The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
GARY MAXWELL, ) CASE NO. 5:19CV837
)
Plaintiff, )
) JUDGE JOHN R. ADAMS
vs. )
)
) OPINION AND ORDER
FCA US LLC, )
)
Defendant. )
Pending before the Court is a motion for summary judgment filed by Defendant FCA US
LLC (“FCA”). Plaintiff Gary Maxwell has opposed the motion, conceding two of his four claims,
and FCA has replied in support. Upon review, FCA’s motion for summary judgment is
GRANTED.
I. FACTS
Gary Maxwell is a former FCA employee who worked most recently as a checker and
packer at the Cleveland Parts and Distribution Center (“Cleveland PDC”) in Streetsboro, Ohio.
Doc. 46 at 1. Maxwell was a member of the United Automobile, Aerospace, Agricultural
Implement Workers of America, Amalgamated Local Union No. 573 (“UAW”). Id. The terms of
his employment were governed by a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) between FCA and
UAW. Id.
Maxwell alleges discrimination by FCA related to his June 2015 termination for violation
of FCA’s attendance policies. Maxwell had accrued seven unexcused absences and after the
seventh, he was terminated on June 8, 2015. Maxwell was visibly agitated during the termination
hearing. After his termination, Cleveland PDC officials were informed by Gary Sitosky, a local
UAW representative, that Maxwell made threats against two local union members: the local UAW
president Michael Kalman and UAW chairman Jimmy Jones. Upon the discovery of this
information, Maxwell's termination classification was changed from a violation of the attendance
policy to termination for the threats to Kalman and Jones per FCA’s workplace violence prevention
policy. Maxwell denies making any of the statements reported to FCA.
Following termination, Maxwell’s unexcused absences were changed to excused absences
after submission of documentation and verification with Sedgwick, the company that FCA utilizes
to monitor attendance and resolve attendance matters at Cleveland PDC. Doc. 50 at 1. However,
due to the alleged threats reported to Cleveland PDC officials, Maxwell’s termination was not
revisited. UAW worked to get Maxwell reinstated and offered two opportunities for Maxwell to
sign conditional reinstatement letters, which would allow Maxwell to return to his work under the
terms of the conditional reinstatement. Maxwell refused to sign either of the letters and his
termination remained in place as he believed that signing either letter was an admission of making
the threats.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Maxwell filed his first complaint on October 10, 2017 in state court. The complaint was
removed to this Court, and Maxwell voluntarily dismissed the Complaint. Maxwell filed his
second Complaint on April 15, 2019, alleging disability discrimination under Ohio Revised Code
§ 4112, violation of the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), breach of verbal contract, and
promissory estoppel. In his answer to FCA’s motion for summary judgment, Maxwell consented
to summary judgment regarding the breach of verbal contract and promissory estoppel claims.
Doc. 50 at 14. Thus, only the O.R.C. § 4112 and FMLA claims require this Court’s consideration.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine issue of material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). The moving party must demonstrate
to the court through reference to pleadings and discovery responses the absence of a genuine issue
of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The burden on the nonmoving party is to show, through
the use of evidentiary materials, the existence of a material fact which must be tried. Id. The court’s
inquiry at the summary judgment stage is “the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is
the need for a trial - whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can
be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either
party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250.
The Court’s treatment of facts and inferences in a light favorable to the nonmoving party
does not relieve that party of its obligation “to go beyond the pleadings” to oppose an otherwise
properly supported motion for summary judgment under Rule 56(e). See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324.
The nonmoving party must oppose a proper summary judgment motion “by any kinds of
evidentiary material listed in Rule 56(c), except the mere pleadings themselves ...” Id. Rule 56(c)
states, “[t]he judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.”
IV. LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Does the Contractual Limitation Period Bar Plaintiff’s Claims Entirely?
1. The Limitation Period is Reasonable
FCA argues that the statute of limitations included in Maxwell’s original employment
contract precludes all claims presented against them. In relevant part, the contract reads:
I agree that any claim or lawsuit arising out of my employment with, or my
application for employment with, Chrysler Corporation or any of its subsidiaries
must be filed no more than six (6) months after the date of the employment action
that is the subject of the claim or lawsuit. While I understand that the statute of
limitations for claims arising out of an employment action may be longer than six
(6) months, I agree to be bound by the six (6) month period of limitations set forth
herein, and I waive any statute of limitation to the contrary.
Maxwell Dep. 83: 18-22; see also Maxwell Dep., Ex. D. FCA claims that the last employment
action between the parties occurred on June 8, 2015, the day of Maxwell's termination. The first
filing with any court regarding this employment action was filed on October 10, 2017. Thus, FCA
contends, all of Maxwell’s claims against FCA are barred by the parties’ contractual statute of
limitations. Maxwell maintains that this waiver does not apply to his FMLA claim and that the
waiver was invalid with respect to his state law claims. Maxwell conceded that a six-month
contractual statute of limitations is not inherently unreasonable. However, Maxwell argues that the
factors articulated in Walker v. Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, Inc., 400 F.3d 370, 381 (6th Cir.
2005), invalidate the contractual waiver.
2. Knowing and Voluntary Waiver
Maxwell argues that he should evade application of the shortened statute of limitations
period because his waiver was not knowing and voluntary. To determine whether a waiver of a
statutory limitation period was knowing and voluntary, a court must consider: (1) the plaintiff’s
experience, background, and education; (2) the amount of time the plaintiff had to consider
whether to sign the waiver, including whether the plaintiff had an opportunity to consult with a
lawyer; (3) the clarity of the waiver; (4) consideration for the waiver; and (5) the totality of the
circumstances. Id. Maxwell makes a plethora of arguments that he did not knowingly and
voluntarily waive his rights.
However, Maxwell points to no evidence in the record that this Court can consider as
supporting an unknowing and/or involuntary waiver. While Maxwell notes that he did not
complete high school, he makes little effort to evaluate the remaining factors. There is nothing in
the record to suggest that Maxwell’s education inhibited his ability to understand the terms of the
waiver. Indeed, Maxwell makes no such contention. Moreover, there is nothing in the record to
suggest that Maxwell was rushed in his review of the waiver or that the waiver lacked clarity.
Accordingly, his attempts to invalidate his waiver do not create a genuine issue of material fact.
Maxwell next argues in the alternative that because he filed a claim with the National Labor
Relations Board on October 2, 2015, he had “fulfilled” the terms of the waiver and the six-year
O.R.C. 4112 statute of limitations should control his claims. Doc. 50 at 8. Maxwell cites Thompson
v. Fresh Products, LLC to support his claim. In Thompson, Plaintiff brought suit under the ADA
and ADEA alleging discrimination in her termination. Thompson v. Fresh Prod., LLC, 985 F.3d
509, 519 (6th Cir. 2021). The 6th Circuit held that under the ADA and ADEA, the claims brought
by the plaintiff were not subject to a contractual waiver of a statute of limitations in her
employment agreement. Id. There is no mention of the fulfillment of a waiver in the Thompson
opinion, and the claim was filed under a different federal act than in the present case. Thus,
Maxwell’s argument that he has met the timeframe by virtue of his NLRB complaint has no support
in precedent. Moreover, Maxwell has offered no legal support to suggest that his filing with the
NLRB tolled the contractual statute of limitations or otherwise inhibited his ability to file a lawsuit
within the agreed-upon timeframe.
Viewing the terms of the waiver in a light most favorable to Maxwell, this Court finds the
signing of the waiver in the employment application was knowing and voluntary under the Walker
factors. Therefore, even when viewing the evidence presented most favorably to the Maxwell, this
Court finds for FCA on all of the state law claims presented against them under ORC § 4112, as
Maxwell has knowingly and voluntarily agreed to shorten his statute of limitations to six months
and his first Complaint was filed more than 2 years after Plaintiff's termination.
3. The Waiver’s Applicability to Plaintiff's FMLA Claim
Maxwell further argues that the contractual waiver cannot apply to his FMLA claim.
Maxwell relies on other district courts that have ruled against contractual waivers’ ability to negate
FMLA claims. See Lewis v. Harper Hosp., 241 F. Supp. 2d 769, 772 (E.D. Mich. 2002); Madry v.
Gibraltor Nat. Corp., No. 10-13886, 2011 WL 1565807, 3 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 25, 2011); Henegar
v. Daimler-Chrysler Corp., 280 F. Supp. 2d 680 (E.D. Mich. 2003), overruled by Byron v. St.
Mary’s Med. Ctr., No. 11-13445, 2012 WL 3966090 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 11, 2012). The Sixth
Circuit has yet to rule on the applicability of a contractual waiver of the FMLA statute of
limitations, but several district courts have ruled against these waivers in favor of public policy.
Because Maxwell’s claim (discussed below) fails on the merits, the Court has no reason to
take a formal position on the applicability of the waiver to FMLA claims.
B. Plaintiff's Breach of Contract and Promissory Estoppel Claims
Plaintiff has conceded that he cannot sustain his burden under Civ. R. 56 for his breach of
contract and promissory estoppel claims. Doc. 40 at 14. Therefore, these claims are dismissed with
prejudice.
C. Plaintiff's State Disability Discrimination Claim is Preempted by the LMRA
FCA argues that Maxwell’s state law discrimination claims are preempted by section 301
of the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”). The two facets of Maxwell’s O.R.C. 4112.02
claim are a seniority of job placement question and discrimination claim regarding his attendance-
based termination. Doc. 53 at 5.
The Sixth Circuit has articulated a two-prong test to determine whether a state law
disability claim is preempted by the LMRA under section 301. This court must determine (1)
whether the state law claim requires interpretation of the CBA terms and (2) whether the right
claimed by the plaintiff exists through state law or solely through the contractual agreement.
DeCoe v. Gen. Motors Corp., 32 F.3d 212, 216 (6th Cir. 1994). To survive preemption, the claim
must require no interpretation of the CBA’s terms and the right must be borne entirely of state law.
If the claim requires interpretation of the CBA or if the right claimed by the plaintiff is borne from
contractual obligations, the claim is preempted by section 301.
Maxwell makes arguments that both support and contradict his claim that interpretation of
the CBA is not required to prove or disprove his state law claims. However, this Court need only
review Maxwell’s opposition to the motion for summary judgment to find whether the CBA is
required. Maxwell argues that FCA’s actions regarding his termination due to the threats reported
to upper management were not proper, legitimate, or nondiscriminatory. Doc. 50 at 17-18.
Maxwell does not suggest how this Court should determine what the proper, legitimate, and
nondiscriminatory action should have been. Instead, only an analysis of the CBA could show
whether Maxwell’s arguments against FCA’s decisions have any merit.
Thus, Maxwell’s state law claims require an analysis of the CBA and are therefore
preempted by section 301 of the LMRA.
D. Maxwell’s FMLA Claim Fails on the Merits
1. The Prima Facie Claim
FCA argues that Maxwell cannot meet the prima facie elements of his FMLA claim. To
establish a prima facie case of FMLA retaliation, Maxwell must show that: 1) he was engaged in
an activity protected by the FMLA; (2) the employer knew that he was exercising his rights under
the FMLA; (3) after learning of the employee’s exercise of FMLA rights, the employer took an
employment action adverse to him and (4) there was a causal connection between the protected
FMLA activity and the adverse employment action. Donald v. Sybra, Inc., 667 F.3d 757, 761 (6th
Cir. 2012).
Maxwell argues that he was engaged in an activity protected by the FMLA but brings no
evidence to support this fact. Further, Maxwell's testimony contradicts this claim, as he stated in
his deposition that he had made the claim under FCA’s sickness and accident plan because he
believed that his alleged pneumonia was not covered under his FMLA leave.1 Maxwell Dep.
124:21-125:1-3.
Maxwell contends that he had informed FCA of his FMLA claim due to a purported request
for FMLA leave that Plaintiff made to Sedgwick, not directly to FCA. Maxwell brings no evidence
to support that FCA knew, or would have any reason to know, that Maxwell had made the requests
at the time of his termination. In fact, Maxwell never used the call-in attendance service, nor did
he directly notify FCA.
Maxwell then purports that the FMLA claim made on May 5, 2015 was the basis for his
alleged retaliatory firing. FCA argues that they had heard and approved other FMLA requests from
1 Maxwell had taken intermittent FMLA leave for a heart condition. While Maxwell’s complaint suggests some
portion of his absence related to pneumonia should have been covered, there is no evidence that he ever sought such
FMLA leave for this particular condition.
Maxwell, and he had not been terminated. Doc. 53 at 9. Further, Maxwell does not address the fact
that he did not accrue attendance occurrences under FCA’s policy due to the absences themselves,
but rather that he did not comply with the call-in procedures required by the CBA. In short,
Maxwell has submitted no evidence of any kind that could demonstrate that there was a causal link
between his firing and the alleged FMLA claim. The sole evidence before the Court indicates that
Maxwell was terminated because he did not call in his absences.
Maxwell’s argument in the alternative -- that the two conditional offers of reinstatement
constitute retaliatory actions -- similarly fails for lack of evidence. Maxwell was offered his
position back twice and declined, indicating that he declined because he thought that signing the
documents was akin to an admission that he had made the threats reported to FCA. Maxwell has
offered no factual or legal support for his assertion that the conditional offers of reinstatement were
retaliatory, let alone evidence that they were in any way related to his FMLA leave. Accordingly,
his claims must fail.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, this Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment. Judgment on the Complaint is hereby entered in favor of Defendant.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: March 3, 2022 /s/ John R. Adams
JUDGE JOHN R. ADAMS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE