Townsend v. Rockwell Automation, Inc.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

FAITH TOWNSEND, ) Case No. 1:21-cv-02226

)

Plaintiff, ) Judge J. Philip Calabrese

)

v. ) Magistrate Judge Thomas M. Parker

)

ROCKWELL AUTOMATION, INC., )

)

Defendant. )

)

OPINION AND ORDER

On November 22, 2021, pro se Plaintiff Faith Townsend filed a complaint

against Defendant Rockwell Automation, Inc. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff alleges that

Defendant discriminated against her based on sex and race in violation of Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Defendant moves to dismiss for failure to state a

claim. (ECF No. 3.) In response, Plaintiff opposes (ECF No. 6) and seeks to amend

her complaint (ECF No. 7). For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS

Plaintiff’s motion to amend (ECF No. 7) and Defendant’s motion to dismiss (ECF

No. 3).

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Taking the facts alleged in the complaint as true and construing them in

Plaintiff’s favor, as the Court must on the motion before it, Plaintiff bases her claims

on the following facts.

A. The Complaint

In her complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Rockwell Automation paid her

substantially less than five white men in her department, even though three of them

began their employment many years after she did. (ECF No. 1, PageID #1; ECF

No. 16, PageID #114.) Further, she also alleges that she outperformed her male

colleagues but they received larger merit raises and bonuses. (ECF No. 1, PageID #1;

ECF No. 16, PageID #114.)

Rockwell Automation employed Faith Townsend, an African-American

woman, from 1996 to 2018. (ECF No. 1, PageID #2; ECF No. 16, PageID #114.) For

ten years, she worked in the technical support call center, during which time she was

promoted to senior engineer. (ECF No. 1, PageID #2; ECF No. 16, PageID #114.)

Notwithstanding her promotion, she was informed that she would not receive an

increase in salary. (ECF No. 1, PageID #2; ECF No. 16, PageID #114.) In 2005,

Mrs. Townsend transferred to the afterhours weekend support group and became the

team lead. (ECF No. 1, PageID #2; ECF No. 16, PageID #114.) Still, she did not

receive a pay increase, though one was promised. (ECF No. 1, PageID #2; ECF

No. 16, PageID #114.)

After her promotion, Mrs. Townsend experienced racial harassment from her

five white male colleagues, which reported on multiple occasions to the human

resources department. (ECF No. 1, PageID #2; ECF No. 16, PageID #114.) She

complains that she was subject to “[s]tories about hangings, nooses, guns, [and]

watermelon[s].” (ECF No. 1, PageID #2; ECF No. 16, PageID #114.) Plaintiff alleges

that, following the first report, she experienced adverse treatment in her job,

including a decrease in merit incentive pay, an increase in her workload, and

deprivation of certain equipment needed for her position. (ECF No. 1, PageID #2;

ECF No. 16, PageID #114.) Still, in 2010, 2011, and 2012, Mrs. Townsend received

good job reviews, though her pay lagged that of her colleagues. (ECF No. 1, PageID

#2; ECF No. 16, PageID #115.) When a new supervisor started, she made another

report to the new supervisor. (ECF No. 1, PageID #2; ECF No. 16, PageID #115.)

On investigation, Plaintiff believed she was underpaid for overtime by about

$700, but her supervisor disputed that she was owed for overtime. (ECF No. 1,

PageID #2; ECF No. 16, PageID #116.) In 2013 and 2014, Plaintiff alleges that she

experienced lower merit pay increases, which were lower as she stepped up her

complaints. (ECF No. 1, PageID #2; ECF No. 16, PageID #116.)

In 2015, Plaintiff alleges that a new supervisor took over her group and

replaced her as team lead with one of her underperforming and less qualified male

colleagues. (ECF No. 1, PageID #2; ECF No. 16, PageID #116.) Further, she alleges

that this new supervisor changed company policies to conceal the underperformance

of her colleagues. (ECF No. 1, PageID #2–3; ECF No. 16, PageID #116.) According

to the complaint, her supervisor dedicated her male colleagues to providing support

for one specific product but required Mrs. Townsend to support as many as twenty

varied products, which had a negative effect on her performance. (ECF No.1, PageID

#3; ECF No. 16, PageID #116–17.) In 2017, her supervisor allegedly made a

derogatory statement that black people “do not educate their children” in Plaintiff’s

presence. (ECF No.1, PageID #3; ECF No. 16, PageID #117.)

