The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
ANTONIO WILLIAMSON, ) CASE NO: 5:21-cv-565
)
) JUDGE JOHN R. ADAMS
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. ) ORDER AND DECISION
)
SHERIFF KANDY FATHEREE, et al., )
) (Resolves Doc. 40)
Defendants. )
)
Pending before the Court is Defendant Sheriff Kandy Fatheree’s motion for judgment on
the pleadings. Doc. 40. Plaintiff Antonio Williamson has opposed the motion, and Fatheree has
replied in support. The Court now resolves the parties’ arguments.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) provides that “[a]fter the pleadings are closed — but early enough not
to delay trial — a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” The standard for evaluating a
motion for judgment on the pleadings is the same as that applicable to a motion to dismiss under
Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Ziegler v. IBP Hog Market, Inc., 249 F.3d 509, 511-12
(6th Cir. 2001). The complaint must contain “either direct or inferential allegations respecting all
the material elements to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory.” Scheid v. Fanny
Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 436 (6th Cir. 1988) (quotations and emphasis omitted).
1. Background
Williamson filed his complaint against Fatheree in her official capacity, the former sheriff,
the city of Akron, and numerous individual officers. The complaint stems from allegations related
to Williamson’s former employment as a lieutenant in the Summit County Sheriff’s office. While
working as an officer, Williamson was indicted on charges of rape, kidnapping, sexual battery,
and sexual imposition. While those charges were pending, further investigation revealed that
Williamson had searched for his own name in the Ohio Law Enforcement Gateway (“OHLEG”).
As a result, an additional 10 counts of criminal misuse of OHLEG were added to the charges
against Williamson.
2. Status as Employer
Fatheree first contends that Williamson’s cannot sue her in her official capacity as the
Summit County Sheriff under Ohio Revised Code § 4112.02. Specifically, Fatheree contends that
as an individual defendant, she cannot meet the statutory definition of employer. Fatheree goes
on to argue that specifically under § 4112.02, the Court should ignore that “[a]s long as the
government entity receives notice and an opportunity to respond, an official-capacity suit is, in all
respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.
159, 166 (1985). Fatheree claims that this maxim applies on § 1983 claims and should not apply
to Williamson’s claim under Ohio law. However, Ohio law also routinely applies this maxim.
See, e.g., Cool v. Brown-Clark, 2020-Ohio-6968, ¶ 22, 165 N.E.3d 734, 740 (citations omitted)
(“It is well settled law that an action against a government official in his or her official capacity is
not an action against the official, but, instead, is one against the official's office and, thus, is treated
as an action against the entity itself.”). Accordingly, this argument provides no basis to dismiss
the complaint.1
1 The Court notes that even if this were a valid basis, it would allow amendment of the complaint
to formally name Summit County as the defendant. As the County has clearly had notice of this
suit from the outset, no prejudice would flow from such an amendment.
3. Timeliness of Claims
Fatheree next contends that Williamson’s wrongful termination and retaliation claims are
time barred. Williamson was terminated on April 19, 2018 and filed this suit on March 10, 2021.
The parties agree that Ohio law allows for a six-year statute of limitation for both of these claims.
As such, the claims are on their face not time barred. Much of Fatheree’s argument is focused
upon the fact that Williamson appears to rely in his complaint upon events that occurred well
outside that six-year window. However, such arguments are more relevant to whether the
underlying evidence supporting those events will be properly considered when it evaluates the
merits of the claims. The fact that such allegations are contained in the complaint, however, does
not impact the underlying fact that the claims themselves were brought well within the six-year
statute of limitations.
4. Issue Preclusion
Fatheree next argues that Williamson’s claim of race discrimination related to his
termination is barred by issue preclusion. Specifically, Fatheree contends that certain findings
made by the state court in an appeal from the dismissal of criminal charges against Williamson
preclude his claim.
Under Ohio law, “[i]ssue preclusion precludes the relitigation of an issue that has been
actually and necessarily litigated and determined in a prior action.” MetroHealth Med. Ctr. v.
Hoffmann–LaRoche, Inc., 80 Ohio St.3d 212, 217 (1997) (citation and internal quotations omitted).
Issue preclusion applies when a fact or issue “(1) was actually and directly litigated in the prior
action, (2) was passed upon and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, and (3) when the
party against whom [issue preclusion] is asserted was a party in privity with a party to the prior
action.” Thompson v. Wing, 70 Ohio St.3d 176, 183 (1994). Fatheree does not, and indeed cannot,
allege that the criminal matter necessarily litigated the underlying basis of Williamson’s
termination. As such, issue preclusion cannot serve to dismiss his claim for race discrimination.
With that said, the Court notes that there are strong arguments that certain facts were established
in the state court proceedings that will not be subject to dispute in this litigation. Those facts,
however, do not warrant a full dismissal of the race discrimination claim at this stage of the
proceedings.
5. Retaliation under R.C. § 4112.02(I)
Finally, Fatheree contends that Williamson’s cause of action of § 4112.02(I) falls short of
alleging a proper cause of action against her. Williamson offered no opposition to the arguments
set forth by Fatheree and effectively abandoned this claim. Accordingly, the § 4112.02(I) claim
against Fatheree is hereby dismissed.
6. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Fatheree’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED
IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. This matter is hereby scheduled for a telephone conference
for counsel for all remaining parties on April 30, 2024 at 2:00 p.m. No later than April 26, 2024,
the parties shall file an updated report of parties’ planning meeting with dates to move this matter
forward to motion practice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
April 22, 2024 /s/ Judge John R. Adams
Date JUDGE JOHN R. ADAMS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT