holding the appropriate statute of limitations for § 1983 civil rights actions arising in Ohio is the two-year statute contained in Ohio Rev. Code § 2305.10
How later courts described this case
- holding the appropriate statute of limitations for § 1983 civil rights actions arising in Ohio is the two-year statute contained in Ohio Rev. Code § 2305.10
- holding that the district court “properly dismissed” a pro se plaintiff’s § 1983 civil rights action sua sponte because the complaint was filed years after Ohio’s two-year statute of limitations had expired
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
TIMOTHY NEWELL, ) CASE NO. 1:22-cv-1179
)
Plaintiff, )
) JUDGE BRIDGET M. BRENNAN
v. )
)
KEITH FOLEY, WARDEN, ) MEMORANDUM OPINION
) AND ORDER
Defendant. )
Pro se Plaintiff Timothy Newell, an Ohio prisoner, has filed a fee-paid civil rights
complaint against Grafton Correctional Institution Warden Keith Foley. (Doc. No. 1.) He has
also filed a motion for an order for service of process by the U.S. Marshal. (Doc. No. 2.) For the
reasons stated below, plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed and his motion for service by the
Marshal is denied.
Background
In his complaint, plaintiff contends he is being unconstitutionally imprisoned pursuant to
a “facially invalid June 26, 1996 sentencing entry” that was entered in two 1978 state criminal
cases in which he was convicted of six counts of kidnaping, thirteen counts of rape, four counts
of aggravated robbery, one count of felonious assault, one count of gross imposition, and one
count of felonious penetration. (Id. at 8.) He asks the Court to declare that the 1996 sentencing
entry violates his rights, and order that he either be returned to the custody of the trial court for
modification of his sentence or released from custody. (Id. at 13.)
Standard of Review and Discussion
Federal district courts are expressly required, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, to screen all
complaints filed in federal court in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental officer or
employee, and to dismiss before service any such complaint that the court determines is frivolous
or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief
from a defendant immune from such relief. See Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 471 (6th Cir.
2010).1
A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it lacks
“sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Hill, 630 F.3d at 470-71 (holding that the dismissal standard articulated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), governs dismissals for
failure to state a claim under § 1915A).
Upon review, the Court finds that plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed pursuant to §
1915A because it fails to state a plausible federal civil rights claim upon which he may be
granted relief.
Beginning with Preiser v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973), federal courts have drawn
careful lines between relief properly considered in a habeas corpus action and relief that is
proper to a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Supreme Court held in Preiser that
state prisoners who seek to challenge their convictions or their sentences, as plaintiff does here,
must seek habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 rather than relief in a civil rights action
under § 1983. See id. at 500 (“We hold today that when a state prisoner is challenging the very
fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is
entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal
1 “[A]ll complaints filed by prisoners against state officials, whether or not they are
proceeding in forma pauperis” are subject to sua sponte dismissal under § 1915A. See Lacoss v.
Engler, 234 F.3d 1268 (Table), 2000 WL 1679482, at *1 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Benson v.
O'Brian, 179 F.3d 1014, 1016 (6th Cir. 1999)).
2
remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.”).
Because plaintiff challenges the validity of a state criminal sentence and seeks speedier or
immediate release, his claim is not cognizable in a civil rights action. Accordingly, his
complaint fails to state a plausible claim upon which he may be granted relief.
Further, even if plaintiff’s complaint asserted a cognizable civil rights claim, his action is
patently time-barred. His complaint challenges a sentencing entry entered over twenty-five years
ago. A civil rights complaint under § 1983 is governed by Ohio’s two-year statute of limitations.
See, e.g., Browning v. Pendleton, 869 F.2d 989, 992 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding the appropriate
statute of limitations for § 1983 civil rights actions arising in Ohio is the two-year statute
contained in Ohio Rev. Code § 2305.10). Although the statute of limitations is an affirmative
defense, when it appears clear on the face of a complaint that an action is time-barred, the
complaint may be dismissed sua sponte on initial screening. See Fraley v. Ohio Gallia Cty., 166
F.3d 1231 (Table), 1998 WL 789385, at *2 (6th Cir. Oct. 30, 1998) (holding that the district
court “properly dismissed” a pro se plaintiff’s § 1983 civil rights action sua sponte because the
complaint was filed years after Ohio’s two-year statute of limitations had expired).
Conclusion
Accordingly, based on the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. In light of this dismissal, his motion for service by the Marshal is denied
as moot. The Court further certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this
decision could not be taken in good faith.
3
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: October 6, 2022 : i Mp
B ET MEEHAN BRENNAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE