Newell v. Chambers-Smith

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

TIMOTHY NEWELL, ) CASE NO. 1:24-cv-00042

)

Plaintiff, ) JUDGE CHARLES E. FLEMING

)

v. )

) ORDER

ANNETTE CHAMBERS-SMITH, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

)

)

Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for a Determination Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

11(b)(1), (2), & (3) (“Rule 11 Motion”). (ECF No. 7). Plaintiff contends that Defendants’ counsel

purposefully and maliciously made false statements in Defendants’ motion to dismiss and reply in

support of the motion to dismiss: namely, that Plaintiff: (i) had been sentenced to consecutive

terms of imprisonment for crimes committed while on parole; and (ii) Plaintiff lost out on parole

consideration because of prison misconduct. (Id. at PageID #103–04). Plaintiff requests that the

Court find that Defendants’ counsel violated Rule 11(b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(3). (Id. at PageID

#104). The Court construes Plaintiff’s Rule 11 Motion as a motion for sanctions.

In their opposition brief, Defendants concede that Plaintiff is correct that he was never on

parole or sentenced to crimes committed while on parole. (ECF No. 8, PageID #107). However,

Defendants note that the record reflects Plaintiff was convicted for escape and possession of

criminal tools and those felonies received a sentence that ran consecutive to his prior convictions

in Case Nos. CR-040130 and CR-040174. (Id.). They argue that it is irrelevant whether Plaintiff’s

convictions for escape and possession of criminal tools are related to conduct occurring while on

parole or during incarceration because it would have had an equal negative impact on the

considerations of the Parole Board; thus, there was no false assertion regarding the import of the

escape and criminal tools convictions on Plaintiff’s parole hearings.1 (Id. at 107–08).

The district court is empowered to award sanctions for party or counsel misconduct even

when it lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case in which the request for sanctions is made,

so long as the misconduct is collateral to the merits of the case. Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S.

131, 136-37, 112 S. Ct. 1076, 117 L. Ed. 2d 280 (1992); see Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp.,

496 U.S. 384, 110 S. Ct. 2447, 110 L. Ed. 2d 359 (1990) (affirming award of sanctions after the

plaintiff had voluntarily dismissed the case). “[An] imposition of a Rule 11 sanction is not a

judgment on the merits of an action. Rather, it requires the determination of a collateral issue:

whether the attorney has abused the judicial process, and, if so, what sanction would be

appropriate.” Willy, 503 U.S. at 138 (quoting Cooter, 496 U.S. at 395–96).

Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b) provides that an attorney submitting a court filing to the Court

represents, inter alia, that: (i) the filing “is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as

to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation”; (ii) “the claims,

defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument

for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law”; and (iii) “the

factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have

evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 11(b)(1)–(3). Rule 11(c) provides the enforcement mechanism for Rule 11(b)’s

requirements, and states that a court may impose sanctions on a party and his attorney.

1 “In the present case, based on the allegations contained in the Complaint, it was reasonable to believe that

Plaintiff’s convictions for escape and possession of criminal tools were the result of the crimes he

committed while in jail, while in prison, or while he was out on parole. Either way, they were among the

possibilities the Parole Board had within its discretion to consider when determining whether Plaintiff was

ready to be put on parole consistent with the safety of society.” (ECF No. 8, PageID #109).

Rule 11(c)(1) gives the Court discretion to award sanctions, and Rule 11(c)(4) requires that

any sanction the Court imposes is “limited to what suffices to deter repetition of the conduct or

comparable conduct by others similarly situated.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(4). The Sixth Circuit does

not permit district courts to use Rule 11 as a “general fee-shifting device.” Orlett v. Cincinnati

Microwave, Inc., 954 F.2d 414, 420 (6th Cir. 1992) (quoting Stephen B. Burbank, Rule // in

Transition: The Report of the Third Circuit Task Force on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 12

(1989)). District courts are instead encouraged to consider “the nature of the violation committed,

the circumstances in which it was committed, the circumstances (including the financial state) of

the individual to be sanctioned, and those sanctioning measures that would suffice to deter that

individual from similar violations in the future.” /d. (citations omitted).

Having considered the Rule 11 Motion, Defendants’ response in opposition, and the record,

the Court finds that the statements in Defendants’ filings concerning Plaintiffs convictions for

escape and possession of criminal tool: (1) did not violate Rule 11(b); (11) did not prejudice Plaintiff

or affect the Court’s analysis of Defendants’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 3); and (ii) do not

warrant sanctions, monetary or otherwise. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Rule 11 Motion (ECF No. 7)

is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: May 6, 2024

CHARLES E.FLEMING

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE