King v. Yost

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

DERRICK MARTIN KING,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 2:19-cv-5522

Judge Edmund A. Sargus, Jr.

Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura

DAVID ANTHONY YOST, et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER and REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, Derrick Martin King, an Ohio resident proceeding without the assistance of

counsel, has submitted a request to file a civil action in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 1.) The Court

GRANTS Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis. All judicial officers who render

services in this action shall do so as if the costs had been prepaid. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).

This matter is also before the Court for the initial screen of Plaintiff’s Complaint under

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) to identify cognizable claims and to recommend dismissal of Plaintiff’s

Complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such

relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Having performed the initial screen, for the reasons that follow, it is

RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).

I.

Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to

“lower judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992).

In doing so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are

assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from

filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490

U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e), which

provides in pertinent part as follows:

(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid,

the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that--

* * *

(B) the action or appeal--

(i) is frivolous or malicious;

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or . . . .

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii); Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. Thus, § 1915(e) requires sua sponte

dismissal of an action upon the Court’s determination that the action is frivolous or malicious, or

upon determination that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Further, to properly state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must

satisfy the basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a).

See also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Under

Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a) “imposes legal and factual

demands on the authors of complaints.” 16630 Southfield Ltd., P’Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B.,

727 F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013).

Although this pleading standard does not require “‘detailed factual allegations,’ . . . [a]

pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause

of action,’” is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A complaint will not “suffice if it tenders ‘naked

assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

Instead, to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), “a

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on

its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Facial plausibility is established “when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The plausibility of an inference depends on

a host of considerations, including common sense and the strength of competing explanations for

the defendant’s conduct.” Flagstar Bank , 727 F.3d at 504 (citations omitted). Further, the

Court holds pro se complaints “‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by

lawyers.’” Garrett v. Belmont Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t., 374 F. App’x 612, 614 (6th Cir. 2010)

(quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). This lenient treatment, however, has

limits; “‘courts should not have to guess at the nature of the claim asserted.’” Frengler v. Gen.

Motors, 482 F. App’x 975, 976–77 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594

(6th Cir. 1989)).

II.

According to Plaintiff’s Complaint, in 2013, he applied for and was ultimately approved

to receive $115 per month in Disability Financial Assistance (“DFA”) from the State of Ohio.

On July 13, 2017, he received a notice from the Summit County Department of Job and Family

Services informing him that he was no longer eligible to receive this payment due to legislation

changes, specifically, the enactment of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 49.

Following unsuccessful administrative appeals with the Ohio Department of Job and

Family Services, Plaintiff filed a state-court action in the Summit County Court of Common

Pleas, appealing the termination of his DFA benefits and further asserting that Am.Sub.H.B. No.

49 was unconstitutional both facially and as applied under both the Ohio and United States

Constitution. The state-court affirmed the termination of Plaintiff’s DFA benefits and upheld the

constitutionality of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 49, and Plaintiff’s appeals were unsuccessful. See King v.

Ohio Dep’t of Job & Family Serv., No. 29198, 2019-Ohio-2989 (Ohio App. 9th Dist. 2019), cert.

denied, 157 Ohio St.3d 1440.

In this action, as in his state-court action, Plaintiff maintains that the elimination of the

DFA program violates the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment to the United States Constitution. More specifically, Plaintiff alleges that “[t]he

elimination of the DFA program . . . deprives [him] of his constitutional right of due process of

law as he was not notified of any proposal to eliminate the DFA program prior to its

elimination.” (Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 54, ECF No. 1-1.) Plaintiff further asserts that “elimination of the

DFA program . . . is not rationally related to a legitimate government purpose and violates [his]

rights to equal protection of the laws.” (Id. at ¶ 55.) Plaintiff also maintains that elimination of

the DFA program violates various provisions in the Ohio Constitution. He seeks declaratory and

injunctive relieve, as well as a monetary award consisting of a retroactive award of DFA

benefits.

III.

The doctrine of res judicata or claim preclusion operates to bar Plaintiff’s claims. Under

the doctrine of res judicata or claim preclusion, “a final judgment on the merits bars further

claims by parties or their privies based on the same cause of action.” Montana v. U.S., 440 U.S.

147, 153 (1979). The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has instructed that res

judicata requires proof of the following four elements: “(1) a final decision on the merits by a

court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a subsequent action between the same parties or their privies;

(3) an issue in the subsequent action which was litigated or which should have been litigated in

the prior action; and (4) an identity of the causes of action.” Kane v. Magna Mixer Co., 71 F.3d

555, 560 (6th Cir. 1995). “The purpose of res judicata is to promote the finality of judgments,

and thereby increase certainty, discourage multiple litigation, and conserve judicial resources.”

Westwood Chemical Co. v. Kulick, 656 F.2d 1224, 1227 (6th Cir. 1981). See also Wilkins v.

Jakeway, 183 F.3d 528, 535 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that res judicata applies even where the

second suit presents different theories of the case arising from the same factual situation).

In the instant action, Plaintiff simply reasserts the same claims, causes of action, and

injuries arising out of the same facts he alleged in his state-court case. See King v. Ohio Dep’t of

Job & Family Serv., No. 29198, 2019-Ohio-2989 (Ohio App. 9th Dis. 2019), cert. denied, 157

Ohio St.3d 1440. It makes no difference that the judgment was obtained in state court—“[s]tate-

court judgments are given the same preclusive effect under the doctrines of res judicata and

collateral estoppel as they would receive in courts of the rendering state.” Anderson v. City of

Blue Ash, 798 F.3d 338, 350 (6th Cir. 2015). Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that the

Court DISMISS this action pursuant to § 1915(e) as barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

To the extent Plaintiff is instead attempting to appeal the state-court judgment affirming

the termination of his DFA benefits, a doctrine known as Rooker-Feldman limits this Court’s

ability to adjudicate such claims. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415–16 (1923);

District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983). “The Rooker-

Feldman doctrine embodies the notion that appellate review of state-court decisions and the

validity of state judicial proceedings is limited to the Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1257,

and thus that federal district courts lack jurisdiction to review such matters.” In re Cook, 551

F.3d 542, 548 (6th Cir. 2009). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies to cases “brought by state-

court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district

court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those

judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Ind. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). “The

pertinent question in determining whether a federal district court is precluded under the Rooker-

Feldman doctrine from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction over a claim is whether the ‘source

of the injury’ upon which plaintiff bases his federal claim is the state court judgment.” In re

Cook, 551 F.3d at 548. Thus, to the extent Plaintiff is attempting to appeal from the state court’s

decision, it is RECOMMENDED that this action be DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction

pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

IV.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis (ECF No. 1) is GRANTED.

In addition, for the reasons set forth above, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS

Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS

If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen

(14) days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those

specific proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made, together with

supporting authority for the objection(s). A Judge of this Court shall make a de novo

determination of those portions of the Report or specified proposed findings or recommendations

to which objection is made. Upon proper objections, a Judge of this Court may accept, reject, or

modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive further

evidence or may recommit this matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1).

The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and

Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the District Judge review the Report

and Recommendation de novo, and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of

the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140

(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Chelsey M. Vascura

CHELSEY M. VASCURA

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE