The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
ROY LEE ANDERSON, JR.,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action 2:19-cv-4001
Judge George C. Smith
Magistrate Judge Jolson
JUDGE TED BARROWS, et al.,
Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
AND ORDER
Plaintiff Roy Lee Anderson, Jr., who is proceeding pro se, is currently incarcerated at
Franklin County Correctional Center, and brings this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
against Defendants Judge Ted Barrows, Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Franklin
County, Ohio, Franklin County Sheriff’s Department, Franklin County Correction Center, Sheriff
Dallas Baldwin, and Sgt. Lewis Schrader. (Doc. 8). This matter is before the Undersigned for
consideration of Plaintiff’s Motions for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 1) and the initial
screen of Plaintiff’s complaint, (Doc. 8), under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(A);(e)(2).
For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED.
Furthermore, having performed an initial screen and for the reasons that follow, it is
RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff’s complaint in its entirety pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
I. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
Upon consideration of Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and (2) (Doc. 1), Plaintiff’s Motion is GRANTED. Plaintiff is required to
pay the full amount of the Court’s $350 filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Plaintiff’s certified
trust fund statement reveals that he has an insufficient amount to pay the full filing fee.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), the custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate trust account at the
Franklin County Correction Center is DIRECTED to submit to the Clerk of the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Ohio as an initial partial payment, 20% of the greater of
either the average monthly deposits to the inmate trust account or the average monthly balance in
the inmate trust account, for the six-months immediately preceding the filing of the Complaint.
After full payment of the initial, partial filing fee, the custodian shall submit 20% of the inmate’s
preceding monthly income credited to the account, but only when the amount in the account
exceeds $10.00 until the full fee of $350.00 has been paid to the Clerk of this Court. 28 U.S.C. §
1915(b)(2). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997). Checks should be made
payable to Clerk, United States District Court and should be sent to:
Prisoner Accounts Receivable
260 U.S. Courthouse
85 Marconi Boulevard
Columbus, Ohio 43215
The prisoner’s name and this case number must be included on each check.
Consequently, it is ORDERED that Plaintiff be allowed to prosecute his action without
prepayment of fees or costs and that judicial officers who render services in this action shall do so
as if the costs had been prepaid. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to mail a copy of this Order
to Plaintiff and the prison cashier’s office. The Clerk is further DIRECTED to forward a copy of
this Order to the Court’s financial office in Columbus.
II. INITIAL SCREEN
A. Relevant Standard
Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must dismiss the complaint,
or any portion of it, that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2). Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to set forth
“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
In reviewing a complaint, the Court must construe it in Plaintiff’s favor, accept all well-
pleaded factual allegations as true, and evaluate whether it contains “enough facts to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). On the other hand, a complaint that
consists of “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action”
is insufficient. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Although pro se complaints are to be
construed liberally, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), “basic pleading essentials” are
still required. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989).
B. Plaintiff’s Complaint
This is Plaintiff’s second complaint against Defendants. (See 2:19-cv-3631, Doc. 1). With
regard to his first complaint, the Undersigned recommended granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave
to Proceed in forma pauperis but recommended dismissing the complaint in its entirety on the
grounds of immunity and failure to state a claim for relief. (Id., Doc. 6). Despite Plaintiff’s
objections, Judge Smith adopted the Undersigned’s Report and Recommendation and dismissed
Plaintiff’s case without prejudice. (Id., Doc. 8).
Upon review of Plaintiff’s second complaint, (Doc. 1-1), the Undersigned found that it was
substantially similar if not identical in substance to his first complaint. Both stemmed from an
unfavorable decision issued by Judge Ted Barrows, of Franklin County Municipal Court. (See
generally 2:19-cv-3631, Doc. 1; 2:19-cv-4001, Doc. 6). After Plaintiff was arrested for violating
a protective order, Judge Barrows sentenced Plaintiff to 148 days at Franklin County Correctional
Center with restricted privileges. (Id.)1. Specifically, Judge Barrows purportedly ordered that
Plaintiff be housed in administrative segregation and placed on phone restriction. (Id.). Given
these similarities, the Undersigned directed Plaintiff to articulate a meaningful difference between
his two complaints. (Id. at 2).
On October 25, 2019 Plaintiff filed a revised complaint as well as a notice explaining the
differences between his two complaints. (Doc. 9). But the only meaningful distinction the
Undersigned can ascertain is that, according to Plaintiff, the first set of civil protection violations
against him have been dismissed since he filed his first complaint. (Id. at 2–3). Accordingly,
Plaintiff contends that Defendants are violating his constitutional rights by continuing to house
him in administrative segregation. He states:
As Plaintiff was placed in Administrative Segregation solely for allegedly violating
the terms of his Civil Protection Order and all charges being dismissed Plaintiff still
remains in Administrative Segregation per Judge Ted Barrows Request and
Authorization of Deputy Sheriff Chief John Doe.
(Doc. 8 at 2).
1 According to his most recent filing, Plaintiff was scheduled to be released last month.
(Doc. 9 at 3). But according to the Franklin County Sheriff Inmate Database, Plaintiff has not
been released.
Plaintiff’s second complaint fails for the same reasons as his first. And the fact that his
protective order violations have purportedly been dismissed does not change this outcome.
To start, and as stated in the Undersigned’s Report and Recommendation, Judge Barrows
is entitled to judicial immunity and cannot be held liable for actions taken in his judicial capacity.
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806 (1982). Plaintiff’s contention that Judge Barrows does
not have jurisdiction over him is without merit. (See Docs. 8, 9). Defendants Sheriff Baldwin and
Sgt. Schrader, who Plaintiff accuses of enforcing Judge Barrows’ order are also immune from suit.
See Wilson v. Karnes, No. 2:06-CV-392, 2009 WL 467566, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 24, 2009)
(rejecting plaintiff’s claim for false imprisonment because, after plaintiff’s prison sentence, sheriff
“had a duty to jail him pursuant to that court order”) (citing Mays v. Sudderth, 95 F.3d 107, 113
(5th Cir. 1996) (holding that “an official acting within the scope of his authority is absolutely
immune from a suit for damages to the extent that the cause of action arises from his compliance
with a facially valid judicial order issued by a court acting within its jurisdiction”)). Plaintiff’s
claim that there is no longer a basis for being housed in administrative segregation does not strip
these Defendants of their immunity.
Moreover, the factual allegations regarding administrative housing, phone privileges, and
access to a grievance system are the same in both complaints. Therefore, the Undersigned’s
conclusion that these allegations fail to state a cognizable liberty interest remains unchanged. (See
2:19-cv-3631, Doc. 6 (finding that Plaintiff’s claims regarding phone restriction and administrative
segregation did not violate his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights)). Accordingly, Plaintiff
has failed to identify any meaningful difference between his recent complaint and his now-
dismissed first complaint.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis is
GRANTED (Doc. 1); however, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff’s
Complaint, (Doc. 8), in its entirety pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to mail a copy of this Order to Plaintiff and the prison
cashier’s office. The Clerk is further DIRECTED to forward a copy of this Order to the Court’s
financial office in Columbus.
Procedure on Objections
If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen
(14) days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those specific
proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made, together with supporting
authority for the objection(s). A Judge of this Court shall make a de novo determination of those
portions of the Report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is
made. Upon proper objections, a Judge of this Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in
part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive further evidence or may recommit
this matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and
Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the District Judge review the Report
and Recommendation de novo, and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of
the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140
(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: November 5, 2019 /s/ Kimberly A. Jolson
KIMBERLY A. JOLSON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE