The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
VINCENT R. LANE, ) CASE NO. 5:21-cv-1377
)
)
PLAINTIFF, ) JUDGE SARA LIOI
)
vs. ) MEMORANDUM OPINION
) AND ORDER
DAVE GREEN, et al., )
)
)
DEFENDANTS. )
Pro se plaintiff Vincent R. Lane (“Lane” or “plaintiff”) filed this action under 42 U.S.C §
1983 against Oriana House and Instructor Dave Green (“Green”) (collectively, “defendants”). In
the complaint, plaintiff alleges Green repeatedly asked him to leave a class and then wrote him up
for violations. Lane also claims Oriana Staff denied him insulin. He claims these actions violated
his civil rights. Lane seeks monetary damages and injunctive relief.
Lane also filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. No. 2). That application
is granted.
I. Background
Lane’s complaint appears to have two claims. The first claim is asserted against Green.
Lane indicates Green teaches a class called “Thinking for Change.” Lane claims Green was
verbally and mentally abusive to students who did not agree with his ideology, forced Lane to
participate in mental health skits against his will under threat of being written up for a violation,
and repeatedly asked him to leave the classroom but then expected him to complete homework
assigned in class that day. Lane alleges Green had classroom rules, including the rule that students
are not permitted to go to the restroom during class time, which allegedly caused Lane to urinate
on himself. Lane’s second claim is asserted against Oriana House. He claims that Oriana House
staff denied him insulin, and he further claims that his blood sugar was very high, causing him to
suffer damage to his kidneys and a confused mental state. He asserts that these are all violations
of his civil rights.
II. Standard of Review
Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365,
102 S. Ct. 700, 70 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.
Ct. 594, 30 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1972), the Court is required to dismiss an in forma pauperis action under
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or if it lacks an
arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 104 L. Ed. 2d
338 (1989); Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990); Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville, 99
F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law or fact when it is premised
on an indisputably meritless legal theory or when the factual contentions are clearly baseless.
Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. A cause of action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted
when it lacks plausibility in the complaint. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564, 127 S.
Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007).
A pleading must contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868
(2009). The factual allegations in the pleading must be sufficient to raise the right to relief above
the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true. Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555. The plaintiff is not required to include detailed factual allegations, but must
provide more than an unadorned, the defendant unlawfully harmed me accusation. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
2
at 678. A pleading that offers legal conclusions or a simple recitation of the elements of a cause of
action will not meet this pleading standard. Id. In reviewing a complaint, the Court must construe
the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Bibbo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 151
F.3d 559, 561 (6th Cir. 1998).
III. Analysis
Lane fails to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Although Lane did not identify a
particular legal claim he is asserting against the defendants, it appears he may be attempting to
assert claims under the Eighth Amendment.
The Eighth Amendment imposes a constitutional limitation on the power of the states to
punish those convicted of crimes. Punishment may not be “barbarous” nor may it contravene
society’s “evolving standards of decency[.]” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346, 101 S. Ct.
2392, 69 L. Ed. 2d 59 (1981). The Eighth Amendment protects inmates by requiring that “prison
officials . . . ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and
. . . ‘take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.’” Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825, 832, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 128 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1994) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S.
517, 526–27, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 82 L. Ed. 2d 393 (1984)). This, however, does not mandate that a
prisoner be free from discomfort or inconvenience during his or her incarceration. Ivey v. Wilson,
832 F.2d 950, 954 (6th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346). Prisoners are
not entitled to unfettered access to the medical treatment of their choice, see Hudson v. McMillian,
503 U.S. 1, 9, 112 S. Ct. 995, 117 L. Ed. 2d 156 (1992), nor can they “expect the amenities,
conveniences and services of a good hotel[.]” Harris v. Fleming, 839 F.2d 1232, 1235 (7th
Cir.1988); see Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 405 (6th Cir. 1999) (concurrence) (quoting
Harris). In sum, the Eighth Amendment affords constitutionally minimum protection against
3
conditions of confinement that constitute health threats, but does not address those conditions that
cause the prisoner to feel merely uncomfortable or that cause aggravation or annoyance. Hudson,
503 U.S. at 9–10 (requiring extreme or grave deprivation).
In Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 115 L. Ed. 2d 271 (1991), the
Supreme Court set forth a framework for courts to use when deciding whether certain conditions
of confinement constitute cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. A
plaintiff must first plead facts which, if true, establish that a sufficiently serious deprivation has
occurred. Id. Seriousness is measured in response to “contemporary standards of decency.”
Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8. Routine discomforts of prison life do not suffice. Id. Only deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs or extreme deprivations regarding the conditions of
confinement will implicate the protections of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 9. A plaintiff must
also establish a subjective element showing the prison officials acted with a sufficiently culpable
state of mind. Id. Deliberate indifference is characterized by obduracy or wantonness, not
inadvertence or good faith error. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319, 106 S. Ct. 1078, 89 L. Ed.
2d 251 (1986). Liability cannot be predicated solely on negligence. Id. A prison official violates
the Eighth Amendment only when both the objective and subjective requirements are met. Farmer,
511 U.S. at 834.
Lane has not alleged any facts suggesting his claims against Green are objectively serious.
He claims Green was verbally and mentally abusive to students who do not agree with his ideology.
He states Green forced him to participate in class skits against his will, asked him to leave the
classroom, and required homework from him on days he was excluded from class. He contends
Green refused to allow students to leave the classroom to go to the restroom, causing him to urinate
on himself. While these incidents are arguably annoying and embarrassing, they do not present a
4
serious risk to Lane’s health and safety. Verbal harassment and offensive comments do not state
an Eighth Amendment claim. See Ivey, 832 F.2d at 955; Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136,
139 (9th Cir. 1987).
Lane’s claim that Oriana House staff members are denying him insulin does present an
objectively serious deprivation that could pose a significant risk to his health. Alleging a serious
deprivation, however, is only the first part of the Eighth Amendment inquiry. Lane must also allege
that the defendant acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. The subjective component
requires a showing that prison officials knew of, and acted with deliberate indifference to, an
inmate’s health or safety. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 302–03. Deliberate indifference “entails something
more than mere negligence[.]” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835 (citing cases). This standard is met if “the
official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both
be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm
exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Flanory v. Bonn, 604 F.3d 249, 253–55 (6th Cir.
2010) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837).
Here, Lane names the entire staff at Oriana House as a collective defendant without
identifying anyone in particular who made decisions that denied him his medication. To hold an
individual within that organization responsible for a constitutional violation, Lane must allege facts
suggesting that the individual was personally responsible for actions that form the basis of that
constitutional claim. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371, 96 S. Ct. 598, 46 L. Ed. 2d 561 (1976);
Mullins v. Hainesworth, No. 95-3186, 1995 WL 559381 (6th Cir. Sept. 20, 1995). Simply naming
Oriana House staff is not sufficient to hold any individual employee personally liable. To hold the
organization liable, Lane must allege facts suggesting that the organization itself, and not its
employees acting on their own, committed the actions. That means Lane must to point to a policy
5
or custom of Oriana House that employees followed when denying him insulin. See Monell v.
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690–91, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978); Hays v.
Jefferson Cnty., Ky., 668 F.2d 869 (6th Cir. 1982); Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir.
1984). Lane does not include any facts suggesting that he was not given insulin due to a policy or
custom of Oriana House. Lane, therefore, has not met the pleading requirements for the subjective
component of an Eighth Amendment claim.
Finally, to the extent Lane intended to assert a claim other than one under the Eighth
Amendment, he failed to do so. Principles requiring generous construction of pro se pleadings are
not without limits. See Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989); Beaudett v. City of
Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). A complaint must contain either direct or
inferential allegations respecting all the material elements of some viable legal theory to satisfy
federal notice pleading requirements. See Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d
434, 437 (6th Cir. 1988). District courts are not required “to conjure up questions never squarely
presented to them[ . . . or] to construct full blown claims from sentence fragments[.]” Beaudett,
775 F.2d at 1278. To do so would “requir[e] . . . [the] courts to explore exhaustively all potential
claims of a pro se plaintiff, . . . [and] would . . . transform the district court from its legitimate
advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most
successful strategies for a party.” Id. at 1278. The facts alleged by Lane do not readily suggest that
he may have another claim.
6
IV. Conclusion
For all the foregoing reasons, Lane’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. No. 3) is
granted, and this action is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(a)(3), an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith. Lane’s motion for a
protection order (Doc. No. 2) and defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 5) are denied as moot.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 6, 2022 oi oe
HONORABLE SARA LIOI
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE