Opinion

Banks v. Atwell

Court
District Court, N.D. Ohio
Filed
Mar 28, 2024
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 28.1%

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

CHARLES E. BANKS III, ) CASE NO. 1:24 CV 00002

)

Plaintiff, ) JUDGE DAN AARON POLSTER

)

vs. ) MEMORANDUM OPINION

) AND ORDER

CRAIG ATWELL, et al., )

)

)

Defendants. )

Pro se plaintiff Charles E. Banks, III filed this action against Craig Atwell, Applebee’s

District Manager; Darrell Smith, Applebee’s Assistant Manager; and John Doe (Doc. No. 1).

Plaintiff’s handwritten complaint is illegible and his statement of claim is indecipherable. The

Court can discern only a few words, including “discrimination,” “freedom of speech,” and

“slander.” And it appears that Plaintiff seeks monetary damages.

Plaintiff filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. No. 2). The application

is granted.

I. Standard of Review

Pro se pleadings are liberally construed. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365, 102 S.

Ct. 700, 70 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S. Ct.

594, 30 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1972). The district court, however, is required to dismiss an in forma

pauperis action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted, or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328,

109 S. Ct. 1827, 104 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1989); Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990);

Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996). A claim lacks an arguable

basis in law or fact when it is premised on an indisputably meritless legal theory or when the

factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327.

A cause of action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it lacks

“plausibility in the complaint.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564, 127 S. Ct. 1955,

167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). In any civil action, a pleading must contain a “short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 677-78, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009). The factual allegations in the pleading

must be sufficient to raise the right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that

all the allegations in the complaint are true. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The plaintiff is not

required to include detailed factual allegations, but he or she must provide more than “an

unadorned, the defendant unlawfully harmed me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A

pleading that offers legal conclusions or a simple recitation of the elements of a cause of action

will not meet this pleading standard. Id. The Court is “not bound to accept as true a legal

conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S. Ct.

2932, 92 L. Ed. 2d 209 (1986).

In reviewing a complaint, the Court must construe the pleading in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff. Bibbo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 151 F.3d 559, 561 (6th Cir.

1998).

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II. Discussion

The Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than

formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. El Bey v. Roop, 530 F.3d 407, 413 (6th Cir. 2008).

However, the “lenient treatment generally accorded to pro se litigants has limits.” Pilgrim v.

Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996). Liberal construction for pro se litigants does not

“abrogate basic pleading requirements.” Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989). A

complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations regarding all the material elements

of some viable legal theory to satisfy federal notice pleading requirements. See Scheid v. Fanny

Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 437 (6th Cir. 1988). The Court is not required to

conjure unpleaded facts or questions not presented to the Court or construct full blown claims

from sentence fragments against defendants on behalf of a pro se plaintiff. See Beaudette v. City

of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1277 (4th Cir. 1985). To do so would “require … the courts to

explore exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se plaintiff, … [and] would … transform the

district court from its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out

the strongest arguments and most successful strategies for a party.” Id. A plaintiff’s failure to

identify a particular legal theory places an unfair burden on the defendants to speculate on the

potential claims being raised against them and the defenses they might assert in response. Wells,

891 F.2d at 594. Although specific facts are not required, to meet the basic minimum notice

pleading requirements of Rule 8, Plaintiff’s complaint must give the defendants fair notice of

what the plaintiff’s legal claims are and the factual grounds on which they rest. See Bassett v.

Nat’l Collegiate Ath. Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426, 437 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Lillard v. Shelby County

Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 726-27 (6th Cir. 1996)).

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Here, Plaintiff's complaint fails to meet even the most liberal reading of the Twombly

and /gbal standard as his pleading fails to set forth “a short and plain statement of [any] claim

showing that [Plaintiff] is entitled to relief[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Rather, Plaintiff's

complaint is composed entirely of barely legible conclusory allegations and sentence fragments.

The complaint fails to include any discernible factual allegations or coherent claims. And the

Court is not required to construct claims from sentence fragments. Plaintiffs statement of his

claim is nothing more than a mere “unadorned, the defendant unlawfully harmed me

accusation.” /gbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The complaint does not satisfy the minimum pleading

requirements of Rule 8.

II. Conclusion

Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc.

No. 2). And the Court dismisses this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e). Further, the Court

certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be

taken in good faith.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

lh. Pe saxo.

DAN AARON POLSTER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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