Spann v. Hannah

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

ALBERT SPANN, ) CASE NO. 1:18-cv-02700

)

Plaintiff, ) JUDGE DAVID A. RUIZ

)

v. )

)

DAVID HANNAH, et al., )

) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Defendants. )

)

This matter is before the Court upon the cross-Motions for Summary Judgment filed by

Defendants Stephanie Adams, Janice Douglas, Nurse Chris, Unknown Doctor, and Unknown

Nurse(s) (Defendants) (R. 29), and pro se Plaintiff Albert Spann (R. 30). For the following

reasons, Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED.

I. Procedure

Plaintiff Albert Spann—an Ohio prisoner in the custody of the Ohio Department of

Rehabilitation and Corrections (ODRC)—filed a civil Complaint in forma pauperis alleging

claims of deliberate indifference and violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel

and unusual punishment, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Defendants, as well as David

Hannah, Nurse Mitchell, and Nurse Snowden, all in their individual and official capacities. (R. 1,

Pa geID# 1–2, 6 ¶¶ 1, 3, 29–32). Plaintiff seeks both monetary and injunctive relief. (Id., PageID#

6–7).

The previously assigned District Court Judge sua sponte dismissed Plaintiff’s Complaint

in its entirety pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can

be granted. (R. 5, PageID# 70–71). On appeal, the Sixth Circuit partially vacated the Court’s

decision, reviving Plaintiff’s claims against the following defendants: Douglas, Chris, Adams,

Doctor Unknown, and Nurse(s) Unknown, in both their individual and official capacities,

because at the pleading stage, the Complaint plausibly alleged that these Defendants were

deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s medical needs. Spann v. Hannah, 2020 WL 8020457, at *2–

3 (6th Cir. Sept. 10, 2020). At the same time, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s

dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims with respect to then-defendants Hannah, Mitchell, and Snowden.

Id. The Sixth Circuit remanded the case for further proceedings. Id. at *4.1

Following the close of discovery, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (R.

29). Plaintiff filed a combined Opposition to Defendants’ Motion and a cross-Motion for

Summary Judgment (R. 30), to which Defendants filed a Reply (R. 31). The Motions have been

fully briefed and are ripe for the Court’s review.

II. Facts

Plaintiff, an Ohio prisoner with glaucoma, is in the custody of the ODRC and confined at

Grafton Correctional Institution (GCI). (R. 1, PageID# 1 ¶¶ 3, 5). Defendants Adams and

Douglas were employed as a GCI nurse and institutional physician, respectively, for all or some

1 On remand, the parties consented, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), to the assignment of the case

to the undersigned, who at the time was a Magistrate Judge. (R. 24, PageID# 150). The case was

again reassigned to the undersigned on February 17, 2022, as a District Court Judge.

of the time between 2017 and 2018. (Id., PageID# 1–2; R. 29, PageID# 165). Defendants Chris,

Unknown Doctor, and Unknown Nurse(s) were employed at Franklin Medical Center (FMC) in

Columbus, Ohio, for all or some of the same time period. (R. 1, PageID# 1–2; R. 29, PageID#

165).

Plaintiff’s claims allege deliberate indifference by the medical staffs at GCI and FMC, in

connection with their treatment of Plaintiff’s glaucoma. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that

between 2017 and 2018, personnel on the medical staffs at GCI and FMC administered certain

eye medications to which staff members knew he was allergic, causing him to experience severe

reactions, including pain, swelling, and the potential to “cause him permanent blindness.” (R. 1,

PageID# 2–6 ¶¶ 5–28). For instance, Plaintiff alleges that in November 2017, Defendant Douglas

prescribed him eyedrops of Dorzolamide to treat his glaucoma, and he subsequently had an

allergic reaction resulting in that drug being “discontinued.” (Id., PageID# 3 ¶¶ 6, 9).

Nonetheless, Plaintiff alleges, the staff at GCI administered him Dorzolamide again in January

2018, which caused him to experience a severe allergic reaction. (Id.).

According to Plaintiff’s Complaint, each defendant had a role in mistreating his

glaucoma and violating his constitutional rights. In addition to Defendant Douglas allegedly

prescribing Plaintiff Dorzolamide, she also “changed” his medications to Xalatan and Alphagan

in April 2018. (Id. ¶ 11). Plaintiff further alleges that another drug that Defendant Douglas had

prescribed him—Timolol—caused him allergic reactions, but that despite explaining this to

Defendant Douglas, she advised Plaintiff to continue taking the Timolol. (Id., PageID# 4 ¶ 16).

Plaintiff also contends that on August 23, 2018, Defendant Adams prescribed him Timolol

despite knowing that Plaintiff had allergic reactions to that drug. (Id. ¶ 18). Separately, Plaintiff

alleges that in August 2018, while he was being treated at FMC, Defendants Chris, Unknown

D octor, and Unknown Nurse(s) repeatedly administered Plaintiff Atropine, despite Plaintiff’s

warning that he was severely allergic to this drug as well. (Id. ¶ 14). And in another instance at

FMC, Defendant Unknown Nurse “put the wrong medications in Plaintiff’s eyes,” leading to

another severe allergic reaction. (Id., PageID# 5 ¶ 23). In addition to the preceding allegations

levied against individual Defendants, Plaintiff’s Complaint contains several accusations directed

generally toward the medical staffs at GCI and FMC for allegedly “knowingly” administering

him drugs to which he was allergic. (See, e.g., id. ¶ 22).

III. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(a); Quinn v. Eshem, 2016 WL 9709498, at *2 (6th Cir. Dec. 20, 2016) (“Summary

judgment is proper when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving

party, there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). There is a genuine dispute as to a

material fact when the “evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the

nonmoving party.” Peffer v. Stephens, 880 F.3d 256, 262 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).

Non-moving parties may not rest upon the mere allegations in their pleadings nor upon

general allegations that issues of fact may exist. See Bryant v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 490

F.2d 1273, 1275 (6th Cir. 1974). Moreover, a party asserting an affirmative defense bears the

burden of proof at trial as to the affirmative defense, and thus bears that burden at the summary

judgment stage as well. See, e.g., Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Favino, 2011 WL 1256847, at *4

(N.D. Ohio Mar. 31, 2011) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–24 (1986)). In

ru ling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must construe the evidence, as well as any

inferences to be drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.

Kraus v. Sobel Corrugated Containers, Inc., 915 F.2d 227, 229 (6th Cir. 1990).

The standards upon which the Court evaluates motions for summary judgment do not

change when, as here, “both parties seek to resolve [the] case through the vehicle of cross-

motions for summary judgment.” Craig v. Bridges Bros. Trucking LLC, 823 F.3d 382, 387 (6th

Cir. 2016) (alteration in original) (quoting Taft Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 929 F.2d 240,

248 (6th Cir. 1991)). The Court must “evaluate each party’s motion on its own merits, taking care

in each instance to draw all reasonable inferences against the party whose motion is under

consideration.” Id. (quoting Taft, 929 F.3d at 248).

IV. Analysis

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) provides that “[n]o action shall be brought

with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a

prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative

remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Proper exhaustion “demands

compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules because no

adjudicative system can function effectively without imposing some orderly structure on the

course of its proceedings.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90–91 (2006). As the Supreme Court

held in Porter v. Nussle, the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement “applies to all inmate suits about

prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they

allege excessive force or some other wrong.” 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). The purpose of the

PLRA’s exhaustion requirement is to “allow prison officials ‘a fair opportunity’ to address

grievances on the merits, to correct prison errors that can and should be corrected and to create

an administrative record for those disputes that eventually end up in court.” Reed-Bey v.

Pramstaller, 603 F.3d 322, 324 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Woodford, 548 U.S. at 94–95).

Since the instant action alleges deliberate indifference and a violation of Plaintiff’s

Eighth Amendment rights pursuant to § 1983 in connection with Defendants’ medical treatment

of Plaintiff during his incarceration, the Court must dismiss the suit if Plaintiff has not properly

exhausted his administrative remedies.2 To make that determination, the Court looks to Ohio

state law for the procedures that inmates must satisfy to properly exhaust their administrative

remedies. Marshall v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. and Corr., 2018 WL 2539418, *2 (6th Cir. May 23,

2018).