Later in 2017, Mrs. Townsend filed a complaint with the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission and received a right-to-sue letter. (ECF No.1, PageID #3;

ECF No. 16, PageID #117.) The complaint acknowledges that Plaintiff did not file

suit, due to Mrs. Townsend’s mental state following the death of her son. (ECF No.1,

PageID #3; ECF No. 16, PageID #117.)

When Mrs. Townsend returned to work following her son’s death, her difficult

working conditions continued. (ECF No.1, PageID #3; ECF No. 16, PageID #117.)

She went to a corporate ombudsman, but did not receive an adequate response. (ECF

No.1, PageID #3; ECF No. 16, PageID #117.) In February 2018, Mrs. Townsend was

suspended after she emailed her entire department with complaints. (ECF No.1,

PageID #3; ECF No. 16, PageID #117.) As a result, Mrs. Townsend alleges that she

was under such great stress that she was hospitalized. (ECF No.1, PageID #3; ECF

No. 16, PageID #118.) In retaliation, Rockwell Automation allegedly canceled her

insurance while Mrs. Townsend was on medical leave. (ECF No.1, PageID #3; ECF

No. 16, PageID #118.) In these circumstances, Mrs. Townsend resigned, though she

alleges that Rockwell Automation reported that she had returned to work to interfere

with her receipt of unemployment benefits. (ECF No.1, PageID #3; ECF No. 16,

PageID #118.)

Later in 2018, Plaintiff filed a lawsuit. (ECF No.1, PageID #3; ECF No. 16,

PageID #118.) Information discovered in that lawsuit led Mrs. Townsend to believe

that the racial discrimination of which she complains was perpetrated not only by her

five white male colleagues but also by management. (ECF No.1, PageID #4; ECF

No. 16, PageID #118.) Plaintiff seeks $10 million in damages, plus $1 million in

punitive damages. (ECF No.1, PageID #4; ECF No. 16, PageID #119.)

B. Amendment

Defendant moves to dismiss for failure to state a claim. (ECF No. 3.) In

response, Plaintiff timely moved to amend. (ECF No. 7.) In that amendment,

Plaintiff adds two claims under State law: one for embezzlement, and one for breach

of contract. (Id., ECF No. 62.) With respect to the former, Plaintiff alleges that

Rockwell automation intentionally withheld wages in breach of the merit base

performance contract. (Id.) As for the latter, Plaintiff alleges that discrimination in

violation of federal law breaches the employment agreement between the parties.

(Id.) Additionally, she may assert this breach of contract claim under various federal

statutes, including 42 U.S.C. §§ 1658 and 1981. (Id., PageID #63.)

Because Plaintiff seeks to amend her complaint as a matter of course pursuant

to Rule 15(a)(1)(B) in response to Defendant’s motion to dismiss, the Court GRANTS

that motion. For that reason, the summary of the allegations in the complaint set

forth above contains parallel citations to the complaint and the amendment. In the

interest of judicial economy and to conserve the resources of the parties, the Court

reads Defendant’s motion to dismiss as applying with equal force to the amended

complaint.

ANALYSIS

Rule 12(b)(6) provides that a court can dismiss a complaint if it fails to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted. A Rule 12(b)(6) motion is “a test of the

plaintiff's cause of action as stated in the complaint, not a challenge to the plaintiff's

factual allegations.” Golden v. City of Columbus, 404 F.3d 950, 958–59 (6th Cir.

2005). Dismissal is proper if the complaint lacks an allegation regarding a required

element necessary to obtain relief. Craighead v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 899 F.2d

485, 489–90 (6th Cir. 1990). When determining whether the plaintiff has stated a

claim upon which relief can be granted, the Court must construe the complaint in the

light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept all factual allegations as true, and

determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that

is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The

plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds for relief “requires more than labels and

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not

do.” Id. at 555.

