no allegations in his Complaint upon which the Court

could draw such an inference. See Sam Han v. Univ. of Dayton, 541 F. App’x 622, 627 (6th Cir.

2013) (upholding trial court’s dismissal of employment discrimination pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)

where the plaintiff had failed to “plausibly show that the . . . adverse employment decision . . .

was a result of discrimination based upon his race or his gender,” explaining that the “Court is

not required to accept the inferences drawn by [the] [p]laintiff”); See also Keys v. Humana, Inc.,

684 F.3d 605, 610 (6th Cir. 2012) (the plausibility standard “applies to causation in

discrimination claims”). Further, Plaintiff fails to sufficiently allege facts upon which this Court

could rely to conclude that his working conditions had become “so intolerable that a reasonable

person would have felt compelled to resign,” see Suders, 542 U.S. at 147, such that the Court

cannot conclude that he has plausibly alleged that he was constructively discharged. Notably,

Plaintiff himself has offered an alternative reason for his retirement, namely, “health reasons.”

(Pl.’s Compl., ECF No. 1-4 at PAGEID # 14.)

Because Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently plead a plausible claim for relief, it is

RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff’s Complaint.

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PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS

If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen

(14) days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those

specific proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made, together with

supporting authority for the objection(s). A Judge of this Court shall make a de novo

determination of those portions of the Report or specified proposed findings or recommendations

to which objection is made. Upon proper objections, a Judge of this Court may accept, reject, or

modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive further

evidence or may recommit this matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1).

The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and

Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the District Judge review the Report

and Recommendation de novo, and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of

the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140

(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Chelsey M. Vascura

CHELSEY M. VASCURA

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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