“[T]he action of striking a pleading should be sparingly used by the courts. It is a drastic remedy to be resorted to only when required for the purposes of justice.”
How later courts described this case
- “[T]he action of striking a pleading should be sparingly used by the courts. It is a drastic remedy to be resorted to only when required for the purposes of justice.”
- “However, within this framework, the court retains ‘liberal discretion’ to strike filings as it deems appropriate.” (citation omitted)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
MARJORIE PATTERSON, ) CASE NO. 1:23-cv-681
)
Plaintiff, ) JUDGE CHARLES E. FLEMING
)
v. )
)
HG OHIO EMPLOYEE HOLDING CORP., )
et al., ) ORDER
)
Defendants. )
Before the Court is the motion of Defendant Lionstone HZ OpCo Holdings, LLC
(“Lionstone”) to strike, or in the alternative, dismiss the second amended complaint (“Motion to
Strike”). (ECF No. 25). For the reasons discussed below, the Motion to Strike is GRANTED IN
PART and Lionstone and Holland Management, Inc. are STRICKEN as party defendants.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On March 31, 2023, Plaintiff Marjorie Patterson filed a complaint against Oak Grove
Manor Operating Company, LLC (“Oak Grove”) and HG Ohio Operations, LLC d/b/a HG Ohio
(“HG Ohio”). (ECF No. 1). On June 1, 2023, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint that dropped
Oak Grove as a defendant and asserted claims against HG Ohio and HG Ohio Employee Holding
Corp. (“HG Holding”) (collectively, the “HG Defendants”). (ECF No. 6). The first amended
complaint asserted four claims against the HG Defendants: (i) Age Discrimination, in violation of
Ohio Rev. Code §§ 4112.02, et seq. (Count One); (ii) Violation of Ohio Public Policy under Ohio
Rev. Code § 4123.90 (Count Two); (iii) Creation of a Hostile Work Environment Based on Age,
in violation of Ohio Rev. Code §§ 4112.02(A) and 4112.99 (Count Three); and (iv) Unlawful
Intentional Age Discrimination, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(“ADEA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 621, et seq. (Count Four). (Id. at PageID #99–106).
On June 15, 2023, the HG Defendants filed an answer to the first amended complaint.
(ECF No. 6). On January 19, 2024, Plaintiff and the HG Defendants filed a Stipulation for Leave
to Amend Complaint to Add Additional Party Defendant. (ECF No. 14). The parties stipulated
under Rule 15(a)(2) to amendment of the pleadings to add Holland Management HZ, LLC
(“Holland Management”) as a party defendant. (Id. at PageID #90). The parties further stipulated
that Plaintiff would have 14 days to file a second amended complaint naming Holland
Management as a party defendant in this action. (Id.). The same day, the Court entered a marginal
order granting the parties’ stipulation for leave to amend the complaint. (ECF No. 15).
On February 1, 2024, Plaintiff filed her second amended complaint, adding Holland
Management as a party defendant and asserting the same four counts from the previous pleadings
against all the defendants (Age Discrimination, Violation of Ohio Public Policy, Hostile Work
Environment, Age Discrimination). (ECF No. 16). The second amended complaint also added
Holland Management, Inc. (“HMI”) and Lionstone as party defendants. (Id. at PageID #94–95).
The HG Defendants filed an answer to second amended complaint and asserted a crossclaim of
indemnification against Holland Management. (ECF No. 21). To date, neither Holland
Management nor HMI have entered an appearance in this action.
II. MOTION TO STRIKE THE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
On March 11, 2024, Lionstone filed its Motion to Strike. (ECF No. 25). Lionstone argues
that the Court should strike the second amended complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f)
because Plaintiff added Lionstone as a party defendant, which exceeded the scope of the parties’
stipulation and the Court’s order for leave to amend. (Id. at PageID #173–75). Alternatively,
Lionstone argues that the Court should dismiss the claims against Lionstone in the second amended
complaint with prejudice because: (1) Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies, as she
did not name Lionstone in her pre-suit administrative charge of age discrimination; (11) Plaintiffs
age discrimination claims against Lionstone are time-barred; and (ii1) the claims against Lionstone
are implausible, as it did not exist until after the events alleged in the pleadings. (/d. at PageID
#175-84).
Plaintiff argues that striking of the second amended complaint is unwarranted because:
(1) other federal courts have allowed amendments that exceeded the leave granted when doing so
served the purposes of judicial economy; and (11) here, Plaintiff “merely amended to add two
related parties, one of whom was expressly mentioned in the stipulated leave to amend, with
supporting allegations to support the identity and role of the new party defendants.” (ECF No. 26,
PageID #204—07). Plaintiff states that she sought to add Lionstone as a party defendant after
supplemental discovery responses from the HG Defendants indicated that Lionstone currently
operates and/or employs the employees at Oak Grove Manor. (/d. at PageID #207-08). She
further states that discovery is needed to establish Lionstone’s relationship to the HG Defendants
and Holland Management—in order to establish whether Lionstone is the successor to the other
defendants or their alter ago). (/d. at PageID #208).
Plaintiff argues that her claims against Lionstone should not be dismissed based on a failure
to exhaust administrative remedies because Lionstone shares a clear identity of interest with the
HG Defendants and Holland Management (the parties named in the relevant EEOC complaint).
(Id. at PageID #208-12). Finally, Plaintiff argues that Lionstone’s motion amounts to a motion
for summary judgment and she should be allowed a full and fair opportunity to conduct discovery
to properly oppose such a motion. (/d. at PageID #213-14).
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS
Addressing Lionstone’s request to strike the second amended complaint, Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 15(a)(1) provides that:
A party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course within: (A) 21 days after
serving it, or (B) if the pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is required,
21 days after service of a responsive pleading or 21 days after service of a motion
under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is earlier.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1) (emphasis added). “In all other cases, a party may amend its pleadings
only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2)
(emphasis added).
Under Rule 12(f), a district court is authorized to “strike from a pleading . . . any redundant,
immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). “Motions to strike are
viewed with disfavor and are not frequently granted.” Operating Eng’rs Local 324 Health Care
Plan v. G&W Constr. Co., 783 F.3d 1045, 1050 (6th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted); see also Brown
& Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. United States, 201 F.2d 819, 822 (6th Cir. 1953) (“[T]he action
of striking a pleading should be sparingly used by the courts. It is a drastic remedy to be resorted
to only when required for the purposes of justice.”). However, district courts in this circuit have
stricken amendments pursuant to Rule 12(f) when they have exceeded the scope of leave granted
by the court. See, e.g., Johnson v. Knox Cnty., No. 3:19-cv-179-PLR-DCP, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
88828, at *14–16 (E.D. Tenn. May 20, 2020) (striking the additional parties added by a pro se
plaintiff that exceeded the permission granted by the district court); Wheat v. Chase Bank, No.
3:11-cv-309, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14003, at *20 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 3, 2014) (“The Court finds
that Plaintiff's non-authorized amendments were ‘impertinent,’ as they exceeded the scope of the
leave that the Court granted, and that allowing them to remain in an active pleading would frustrate
the purpose of the Court’s original order.”); In re Keithley Instruments, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 2d 908,
912 (striking portions of the amended pleadings that exceeded court’s grant of leave to amend).
Ultimately, district courts have broad discretion to strike filings when they deem it appropriate.
McKinney v. Bayer Corp., No. 10-CV-224, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69247, at *4 (N.D. Ohio July
12, 2010) (citing Frisby v. Keith D. Weiner & Assoc., 669 F. Supp. 2d 863, 867 (N.D. Ohio. 2009);
see In re Keithley Instruments, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 2d at 911 (“However, within this framework, the
court retains ‘liberal discretion’ to strike filings as it deems appropriate.” (citation omitted)).
The joint stipulation filed by Plaintiff and the HG Defendants sought permission to solely
add Holland Management as a party defendant. (ECF No. 14). The Court’s order granted leave
to amend the pleadings solely on this basis. (See ECF No. 15). The second amended complaint
added two additional parties not mentioned or referenced in either the joint stipulation or the
Court’s order granting leave to amend—HMI and Lionstone. (ECF No. 16, PageID #93–95).
Plaintiff’s response in opposition to the instant motion essentially concedes that the second
amended complaint exceeded the scope of the Court’s order, but argues that the Court should not
strike the amended pleadings on the basis of judicial efficiency. (ECF No. 26, PageID #204–06).
Plaintiff also states that she added Lionstone as a party defendant because supplemental discovery
responses from the HG Defendants, which were received after the Court issued the order granting
leave to amend, revealed that Lionstone “operates and/or employs employees at Oak Grove Manor
and is in possession of documents, including relevant personnel files, requested by Plaintiff in
discovery.” (Id. at PageID #207–08) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Court finds that the amendment and addition of HMI and Lionstone as party defendants
exceeded the scope of the Court’s order granting leave to amend and the agreement of the parties.
While Plaintiff might have discovered new information regarding parties that it believed should
be added to this action, she cannot take a shortcut around the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
unilaterally add them as party defendants outside the strictures of Rule 15(a). Plaintiff already had
an opportunity to file an amended complaint, as a matter of course, and took advantage of that
opportunity. Plaintiff could have filed a renewed motion for leave to amend or could have sought
a stipulation to add the new party defendants. She failed to do either, and chose instead to go
beyond the scope of the leave granted by this Court.
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS IN PART Lionstone’s request to strike the second
amended complaint and shall STRIKE HMI and Lionstone as party defendants. The Court will
provide Plaintiff with an opportunity to file a new motion for leave to file an amended complaint.
Because the Court has stricken Lionstone as a party defendant, the Court declines to address the
alternative arguments concerning dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
VI. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court ORDERS as follows:
1. Lionstone’s Motion to Strike (ECF No. 25) is GRANTED IN PART;
2. Holland Management, Inc. and Lionstone HZ OpCo Holdings, LLC are STRICKEN
as party defendants WITHOUT PREJUDICE;
3. Plaintiff shall have 30 days from the issuance of this Order to file a motion for leave to
amend the complaint to add new party defendants; and
4. The clerk’s entry of default against Holland Management, Inc. is VACATED.!
IT ISSO ORDERED.
Dated: May 7, 2024 ‘adi Have
CHARLES E.FLEMING
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
' On April 3, 2024, Plaintiff filed an application for entry of default and the clerk entered default against
HMI. (ECF Nos. 27, 29). Because HMI was stricken as a party defendant, the entry of default must be
vacated.