Although the pleadings and documents pro se litigants file are liberally

construed and held to less stringent standards than the formal pleadings of lawyers,

Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004), pro se litigants are not exempt

from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Wells v. Brown, 891

F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989). At this stage of the proceedings that means that even

a pro se complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state

a claim to relief that is plausible on its face’” to avoid dismissal. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

678.

I. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

Before filing suit under Title VII, a plaintiff must bring claims to the EEOC to

provide the agency an opportunity to investigate and decide if it wants to pursue

charges on behalf of the federal government. See EEOC v. Frank’s Nursery & Crafts,

Inc., 177 F.3d 448, 455–56 (6th Cir. 1999). “[F]or 180 days after the filing of a charge,

the EEOC retains ‘exclusive’ jurisdiction over the subject matter of that charge[,]” a

period of time that is “crucial to the statutory scheme.” Id. at 456 (quoting EEOC v.

Hearst Corp., 103 F.3d 462, 466 (5th Cir. 1997)).

Under the law of this Circuit, the lack of a right to sue letter does not deprive

a district court of jurisdiction, but instead constitutes a condition precedent to filing

suit that is curable (by receiving a right-to-sue letter) or waivable (by the parties or

the Court). Parry v. Mohawk Motors of Mich., Inc., 236 F.3d 299, 309 (6th Cir. 2000)

(noting it would be “unduly harsh . . . to deny Plaintiff his day in court as to his ADA

claim” based on not having a right to sue letter at the time he filed the complaint);

Rivers v. Barberton Bd. of Educ., 143 F.3d 1029, 1032 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding a right

to sue letter is a condition precedent, not a jurisdictional requirement). However,

district courts retain discretion to dismiss claims or actions without prejudice where

a plaintiff fails to obtain a right-to-sue letter before filing. See Mitchell v. Chapman,

343 F.3d 811, 820 n.10 (6th Cir. 2003); accord Lott v. Kmart, No. 2:13- cv-228, 2013

WL 3927617, at *2 (S.D. Ohio July 29, 2013) (dismissing without prejudice).

Here, the complaint makes clear that Plaintiff, though proceeding pro se,

knows she must obtain a right-to-sue letter. So far as the Court can tell, Plaintiff

does not have one. Defendant has not waived the requirement that Mrs. Townsend

present the claims to the agency before filing suit. Because obtaining a right-to-sue

letter is a condition precedent to filing suit, and there is no record Plaintiff received

one, the Court dismisses this action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

The Court need not decide whether that dismissal is with or without prejudice

because of Defendant’s argument for dismissal on the basis of res judicata.

II. Res Judicata

“Res judicata” is an overarching term encompassing both issue and claim

preclusion. See Hutcherson v. Lauderdale Cnty., 326 F.3d 747, 758 n.3 (6th Cir. 2003)

(citing Charles Alan Wright, The Law of Federal Courts § 100A, at 722–23 (5th ed.

1994); Black’s Law Dictionary 1312 (7th ed. 1999)). Res judicata promotes “the

finality of judgments and thereby increase certainty, discourage multiple litigation,

and conserve judicial resources.” Stolmayer v. McCarthy, 171 F. Supp. 3d 690, 694

(N.D. Ohio 2016).

Claim preclusion prevents “parties from raising issues that could have been

raised and decided in a prior action—even if they were not actually litigated.” Lucky

Brand Dungarees, Inc. v. Marcel Fashions Grp., Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1589, 1954 (2020). “If

a later suit advances the same claim as an earlier suit between the same parties, the

earlier suit’s judgment ‘prevents litigation of all grounds for, or defenses to, recovery

that were previously available to the parties, regardless of whether they were

asserted in the prior proceeding.’” Id. (quoting Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 131

(1979)).

To prevail on this defense, a party must demonstrate: (1) a prior final valid

decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action

involving the same parties, or their privities, as the first; (3) a second action arising

from claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second

action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the

previous action. Martin v. JBS Techs., LLC, 443 F. Supp. 2d 962, 965 (S.D. Ohio

2006) (cleaned up). Because res judicata constitutes a defense, Defendant bears “the

burden of pleading and proving each element.” Id.

II.A. Prior Litigation Between These Parties

Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that she filed a previous lawsuit in 2018. See also

Townsend v. Rockwell Automation Inc., No. 1:18-cv-2742 (N.D. Ohio). Although a

court’s analysis on a motion to dismiss is ordinarily limited to the complaint, matters

of public record, orders, items appearing in the record of the case, and exhibits

attached to or made part of the complaint may also be taken into account. Amini v.

Oberlin College, 259 F.3d 493, 502 (6th Cir. 2001). Accordingly, the Court considers

the record from the earlier lawsuit between the parties both because it is a matter of

public record and because Plaintiff references it in her complaint.

In the earlier litigation, the amended complaint alleged that Mrs. Townsend’s

supervisor, who also named as a defendant there but is not here, ignored complaints

of harassment by co-workers, failed to investigate misuse of company property by

Plaintiff’s co-workers and other violations of company policy, and treated her more

unfavorably than her co-workers based on her race. Further, the amended complaint

in the first lawsuit claims that Plaintiff did not receive overtime pay, had her

performance reviews negatively affected by incorrect statistics about call volumes,

and was suspended for airing her grievances to all employees at her location. See

generally Townsend, No. 18-cv-2742, ECF No. 13 (Apr. 5, 2019).

In the earlier lawsuit, the court entered summary judgment in favor of the

defendants. That ruling came after the parties engaged in discovery. First, the court

determined that various factual claims on which Plaintiff relied for her claims were

time-barred because Plaintiff failed to file suit within 90 days of receiving a right-to-

sue letter, leaving her to complain only of alleged discrimination occurring after

November 17, 2017. Additionally, the court concluded that Plaintiff failed to carry

her burden of establishing a Title VII claim or that she was subject to a hostile work

environment, constructively discharged, or subject to unlawful retaliation. See

generally Townsend, No. 18-cv-2742, ECF No. 66 (Jan. 8, 2020). On appeal, the Sixth

Circuit affirmed. Townsend v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 852 F. App’x 1011, 1013–

17 (6th Cir. 2021).

II.B. Claim Preclusion

With the benefit of the prior lawsuit Mrs. Townsend brought in federal court

against Rockwell Automation raising substantially similar claims based on many of

the same material allegations, Defendant has an easy time carrying its burden of

establishing that res judicata bars this suit. In the first suit between the parties, the

Northern District of Ohio reached a decision on the merits on summary judgment,

which was affirmed on appeal; the parties in this action are the same as in the first

action; Plaintiff’s discrimination claims were actually litigated in the first action; and

this action arises out of and relates to the same transaction or occurrence at issue in

the first suit.

Two other issues merit a brief mention, but need not detain the Court long.

First, to the extent Plaintiff’s amended complaint in this case alleges facts occurring

after the first lawsuit, she might argue that preclusion doctrine does not bar this suit.

Such an argument would fail. Res judicata bars not just any claim actually litigated,

but also any claim that could have been asserted in the first action. See, e.g., Brown

v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 131 (1979) (recognizing that preclusion doctrine encompasses

that “were previously available to the parties, regardless of whether they were

asserted or determined in the first proceeding”). In her first suit and here, Plaintiff’s

claims arose from a set of facts culminating in her separation from employment with

Rockwell Automation. For that reason, any cause of action Plaintiff might wish to

assert could have—and should have—been raised in her first suit and is barred now.

Second, even if that were not the case, Plaintiff’s new State-law causes of

action—embezzlement and breach of contract—fail as a matter of law. In effect, her

breach of contract claim restates Plaintiff’s Title VII cause of action, perhaps in an

effort to avoid the procedural bar of preclusion doctrine. As for embezzlement,

Plaintiff attempts to state a claim under Ohio’s criminal statute proscribing

embezzlement. Enforcement of that statute rests with a county prosecutor, not

Plaintiff. To the extent her allegations, liberally construed, state a civil claim for

criminal conduct under Section 2307.60 of the Ohio Revised Code, a one-year statute

of limitations applies, barring any such claim here.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to amend

(ECF No. 7) and Defendant’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 3). Further, the Court

DIRECTS the Clerk to enter judgment accordingly.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 22, 2022

J. Philip Calabrese

United States District Judge

Northern District of Ohio

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