Opinion

Newsome v. Wakefield

Court
District Court, N.D. Ohio
Filed
Jun 28, 2023
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 28.1%

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

Darrick Newsome, Jr., Case No. 3:20-cv-2630

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM OPINION

AND ORDER

Shawn Wakefield, et al.,

Defendants.

I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Pro se plaintiff Darrick Newsome, Jr., an inmate at the Allen Oakwood Correctional

Institution (“AOCI”) in Lima, Ohio, filed suit against Defendants AOCI Investigator Shawn

Wakefield, Chairman of the Rules Infraction Board (“RIB”) Michael Ledesma, Case Manager Ms.

Wilson, Assistant Warden Jody Factor, Restrictive Housing Sgt. Van Horn, and 3-House Unit

Manager Ida Collier, alleging due process and equal protection violations and retaliation in

connection with prison discipline imposed on him by the AOCI RIB in 2020. (Doc. No. 1). I

dismissed Newsome’s due process and equal protection claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B), for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (Doc. No. 6). I also

granted the motion of the State of Ohio to dismiss Newsome’s remaining retaliation claim on behalf

of all Defendants. (Doc. No. 25).

Newsome has filed a document he titled “Writ of Objection.” (Doc. No. 27). It appears

this document is a motion for reconsideration of my dismissal of his retaliation claim. The State of

Ohio has treated it as a motion for reconsideration as well and has filed a brief in opposition. (Doc.

No. 28). For the reasons stated below, I deny Newsome’s motion.

II. STANDARD

Although a motion for reconsideration is not mentioned in the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, it is often treated as a motion made under Rule 59(e). McDowell v. Dynamics Corp. of

America, 931 F.2d 380 (6th Cir. 1991). Rule 59(e) states that a party must file a motion to alter or

amend a judgment within 28 days of the entry of the judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). The party

filing a Rule 59(e) motion must demonstrate there was “(1) a clear error of law; (2) newly discovered

evidence; (3) an intervening change in controlling law; or (4) a need to prevent manifest

injustice.” Henderson v. Walled Lake Consol. Sch., 469 F.3d 479, 496 (6th Cir. 2006).

Rule 60 also provides some limited recourse for a party seeking relief from a final judgment.

Rule 60(b) provides that, “[o]n motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal

representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:

(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;

(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been

discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);

(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or

misconduct by an opposing party;

(4) the judgment is void;

(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an earlier

judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer

equitable; or

(6) any other reason that justifies relief.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). A party “seeking relief under Rule 60(b) bears the burden of establishing the

grounds for such relief by clear and convincing evidence.” Info-Hold, Inc. v. Sound Merch., Inc., 538

F.3d 448, 454 (6th Cir. 2008).

III. ANALYSIS

Newsome claims he was denied due process because: (1) I did not issue a scheduling order

pursuant to Rule 16; (2) I did not issue an order setting a deadline for him to respond to the motion

to dismiss; and (3) I denied his motion for summary judgment without requiring the Defendants to

respond to it. (Doc. No. 27 at 2). These arguments are not persuasive.

First, Newsome has not shown he suffered any harm due to the absence of a scheduling

order. The Local Civil Rules set the applicable deadline for responding to a dispositive motion. See

Loc. R. 7.1(d). And Newsome in fact filed a timely brief in opposition to the motion to dismiss.

(See Doc. No. 16). Moreover, I did not grant the motion to dismiss simply because Newsome did

not respond to the State of Ohio’s specific arguments. Instead, I reviewed Newsome’s complaint,

and I granted the motion because the factual allegations in the Complaint are insufficient to state a

plausible claim for relief. (See Doc. No. 25).

Nor is Newsome entitled to relief because I denied his motion for summary judgment as

moot. The Defendants moved for a stay of their response deadline due to the fully briefed motion

to dismiss, (Doc. No. 19), and I granted that motion, staying the briefing until that motion was

resolved. (Doc. No. 20). Further, Newsome’s arguments in his summary judgment motion did not

identify a sufficient causal connection between the Defendants’ alleged conduct and Newsome’s

exercise of a protected right.

Therefore, I conclude Newcome fails to show he is entitled to relief under Rule 59 or Rule

60 and deny his motion.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, I overrule Newsome’s Writ of Objection, (Doc. No. 27), and

affirm my dismissal of Newsome’s First Amendment retaliation claim. Further, I certify, pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith.

So Ordered.

s/ Jeffrey J. Helmick

United States District Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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