Cook v. Boss

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

JOHN COOK, ) Case No.: 1:22 CV 1535

)

Plaintiff ) JUDGE SOLOMON OLIVER, JR.

)

v. )

)

DAVID BOSS, et al., )

)

Defendants ) ORDER

Currently pending before the court in the above-captioned case is Defendant City of

Cleveland’s (“Defendant” or “Cleveland”) Motion for Summary Judgment (“Motion”) (ECF

No. 39). For the reasons that follow, the court grants Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

with respect to the federal claims. Because the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

over Cook’s state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), Defendants’ motion with respect

to his state law claims is dismissed as moot.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

On April 2, 2020, Plaintiff John Cook (“Plaintiff” or “Cook”) contacted the Cleveland Police

Department to report that the vehicle registered to his business, Jaden Construction, LLC, had been

stolen. (Amended Compl. ¶¶ 9–10, ECF No. 1-2); (see also Ex. A to Messer Decl., ECF No. 39-1).

When Officer Brian Messer of the Cleveland Police Department arrived on the scene, Cook informed

Messer that his neighbor had surveillance footage of an unknown White male who had hooked

Cook’s car to a tow truck and drove away. (Messer Decl. ¶¶ 3–7, ECF No. 39-1). Messer instructed

Cook to sign a Stolen Vehicle Statement Form and requested that detectives follow up with the

incident. (Id. at ¶¶ 8–10). A few days later, Cook recovered his vehicle and allegedly reported the

recovery to a man who identified himself as the Cleveland detective assigned to his case. (Amended

Compl. ¶ 12, ECF No. 1-2). On April 8, 2020, Detective James Bellanca of the Cleveland Police

Department (“Detective Bellanca” or “Bellanca”) spoke with Cook’s neighbor, who informed

Bellanca that Cook had recovered his vehicle. (Bellanca Decl. ¶¶ 5–6, ECF No. 39-2). Detective

Bellanca then asked Cook’s neighbor to tell Cook to get in touch with him as Bellanca was having

trouble contacting Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶ 9). When Cook later called Bellanca, he left a voicemail stating

that he had recovered his vehicle and would be completing a “call-off report.” (Id. at ¶ 10). Under

department policy, when a stolen vehicle is recovered, officers must inspect the vehicle and complete

a recovery report, also known as a “call-off report.” (See Cleveland General Police Order, Ex. B to

Bellanca Decl. at PageID #509–513, ECF No. 39-2). According to officer notes, as of April 18, 2020,

Cook still had not completed a call-off report. (Bellanca Decl. ¶ 12, ECF No. 39-2); (see also

Cleveland General Police Order, Ex. B to Bellanca Decl. at PageID #508). As a result, the vehicle

remained listed as unrecovered in the City’s stolen vehicle database. (Bellanca Decl. ¶ 13, ECF No.

39-2). Bellanca was eventually advised to close Plaintiff’s file due to an uncooperative witness. (Id.

at ¶ 12).

On July 30, 2020, Cook was driving his truck in the City of Lyndhurst, Ohio as police

officers from the City of Lyndhurst (“Lyndhurst”) were driving behind him. (Amended Compl. ¶ 13,

ECF No. 1-2). When City of Lyndhurst officers ran a license plate check on the vehicle, they

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discovered the truck had been registered as stolen. (Mot. at PageID #458, ECF No. 39); (see also

Amended Compl. ¶¶ 16–17, ECF No. 1-2). The Lyndhurst officers then initiated a traffic stop on

Cook’s vehicle, ordering Cook to turn off the vehicle and exit the car with his hands up. (Amended

Compl. ¶¶ 18–19, ECF No. 1-2). The officers then ordered Plaintiff to place his hands on his head

and get on his knees before cuffing him with two pairs of handcuffs. (Id. at ¶¶ 20–22). Plaintiff

complained to officers that the tightness of the handcuffs was hurting his hands and wrists so officers

adjusted his right handcuff. (Id. at ¶ 24). Plaintiff alleges he once again complained to officers that

he was experiencing significant pain and numbness in his hands, but the officers took no action. (Id.

at ¶ 25). Meanwhile, other officers walked with Cook’s wife into their home, which was located on

the same street where officers had executed the traffic stop, to obtain proof that Cook’s car was

actually his. (Id. at ¶ 26). Once his wife provided proof of ownership, the officers removed the

handcuffs. (Id. at ¶¶ 27–28). Later that day, the Lyndhurst Police Department contacted the

Cleveland Police Department to inform it that Cook’s vehicle had been recovered. (Mot. at PageID

#459, ECF No. 39). Cook’s truck was then removed from the stolen vehicle database. (Id.); (see also

Ex. A to Messer Decl. at PageID #490, ECF No. 39-1).

B. Procedural History

On July 30, 2022, Cook filed a Complaint (ECF No. 1-1) in the Cuyahoga County Court of

Common Pleas against Officers David Boss, Kelly Vasas, Jonathon Romanin, Justin Blatnick

(collectively, the “Lyndhurst Officers”), the City of Cleveland, the City of Lyndhurst, and five

unidentified “John Doe” Defendants, alleging injuries he suffered growing out of the incident

described above. On August 17, 2022, Cook filed an Amended Complaint (ECF No. 1-2), alleging

violations of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as claims of assault/battery,

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false arrest/imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”), negligence, and

employer liability. (See Amended Compl. at PageID #23–32, ECF No. 1-2). The case was removed

to this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 et seq. (ECF No. 1) on August 31, 2022. On September

7, 2022, the City of Cleveland filed an Answer (ECF No. 7), denying Plaintiff’s allegations and

asserting various affirmative defenses. Cleveland also maintained that any injuries Plaintiff allegedly

sustained were caused by the acts or omissions of entities other than Cleveland. (Cleveland Answer

at PageID #65–67, ECF No. 7). On August 15, 2023, Cleveland filed the Motion for Summary

Judgment considered herein. (ECF No. 39).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) governs summary judgment motions and provides that:

The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there

is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. The court should state on the record the

reasons for granting or denying the motion.

A party asserting there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact or that a fact is genuinely

disputed must support the assertion by:

(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including

depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or

declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the

motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or

(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or

presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce

admissible evidence to support the fact.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). In reviewing summary judgment motions, this court must view the evidence

in the light most favorable to the non-moving party to determine whether a genuine issue of material

fact exists. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 153 (1970); White v. Turfway Park Racing

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Ass’n, Inc., 909 F.2d 941, 943–44 (6th Cir. 1990). A fact is “material” only if its resolution will

affect the outcome of the lawsuit. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

The moving party has the burden of production to make a prima facie showing that it is

entitled to summary judgment. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 331 (1986). The moving party

can meet its burden of production by either: (1) submitting “affirmative evidence that negates an

essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim” or (2) demonstrating “to the court that the

nonmoving party’s evidence is insufficient to establish an essential element of the nonmoving party’s

claim.” Id. If the moving party meets its burden of production, then the non-moving party must point

out specific facts in the record which create a genuine issue of material fact. Zinn v. United States,

885 F. Supp. 2d 866, 871 (N.D. Ohio 2012) (citing Fulson v. City of Columbus, 801 F. Supp. 1, 4

(S.D. Ohio 1992)). The non-movant must show “more than a scintilla of evidence to overcome

summary judgment;” it is not enough to show that there is slight doubt as to material facts. Zinn,

885 F. Supp. 2d at 871 (quoting Fulson, 801 F. Supp. at 4). The trial court does not have “a duty to

search the entire record to establish that it is bereft of a genuine issue of material fact.” Street v. J.C.

Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479–80 (6th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted)).

III. LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Section 1983 claims

1. Statute of Limitations

Cleveland argues that Cook’s Section 1983 claims are barred by the applicable statute of

limitations. Congress did not establish a statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims. See Drake

v. City of Detroit, 266 Fed.Appx. 444, 448 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Banks v. City of Whitehall, 344

F.3d 550, 553 (6th Cir. 2003)). As a result, “federal courts must borrow the statute of limitations

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governing personal injury actions in the state in which the section 1983 action was brought.” City

of Whitehall, 344 F.3d at 553. The Sixth Circuit has long held that a two-year statute of limitations

applies to Section 1983 claims arising in Ohio. Id. (citing Browning v. Pendelton, 869 F.2d 989, 990

(6th Cir. 1989) (en banc)). However, when a plaintiff amends their Complaint after the statute of

limitations has run, the amendment must “relate back”to the original Complaint for the amendment

to be timely. Asher v. Unarco Material Handling, Inc., 596 F.3d 313, 317–19 (6th Cir. 2010); see

also Anderson v. Clark, 2024 WL 665544, at *1 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 16, 2024). Under the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure, “[a]n amendment to a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading

when...the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or

occurrence set out—or attempted to be set out—in the original pleading.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

15(c)(1)(B); see also Asher, 596 F.3d at 318 (“Rule 15(c)(1)(B) allows relation back of an

amendment asserting a “claim or defense,” but it does not authorize the relation back of an

amendment adding a new party.”) (emphasis in original). Here, Plaintiff filed his original Complaint

(ECF No. 1-1) on July 30, 2022, followed by an Amended Complaint (ECF No. 1-2) on August 17,

2022. Although Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint falls outside the two-year statute of limitations since

the incident giving rise to this suit took place on July 30, 2020, Cook argues that the “relation back”

doctrine under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) makes his Complaint timely. The court agrees.

The allegations in Cook’s Amended Complaint arose from the same occurrences and conduct in his

Original Complaint: the officers’ alleged excessive use of force and other tortious conduct

surrounding Cook’s detention on July 30, 2020. (Compare Amended Compl. at PageID #23–32, ECF

No. 1-2 with Original Compl. at PageID #8–12, ECF No. 1-1). Accordingly, the court finds that

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Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint relates back to his original timely Complaint, meaning that the

statute of limitations does not bar Cook from bringing his Section 1983 claim.

2. Merits

Section 1983 provides a remedy for any person who is deprived of their constitutional rights

by another person acting under the color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also Collins v. City

of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 120 (1992). When assessing a Section 1983 claim asserted against

a municipality, courts must consider two issues: “(1) whether the plaintiff’s harm was caused by a

constitutional violation and (2) if so, whether the city is responsible for that violation.” City of

Harker Heights, 503 U.S. at 120 (citing City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 817 (1985)).

Most cases turn on the latter of the two issues. See City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. at 120.

In Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the

Supreme Court held that a municipality can only be found liable under Section 1983 if the

municipality itself causes the alleged constitutional violation at issue by executing an official policy

or custom that causes the alleged injury. See Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 817 (citing City of Canton v. Harris,

489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989)) (emphasis in original). In this regard, municipalities may be liable under

Section 1983 for constitutional violations resulting from a failure to train its municipal employees.

City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 380. In light of these constraints, the “first inquiry in any case alleging

municipal liability under § 1983 is [...] whether there is a direct causal link between a municipal

policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Id.

a) Excessive Force claim

In his Amended Complaint, Cook’s Section 1983 claim alleges an excessive use of force

claim, in part, as follows:

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“Without probable or just cause or reasonable suspicion or good faith evidence,

the Defendants arrested the Plaintiff, physically forced, and assaulted him,

restrained the Plaintiff and his freedoms, verbally and/or physically harassed the

Plaintiff, among other unconstitutional, illegal, improper, and otherwise tortious

conduct.

At all times relevant, despite allegations of the Defendants, the Plaintiff did not

make any substantive threatening gestures or exhibited any violent or otherwise

resistive behavior toward the Defendants and the Plaintiff complied with the

commands of the officers in question.

Immediately after being handcuffed, and several times thereafter, the Defendants

caused significant pain and suffering to the Plaintiff and failed and/or refused to

alleviate the problem and/or allow the Plaintiff to seek medical attention,

observation, care, and/or treatment.

Said use of excessive and unnecessary force, search, seizure, and destruction

deprived the Plaintiff of his Constitutional rights to bodily security and liberty

protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and

was an unreasonable physical seizure of the Plaintiff protected by the Fourth

Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, Article I, Section 14, Ohio

Constitution, and/or otherwise.”

(Amended Compl. ¶¶ 45–48, ECF No. 1-2). Elsewhere in his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges

that “Defendants City of Lyndhurst and/or City of Cleveland were responsible for the training,

supervision and/or commission of Defendant Officers, and were also responsible for the business

policies, instructions, and employee conduct. Defendants City of Lyndhurst and/or City of Cleveland

executed policy and/or custom and/or officially and/or personally sanctioned, ordered, ratified,

and/or failed to properly instruct, train, employ, retain, or otherwise the relevant tortious, illegal, and

unconstitutional acts and behavior of Defendants Officers.” (Id. at ¶¶ 42–43).

Cleveland argues, in part, that it is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s excessive

force claim because Plaintiff admits that “none of Cleveland’s officers detained him, arrested him

or so much as touched him.” (Mot. at PageID #463, ECF No. 39) (citing Cook Dep. at PageID

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#1570–71, ECF No. 42-2). Cleveland further argues that Plaintiff has failed to allege or establish any

facts demonstrating that an official custom or policy of the City of Cleveland led to his alleged

constitutional violation. Specifically, Plaintiff has not established any facts to support his contention

that Cleveland has any deficiencies in its training, supervision, or oversight of its officers. (Mot. at

PageID #463–66, ECF No. 39). In response, Plaintiff contends that his Section 1983 claim is “based

on his sufficiently pled allegations that Defendant City of Lyndhurst has a policy of inadequately

training its police officers on stops, detentions/arrests, handcuffing, and when and how they are

permitted to enter private property in the course of their duties.” (Pl.’s Opp. at PageID #1764, ECF

No. 51-1). However, Plaintiff does not point to any evidence or facts in the record demonstrating

what official policy or custom Cleveland relied on that resulted in his alleged excessive force claim.

This is despite Plaintiff’s contention that “the evidence in this matter clearly shows genuine issues

of material facts regarding the liability of Defendant Cleveland.” (Pl.’s Opp. at PageID #1766, ECF

No. 51-1). Accordingly, there is no basis to hold Cleveland liable for an allegation for use of

excessive force when Plaintiff admits that no Cleveland employees were present at the incident

giving rise to this claim and grants summary judgment to Cleveland.

b) Stolen Vehicle Database claim

In addition to his excessive force claim, Plaintiff’s Complaint can be fairly read to allege a

failure to train claim against Cleveland for its employees’ failure to remove his truck from the city’s

stolen vehicle database. However, Plaintiff did not name or add any Cleveland officers or employees

as defendants to this suit. In its Motion, Cleveland maintains that Plaintiff’s vehicle was not removed

from the stolen vehicle database because Plaintiff failed to complete Cleveland’s process for

removing a vehicle reported as stolen from the city’s internal systems. (See Bellanca Decl., ECF No.

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39-2); (see also Cleveland General Police Order, Ex. B to Bellanca Decl., ECF No. 39-2).

Specifically, Cleveland attests that Plaintiff informed Detective Bellanca that he had recovered his

truck and would be “taking the vehicle to complete a call-off report.” (Bellanca Decl. at PageID

#497, ECF No. 39-2). In response, Plaintiff argues that because he called Detective Bellanca to

inform him that he had recovered his vehicle, his car should have been removed from the stolen

vehicle database. (See Pl.’s Opp. to Mot. at PageID #1767, ECF No. 51-1).

Plaintiff does not address Cleveland’s declaration that he told Detective Bellanca that he was

taking his car to complete a call-off report. Instead, Plaintiff argues that Cleveland’s own policy

indicates that Cleveland was required “to do what was necessary to confirm that the vehicle was

recovered by the Plaintiff and/or remove the vehicle as stolen/not recovered.” (Id. at PageID

#1767–68). Accordingly, Plaintiff argues his Section 1983 claim “asserts liability against Cleveland

for a failure to supervise, train, and take corrective measures and violation of its policies.” (Id. at

PageID #1768). In Reply, Cleveland argues that Plaintiff cannot establish a failure to train claim

against it because Plaintiff cannot show that Cleveland was deliberately indifferent with respect to

its training of its officers with respect to the recovery of stolen vehicles. The court finds Cleveland’s

arguments persuasive.

In order to establish a failure to train or supervise claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must

prove that: “(1) the training or supervision of city employees was inadequate for the tasks performed;

(2) the inadequacy was the result of the municipality’s deliberate indifference; and (3) the

inadequacy was closely related to or actually caused the injury.” Mosier v. Evans, 90 F.4th 541, 549

(6th Cir. 2024) (citing Ellis ex rel. Pendergrass v. Cleveland Mun. Sch. Dist., 455 F.3d 690, 700 (6th

Cir. 2006). To make a showing of deliberate indifference, plaintiff must show the municipality

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“completely disregarded” its duty to train evidenced by “total inaction in the face of repeated, known,

rights violations.” Id. (citations omitted). Plaintiff does not allege any facts or introduce any evidence

that Cleveland exhibited a pattern of inaction in the face of repeated, known violations of people’s

rights in respect to their stolen vehicles. Without any of the above, Cook cannot establish the

essential elements of his Monell claim. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 331 (explaining that, on a

summary-judgment motion, a moving party can meet its burden of production by either:

(1) submitting “affirmative evidence that negates an essential element of the nonmoving party’s

claim” or (2) demonstrating “to the court that the nonmoving party’s evidence is insufficient to

establish an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim.”) (emphasis added). Accordingly, the

court grants summary judgment to Cleveland on this claim.

B. State law claims

Federal courts may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims that are so related

to claims for which the court has original jurisdiction, such that the state claims form part of the

same case or controversy under the court’s original jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). However

under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), “district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

a claim [...] if the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” The

Supreme Court has long held that where federal law claims are dismissed before trial, district courts

should generally decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the related state law claims.

United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966); see also Poindexter v. McKee, 444

F.Supp.2d 783, 786 (W.D. Mich. 2006) (collecting cases). Having dismissed Plaintiff’s federal

claims, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Cook’s remaining state law

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claims. See Poindexter, 444 F.Supp.2d at 786; see also Vos v. Cordray, 719 F.Supp.2d 832, 842–43

(N.D. Ohio 2010).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court grants Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment with

respect to Plaintiff’s federal claims and declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction (ECF No. 39).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ SOLOMON OLIVER, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

March 30, 2024

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