Ohio Administrative Code (OAC) § 5120-9-31 provides a three-step grievance procedure

for inmates, which is designed to address their complaints related to institutional life. OAC §

5120-9-31(A), (J). First, the inmate must file an “informal complaint.” Id. § 5120-9-31(J)(1).

Informal complaints “must contain specific information; dates, times, places, the event giving

rise to the complaint and, if applicable, the name or names of personnel involved and the name

or names of any witnesses.” Id. § 5120-9-31(J). If the inmate does not know the identity of the

personnel involved in the incident being reported, the inmate may file a “John/Jane Doe”

complaint; but when filing such a complaint, it must “be specific as to dates, times, places,

2 Plaintiff appears to argue that the Court has already ruled in his favor on the issue of

exhaustion elsewhere on the docket, meaning that the Court’s review of that issue here would be

improper for reasons of preclusion and the law of the case doctrine. (R. 30, PageID# 586–587).

Specifically, Plaintiff contends that this issue has been decided by the Court during its Ҥ 1915

review” of the case. (Id.). To the extent that this is a reference to the Court’s mandatory screen of

proceedings in forma pauperis for the dismissal of frivolous actions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e), Plaintiff is mistaken that the case’s mere passage through that mandatory screen

indicates a ruling in his favor on the issue of exhaustion. This Court, and the Sixth Circuit for

that matter, have not ruled on this issue of PLRA exhaustion, and the Court will consider it here.

See Spann, 2020 WL 8020457.

ph ysical descriptions of any unidentified personnel and the actions of said personnel giving rise

to the complaint.” Id. If an inmate is dissatisfied with the response to the informal complaint, the

second step is for the inmate to file a notification of grievance with the inspector of institutional

services. Id. § 5120-9-31(J)(2). If the issue has still not been resolved at that point, the inmate

may then move to the third step and file an appeal with the office of the chief inspector. Id.

§ 5120-9-31(J)(3). After the completion of all these steps, the inmate would then have exhausted

his or her administrative remedies.

When analyzing whether Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies, the Court keeps

in mind that a failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense, meaning that Plaintiff need not

demonstrate exhaustion in his Complaint. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007). Rather,

Defendants have the burden to plead and prove Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust. See Board v. Smith,

2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140759, at *5 (W.D. Mich. July 2, 2020) (citing Jones, 549 U.S. at 212–

16), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139480 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 5,

2020). “[W]here the moving party has the burden—the plaintiff on a claim for relief or the

defendant on an affirmative defense—his showing must be sufficient for the court to hold that no

reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party.” Calderone v. United States,

799 F.2d 254, 259 (6th Cir. 1986) (quoting W. Schwarzer, Summary Judgment Under the Federal

Rules: Defining Genuine Issues of Material Fact, 99 F.R.D. 465, 487–88 (1984)) (emphases

omitted). The Sixth Circuit has emphasized that the party with the burden of proof “must show

that the record contains evidence satisfying the burden of persuasion and that the evidence is so

powerful that no reasonable jury would be free to disbelieve it.” Cockrel v. Shelby Cty. Sch.

Dist., 270 F.3d 1036, 1056 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting 11 James William Moore et al., Moore’s

Federal Practice § 56.13[1], at 56–138 (3d ed. 2000)).

Plaintiff has made several grievance-related filings that have progressed to various levels

in the three-step process outlined above. (See R. 29-1, PageID# 186–204; R. 1-4, PageID# 28; R.

1-5, PageID# 29–30; R. 1-6, PageID# 31–32; R. 1-7, PageID# 33–34). However, for the

following reasons, Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies for grievance claims

against any of the Defendants. The Court considers each defendant in turn.

A. Defendants Adams and Nurse Chris

Defendants Adams and Nurse Chris were never mentioned, by name or otherwise, in any

of Plaintiff’s grievance-related filings. Although “exhaustion is not per se inadequate simply

because an individual later sued was not named in the grievances, a plaintiff generally fails to

exhaust administrative remedies by failing to include an official’s name in a grievance if it is

required by the applicable grievance procedures.” Hall v. Warren, 443 F. App’x 99, 106 (6th Cir.

2011) (internal citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Jones, 549 U.S. at

219; Sullivan v. Kasajuru, 316 F. App’x 469, 470 (6th Cir. 2009)).

In Hall, the Sixth Circuit considered Michigan state grievance procedures in the context

of an exhaustion analysis. Id. The Michigan procedures required that inmates include in their

grievances “dates, times, places, and names of all those involved in the issue being aggrieved.”

Id. (citing Mich. Dep’t Corr. Pol’y Directive 03.02.130) (emphasis omitted). In that case, the

Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of a defendant on exhaustion grounds

because the plaintiff failed to provide the defendant’s name in his grievance. Id.; see also King v.

Banks, 2012 WL 1068103, at *3–4 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 2012) (holding that the plaintiff failed to

exhaust his administrative remedies under Ohio law as to two particular defendants where those

defendants were not named in his grievance, and that general references to the prison

“administration” were insufficient to name the specific defendants), report and recommendation

ad opted, 2012 WL 2891264, at *1 (S.D. Ohio July 13, 2012) (“Ordinarily, a claim against a

particular corrections official is not properly exhausted if that official is not named in the

grievance.”); Leonard v. Mohr, 2012 WL 423771, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 9, 2012)

(recommending that summary judgment be granted to the defendants that were not named in the

plaintiff’s grievances), report and recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 936410, at *4 (S.D. Ohio

Mar. 20, 2012); see also Goodrich v. Houghlan, 2019 WL 1362524, *4 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 26,

2019) (gathering cases).

Here, Ohio procedure required that Plaintiff’s informal complaints provide “the name or

names of personnel involved,” but he failed to include any specific reference to Defendants

Adams or Nurse Chris. As a result, Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as

to his claims against these two Defendants.

B. Defendant Douglas

In contrast to the previous two Defendants, Plaintiff did specifically refer to Defendant

Douglas by name in two of his grievance-related filings. (See R. 1-5, PageID# 29–30; R. 1-6,

PageID# 31–32; R. 29-1, PageID# 202–203; R. 29-1, PageID# 196–198). However, in neither

case did Plaintiff complain about Defendant Douglas’s conduct.

First, in an informal complaint dated January 9, 2018, Plaintiff recounted an appointment

he had with Defendant Douglas, where he explained to her that he was unable to put medication

in his eyes due to his poor vision. (R. 1-5, PageID# 29; R. 29-1, PageID# 202). Their

appointment was then interrupted by Nurse Snowden, who Plaintiff said was “very aggressive

and rude” to him—and that was the reason for Plaintiff filing the informal complaint, which did

not question any action by Defendant Douglas. (R. 1-5, PageID# 29; R. 29-1, PageID# 202).

Similarly, in another informal complaint dated March 16, 2018, Plaintiff began by

ex plaining that on January 9, 2018, he saw Defendant Douglas, who had taken Plaintiff off

Dorzolamide because the drops were causing his eyes to be infected. (R. 1-6, PageID# 31–32; R.

29-1, PageID# 196–198). Plaintiff next explained that when he was called to “medical” in March

2018 to pick up his medication, he was given the medication that Defendant Douglas had

stopped prescribing in January 2018. (R. 1-6, PageID# 31; R. 29-1, PageID# 196). Plaintiff

complained that he was being “improperly supervised” and that he just wanted “proper medical

care.” (R. 1-6, PageID# 31; R. 29-1, PageID# 196). In other words, in this grievance-related

filing, Plaintiff once again did not complain about Dr. Douglas’s conduct, who according to

Plaintiff had taken him off a medication that irritated his eyes, while unidentified personnel in

“medical” allegedly gave him the wrong medication two months later.

The foregoing two grievances did not put Defendant Douglas or GCI on notice about the

allegations that Plaintiff would later make in his Complaint—namely, that Defendant Douglas

advised Plaintiff to continue taking Timolol even though she knew that he was allergic. (Id.,

PageID# 4 ¶ 16). Therefore, Plaintiff has also failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to

his claims against Defendant Douglas.

C. Defendants Unknown Doctor and Unknown Nurse(s)

According to the Complaint, Defendants Unknown Doctor and Unknown Nurse(s) were

employed at FMC. (R. 1, PageID# 1–2). The only one of Plaintiff’s informal complaints that can

be construed as alleging misconduct against personnel at FMC is dated August 20, 2018. (R. 1-7,

PageID# 33–34; R. 29-1, PageID# 192). In that complaint, Plaintiff alleged that following eye

surgery in May 2018, he had severe pain and swelling, and was ultimately transferred to FMC.

(R. 1-7, PageID# 33; R. 29-1, PageID# 192). Plaintiff accused “ODRC medical personnel” at

FMC of demonstrating deliberate indifference to his medical condition by “knowingly”

pr oviding him with the wrong medications. (R. 1-7, PageID# 33; R. 29-1, PageID# 192).

Plaintiff said that he did not know the names of the “ODRC medical personnel” in question—

and that they would be “determined following discovery”—because he was refused their names

upon request. (R. 1-7, PageID# 33; R. 29-1, PageID# 192).

To the extent that Plaintiff would have the Court construe this grievance as a “John/Jane

Doe” complaint, it would still be insufficient to satisfy his exhaustion requirements as to

Defendants Unknown Doctor and Unknown Nurse(s) because in such a complaint, Plaintiff

would still be required to provide specific details, including “physical descriptions of any

unidentified personnel and the actions of said personnel giving rise to the complaint,” which he

did not do. OAC § 5120-9-31(J). General references to “ODRC medical personnel” are

insufficient to put any particular individual on notice of the conduct about which Plaintiff

complained. See Triplett v. Sheldon, 2018 WL 3105064, at *3 (N.D. Ohio June 25, 2018)

(holding that where a plaintiff did not mention individual defendants in his grievance related

filings, and did not avail himself of the opportunity to file a “John Doe” or “Jane Doe”

grievance, that plaintiff had failed to exhaust his claims as to the defendants). As a result,

Plaintiff has also failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to his claims against

Defendants Unknown Doctor and Unknown Nurse(s).3

There is no material dispute that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies

3 Plaintiff argues that the Court should not hold it against Plaintiff that he was unable to identify

certain ODRC employees in his grievance-related filings because “ODRC employees routinely

hide their identifies under the guise of ‘security’ thus creating obstacles for pro se and often

illiterate prisoners to properly render allegations within the truncated grievance process.” (R. 30,

PageID# 586). But Plaintiff’s argument elides over the fact that he had the ability to file a

“John/Jane Doe” complaint in order to exhaust his claims. Plaintiff could have, but did not, avail

himself of this procedure by, inter alia, providing a physical description of the personnel he was

unable to identify. Therefore, Plaintiff’s argument is not well taken.

un der the PLRA against all remaining Defendants in this action. The Defendants, having carried

their burden to demonstrate that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies,

are entitled to summary judgment.4

V. Conclusion

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 29) is GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s

Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 30) is DENIED. As a result, this action is DISMISSED with

prejudice. Further, the Court certifies that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in

good faith and that there is no basis upon which to issue a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a)(3).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ David A. Ruiz

David A. Ruiz

United States District Judge

Date: September 18, 2023

4 Plaintiff raises another contention—that the technology employed by GCI to log prisoner

grievances essentially makes the grievance procedure unavailable to inmates. (R. 30, PageID#

587). For instance, Plaintiff contends that the machines that inmates must use to type their

grievances only allows them access for twelve-minute increments, and that the typing system

renders the process unavailable to those inmates suffering from blindness. (Id.). Even assuming

all of this to be true, Plaintiff does not contend that he was unable to access the grievance

system—in fact, such a contention would be belied by the number of grievances Plaintiff

actually filed with GCI. (See R. 29-1, PageID# 186–204). Therefore, Plaintiff’s contention is

unavailing.