Noco Company v. Jasper Industrial Supply, Inc.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

NOCO COMPANY, ) CASE NO. 1:22-cv-00851

)

Plaintiff, )

) JUDGE BRIDGET MEEHAN BRENNAN

v. )

)

JASPER INDUSTRIAL SUPPLY, INC., ) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND

) ORDER

Defendant. )

)

Before this Court is Defendant Jasper Industrial Supply, Inc.’s (“Jasper”) motion to

dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue, and failure to state a claim. (Doc. No.

21.) Plaintiff Noco Company (“Noco”) moved unopposed for jurisdictional discovery, and the

Court granted leave to conduct such discovery. (Doc. Nos. 23, 25.) After the close of

jurisdictional discovery, the parties completed briefing Jasper’s motion to dismiss. (Doc. Nos.

35, 36.) For the reasons that follow, the Court concludes that it lacks personal jurisdiction over

Jasper. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Jasper’s motion to dismiss without reaching Jasper’s

arguments regarding venue and failure to state a claim.

I. Background

A. Factual Background

Noco makes and sells battery chargers, portable power devices, and related products and

accessories. (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 5.) As part of its marketing efforts for those products, Noco has

registered several trademarks, such as marks for “NOCO GENIUS” and “ULTRASAFE.” (Id. at

¶ 19.) Noco sells some of its products directly to consumers, but Noco also sells to wholesalers

and authorized resellers. (Id. at ¶¶ 26–28, 31.) When Noco works with authorized resellers, it

enters into contracts with those resellers that limit the resellers’ ability to make bulk sales or

resell Noco products to wholesalers. (Id.)

Jasper is an Indiana corporation based in Indiana. (Id. at ¶ 6; Doc. No. 14-2 at ¶ 3.)

Noco alleges that Jasper sold Noco products without authorization. (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 33.) On

information and belief, Noco claims that Jasper purchases Noco products from resellers in Ohio

and that Jasper makes sales to retail consumers in Ohio using a Walmart storefront. (Id. at ¶¶ 35,

39–42.) Based on Jasper’s alleged sales of Noco products, Noco raises claims for trademark

infringement and dilution, trademark-related unfair competition and deceptive business practices,

and tortious interference with reseller contracts. (Id. at ¶¶ 54–113.)

B. Procedural Background

On May 23, 2022, Noco filed the complaint in this case. (Id.) Jasper failed to timely

respond, so the Clerk entered default on August 25, 2022. (Doc. No. 11.) Subsequently, Jasper

moved to set aside the default. (Doc. No. 14.) The Court granted Jasper’s motion and vacated

the default. (Doc. No. 19.)

On February 16, 2023, Jasper filed its motion to dismiss. (Doc. No. 21.) Noco then

sought jurisdictional discovery, which Jasper did not oppose. (Doc. No. 23.) The Court granted

the requested discovery. (Doc. No. 25.) During the course of discovery, Noco twice moved for

extensions of the discovery deadline. (Doc. Nos. 28, 30.) The Court granted the first extension.

(Doc. No. 29.) But it denied the second. (Doc. No. 34.) In seeking a second discovery

extension, Noco argued that an extension would allow the parties to discuss settlement and that

Jasper’s discovery responses were not due until two days after the discovery deadline. (Doc.

Nos. 30, 32.) But as the Court explained when denying the second extension, settlement

discussions are no excuse for skirting discovery obligations, and Jasper’s late response was an

issue of Noco’s own making. (Doc. 34 at 310–11.)1 Shortly after the close of discovery, the

parties completed briefing the motion to dismiss. (Doc. Nos. 35, 36.)

II. Discussion

A. Legal Standard

District courts have discretion in deciding how to resolve motions to dismiss for lack of

personal jurisdiction. A district court “may rely ‘upon the affidavits alone; it may permit

discovery in aid of deciding the motion; or it may conduct an evidentiary hearing to resolve any

apparent factual questions.’” MAG IAS Holdings, Inc. v. Schmückle, 854 F.3d 894, 899 (6th Cir.

2017) (quoting Theunissen v. Matthews, 935 F.2d 1454, 1458 (6th Cir. 1991)).

Regardless of the court’s choice, “[t]he party seeking to assert personal jurisdiction bears

the burden of demonstrating that such jurisdiction exists.” Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865, 871

(6th Cir. 2002). However, the court’s choice of procedure affects the weight of the burden.

When the court “‘rules on written submissions alone[,]’ the burden consists of ‘a prima facie

showing that personal jurisdiction exists.’” Schneider v. Hardesty, 669 F.3d 693, 697 (6th Cir.

2012) (quoting Serras v. First Tenn. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 875 F.2d 1212, 1214 (6th Cir. 1989)).

But when the court conducts an evidentiary hearing, the burden is a preponderance of the

evidence. Id.

The applicable burden is not fully settled for situations where, like here, courts have

allowed some discovery but have not held an evidentiary hearing. Stolle Mach. Co., LLC v.

RAM Precision Indus., 605 F. App'x 473, 480 n.5 (6th Cir. 2015). In Schneider v. Hardesty, the

Sixth Circuit held that the prima facie standard generally applies in such situations. 669 F.3d at

698–99. The Schneider court left open the possibility, though, that preponderance of the

1 For ease and consistency, record citations are to the electronically stamped CM/ECF document

and PageID# rather than any internal pagination.

evidence might apply when there is “no real dispute as to the facts or to the extent of discovery.”

Id. at 698 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Dean v. Motel 6 Operating L.P., 134 F.3d 1269,

1272 (6th Cir. 1998)). That is, there might be an exception to the prima facie standard in those

“rare instances” where the party asserting personal jurisdiction “has been granted all discovery

requested and that discovery resulted in an undisputed set of facts such that an evidentiary

hearing would be pointless.” Id. at 699 (emphasis added).

In this case, Noco has not received all discovery requested. The Court denied Noco’s

second request for a discovery extension. (Doc. No. 34.) Moreover, Noco contends that Jasper’s

productions were deficient. (Doc. No. 35 at 331–32; Doc. No. 35-2.) Noco is responsible for its

failure to timely ensure compliance with its requested discovery.2 And the existence of these

unresolved discovery issues means that the Schneider exception cannot apply. Therefore, the

Court evaluates personal jurisdiction under the prima facie standard.

To make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction, Noco need only “establish[] with

reasonable particularity sufficient contacts between [Jasper] and the forum state to support

jurisdiction.” Neogen Corp. v. Neo Gen Screening, Inc., 282 F.3d 883, 887 (6th Cir. 2002)

(quoting Provident Nat’l Bank v. Cal. Fed. Savings Loan Ass’n, 819 F.2d 434, 437 (3d Cir.

1987)). In assessing Noco’s prima facie case, the Court considers the evidence “in a light most

favorable to [Noco]” and does not weigh “the controverting assertions of the party seeking

dismissal.” Anwar v. Dow Chem. Co., 876 F.3d 841, 847 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting Theunissen,

935 F.2d at 1459).

2 It is not clear whether and how the dispute over Jasper’s allegedly deficient discovery

responses was resolved. Noco never filed a motion to compel, perhaps because the deadline to

file such motions passed by the time Noco raised its discovery dispute with Jasper. See LR

37.1(b). But if that is so, the failure to meet the deadline is due to Noco’s lack of diligence, as

the Court explained in denying a second extension of discovery deadlines. (See Doc. No. 34.)

B. Personal Jurisdiction

The Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over Jasper only if Jasper is “amenable to

service of process under [Ohio’s] long-arm statute and if the exercise of personal jurisdiction

would not deny [Jasper] due process.” Bird, 289 F.3d at 871 (quoting Mich. Coal. of

Radioactive Material Users, Inc. v. Griepentrog, 954 F.2d 1174, 1176 (6th Cir. 1992)). Here,

the Court concludes that personal jurisdiction would not be consistent with due process.3

Personal jurisdiction can be either general or specific. Goodyear Dunlop Tires

Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011). Because Noco argues only for specific

jurisdiction, the Court limits its analysis to specific jurisdiction. (See Doc. No. 35 at 324–28.)

The Sixth Circuit applies a three-part test to determine whether specific personal

jurisdiction comports with due process. “First, the defendant must purposefully avail himself of

the privilege of acting in the forum state or causing a consequence in the forum state.” Sullivan

v. LG Chem, Ltd., 79 F.4th 651, 670 (6th Cir. 2023) (emphasis removed) (quoting AlixPartners,

LLP v. Brewington, 836 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2016)). Second, “the claims must arise out of or

relate to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.” Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting

Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 592 U.S. ----, 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1025 (2021)).

And third, “the acts of the defendant or consequences caused by the defendant must have a

3 Historically, Ohio’s long-arm statute was “not coterminous with federal constitutional limits.”

Bird, 289 F.3d at 871. Recently though, the Ohio General Assembly amended the long-arm

statute to also permit “personal jurisdiction over a person on any basis consistent with the Ohio

Constitution and the United States Constitution.” Ohio Rev. Code § 2307.382(C). Ohio courts

have not yet ruled on the effect of this amendment, and federal district courts have been split on

their interpretations of the amendment. See Predictive Conversations, LLC v. Leica Geosys.,

Inc., No. 5:22-cv-311, 2023 WL 4052471, at *3 (N.D. Ohio June 16, 2023) (collecting cases).

Since the Court finds that personal jurisdiction would be inconsistent with due process, it is

unnecessary for the Court to address Ohio’s long-arm statute. Therefore, the Court expresses no

opinion regarding the ongoing debate over the long-arm statute’s meaning.

substantial enough connection with the forum state to make the exercise of jurisdiction over the

defendant reasonable.” Id. (quoting AlixPartners, 836 F.3d at 549–50).

The Court finds that Noco has failed to make a prima facie case at any step of the test.

1. Purposeful Availment

A defendant purposefully avails itself of a forum when it “act[s] or cause[s] a

consequence” in the forum such that it “invoke[s] the benefits and protections” of that forum’s

law. MAG IAS Holdings, 854 F.3d at 900. The requirement of purposeful availment is “more

aspirational than self-defining,” but years of judicial experience have uncovered four principles

that now guide the Court. Power Invs., LLC v. SL EC, LLC, 927 F.3d 914, 917–18 (6th Cir.

2019) (quoting Dudnikov v. Chalk & Vermilion Fine Arts, Inc., 514 F.3d 1063, 1071 (10th Cir.

2008)).

First, the defendant’s forum contacts must be intentional. Purposeful availment requires

the defendant to have “deliberately reached out beyond its home” into the forum. Ford, 141 S.

Ct. at 1025 (emphasis added) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Contacts that are no

more than “random, fortuitous, or attenuated” are not enough. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,

471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) (internal quotations and citation omitted).

Second, the defendant’s forum contacts must be of sufficient significance. The defendant

must have “created a ‘substantial connection’ with the forum state by engaging in ‘significant

activities within [the] State,’ or by creating ‘continuing obligations’ to residents in that state.”

MAG IAS Holdings, 854 F.3d at 900 (alteration in original) (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at

475–76). Substantiality does not require any specific type of contact. For example, forum

contacts can be substantial even when the defendant is not physically present in the forum,

though physical presence is relevant to the analysis. Id. (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476;

and Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 285 (2014)). Instead, whether forum contacts are

sufficiently substantial depends on the “quality of the contacts, and not their number or status.”

CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1265 (6th Cir. 1996) (cleaned up) (citation

omitted). That said, “[a] single deal with an in-forum resident [] does not by itself suffice.”

Power Invs., 927 F.3d at 918 (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 478); see also Neogen, 282 F.3d at

891 (explaining that a “one-time, unlikely-to-be-repeated” deal did not create personal

jurisdiction).

Third, purposeful availment depends on the “contacts that the ‘defendant [it]self’ creates

with the forum State.” Walden, 571 U.S. at 284 (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475).

Because personal jurisdiction focuses on the defendant, contacts between a plaintiff or third party

and the forum state cannot establish minimum contacts. Id.

Fourth, and relatedly, purposeful availment “looks to the defendant’s contacts with the

forum State itself, not the defendant’s contacts with persons who reside there.” Id. at 285.

While the “defendant’s contacts with the forum State may be intertwined with his transactions or

interactions with the plaintiff or other parties,” the Supreme Court has explained that the

“defendant’s relationship with a plaintiff or third party, standing alone, is an insufficient basis for

jurisdiction.” Id. at 286.

Applying these four guiding principles, the Court finds that Noco has failed to make a

prima facie case of purposeful availment. Jurisdictional discovery has revealed that Jasper has

no warehouses in Ohio. (Doc. No. 35-1 at 338.) In fact, Noco has offered no evidence that

Jasper has any physical presence in the state. Jasper’s only contacts with Ohio are its website

and online Walmart storefront. (Doc. No. 35 at 320; Doc. No. 1-2.)

An online commercial presence can be sufficient to establish purposeful availment, but

not in this case. To determine whether a website creates personal jurisdiction, the Sixth Circuit

uses the Zippo test. Neogen, 282 F.3d at 890. Under this test, “[a] defendant purposefully avails

itself of the privilege of acting in a state through its website if the website is interactive to a

degree that reveals specifically intended interaction with residents of the state.” Id. (citing Zippo

Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997)). Thus, courts

applying Zippo place websites on a “sliding scale” from passive to interactive. Id. (quoting

Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124). The more interactive a website, the more likely it is that personal

jurisdiction is proper. Id.

Where a website sits on the Zippo scale depends on the level of actual interaction

between a defendant and forum residents. The Zippo court explained that websites are

interactive, and personal jurisdiction is proper, when the defendant does business with forum

residents, such as by “enter[ing] into contracts with residents . . . that involve the knowing and

repeated transmission of computer files over the Internet.” Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124. So, for

instance, the defendant in Zippo purposefully availed itself of Pennsylvania when it consciously

chose to process 3,000 subscriptions and payments that it received from Pennsylvania residents

through its website, and to assign those subscribers passwords. Id. at 1121, 1126. Likewise, the

Sixth Circuit has centered its interactivity inquiry on the question of whether a defendant

conducts business with residents through its website. See Neogen, 282 F.3d at 890–91 (the

granting of passwords to forum residents as part of a contract for a defendant’s services weighs

in favor of purposeful availment); Bird, 289 F.3d at 874 (accepting business from 4,666 forum

residents through a website is enough interactivity to establish purposeful availment); Zoya Co.

v. Julep Nail Parlor Co., No. 1:11-cv-1702, 2011 WL 5975054, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 29, 2011)

(the most important factor for purposeful availment is whether forum residents actually ordered

products from the defendant, and whether the defendant actually sold products to forum residents

through its website).

On the other hand, a website is passive, and personal jurisdiction is not proper, when that

website “does little more than make information available to those who are interested.” Zippo,

952 F. Supp. at 1124. By their nature, websites can be accessed from almost anywhere. Neogen,

282 F.3d at 890. So, “[t]he maintenance of [a] website, in and of itself, does not constitute []

purposeful availment.” Id. The contact from a website’s mere availability on the internet is “an

‘attenuated’ contact that falls short of purposeful availment.” Id. (citation omitted); cf. Bird, 289

F.3d at 874 (“Furthermore, the fact that [a defendant] maintains a website that is accessible to

anyone over the Internet is insufficient to justify general jurisdiction.”). For example, a

defendant does not purposefully avail itself of a forum through its website when there is no

evidence that any forum residents contacted the defendant through its website, or that any of the

defendant’s sales occurred in the forum. See, Inc. v. Imago Eyewear Pty, Ltd., 167 F. App'x 518,

523 (6th Cir. 2006).

A website sits in the middle of the Zippo scale when “a user can exchange information

with the host computer,” but that user has not necessarily conducted business with the defendant.

Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124; see also Cadle Co. v. Schlichtmann, 123 F. App’x 675, 678 (6th

Cir. 2005) (finding a website to be semi-interactive when it provided contact information and

“arguably solicit[ed] support” from those who visited the website).

The Court finds that Jasper’s website and Walmart storefront are semi-interactive. Both

the website and Walmart storefront are capable of interacting with customers and are capable of

conducting sales. (See Doc. No. 1-2; Doc. 35 at 320.) The problem for Noco’s theory of

personal jurisdiction is that the evidence shows that all of Jasper’s sales of Noco products were

to non-Ohio residents. (Doc. No. 35-1 at 348–64.) Absent any “commercial connection”

between Jasper and Ohio, the simple fact that Jasper’s website and storefront had interactive

capabilities is not enough to establish purposeful availment. Noco Co. v. Doe, No. 1:19-cv-2260,

2020 WL 836757, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 20, 2020) (citation omitted); see also Imago Eyewear,

167 F. App’x at 523 (no purposeful availment when there was no contact with forum residents or

forum sales through a website); Cadle, 123 F. App’x at 678 (semi-interactive website did not

establish purposeful availment when there was no exchange of information between the

defendant and forum residents over the website). That is especially so when there is no evidence

that any Ohio resident even used the interactive features on Jasper’s website and storefront. See

Kraemer v. WhizCut Am. Inc., No. 1:16-cv-2364, 2017 WL 2119342, at *4 (N.D. Ohio May 16,

2017) (no personal jurisdiction when no Ohio residents used any of the interactive features of the

defendant’s website). Under these circumstances, Jasper’s website and storefront functioned

more like passive sources of information than interactive webpages. As such, Jasper’s contacts

with Ohio are not substantial enough to support purposeful availment.

Nor is there any other indication that Jasper deliberately targeted Ohio residents through

its website and storefront. Noco has not pointed to any statement or advertising on Jasper’s

website or storefront through which Jasper “holds itself out as welcoming [Ohio] business,” or

through which Jasper represents to consumers that it does business in Ohio. Neogen, 282 F.3d at

891. Even if that evidence existed, purposeful availment would still be “a close question” at

best. Id. Without any indications that Jasper was specifically targeting Ohio, the Court cannot

conclude that any of Jasper’s contacts with Ohio were deliberate.

Finally, Noco suggests that Jasper has sufficient contacts with Ohio because Jasper

injured Noco in Ohio and because Jasper tortiously interfered with an Ohio contract between

Noco and a third-party reseller. (Doc. No. 35 at 323–24.) But those are not Jasper’s contacts

with Ohio. They are Noco’s and the third-party reseller’s contacts with Ohio. Such contacts are

not properly considered to establish personal jurisdiction over Jasper. See Walden, 571 U.S. at

285–86.

Accordingly, the Court concludes that Jasper did not purposefully avail itself of an Ohio

forum.

2. Arise Out Of or Relate To

Due process also requires that a plaintiff’s claims “must arise out of or relate to the

defendant’s contacts with the forum.” Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1025 (internal quotations and citation

omitted). This standard does not necessarily require a causal connection between the defendant’s

contacts and plaintiff’s claims. While “[t]he first half of that standard asks about causation[,] the

back half, after the ‘or,’ contemplates that some relationships will support jurisdiction without a

causal showing.” Id. at 1026.

Of course, the “relate to” inquiry “does not mean anything goes.” Id. There are “real

limits” that “protect defendants foreign to a forum.” Id. In practice, “relate to” means that the

defendant’s forum contacts are of the same type that gave rise to the plaintiff’s claims, even if

the actions that created those claims occurred outside the forum.

To illustrate, consider the Supreme Court’s decision in Ford Motor Company v. Montana

Eighth Judicial District Court. 141 S. Ct. 1017. There, the plaintiffs alleged that their Ford

vehicles were defective. Id. at 1028. Ford had advertised, sold, and serviced the allegedly

defective car models in Montana and Minnesota for years, clearly establishing purposeful

availment. Id. The only complication was that Ford originally sold the specific vehicles at issue

outside of Montana and Minnesota, so the plaintiffs’ claims were not caused by Ford’s forum

contacts. Id. at 1029. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court held that Montana and Minnesota could

exercise personal jurisdiction over Ford because Ford’s forum contacts in marketing and selling

those car models gave Ford “clear notice” that it could be subject to the forum courts’

jurisdiction when those car models malfunctioned in the forums. Id. at 1030.

The Sixth Circuit’s recent decision in Sullivan v. LG Chem, Ltd. demonstrates the same.

79 F.4th 651. In that case, the plaintiff was injured by one of LG Chem’s batteries, called 18650

batteries. Id. at 657. LG Chem conducted business in Michigan regarding 18650 batteries, and

LG Chem also shipped 18650 batteries into Michigan. Id. at 673. Even though it was not clear

in Sullivan whether the 18650 battery that injured the plaintiff was one of the batteries shipped

into Michigan or whether it came from another state, LG Chem “had fair notice that it could be

sued in Michigan for the Michigan consequences of defects relating to its 18650 battery.” Id.

Thus, the Sixth Circuit found personal jurisdiction to be proper. Id. at 674.

Here, none of Noco’s claims arise from Jasper’s contacts with Ohio. Noco’s claims fall

into two general categories. First are trademark-related claims, which include most of Noco’s

claims. Second is Noco’s claim for tortious interference with contract. (See Doc. No. 1.)

Trademark violations occur “where the passing off of the allegedly infringing goods

occurred.” CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1267 (citing Dakota Indus. v. Dakota Sportswear, Inc., 946

F.2d 1384, 1388 (8th Cir. 1991)). In turn, “passing off” occurs “where the deceived customer

buys the defendant’s product in the belief that he is buying the plaintiff’s.” Dakota Indus., 946

F.2d at 1388 (quoting Vanity Fair Mills v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 639 (2d. Cir. 1956)).

