Anderson v. Vandercar

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

Jeffery L. Anderson ) CASE NO: 5:24CV00221

)

Plaintiff, ) JUDGE JOHN ADAMS

)

v. ) OPINION AND ORDER

)

Ashley Vandercar, et al., )

)

)

Defendants. )

Pro se plaintiff Jeffery L. Anderson filed this civil rights action against Ashley

Vandercar and Dr. Zicoff. (Doc. No. 1). Plaintiff also filed an application to proceed in

forma pauperis. (Doc. No. 2). That application is granted.

I. Background

Plaintiff’s complaint is very brief. It contains one paragraph stating “Dr.

Vandercar and Dr. Zicoff filed a force medication order after Dr. Zicoff told me it was

clear for me to go to court” and “the medication caused me to have a very high glucose

reading level. It is a long acting medication.” (Doc. No. 1 at 6). Plaintiff seeks five

million dollars in damages.

II. Standard of Review

Pro se pleadings are liberally construed. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365,

102 S. Ct. 700, 70 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,

520, 92 S. Ct. 594, 30 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1972). The district court, however, is required to

dismiss an in forma pauperis action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) if it fails to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted, or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 104 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1989); Lawler v.

Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990); Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194,

197 (6th Cir. 1996). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law or fact when it is premised on

an indisputably meritless legal theory or when the factual contentions are clearly

baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. A cause of action fails to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted when it lacks “plausibility in the complaint.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007).

A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that

the pleader is entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78, 129 S. Ct. 1937,

173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009). The factual allegations in the pleading must be sufficient to

raise the right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the

allegations in the complaint are true. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The plaintiff is not

required to include detailed factual allegations, but he or she must provide more than “an

unadorned, the defendant unlawfully harmed me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A

pleading that offers legal conclusions or a simple recitation of the elements of a cause of

action will not meet this pleading standard. Id. The Court is “not bound to accept as true a

legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286,

106 S. Ct. 2932, 92 L. Ed. 2d 209 (1986).

In reviewing a complaint, the Court must construe the pleading in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff. Bibbo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 151 F.3d 559, 561 (6th

Cir. 1998).

III. Discussion

The Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard

than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. El Bey v. Roop, 530 F.3d 407, 413 (6th Cir.

2008). However, the “lenient treatment generally accorded to pro se litigants has limits.”

Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996). Liberal construction for pro se

litigants does not “abrogate basic pleading requirements.” Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591,

594 (6th Cir. 1989). The Court is not required to conjure unpleaded facts or construct

claims against defendants on behalf of a pro se plaintiff. See Beaudett v. City of

Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985) (District courts are not required to conjure

up questions never squarely presented to them or to construct full claims from sentence

fragments. To do so would “require . . . [the courts] to explore exhaustively all potential

claims of a pro se plaintiff. . . [and] would . . . transform the district court from its

legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest

arguments and most successful strategies for a party.”) (citation omitted). Although

specific facts are not required, to meet the basic minimum notice pleading requirements

of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff’s complaint must give the

defendants fair notice of what the plaintiff’s legal claims are and the factual grounds on

which they rest. See Bassett v. Nat’l Collegiate Ath. Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426, 437 (6th Cir.

2008); see also Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 437 (6th Cir.

1988) (all complaints must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all

material elements of some viable legal theory to satisfy federal notice pleading

requirements) (citations omitted).

Here, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to meet even the most liberal reading of the

Twombly and Iqbal standard as his pleading fails to set forth “a short and plain statement

of [any] claim showing that [Plaintiff] is entitled to relief[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

Rather, Plaintiff’s very brief complaint contains very few facts, and it fails to assert a

cognizable claim based on recognized legal authority. This Court and Defendants are left

to guess at basic elements of Plaintiff’s purported claim. The complaint does not satisfy

the minimum pleading requirements of Rule 8 and is therefore dismissed on this basis.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, this action is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B). The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal

from this decision could not be taken in good faith.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

June 7, 2024 _/s/ John R. Adams________________

JUDGE JOHN R. ADAMS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT