Chilton v. Walters

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

KRISTOPHER CHILTON, CASE NO. 3:21 CV 1312

Plaintiff,

v. JUDGE JAMES R. KNEPP II

DEPUTY WARDEN RYAN L. WALTERS,

et al.,

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND

Defendants. ORDER

INTRODUCTION

Pro se Plaintiff Kristopher Chilton, an inmate incarcerated at Toledo Correctional

Institution (“TCI”), brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging various TCI employees

violated his Eighth Amendment rights. See Doc. 1. The served Defendants (Ryan Walters, James

Hobbs, Troy Reed, Abel Buck, Peter Kimball, and Christopher Salatin), along with interested

party, the State of Ohio on behalf of unserved Defendants (Captain John Doe and Matthew

Elder) move to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted. (Doc. 8). Plaintiff has not filed a response, and the time in which to do so has expired.

See Local Rule 7.1(d) (providing that an opposition to a case-dispositive motion shall be filed

within 30 days). Jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. For the reasons stated below, the

Court grants Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.

BACKGROUND

At all relevant times to the instant case, Plaintiff was confined at the Toledo Correctional

Institution (“TCI”). (Doc. 1, at ¶ 5). Following an October 2019 visit with his sister in the TCI

visitation room, Plaintiff was ordered to dry cell watch. Id. at ¶ 16-18. He was “placed inside of

an empty concrete room with absolutely nothing in it besides four concrete walls”, including no

bed or blanket, sink or toilet, and “was stripped down and given a paper gown.” Id. at ¶¶ 21-22,

27-29. This room was in the receiving and discharge (“R&D”) unit. Id. at ¶ 19. He remained in

the room in this condition for nine days. Id. at ¶ 22. He slept on the concrete floor with cold air

conditioning blowing through the room. Id. He used a five-gallon bucket for toileting, which was

not emptied until the day he left the room. Id. at ¶ 29.

Plaintiff brings claims against the Deputy Warden of Operations, Investigators, the Safety

and Health Coordinator, a Major, the Second Shift Captain, and two Corrections Officers at TCI,

asserting each had some involvement in the above actions (or failed to respond to his

complaints). See id. at ¶¶ 6-13, 23-44. He seeks compensatory damages, as well as declaratory

and injunctive relief. Id. at 8-9.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

When deciding a motion to dismiss under Federal Civil Rule 12(b)(6), the Court tests the

complaint's legal sufficiency. The Court is required to accept the allegations stated in the

complaint as true, while viewing the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Hishon

v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236

(1974); Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 858 (6th Cir. 1976); see also Papasan v. Allain, 478

U.S. 265, 286 (1986) (noting that “[a]lthough for the purposes of this motion to dismiss we must

take all the factual allegations in the complaint as true, we are not bound to accept as true a legal

conclusion couched as a factual allegation”).

Although a complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” it requires more

than “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of

action.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Thus, a complaint survives

a motion to dismiss if it “contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). And “[a]

claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Hensley

Mfg. v. ProPride, Inc., 579 F.3d 603, 609 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949); see

also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief”).

DISCUSSION

Defendants move to dismiss, asserting the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted. They contend Plaintiff has not pled facts to satisfy the objective component

of an Eighth Amendment claim, citing caselaw regarding temporary uncomfortable prison

conditions such as sleeping on the floor, cold cell temperatures, and unsanitary conditions.

Again, as noted, Plaintiff has not responded.

To state a claim that prison conditions violate the Eighth Amendment under § 1983, an

inmate must allege prison officials acted with “deliberate indifference” to the inmate’s health or

safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828-29 (1994). Deliberate indifference is a higher

standard than negligence, and it contains objective and subjective components. Id. at

834; Harrison v. Ash, 539 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2008). The risk of harm to the prisoner caused

by the conditions of confinement must have been, objectively, sufficiently serious to require

constitutional protection. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. The subjective component requires the

inmate to “show that (1) ‘the official being sued subjectively perceived facts from which to infer

a substantial risk to the prisoner,’ (2) the official ‘did in fact draw the inference,’ and (3) the

official ‘then disregarded that risk.’” Richko v. Wayne County, 819 F.3d 907, 915-16 (6th Cir.

2016) (quoting Rouster v. County of Saginaw, 749 F.3d 437, 446 (6th Cir. 2014)).

To establish such deliberate indifference, the prisoner must allege he was deprived of the

“minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347,

(1981). Conditions that are restrictive or even harsh, but are not cruel and unusual under

contemporary standards, are not unconstitutional. Id.; see also Agramonte v. Shartle, 491 F.

App’x 557, 560 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Harsh and uncomfortable prison conditions do not

automatically create an Eighth Amendment violation.”). Rather, an inmate must allege an

“extreme deprivation”. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992). Thus, federal courts may not

intervene to remedy conditions that are merely unpleasant or undesirable.

In considering whether an Eighth Amendment violation has occurred, a court must

consider “‘[t]he circumstances, nature, and duration of a deprivation.’” Spencer v. Bouchard, 449

F.3d 721, 728 (6th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 220

(2007) (quoting Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000)).

Plaintiff’s Complaint asserts he was confined to a cold concrete room for nine days,

wearing a paper gown, without a bed, blanket, sink, or toilet; he used a bucket for toileting, and

the bucket was not emptied until the day he left the room. See Doc. 1. The Court finds that

although Plaintiff certainly alleges uncomfortable and unpleasant conditions, none of Plaintiff’s

allegations rise to the level of a constitutional deprivation.

Lack of Mattress

Requiring an inmate to sleep on the floor without a mattress for a relatively short duration

does not violate the Eighth Amendment. See Grisson v. Davis, 55 F. App’x 756, 757 (6th Cir.

2003) (allegations of seven day deprivation of mattress and blanket did not “allege facts that, if

proven, would rise to the level of the serious deprivation and deliberate indifference required to

support and Eighth Amendment claim.”); Jones v. Toombs, 77 F.3d 482 (6th Cir. 1996)

(unpublished table disposition) (requiring inmate to sleep on floor for a two week period does

not violate the Eighth Amendment) (citing Schroeder v. Kaplan, 1995 WL 398878, at *2 (9th

Cir.) (requiring prisoner to sleep on floor for four weeks does not violate the Eighth

Amendment)); Valdes v. Evans, 2019 WL 334171, at *5 (W.D. Ky.) (“A . . . one-week period

without a mattress where an inmate does not allege any specific harm from going without it does

not give rise to a constitutional violation.”); Lee v. Wagner, 2017 WL 2608752, at *4 (W.D.

Mich.) (eight day deprivation of mattress not a violation); Bodman v. Dennis, 2011 WL 3739033,

at *7 (W.D. Mich.) (“Plaintiff’s allegation that he was . . . made to sleep on the floor for eight

days constitutes only a minor inconvenience; it falls short of demonstrating the sort of inhumane

conditions that implicate the Eighth Amendment.”); see also Trammell v. Keane, 338 F.3d 155,

163-65 (2d Cir. 2003) (no violation when inmate deprived of clothing, blanket, and mattress for

several weeks, and toilet paper for more than a week as a disciplinary measure because

discomfort of lacking clothing and bedding did not risk inmate’s health and safety).

As such, Plaintiff’s assertions regarding denial of a mattress and bedding for nine days do

not state an Eighth Amendment claim.

Toilet

The Sixth Circuit has recognized on more than one occasion that the Eighth Amendment

does not require flushable toilets in prison. See Abdur-Reheem-X v. McGinnis, 198 F.3d

244,1999 WL 1045069, at *2 (6th Cir.) (table) (the “Eighth Amendment does not require that

prisoners enjoy immediately available and flushable toilets”); Knop v. Johnson, 977 F.2d 996,

1013 (6th Cir. 1992) (“We do not agree that it violates the Eighth Amendment to require

prisoners to use nonflushable toilets on occasion.”); Dellis v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 257 F.3d 508,

511 (6th Cir. 2001) (“With respect to Plaintiff's conditions of confinement claims—that he was

deprived of a lower bunk, was subjected to a flooded cell, and was deprived of a working

toilet—Plaintiff alleged only temporary inconveniences and did not demonstrate that the

conditions fell beneath the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities as measured by a

contemporary standard of decency.”); Wiley v. Ky. Dep’t of Corr., 2012 WL 5878678, at *4

(E.D. Ky.) (“Temporary placement in a cell with no flushable toilet is not an extreme deprivation

of a basic necessity.”) (dismissing for failure to state a claim Eighth Amendment claim based on

plaintiff’s confinement to a dry cell for two weeks with, inter alia, no flushable toilet and no

running water).

Again, the Court finds Plaintiff has not alleged facts which, if proven, would demonstrate

an Eighth Amendment violation, and as such, dismissal is appropriate.

Cold Temperatures

The Supreme Court has explained that “[s]ome conditions of confinement may establish

an Eighth Amendment violation ‘in combination’ when each would not do so alone, but only

when they have a mutually enforcing effect that produces the deprivation of a single, identifiable

human need such as food, warmth, or exercise—for example, a low cell temperature at

night combined with a failure to issue blankets.” See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991).

As with all Eighth Amendment claims, however, a court must consider the relevant factors of

“‘[t]he circumstances, nature, and duration of a deprivation.’” Spencer, 449 F.3d at 728

(quoting Johnson, 217 F.3d at 731).

Plaintiff alleges he was dressed in a paper gown, not provided with a blanket, and cold air

conditioning was blowing through the room. (Doc. 1, at ¶ 22). He does not allege he suffered any

specific injury as a result.

However, courts have found being subject to cold temperatures for a relatively short

duration does not violate the Eighth Amendment. See, e.g., Wells v. Jefferson Cty. Sheriff Dep’t,

35 F. App’x 142, 143 (6th Cir. 2002) (allegations that Plaintiff was forced to sleep in a cold cell

for six days does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation); Dean v. Campbell, 1998 WL

466137, at *2 (6th Cir. 1998) (confinement in a cold segregation cell for more than

twenty days not sufficient to show the type of extreme deprivation necessary for

an Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim”); Martinez v. Gore, 2021 WL 2269987,

at *3 (W.D. Ky.) (“The Court finds that Plaintiff’s claim that he spent four days with nothing but

paper boxers to wear in a cold cell with no mat, sheets, blankets, shoes, socks, or other property,

standing alone, does not state an Eighth Amendment claim.”); Wiley, 2012 WL 5878678, at *4

(conditions including cold temperatures did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation

when they were “experienced for a short period of time, fourteen days”);

The Court finds the same result appropriate here. Although Plaintiff alleges he was

subject to cold cell conditions, he asserts no specific injury resulting therefrom, the conditions

were temporary (nine days), and the facts alleged do not set forth the sort of “extreme

deprivation” required.

Taken together, although certainly unpleasant, uncomfortable, and undesirable, “the

conditions about which Plaintiff complains . . . were discomforts which he experienced for a

short period of time”, nine days. Wiley, 2012 WL 5878678, at *4. They were “temporary

inconveniences, not conditions that fall beneath the minimal civilized measure of life’s

necessities as measured by a contemporary standard of decency”. Id. They do not amount to the

“extreme deprivation” necessary to demonstrate an Eighth Amendment violation. Hudson, 503

U.S. at 9.1

Physical Injury 42 U.S.C. § 1915e(e)

Furthermore, in addition to the above, even if Plaintiff had stated a constitutional claim,

dismissal of his damages claims would still be appropriate. Although Plaintiff’s Complaint

includes a conclusory allegation he suffered physical injury and seeks damages for such, the

Complaint does not allege facts to identify any specific injury or connect it to any particular

condition imposed. See Doc. 1. Section 1997e(e) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act states that

“[n]o Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner . . . for mental or emotional injury

suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury.”42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). The

physical injury need not be significant, but must be more than de minimis for a request for

compensatory damages based on an Eighth Amendment claim. Flanory v. Bonn, 604 F.3d 249,

254 (6th Cir. 2010). Without such allegations, claims for mental or emotional injury may not be

maintained. See Richmond v. Settles, 450 F. App’x 448, 455 (6th Cir. 2011) (“In the absence of

evidence that a prisoner suffered a physical injury, the deprivation of a mattress and bedding for

1. Additionally, and alternatively, the Court notes that Plaintiff failed to respond to Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss and the time in which to do so has expired. He has thus waived opposition to

the motion. See Humphrey v. U.S. Attorney General’s Office, 279 F. App’x 328, 331 (6th Cir.

2008) (“where, as here, plaintiff has not raised arguments in the district court by virtue of his

failure to oppose defendants’ motions to dismiss, the arguments have been waived”) (citing, inter

alia, Scott v. State of Tennessee, 878 F.2d 382, 1989 WL 72470, at *2 (6th Cir. 1989)

(unpublished table decision) (affirming district court’s grant of defendants’ unopposed motion to

dismiss and noting that “if a plaintiff fails to respond or to otherwise oppose a defendant’s

motion, then the district court may deem the plaintiff to have waived opposition to the

motion.”)); see also Brown v. Panther Premium Logistics, Inc., 2017 WL 6502822, at *1 (N.D.

Ohio) (“This Court may interpret the absence of a response to a motion to dismiss as a waiver of

opposition.”); Burdick v. Anthony, 2007 WL 275968, at *1 (N.D. Ohio) (“The district court's

power to grant motions to dismiss because they are unopposed is firmly settled.”).

a fixed period of time does not violate the Eighth Amendment.”); Grissom, 55 F. App’x at 758

(allegations that deprivation of mattress caused “aching” were “nothing more than [allegations

of] a de minimis physical injury”).

A plaintiff must allege “a specific physical injury” to satisfy § 1997e(e). Herman v.

Holiday, 238 F.3d 660, 665 (5th Cir. 2001). General allegations of physical health problems and

conditions that do not require medical attention are insufficient. See id. at 665-66 (inmate’s

general allegations of “physical health problems” not sufficiently specific to satisfy § 1997e(e)).

Although Plaintiff generally alleges he suffered “serious physical injury” as a result of

Defendants’ actions, he does not describe or name a specific ailment or injury, nor specifically

connect any such injury to the conditions imposed. As such, § 1997e(e) provides an independent

basis for dismissing Plaintiff’s damages claims.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, good cause appearing, it is

ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 8) be, and the same hereby is,

GRANTED; and the Court

FURTHER CERTIFIES, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this

decision could not be taken in good faith.

s/ James R. Knepp II

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE