The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
Michael Rypiak, Case No. 1:23cv1395
Plaintiff,
-vs- JUDGE PAMELA A. BARKER
Southwest General Hospital, MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
ORDER
Defendant.
Introduction
Pro se plaintiff Michael Rypiak has filed a civil complaint in this case against Southwest
General Hospital (“defendant” or “Southwest General”). (Doc. No. 1.) He did not pay the filing fee
but, instead, filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. No. 2.) That motion is granted. For
the reasons stated below, his complaint is dismissed.
Background
Plaintiff alleges he was a financial services intern at Southwest General and began his
internship on May 28, 2023. (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 4.) On June 23, 2023, his supervisor Cheryl Hadaam
allegedly pulled him into her office and informed him that the Chief Financial Officer had noticed
his feet kicked up on a chair in a closed cubicle while he was on break. He alleges Hadaam informed
him that “it was not a big deal and nothing more than a learning experience” and that she “truly
appreciated all the great work [plaintiff] was doing.” (Id. at ¶ 5.) According to plaintiff, he responded
to Hadaam that “he was feeling harassed by the Chief Financial Officer and was too frustrated to talk
after staying an hour late to make sure all the work was thoroughly completed before leaving on
vacation.” (Id.)1 He alleges that Hadaam merely responded “ok,” and that, on July 3, 2023, he
received a phone call informing him that his position was terminated. (Id. at ¶¶ 5, 6.) He states he
believes he was terminated for “informally reporting harassment” by the Chief Financial Officer. (Id.
at ¶ 10.)
Although he does not assert a specific legal claim or cause of action in his complaint, he
indicates on the cover sheet he filed with his complaint that he seeks to assert an employment
discrimination claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. (Doc. No. 1-1.) He seeks
$150,000 in compensatory damages, $150,000 in punitive damages, and $2,000 for “economic pay
for lost job.” (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 11.)
Standard of Review and Discussion
Because plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, his complaint is subject to review under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). That statute requires district courts to review all in forma pauperis
complaints filed in federal court, and to dismiss before service any such action that the Court
determines is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See id. To survive a dismissal
for failure to state a claim, a pro se complaint must set forth sufficient factual matter accepted as true
sufficient to state a claim that is plausible on its face. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir.
2010).
1 He also alleges he “had a previous conversation with the defendant's Director of Finance Charleen,
in which the Chief Financial Officer took a picture of the Plaintiff resting his head and neck while on
his phone during his unpaid break.” (Id. at ¶ 7.)
2
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to “discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1). Title VII also
contains an anti-retaliation provision, which prohibits employers from “discriminat[ing] against any
of [its] employees ... because [the employee] has opposed any employment practice made an unlawful
employment practice [by Title VII] … or because [the employee] has made a charge” that the
employer has engaged in an unlawful employment practice. Id. § 2000e–3(a).
Upon review, the Court finds that plaintiff’s complaint fails to allege a plausible Title VII
claim. Plaintiff does not allege or set forth facts permitting a plausible inference that he was
terminated from his internship or otherwise discriminated against with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of a characteristic protected by Title VII. Nor
does his complaint allege a plausible Title VII retaliation claim.
To establish such a claim, a plaintiff must show that “(1) he ... engaged in protected activity,
(2) the employer knew of the exercise of the protected right, (3) an adverse employment action was
subsequently taken against the employee, and (4) there was a causal connection between the protected
activity and the adverse employment action.” Hamilton v. Gen. Elec. Co., 556 F.3d 428, 435 (6th
Cir. 2009). Plaintiff’s allegations, even liberally construed, do not satisfy these elements.
To receive protection under Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision, a plaintiff's expression of
opposition to an employer’s conduct must concern a violation of Title VII. See Springs v. Cincinnati
Children's Hosp. Medical Center, No. 1: 10-cv-213, 2012 WL 1354475, at *11 (S.D. Ohio 2012),
citing Fox v. Eagle Distributing Co., Inc., 510 F.3d 587, 591 (6th Cir. 2007). Title VII does not
protect an employee if his opposition is merely a “vague charge of discrimination.” Land v. Southern
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States Cooperative, Inc., 740 Fed. Appx. 845, 850 (6th Cir 2018), citing Booker v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 1304, 1313 (6th Cir. 1989) and Fox, 510 F.3d at 592. “Otherwise,
every adverse employment decision by an employer would be subject to challenge under either state
or federal civil rights legislation simply by an employee inserting a charge of discrimination.”
Booker, 879 F.2d at 1313.
Thus, in Fox, the Sixth Circuit held that a plaintiff's statements to his manager that he intended
to sue the defendant company, that “upper management [was] out to get him,” and that management
had “prevented him from becoming a pre sell rep,” without mentioning the characteristic protected
by the anti-discrimination statute under which he sued,2 were insufficient to support a plausible
retaliation claim. Fox, 510 F.3d at 589–90, 592.
Plaintiff’s alleged complaints to Hadaam that he felt “harassed” and “frustrated” by the Chief
Financial Officer’s comments about him are similar to the statements made by the plaintiff in Fox.
Plaintiff’s complaints to Hadaam were not connected to any characteristic protected by Title VII and
would not reasonably have notified Hadaam that he was opposing an employment practice he
believed violated Title VII. At the most, plaintiff’s complaints would have suggested that he felt
harassed and frustrated that the Chief Financial Officer was concerned about his workplace conduct
and/or objected to his putting his feet up on a chair. Plaintiff’s statements, like those made by the
plaintiff in Fox, even accepted as true, are too vague and insufficient to demonstrate that he engaged
in protected activity of which his employer was aware as required to establish a prima facie retaliation
claim.
2 The plaintiff in Fox sued under the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act.
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Further, it is well settled that a plaintiff must exhaust his administrative remedies before filing
a Title VII lawsuit in federal court. Randolph v. Ohio Dep't of Youth Servs., 453 F. 3d 724, 731 (6th
Cir. 2006). The purpose of this requirement is to allow the EEOC or corresponding state agency the
opportunity to convince the parties to resolve the matter by voluntary settlement rather than through
litigation. Id. at 731–32 (citing Parsons v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 741 F.2d 871, 873 (6th Cir.
1984)). If the EEOC elects not to prosecute a discrimination charge, it shall issue a notice of right-
to-sue to the plaintiff. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(b).
Plaintiff does not indicate that he filed a discrimination charge with the EEOC or
corresponding state agency or that he received a right-to-sue notice. Failure to exhaust administrative
remedies is an appropriate basis for dismissal of a Title VII action. Williams v. Northwest Airlines,
Inc., 53 Fed. Appx. 350, 351 (6th Cir. 2002).
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a plausible Title VII claim and is
dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court further certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Pamela A. Barker
PAMELA A. BARKER
Date: October 5, 2023 U. S. DISTRICT JUDGE
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