Reig v. Village of Seville

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

MICHELLE RIEG, et al., ) CASE NO. 1:22-CV-2120

)

Plaintiffs, ) JUDGE CHARLES E. FLEMING

)

vs. )

) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND

VILLAGE OF SEVILLE, ) ORDER

)

Defendant. )

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 19, 2022, Plaintiffs filed their complaint with the Medina County Court of

Common Pleas concerning actions taken by the Village of Seville to approve the Flint

Development site plan which consisted of an industrial warehouse and distribution hub facility

allegedly in the vicinity of properties owned by Plaintiffs. (ECF No. 1, PageID #5–17). On

November 22, 2022, Defendant removed the case to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331

because the complaint asserted violations of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments via claims

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1, PageID #1–2).

On November 29, 2022, NEO Commerce Center, LLC moved to intervene as a party in

this case because the ordinance and the Village of Seville Planning Commission actions in question

concern the approval of an industrial warehouse development on its property. (ECF No. 3, PageID

#92). The Court granted that motion and Intervenor filed a motion to dismiss on November 30,

2022. (ECF No. 5). Intervenor moved for the Court to dismiss the entirety of Plaintiffs’ complaint

with prejudice pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can

be granted. (Id. at PageID #119). On December 29, 2022, Plaintiffs opposed Intervenor’s motion.

(ECF No. 9). On January 12, 2023, Intervenor replied in support of its motion. (ECF No. 10).

For the following reasons, Intervenor’s motion is GRANTED.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must “contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

A claim is plausible on its face when “the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678.

The “complaint must contain direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements

under some viable legal theory.” Commercial Money Center, Inc. v. Illinois Union Ins. Co., 508

F.3d 327, 336 (6th Cir. 2007). In assessing plausibility, the Court construes factual allegations in

the complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, accepts the allegations of the complaint as

true, and draws all reasonable inferences in Plaintiffs’ favor. Directv, Inc. v. Treesh, 487 F.3d 471,

476 (6th Cir. 2007).

III. ANALYSIS

Intervenor argues that the complaint does not state a cognizable claim under either the

United States Constitution or the Ohio Constitution, so counts three, four and five should be

dismissed. (ECF No. 5, PageID #125). If the legal basis underlying those claims is insufficient,

Intervenor notes that Plaintiffs are not entitled to declaratory relief, so count one should be

dismissed. (Id. at PageID #132). Intervenor alleges that injunctive relief is a remedy, not a cause

of action, so count two should be dismissed. (Id. at PageID #132–33).

A. Counts Three, Four, and Five

In count three, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant violated procedural due process, substantive

due process, and equal protection when it passed Ordinance 2022-40 as an emergency and when

the Planning Commission applied Ordinance 2022-40 to approve a site plan for the Flint

Development that allowed violations of Section 611 of the Zoning Code. (ECF No. 1, PageID

#21–24). Plaintiffs allege in count four that Defendant’s “conduct in enacting and enforcing

Ordinance 2022-40 and its other unconstitutional ordinances, policies, and customs under color of

law was and is in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” (Id. at PageID #24). In count five, Plaintiff

alleges, “[t]o the extent the Village’s enactment and enforcement of Ordinance 2022-40 violates

Plaintiff’s rights under the United States Constitution, it likewise violates Plaintiff’s rights under

Article I, Sections 1, 2, and 16 of the Constitution of the State of Ohio.” (Id. at PageID #25).

Intervenor analyzes the state and federal constitutional violations together because both the

due process and equal protection clauses of each constitution are to be construed and analyzed

identically. (ECF No. 5, PageID #125 (citing Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 880 N.E.2d 420, 433

(Ohio 2007); Am. Assn. of Univ. Professors v. Cent. State Univ., 717 N.E.2d 286, 291 (Ohio

1999))). The bulk of these claims will be analyzed together. However, there are indications that

the Equal Protection Clause of the Ohio Constitution may offer protections beyond the federal

Constitution in certain circumstances. See State v. Mole, 74 N.E.3d 368, 374 (Ohio 2016) (“the

Ohio Constitution is a document of independent force”); State v. Noling, 75 N.E.3d 141, 146 (Ohio

2016) (“Because the Equal Protection Clause of the Ohio Constitution is coextensive with, or

stronger than, that of the federal Constitution, we cite both throughout this opinion.”).

Accordingly, if there is case law that extends the state claim beyond the federal claim, the Court

will consider it in its analysis. Otherwise, the alleged constitutional violations will be analyzed

together.

i. Due Process

Intervenor argues that Plaintiffs’ procedural and substantive due process claims fail because

Plaintiffs have not established a constitutionally protected property or liberty interest. (ECF No.

5, PageID #125). Plaintiffs contend they have a constitutionally protected property interest

because their “properties are in areas adjacent to the Overlay District” and because they have

standing to appeal an administrative zoning order. (ECF No. 9, PageID #201). Intervenor replies

that the requirements to establish standing for a zoning appeal do not establish a constitutionally

protected property interest, any “adverse effects” due to proximity do not create a vested property

interest, and diminution of property values does not give rise to substantive due process protection.

(ECF No. 10, PageID #217–20).

The Fourteenth Amendment states, “[n]o State shall … deprive any person of life, liberty,

or property without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. This clause has a procedural

and a substantive component. EJS Properties, LLC v. City of Toledo, 698 F.3d 845, 855 (6th Cir.

2012). Procedural due process requires “that the government provide a fair procedure when

depriving someone of life, liberty, or property” while substantive due process “protects individual

liberty against certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to

implement them.” Id. (citing Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)). The

threshold question of both a procedural and a substantive due process claim is whether Plaintiffs

have shown that a constitutionally protected property or liberty interest exists. Id. (citing Women’s

Med. Pro’l Corp. v. Baird, 438 F.3d 595, 611 (6th Cir. 2006) and Braun v. Ann Arbor Charter Twp.,

519 F.3d 564, 573 (6th Cir. 2008)). “[N]either the Sixth Circuit nor Ohio courts have gone so far

as to say that property owners have a property interest in the existing zoning classifications of

nearby or neighboring properties.” Brooks v. Butler County, Ohio, 2022 WL 2526601, *7 (6th Cir.

July 7, 2022).

The plaintiffs in Brooks raised a similar argument to Plaintiffs in this case concerning their

property interest. The plaintiffs in Brooks argued their ability to appeal a zoning decision to the

Ohio Court of Common Pleas was “sufficient to create a protected property interest under state

law.” Id. at *6. The Sixth Circuit found that the right to appeal does not automatically create a

property interest. Id. Instead, the Sixth Circuit held, “for a contiguous or adjacent property owner

to show a property interest in a [Board of Zoning Appeals] decision, the property owner must, at

the minimum, participate in the administrative process and demonstrate a direct effect from the

decision.” Id.

Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges, “[t]he Rieg Residence is in the neighborhood adjoining the

Flint Property and is in the immediate vicinity of the Flint Development” and “[t]he Wangler

Residence is directly adjoined to the Flint Property and Flint Development.” (ECF No. 1, PageID

#8). Plaintiffs allege that because of Seville’s enactment and enforcement of Ordinance 2022-40,

which led to the subsequent approval of the Flint Development site plan by the Planning

Commission on September 19, 2022, they “lost value in their properties and have incurred

litigation costs, expenses, and attorney fees.” (ECF No. 1, PageID #16). They expect damages to

continue in the future. Id.

Plaintiffs’ complaint details their participation in the administrative process surrounding

the approval of the Flint Development and the passage of Ordinance 2022-40. (ECF No. 1, PageID

#10) (At a May 23, 2022 Planning Commission meeting concerning proposed amendments by

Flint, “some of the Plaintiffs here, spoke against the Amendments and the Flint Development

identifying violations of the Mixed Use Overlay District provisions, stating concerns of health

effects, excessive sound, environmental issues, unreasonable traffic increases, drainage problems

and loss of value to their own properties.”); Id. at PageID #12–13 (“On or about June 13, 2022, at

a public hearing, Mrs. Rieg questioned the propriety of emergency language in Ordinance 2022-

40” and “Mrs. Wangler asked the Seville Village Council to define ‘reasonable’ as it was used in

the Ordinance.”); Id. at PageID #14 (“On or about June 27, 2022, the Flint Development site plan

was presented to Planning Commission. Again, the Wanglers and Riegs appeared and objected.”);

Id. (“At a Council meeting on July 11, 2022, Rieg asked the Council why all ordinances concerned

with the Flint Development included emergency language.”); Id. at PageID #15 (Prior to a

September 19, 2022 Planning Commission meeting, “the attorney for the Riegs and Wanglers, on

their behalf, e-mailed to Seville’s solicitor a comprehensive statement in opposition to Ordinance

2022-40 and the Flint Development site plan and requested the solicitor forward the same to the

Planning Commission members. The attorney also submitted hard copies of the statement to each

of the Planning Commission members at the meeting.”); Id. at PageID #16 (At the meeting, “[t]he

Riegs and Robin Wangler appeared and stated what objections they could within the three minutes

allotted. The Riegs’ and Wanglers’ attorney also spoke on their behalf in objection to the site plan

and the Ordinance 2022-40.”). Intervenor concedes this in its motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 5,

PageID #127) (“Plaintiffs attended and were active participants at the hearings concerning the

Zoning Code amendment and the Development.”). Thus, Plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded that they

participated in the administrative process.

The remaining issue for determination of property interest is whether Plaintiffs adequately

pleaded a direct effect from the zoning decision at issue in this case. Plaintiffs contend this element

is met through proximity of the Flint development to their properties and through the diminution

of the value of their properties. (ECF No. 9, PageID #202). Proximity alone does not meet this

requirement because the Sixth Circuit noted in Brooks, “neither the Sixth Circuit nor Ohio courts

have gone so far as to say that property owners have a property interest in the existing zoning

classifications of nearby or neighboring properties.” Brooks v. Butler County, Ohio, 2022 WL

2526601, *7 (6th Cir. July 7, 2022). Consequently, the remaining issue is whether Plaintiffs’

alleged loss of value in their properties is adequate to establish a property interest.

Intervenor cites to case law from the Second Circuit for the proposition that alleged decline

in property values is not an interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Fusco v. State

of Conn., 815 F.2d 201, 205–06 (2d Cir. 1987). The Court could not find any cases within the

Sixth Circuit addressing this issue. The closest analogy the Court could find was in analysis of the

Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause where the Sixth Circuit determined that decline in property

values is not per se a taking requiring compensation. See Amen v. City of Dearborn, 718 F.2d 789,

796 (6th Cir. 1983) (citing Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271, 285 (1939)). Plaintiffs cite to

an Ohio case that conferred standing to raise an administrative appeal of a zoning decision when

there was evidence that the challenging party’s property value may be reduced. See Jenkins v.

Gallipolis, 715 N.E. 2d 196, 200 (Ohio 4th Dist. 1998). However, Plaintiffs again confuse the

requirements for bringing an administrative appeal with the requirements for establishing a due

process property interest, which the Sixth Circuit expressly rejected in Brooks. Brooks v. Butler

County, Ohio, 2022 WL 2526601, *6 (6th Cir. July 7, 2022).

With no authority to support the contention that alleged diminution of property values

establishes a constitutionally protected property interest, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not

adequately pleaded a claim for either procedural or substantive due process.

ii. Equal Protection

Intervenor argues that Plaintiffs’ equal protection claim fails because Plaintiffs are not

similarly situated to Intervenor and were not denied the variance process. (ECF No. 5, PageID

#130–31). Additionally, Plaintiffs failed to allege that Defendant lacked a rational basis to adopt

Ordinance 2022-40 and approve the Flint Development. (Id. at PageID #131–32).

Plaintiffs respond that Intervenor is mistaken as to what similarly situated class they

identified in their complaint. (ECF No. 9, PageID #213). Plaintiffs allege the similarly situated

party consists of property owners adjacent to other zoning districts that enjoy the protection of

Seville’s robust variance procedure. (Id.). Similarly, Plaintiffs allege that Intervenor is confused

as to what rational basis is required. (Id.). Plaintiffs concede there is a rationale for the economic

development, but they argue that it is the distinction between them and their articulated similarly

situated class that requires a rational basis. (Id.). Plaintiffs state, “[t]here is no rational basis to

treat Plaintiffs differently than other property owners in Seville.” (Id.).

In reply, Intervenor notes that the complaint does not allege that Defendant treated

Plaintiffs differently than other property owners. (ECF No. 10, PageID #229). Intervenor argues

that Plaintiffs instead repeatedly allege that Defendant’s actions impacted Plaintiffs and “the

community at large.” (Id.). Even if that class had been properly alleged, Intervenor contests that

Plaintiffs are still not similarly situated to property owners adjacent to other zoning districts

because “property owners adjacent to other zoning districts will neighbor properties that are

subject to separate and distinct substantive restrictions and procedural requirements.” (Id. at

PageID #230). Intervenor challenges that Plaintiffs failed to allege that Defendant’s actions lacked

a rational basis because they “must negate every conceivable basis which might support the

government action or show that the challenged action was motivated by animus or ill-will.” (Id.

at PageID #231).

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that “[n]o State

shall … deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const.

amend. XIV, § 1. “[A] valid equal protection claim requires showing that the government treated

the plaintiff disparately as compared to similarly situated persons and that such disparate treatment

either burdens a fundamental right, targets a suspect class, or has no rational basis.” Reform

America v. City of Detroit, Michigan, 37 F.4th 1138, 1152 (6th Cir. 2022). To be “similarly

situated,” “the plaintiff and the comparator must be alike in all relevant respects.” Id. (citing

Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992)). Equal protection claims can be brought by a class of

one, “where the plaintiff alleges that the state treated the plaintiff differently from others similarly

situated and that there is no rational basis for such difference in treatment.” Warren v. City of

Athens, Ohio, 411 F.3d 697, 710 (6th Cir. 2005). As Plaintiffs are not a suspect class, they proceed

under a class of one theory. “A class of one plaintiff may demonstrate that a government action

lacks a rational basis in one of two ways: either by negating every conceivable basis which might

support the government action or by demonstrating that the challenged government action was

motivated by animus or ill-will.” Anders v. Cuevas, 984 F.3d 1166, 1179 (6th Cir. 2021).

Plaintiffs argue that they pleaded “that property owners adjacent to other zoning districts

enjoy the protection of Seville’s robust variance procedure” and that Plaintiffs were denied that

protection simply because their property lies in the vicinity of an “Overlay District.” (ECF No. 9,

PageID #213). Plaintiffs stated in their complaint, “owners of properties neighboring Mixed Use

Overlay Districts are denied the equal protection of law (namely the variance process) that other

land owners are provided as it relates to development of properties neighboring other districts.”

(ECF No. 1, PageID #12). Intervenor contends that property owners adjacent to other zoning

districts are not “similarly situated.” (ECF No. 10, PageID #230). Intervenor states that those

property owners are inherently dissimilar because each zoning district has its own permitted and

prohibited uses and procedures. (/d.). Thus, Plaintiffs and property owners that are adjacent to

other zoning districts in Seville are not “similarly situated in all relevant respects.”

Even if the Court were to find that Plaintiffs adequately pleaded that they were treated

differently from others alleged to be similarly situated, Plaintiffs failed to allege there was no

rational basis for the difference in treatment, or that it was due to animus/ill will. Plaintiffs concede

in their complaint that Defendant stands to “gain substantial amounts of money from direct and

indirect tax revenue generated by the Flint Development.” (ECF No. 1, PageID #16). Defendant

noted in Ordinance 2022-40 that the purpose of the Ordinance was “to maximize potential for

economic development within the Village.” (Ud. at PageID #39). Plaintiffs did not allege any

animus or ill-will from Defendant in their complaint and did not argue that in their opposition.

Instead, Plaintiffs allege:

While there is rationale for economic development, it is the class distinction that

needs a rational basis. There is no rational basis for placing upon Plaintiffs a

disproportionate amount of the burden that comes from the economic benefit to

Seville just because they live next to an Overlay District as opposed to another type

of zoning district.

(ECF No. 9, PageID #213). Intervenor argues that it is rational for Defendant to decide that certain

zoning districts are appropriate for economic development and pass the requisite ordinances to

accomplish that. (ECF No. 10, PageID #231). The Court concurs. Thus, Plaintiffs failed to negate

every conceivable basis which might support the government action or demonstrate that the

challenged government action was motivated by animus or ill-will as required.

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Plaintiffs did not adequately pleaded claims for a violation of their rights to procedural due

process, substantive due process, or equal protection. As Plaintiffs have failed to plead a violation

of either the United States or Ohio constitution, counts three, four, and five are DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE.

B. Count One

Plaintiffs request declaratory judgment against Defendant in count one of their complaint

because Ordinance 2022-40 is facially unconstitutional and unconstitutional as applied to the Flint

Development. (ECF No. 1, PageID #17–20). Intervenor argues that this count should be dismissed

because Plaintiffs are not entitled to declaratory relief when the legal basis underlying the claim is

insufficient, as determined above. (ECF No. 5, PageID #132). As counts three, four, and five are

dismissed, there remains no legal basis for a declaratory judgment. Count one is DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE.

C. Count Two

Count two seeks to enjoin the construction of the Flint Development under the current site

plan approved by the Planning Commission. (ECF No. 1, PageID #21). Intervenor argues that

injunctive relief is a remedy, not a cause of action. (ECF No. 5, PageID #132–33). Intervenor also

notes that count two should be dismissed because there are no remaining causes of action. (Id.).

As there are no remaining causes of action, the Court DISMISSES count two of Plaintiffs’

complaint WITH PREJUDICE; injunctive relief can only be granted if the underlying claims are

meritorious.

IV. CONCLUSION

Intervenor’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED. All counts of Plaintiffs’ complaint are

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Accordingly, this case is

DISMISSED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: March 26, 2024 “adi Hime

CHARLES E. FLEMING

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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