The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
JAMES A. GIDEON, CASE NO. 3:21 CV 2087
Petitioner,
v. JUDGE JAMES R. KNEPP II
SHERIFF MATTHEW B. TREGLIA,
Respondent. ORDER
INTRODUCTION
Currently pending before the Court in this 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas case is Magistrate
Judge William H. Baughman, Jr.’s Report and Recommendation (Doc. 7) that Petitioner’s
Emergency Motion for Bond (Doc. 4) be denied. Petitioner has filed Objections (Doc. 10),
Respondent has filed a Response (Doc. 13), and Petitioner replied (Doc. 14). Petitioner has also
filed a Motion for a Conference or Hearing (Doc. 11). For the reasons discussed below, the Court
denies Petitioner’s Motion for a Conference, overrules Petitioner’s Objections, and adopts the
R&R’s recommendation that Petitioner’s Motion for Bond be denied.
BACKGROUND
The R&R sets forth the factual and procedural history of this case. See Doc. 4, at 1-2.
Namely, Petitioner (a retired rheumatologist) was convicted in 2018 of three misdemeanor crimes
for sexual imposition involving inappropriately touching patients during office visits. See id. at 1.
Following the expiration of his appeals, Petitioner filed a habeas petition with this Court in
November 2021. (Doc. 1).
Shortly thereafter, Petitioner filed an Emergency Motion seeking release on bond until the
pending petition is adjudicated. He asserts his Petition shows a substantial claim of law and
exceptional circumstances warrant his release. Specifically, Petitioner cites his advanced age and
deteriorating physical health, combined with his relatively brief (180-day) sentence as exceptional
circumstances. See generally Doc. 4, at 4.
Judge Baughman issued an R&R recommending denial of Petitioner’s motion for release.
He found Petitioner failed to exhaust all post-conviction remedies at the state court level, and failed
to show the necessary substantial claim of law or exceptional circumstances necessary to justify
release in a habeas case. See Doc. 7.
Petitioner has since filed an objection to the Report and Recommendation (Doc. 10), to
which Respondent has responded (Doc. 13) and Petitioner has replied (Doc. 14).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under the relevant statute:
Within fourteen days of being served with a copy [of a Magistrate Judge’s R&R],
any party may serve and file written objections to such proposed findings and
recommendations as provided by rules of court. A judge of the court shall make a
de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings
or recommendations to which objection is made.
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2)-(3). “The district judge may accept, reject,
or modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the
magistrate judge with instructions.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).
DISCUSSION
Petitioner makes several objections to the Report and Recommendation. (Doc. 10). He
contends the R&R applies the wrong standard of review and incorrectly assumes Petitioner failed
to exhaust his state remedies. Id. He further contends the R&R’s rejection of Petitioner’s cited
exceptional circumstances for release is unreasonable. See id. In response, Respondent contends
the correct legal standard was applied and the “magistrate judge reviewed the very factors cited by
[Petitioner], and recommended denying his motion.” (Doc. 13, at 2) (citing Doc. 7, at 7-8).
“Release of a state prisoner pending consideration of the habeas corpus petition is reserved
for the extraordinary case.” Greenup v. Snyder, 57 F. App’x 620, 621 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Lee
v. Jabe, 989 F.2d 869, 871 (6th Cir. 1993)). “Since a habeas petitioner is appealing a presumptively
valid state conviction, both principles of comity and common sense dictate that it will indeed be
the very unusual case where a habeas petitioner is admitted to bail prior to a decision on the merits
in the habeas case.” Lee, 989 F.2d at 871. A habeas petitioner must show “not only a substantial
claim of law based on the facts surrounding the petition but also the existence of ‘some
circumstance making [the motion for bail] exceptional and deserving of special treatment in the in
the interest of justice.’” Dotson v. Clark, 900 F.2d 77, 79 (6th Cir. 1990) (quoting Aronson v. May,
85 S. Ct 3, 5 (1964) (Douglas, J., in Chambers)). The Sixth Circuit recognized in Dotson that there
would “be few occasions where a prisoner will meet this standard” and that “as a practical matter,
the motions for bail will be denied in most of the habeas proceedings.” Id.
For the reasons stated below, the Court overrules Petitioner’s objections and adopts the
R&R’s recommendation that Petitioner’s motion be denied.
Substantial Claim
Petitioner asserts his Petition raises four substantial claims of law that support his motion
for bond: (1) improper admission of inculpatory statements made to state medical board
investigator; (2) improper joinder of separately-filed criminal complaints; (3) improper jury
instruction and prosecutorial misconduct; and (4) insufficient evidence. (Doc. 1, at 2). For his
“substantial claim” argument, Petitioner relies primarily on his first claim – the admission of his
inculpatory statements. See Doc. 14, at 4.
By way of background, the Third District Court of Appeals originally overturned
Petitioner’s convictions on appeal, finding Petitioner’s statements were not voluntary and should
have been suppressed by the trial court. See State v. Gideon, 130 N.E.3d 357, 370-80 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2019). But the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed and remanded on this issue, finding the
statements voluntary and not the product of coercion. State v. Gideon, 165 Ohio St. 3d 142, 144-
49 (Ohio 2020); State v. Gideon, 165 Ohio St. 3d 156 (Ohio 2020) (superseding opinion on
reconsideration). On remand from the Ohio Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals rejected the other
claims Petitioner now raises and affirmed his conviction. See State v. Gideon, 174 N.E.3d 381
(Ohio Ct. App. 2021). The Supreme Court of Ohio declined to hear the case a second time on
appeal from that decision, State v. Gideon, 165 Ohio St. 3d 1424 (Ohio 2021) and Petitioner’s
subsequent writ of certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court of the United States, Gideon v.
Ohio, 142 S. Ct. 96 (2021).
This Court finds Petitioner has not satisfied the first Dotson prong. At the outset, the
standard of review applied to a federal habeas corpus petition is an “exacting” one. Bush v.
Warden, S. Ohio Corr. Facility, 573 F. App’x 503, 513 (6th Cir. 2014). “A state court’s
determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists
could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S.
86, 101 (2011) (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). Petitioner must show
the state court’s “presumptively correct factual findings are rebutted by ‘clear and convincing
evidence’ and do not have support in the record.” Matthews v. Ishee, 486 F.3d 883, 889 (6th Cir.
2007) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)).
Petitioner has already litigated his case through the State courts and to the United States
Supreme Court. Both the Ohio Supreme Court and the Third District Court of Appeals have heard
Petitioner’s grounds for relief and each court offering their last reasoned opinion rejected them on
the merits.1 Petitioner is now challenging a presumptively valid state court conviction. Because of
the “high level of deference afforded state court decisions and factual findings on habeas review”,
and upon review of Petitioner’s substantive claims – including an examination of the prior State
court decisions in Petitioner’s case – the Court finds Petitioner’s grounds for relief do not raise a
substantial claim on the merits. See, e.g., Stermer v. Warren, 2017 WL 5712894 (E.D. Mich.)
(finding Petitioner’s motion for bond were not “of such weight or merit” to overcome the high
level of deference afforded to state court decisions).
Exceptional Circumstances
Petitioner also asserts the R&R’s rejection of exceptional circumstances in this case was
unreasonable. (Doc. 10, at 5-6). He argues his worsening health serves as an exceptional
circumstance in conjunction with his misdemeanor-level convictions and short sentence. Id. at 6.
In response, Respondent argues that if Petitioner’s circumstances – a short sentence and age/poor
health – were considered “extraordinary”, the standard for obtaining release on bond in a habeas
case would no longer be a “high bar” (that the standard anticipates) to meet. (Doc. 13, at 4). The
Court agrees with Respondent.
Even assuming, arguendo, Petitioner could satisfy the first Dotson prong and show a
substantial claim on the merits, the Court agrees with the R&R’s conclusion that he has not shown
his circumstances are so “exceptional” as to justify relief. See Merriam-Webster Online
1. The state court addressed the jury instruction portion of Petitioner’s third claim on the merits,
and his argument regarding prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument on plain error review.
State v. Gideon, 174 N.E.3d 381 (Ohio Ct. App. 2021)
Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/exceptional (defining “exceptional” as
“forming an exception: RARE”). Courts have limited exceptional circumstances warranting
release during review “to situations where (1) the prisoner was gravely ill, (2) the prisoner
committed a minor crime and is serving a short sentence, or (3) possibly where there was an
extraordinary delay in processing the habeas petition.” Blocksom v. Klee, 2015 WL 300261, at *4
(E.D. Mich.).
Petitioner’s first justification for his release is the length of his sentence. The Court
acknowledges a short sentence can be a basis for release but finds it does not, on its own, justify
release in these circumstances. See Stell v. Myers, 2011 WL 884825 at *1 (D. Or.) (“petitioner’s
relatively short sentence does not constitute an extraordinary circumstance justifying federal
intervention.”); United States v. Stevens, 2017 WL 2362852 at *2 (N.D. Okla.) (“[A]lthough a
short sentence is a relevant consideration in determining whether exceptional circumstances exist,
a one-year sentence, on its own, does not rise to the level of ‘truly unusual.’”); Ancona v. Lantz,
2005 WL 839655, at *10 (D. Conn.) (denying bail to a prisoner serving a six-month sentence with
three months remaining in the sentence).
Petitioner also contends his health conditions – including his age, diabetic status, atrial
fibrillation, cardiomegaly, and numerous surgeries to correct his spine and ankle – are exceptional
circumstances. (Doc. 4, at 4). Petitioner also states his mobility is limited. Id. Petitioner’s physician
noted Petitioner has a greater risk of worsening disc and nerve disease in his back in a prison
setting. (Doc. 4-1, at 7a). Additionally, he opines Petitioner is at risk of falling and suffering serious
injuries. Id. While this Court is sympathetic to Petitioner’s health concerns, these conditions are
likely shared by many inmates throughout the prison population.
Based on precedent, Petitioner’s health conditions do not meet the “high bar” standard to
be an exceptional circumstance on their own. See Jefferson v. Ohio, 2020 WL 1983065 (N.D.
Ohio) (petitioner suffered from bronchitis and epilepsy and was denied release based on fear of
COVID-19-related outcomes); McNaught v. United States, 2009 WL 1181266, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.)
(petitioner suffering from a stroke, vertigo and dizziness caused by Meniere’s Syndrome, and a
major depressive disorder did not constitute extraordinary circumstances); Centofanti v. Neven,
2020 WL 2114360 (D. Nev.) (no exceptional circumstances for petitioner with stage four
Hodgkin’s lymphoma, diminished lung capacity, and a possible undiagnosed heart condition
fearing high risk of complications from COVID-19). Even considering Petitioner’s short sentence
and health conditions in tandem, this Court cannot conclude these are special circumstances
warranting release.
Petitioner cites Puertas v. Overton, 272 F. Supp. 2d 621 (E.D. Mich. 2003) to support his
argument. (Reply in Support of Objections, Doc. 14, at 2). In that case, the Court held that a 76-
year-old petitioner’s life-threatening bladder cancer and heart disease constituted exceptional
circumstances and granted his release on bond. Puertas, 272 F. Supp.2d at 631. Petitioner argues
his circumstances are “surely as exceptional as those of the petitioner in Puertas.” (Reply in
Support of Objections, Doc. 14, at 2). This Court does not agree. In a later case heard by the same
court, a petitioner sought release on bond due to health concerns arising from an eye condition.
See Couch v. Trombley, 2007 WL 2259110 (E.D. Mich.). The court denied the motion for bond
because the petitioner’s condition “[was] not dire nor life-threatening[.]” Id. This is more
analogous to the case at hand. While the Court acknowledges Petitioner’s health concerns are
serious, he has not shown them to be dire nor life-threatening.
Petitioner has not shown he has a substantial claim, or deteriorating health conditions
sufficient to warrant release pending review. Therefore, the Court finds this is not the “very
unusual case”, Lee, 989 F.2d at 871, where a habeas petitioner should be released pending a
determination on the merits.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, good cause appearing, it is
ORDERED that Petitioner’s Objections to the R&R (Doc. 10), be and the same hereby are,
OVERRULED; and it is therefore
FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner’s Emergency Motion for Bond (Doc. 7) be, and the
same hereby is, DENIED, and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner’s Motion for a Conference or Hearing (Doc. 11), be
and the same hereby is, DENIED.
s/James R. Knepp II
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE