Robinson v. County of Mahoning

PEARSON, J.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

MONTY ROBINSON, )

) CASE NO. 4:23CV2251

Plaintiff, )

) JUDGE BENITA Y. PEARSON

v. )

)

COUNTY OF MAHONING, et al., ) MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

) AND ORDER

Defendants. ) [Resolving ECF Nos. 3 and 4]

Pro Se Plaintiff Monty Robinson filed this action under the Religious Land Use and

Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a), and 42 U.S.C. § 1983

against County of Mahoning , Mahoning County Commissioners D. Ditzler, C. Rimedio-

Righetti, and A. Traficanti, Mahoning County Jail Warden Cappabianca, Mahoning County Jail

Assistant Warden Lt. Diangelo, Mahoning County Sheriff Jerry Greene, Administrator Kountz,

Mahoning County Sheriff’s Deputy Tina Cunningham, Mahoning County Sheriff’s Deputy

Ibrahim, and Trinity Corporation. He brings claims against Commissioners Ditzler,

Rimedio-Righetti, and Traficanti, Warden Cappabianca, Assistant Warden Lt. Diangelo, Sheriff

Greene, Administrator Kountz, Deputy Cunningham, and Deputy Ibrahim in their individual and

official capacities. See ECF No. | at PageID #: 1. Plaintiff seeks $2,500,000 in damages. See

ECE No. 1 at PageID #: 12.

I. Background

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Plaintiff is a convicted state prisoner who was held periodically in the Mahoning County

Jail while awaiting trial and then while awaiting sentencing and transport to prison. See ECF No.

1 at PageID #: 17. The claims asserted in the Complaint (ECE No. 1) pertain to conditions of

confinement in the Mahoning County Jail.

First, Plaintiff asserts a claim under RLUIPA. He alleges the Mahoning County Jail

supplies inmates only Christian Bibles free of charge. Inmates practicing other faiths must

purchase religious materials. Plaintiff alleges that only Christian services are offered on Sunday.

Plaintiff states that he is a Sunni Muslim of the Islamic faith. He claims that Islamic inmates

must purchase their religious books from the canteen and are not provided a special area to make

congregational prayers. Plaintiff also alleges that no Iman comes to the facility. See ECF No. |

at PageID #: 2. He contends that during Ramadan, he was not provided with hot meals. Plaintiff

states that the facility would prepare Ramadan meals at the same time as they prepared regular

meals. He states that the meals would then be set aside and served to the Muslim inmates after

sundown. According to Plaintiff, this resulted in loss of heat, the accumulation of bacteria,

collection of dust, and attraction of gnats. See ECF No. | at PagelID #: 4.

Plaintiff then lists multiple conditions of confinement and asserts claims under the First,

Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. He states he has not been offered outdoor recreation

depriving him of fresh air. See ECF No. | at PageID #: 5. Plaintiff claims that inmates in

segregation are denied contact with all other people except deputies, are exposed to 24-hour

lighting, are not given extra shower time or clean-up time, and are exposed to the constant smell

of feces. See ECF No. 1 at PageID #: 6. He alleges the doors and lighting at the jail do not work

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properly. Plaintiff states there are no fire drills, and not enough chairs in the dorms for all the

inmates to sit and watch television. See ECF No. | at PageID #: 7. He contends the sleeping

mats are very thin. Plaintiff claims there is no clock in the dorms to help inmates keep track of

time. He states that cleaning supplies are limited. Plaintiff alleges that the facility does not

provide educational opportunities. See ECF No. 1 at PageID #: 8. He alleges that the jail has a

high number of inmate-on-inmate and inmate-on-staff assaults. See ECF No. 1 at PagelD #: 8, 9.

Plaintiff claims this is due to overcrowding and understaffing. He complains that inmates are

locked down from 5:45 p.m. to 7:45 am. See ECF No. 1 at PageID #: 9. Plaintiff alleges that

Trinity Corporation does not inspect the food trays before they are delivered to inmates. Plaintiff

indicates he has received food trays that were still dirty from the previous use, or contained

cockroaches, rocks, glass, or maggots. See ECF No. 1 at PageID #: 10. He alleges that the toilets

gurgle constantly and do not always flush properly. Finally, Plaintiff states that the showers have

black mold and gnats in them. See ECF No. | at PageID #: 12.

Plaintiff asserts that he was denied due process before being sent to segregation. He

states that on March 16, 2023, Deputy Cunningham was conducting a shake down of the Queen

pod with other deputies. See ECF No. | at PageID #: 5. Someone called out to Deputy

Cunningham addressing her by her first name. She assumed it was Plaintiff, although he denied

that he called out to her. He claims that the Mahoning County Jail’s administration placed him in

segregation without providing him a hearing. See ECF No. | at PageID #: 5-6. Plaintiff claims

this denied him due process. See ECF No. | at PagelID #: 6.

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Plaintiff states that the facility does not have a law library nor does it offer a legal

assistance program. See ECF No. | at PageID #: 8. He does not, however, specify a particular

constitutional right he believes was violated.

Finally, Plaintiff asserts two retaliation claims. He states that Deputy Ibrahim uses

retaliation tactics if an inmate uses the grievance process. See ECF No. | at PageID #: 9. But

Plaintiff does not elaborate on this statement. He also alleges that when inmates ask to see a

supervisor, the staff member activates the “man down” button, and reports that the inmate broke

arule. See ECF No. 1 at PageID #: 11. Again, Plaintiff does not elaborate on this statement.

II. Standard for Dismissal

Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364,

365 (1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), the district court is

required to dismiss an in forma pauperis action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) if it fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989); Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990); Sistrunk v.

City of Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996). An action has no arguable basis in law or

fact when it is premised on an indisputably meritless legal theory or when the factual contentions

are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327.

A cause of action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it lacks

“plausibility in th{e] complaint.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564 (2007). A

pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v. Igbal_, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.

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8(a)(2)). The factual allegations in the pleading must be sufficient to raise the right to relief

above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true.

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The plaintiff is not required to include detailed factual allegations,

but must provide more than “an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pleading that offers legal conclusions or a simple recitation of the

elements of a cause of action will not meet this pleading standard. Jd. In reviewing a complaint,

the court must construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Bibbo v. Dean

Witter Reynolds, Inc., 151 F.3d 559, 561 (6th Cir. 1998).

III. Law and Analysis

A. Individual Capacity vs. Official Capacity

Plaintiff brings his claims against Commissioners Ditzler, Rimedio-Righetti, and

Traficanti, Warden Cappabianca, Assistant Warden Lt. Diangelo, Sheriff Greene, Administrator

Kountz, Deputy Cunningham, and Deputy Ibrahim in their individual capacities and their official

capacities. Individual capacity claims seek to hold a defendant personally liable for damages.

These claims must be based on the defendant’s own actions. A defendant cannot be held liable

simply because she was charged with overseeing a subordinate who may have violated Plaintiff’ s

constitutional rights. Peatross vy. City of Memphis, 818 F.3d 233, 241 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing

Gregory vy. City of Louisville, 444 F.3d 725, 751 (6th Cir. 2006)). Instead, individual liability

requires some “active unconstitutional behavior” on the part of the defendant. Peatross, 818

F.3d at 241 (quoting Bass v. Robinson, 167 F.3d 1041, 1048 (6th Cir. 1999)). Consequently,

unless plaintiff affirmatively pleads the direct involvement of the defendant in the allegedly

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unconstitutional action, the complaint fails to state a claim against that defendant and dismissal is

warranted. See Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1984).

Conversely, claims asserted against defendants in their official capacity are claims

directed at the political entity they serve, not the individual defendant. In this case, the claims

asserted against Commissioners Ditzler, Rimedio-Righetti, and Traficanti, Warden Cappabianca,

Assistant Warden Lt. Diangelo, Sheriff Greene, Administrator Kountz, Deputy Cunningham, and

Deputy Ibrahim in their official capacity are claims directed at Mahoning County. Will v. Mich.

Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). These claims must be based on constitutional

violations that occurred as the result of the County’s own official policy enacted by its

lawmakers, Powers v. Hamilton Cnty. Pub. Defender Comm’n, 501 F.3d 592, 607 (6th Cir. 2007)

(citing Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978)), or by the

County’s own custom which, while not officially memorialized in an ordinance, is so permanent

and well-settled that it carries the force of law. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691.

1. Individual Capacity

Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Commissioners Ditzler, Rimedio-Righetti, and

Traficanti, Warden Cappabianca, Assistant Warden Lt. Diangelo, Sheriff Greene, Administrator

Kountz, Deputy Cunningham, and Deputy Ibrahim in their individual capacities. The only

defendants that Plaintiff identifies as being personally involved in the actions described in the

Complaint (ECF No. 1) are Deputy Cunningham, Deputy Ibrahim, and Trinity Corporation. He

claims Deputy Cunningham issued a conduct report for calling her by her first name. Plaintiff

claims Deputy Ibrahim retaliates against inmates for using the grievance system. And he alleges

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that Trinity Corporation does not inspect food trays. The remaining Defendants are sued because

they are responsible for operating the Mahoning County Jail. Because Plaintiff has not alleged

facts to suggest that Commissioners Ditzler, Rimedio-Righetti, and Traficanti, Warden

Cappabianca, Assistant Warden Lt. Diangelo, Sheriff Greene or Administrator Kountz personally

participated in any of the actions giving rise to the Complaint (ECF No. 1), the claims asserted

against them in their individual capacities are dismissed.

Plaintiff’s allegations against Deputy Cunningham are very brief. He states only that she

wrote a conduct ticket accusing him of disrespect because she believed he had called her by her

first name. Plaintiff claims this led to him being taken to segregation without a hearing. Plaintiff

claims he was denied due process. As an initial matter, he does not allege that Deputy

Cunningham was the person who decided he should go to segregation. Plaintiff merely alleges

that she was the author of the conduct report. Furthermore, the due process clause is triggered

only if the inmate establishes a deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty or property

interest. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005). Placement in segregation, alone, does

not implicate a protected liberty interest. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485 (1995).

Generally, unless placement in segregation is accompanied by a withdrawal of good time credits

or is for a significant period of time, no liberty or property interest will be found in the case. Id.

at 484. Plaintiff does not indicate that he was deprived of good time credits or that his placement

in segregation was for an unusually long period of time. Therefore, he fails to state a claim for

denial of due process.

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Plaintiff's claim against Deputy Ibrahim is similarly brief. He states only that “Deputies

working within the facility such as Deputy Ibrahim will and still use retaliation tactics as well as

tic for tac measures, or methods, whenever detainees decide to go about using the grievance

system that the facility has put into place.” ECF No. 1 at PageID #: 9. Plaintiff provides no

other information to explain this claim. Retaliation, though it is not expressly referred to in the

Constitution, is actionable because retaliatory actions may tend to chill an individual’s exercise

of First Amendment rights. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972). To state a prima

facie case for retaliation prohibited by the First Amendment, Plaintiff must establish: 1) he

engaged in protected conduct; 2) an adverse action was taken against him that would deter a

person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that conduct; and, 3) that a causal

connection exists between the first two elements. Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th

Cir. 1999). Although filing a grievance could be protected conduct if the grievance was not

frivolous, Plaintiff has not alleged facts to suggest that he filed non-frivolous grievances, that

Deputy Ibrahim took an action against him, what kind of action Deputy Ibrahim took against

him, and how that action was related to the deputy’s actions. This claim is stated solely as a

general legal conclusion. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for retaliation against Deputy

Ibrahim.

Finally, Plaintiff alleges that Trinity Corporation does not inspect food trays before

sending them out to inmates. Plaintiff states he has discovered rocks, glass, and insects on his

trays. Trinity Corporation can only be held liable for its own wrongdoing. It cannot be held

liable for the actions of its employees under a respondeat superior theory of liability. Plaintiff

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does not allege facts suggesting Trinity Corporation had a corporate policy of not inspecting food

trays before they are served to inmates. A policy cannot be inferred, as it is equally possible that

individual Trinity Corporation employees at the Mahoning County Jail carelessly or inattentively

performed their jobs and allowed trays to go out to the prison population with contaminates on

the trays. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for relief against Trinity Corporation.

2. Official Capacity

Plaintiff also fails to state a claim against County of Mahoning. He does not identify an

ordinance enacted by the county that led to the conditions to which he objects, nor does he allege

facts suggesting the conditions were the result of an official custom of Mahoning County as

opposed to the actions of individuals working within the jail. As a result, his claims against

Mahoning County must be dismissed.

B. Standing

Furthermore, Plaintiff fails to allege facts suggesting he has standing to raise claims

pertaining to assaults on other inmates or staff. Plaintiff claims the institution has a high rate of

inmate-on-inmate fights, but he does not allege he personally experienced violence nor does he

offer any explanation of what he considers to be a “high rate.” He alleges that a staff member

was raped by an inmate. Plaintiff was arrested on March 23, 2023. There is no indication,

however, that he was at the Mahoning County Jail on May 5, 2022 when the assault on the staff

member occurred. See Stone v. Mahoning County, No. 4:23CV1138 (N.D. Ohio filed June 7,

2023). A party must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief

on the legal rights or interests of third parties. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975);

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Allstate Ins. Co. v. Wayne Cnty., 760 F.2d 689, 693 (6th Cir. 1985). The fact that Plaintiff may

be collaterally affected by the adjudication of another inmate’s rights does not necessarily extend

the Court’s Article III powers to him. Allstate Ins. Co., 760 F.2d at 692.

C. RLUIPA

RLUIPA prohibits a State or local government from imposing “a substantial burden on

the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution” unless the government

shows that the burden furthers “‘a compelling governmental interest” and “‘is the least restrictive

means” of doing so. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). RLUIPA does not provide a cause of action

against defendants in their individual capacities. Colvin vy. Caruso, 605 F.3d 282, 288 (6th Cir.

2010). Moreover, it requires a plaintiff to allege facts reasonably suggesting the government

entity’s actions placed a substantial burden on plaintiffs exercise of her sincerely held religious

beliefs.

None of Plaintiff’ s allegations in the case at bar suggest Mahoning County substantially

burdened the exercise of his religion. A substantial burden exists when the government places

significant pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs. Haight v.

Thompson, 763 F.3d 554, 565 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Living Water Church of God v. Charter

Twp. of Meridian, 258 Fed.Appx. 729, 739 (6th Cir. 2007); see Civil Liberties for Urban

Believers v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 761 (7th Cir. 2003) (a substantial burden is one

which renders religious exercise “effectively impracticable”). An isolated, inconsequential,

incidental or de minimis burden on religious practice does not rise to this level. Braunfeld v.

Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses, Inc. v. City

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of Lakewood, Ohio, 699 F.2d 303, 306 (6th Cir. 1983). Plaintiff alleges Christians were given

free Bibles, but he does not allege that he was denied a Qur’an. Plaintiff alleges Christians were

given a specific room in which to worship, but he does not indicate he was denied worship.

Moreover, the Supreme Court opined generally that congregate religious services need not be

provided for every religious sect:

We do not suggest, of course, that every religious sect or group within a

prison—however few in number—must have identical facilities or personnel. A

special chapel or place of worship need not be provided for every faith regardless

of size; nor must a chaplain, priest, or minister be provided without regard to the

extent of the demand. But reasonable opportunities must be afforded to all

prisoners to exercise the religious freedom guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth

Amendment without fear of penalty.

Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 n.2 (1972); Cavin v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 927 F.3d 455, 458

(6th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted). Finally, Plaintiff alleges that food for Ramadan was prepared

at regular mealtimes and kept warm until sundown when he could break the fast. While the food

he was served may not have been as hot as it was when it was prepared, he does not allege he

was denied meals or that Mahoning County did not attempt to accommodate the needs of its

Muslim detainees. Plaintiff does not allege sufficient facts to suggest Mahoning County violated

any provision of RLUIPA.

D. General Conditions Claims

Plaintiff asserts claims which pertain to general conditions in the Mahoning County Jail.

Claims pertaining to conditions of confinement in jail arise under either the Eighth Amendment,

if the inmate is a convicted prisoner, or the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, if the

inmate is a pretrial detainee. Plaintiff appears to have been both a detainee and a convicted

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prisoner during the time he was held in the Mahoning County Jail. While the standards for

examining these claims under the Eighth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment differ in

the requirements for the subjective mental state of the defendant, both standards require a

plaintiff to demonstrate that she was held under conditions which posed an objectively and

sufficiently serious threat to her health and safety. See Brawner v. Scott Cnty., 14 F. 4th 585, 596

(6th Cir. 2021) (Fourteenth Amendment); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 1994) (Eighth

Amendment). The Complaint (ECE No. 1), as well as the written statement regarding the

stitches in his hand and problem with his wrist (ECF No. 3) fail to meet this objective standard

under either the Eighth or the Fourteenth Amendment.

The Constitution protects inmates by requiring that “prison officials .. . ensure that

inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and. . . ‘take reasonable

measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.’ ” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832. It does not mandate

that an inmate be free from discomfort or inconvenience. Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, 954 (6th

Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981)). They are not

entitled to unlimited access to the medical treatment of their choice, see Hudson v. McMillian,

503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992), nor can they “expect the amenities, conveniences and services of a good

hotel.” Harris v. Fleming, 839 F.2d 1232, 1235 (7th Cir. 1988); see Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at

405. In sum, the Constitution prohibits conditions of confinement which constitute serious

health threats, but does not provide a remedy for those conditions which merely cause the inmate

to feel uncomfortable or which cause aggravation or annoyance. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9-10

(requiring extreme or grave deprivation).

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The conditions Plaintiff lists are not objectively and sufficiently serious to rise to the level

of a constitutional violation. Denial of fruit and fruit juice is not an objectively serious condition

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Similarly, there is no applicable precedent

requiring any minimum amount of outdoor recreation for prisoners. Kizer v. Robertson Cnty.,

No. 3:17-cv-00715, 2018 WL 2164557, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. May 10, 2018) (citing Argue v.

Hofmeyer, 80 Fed.Appx. 427, 430 (6th Cir. 2003)). Instead, the Constitution is violated only

when there is “a total or near-total deprivation of exercise or recreational opportunity, without

penological justification. . . .” Rodgers v. Jabe, 43 F.3d 1082, 1086 (6th Cir. 1995). Plaintiff

does not allege he was denied recreation and exercise. He alleges only that it did not take place

outdoors. His claim that there are no fire drills, not enough chairs in the dorms for all the

inmates to watch television, thin sleeping mats, no clock, limited cleaning supplies, no

educational opportunities, dirty showers, unclean food trays and evening lock-downs do not

present health threats, but rather suggest conditions which at best are uncomfortable. Plaintiff

alleges that the facility is over-crowded and understaffed, but he does not elaborate on these

terms. Those conditions in and of themselves do not rise to the level of a constitutional

violation. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347.

E. Access to the Courts

Finally, Plaintiff claims the facility has no law library. There is no general constitutional

right to a law library. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 353 (1996). To the extent that he was

attempting to assert a claim for denial of access to the courts, he failed to do so. To prevail on

that claim, he must demonstrate “actual injury” by showing that a direct appeal, habeas corpus, or

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civil rights action was dismissed or turned away by a court as the result of an action of one of the

identified Defendants. Id. Plaintiff does not allege he experienced an actual injury.

IV. Conclusion

Accordingly, this action is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Plaintiff’s Motion

for Leave to File Amended Complaint (ECF No. 3) is granted. Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to

File Amended Complaint (ECF No. 4) is denied as moot. The Court certifies, pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

April 15, 2024 /s/ Benita Y. Pearson

Date Benita Y. Pearson

United States District Judge

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