Because Jasper did not sell any Noco products in Ohio, Noco’s trademark-related claims were

not caused by any of Jasper’s Ohio contacts.

In similar fashion, Noco’s tortious interference with contract claim does not arise from

Jasper’s Ohio contacts. Noco alleged that Jasper interfered with reseller contracts that limited

the ability of authorized resellers to sell Noco products to non-consumer third parties. (Doc. No.

1 at ¶¶ 78–84.) So, a tortious interference claim arises only when a Noco product is sold. Again,

since there is no evidence that Jasper was involved with any sales of Noco products in Ohio,

whether to or from Jasper, Noco’s tortious interference claim was not caused by Jasper’s Ohio

contacts.

The Court also concludes that none of Noco’s claims relate to Jasper’s Ohio contacts. As

the Court has repeatedly noted, there is no evidence that Jasper conducted any transactions

related to Noco products in Ohio. Jasper may have made Noco products accessible for

customers to purchase from its website and Walmart storefront, but without any actual purchases

in Ohio, mere accessibility cannot establish personal jurisdiction. See Neogen, 282 F.3d at 890

(a website’s mere availability is an attenuated contact not relevant to the personal jurisdiction

inquiry).

Thus, the Court finds that Noco’s claims do not arise from or relate to Jasper’s Ohio

contacts.

3. Reasonableness

The last step in the due process inquiry is to determine whether exercising personal

jurisdiction would be reasonable. In assessing reasonableness, courts consider multiple factors,

including: “(1) the burden on the defendant; (2) the interest of the forum state; (3) the plaintiff's

interest in obtaining relief; and (4) other states’ interest in securing the most efficient resolution

of the policy.” Air Prods. & Controls, Inc. v. Safetech Int'l, Inc., 503 F.3d 544, 554–55 (6th Cir.

2007).

The first and fourth factors both weigh against reasonableness. Jasper is an Indiana

corporation based in Indiana (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 6), so litigating in Ohio would be a substantial

burden. Intera Corp. v. Henderson, 428 F.3d 605, 618 (6th Cir. 2005). And Indiana has a strong

interest in this suit because Jasper is based in Indiana and would have directed the allegedly

unlawful activity from Indiana. By contrast, the second factor is neutral. Ohio has some interest

in this dispute because Noco is an Ohio resident (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 13), but that interest is

mitigated because none of Jasper’s allegedly unlawful activity occurred in Ohio. Intera Corp.,

428 F.3d at 618. Only the third factor weighs in favor reasonableness because Noco has a

substantial interest in obtaining relief. Id. at 619.

On balance, then, it would not be reasonable for the Court to exercise personal

jurisdiction over Jasper.

C. Discovery Issues

As a closing argument, Noco asserts that the Court should allow this case to move

forward because Jasper’s responses to jurisdictional discovery were deficient. (Doc. No. 35 at

331–32.) At the outset, it is far from obvious that there is any additional relevant discovery left,

or that additional discovery would support personal jurisdiction. But there is a more

fundamental problem with Noco’s argument. Even assuming that there is undiscovered evidence

that might support personal jurisdiction, it was Noco’s burden to bring that evidence to the

Court’s attention. Bird, 289 F.3d at 871 (the proponent of personal jurisdiction bears the burden

of establishing that personal jurisdiction is appropriate). And it was Noco’s responsibility to

diligently conduct discovery to find that evidence in time to meet case deadlines. As the Court

explained above, Noco failed to diligently conduct discovery, and its inability to compel further

productions from Jasper stems directly from that failure. Noco has offered no authority

supporting its position that, due to discovery failures fully within its control, the Court can find

personal jurisdiction exists when Noco has otherwise failed to meet its burden. As such, this

discovery dispute does not justify allowing this case to continue.

III. Conclusion

The Court finds that it lacks personal jurisdiction over Jasper, so it does not reach

Jasper’s arguments regarding venue or failure to state a claim. See Intera Corp., 428 F.3d at 621

(“Furthermore, upon a determination that personal jurisdiction is lacking, a court should not

dismiss a case on the merits . . . .”). The Court GRANTS Jasper’s motion to dismiss and

DISMISSES this case without prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: December 12, 2023 _________________________________

BRIDGET MEEHAN BRENNAN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE