a claim of improper parole revocation is unexhausted where the petitioner failed to attempt to raise his claim in Ohio courts through mandamus or State habeas proceedings
How later courts described this case
- a claim of improper parole revocation is unexhausted where the petitioner failed to attempt to raise his claim in Ohio courts through mandamus or State habeas proceedings
- the district court has a duty to “screen out” habeas corpus petitions that lack merit on their face
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
MAURICE L. JEFFERSON, ) Case No. 3:21-cv-01808
)
Petitioner, ) Judge J. Philip Calabrese
)
v. ) Magistrate Judge
) Jonathan D. Greenberg
OHIO ADULT PAROLE )
AUTHORIT[Y], et al., )
)
Respondents. )
)
OPINION AND ORDER
Pro se Petitioner Maurice L. Jefferson is presently incarcerated at Toledo
Correctional Institution. On September 22, 2021, Jefferson filed this Petition for Writ
of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. No. 1) concerning his parole.
Mr. Jefferson was convicted of aggravated robbery in the Franklin County
Court of Common Pleas in 1991, sentenced to not less than 6 nor more than 25 years
incarceration, and paroled in 2002 (Case Nos. 90CR-10-5320A, 91CR-02-855B, and
91CR-03-1339). It appears that while on parole, Mr. Jefferson was convicted of
aggravated robbery with a firearm specification and theft in the Muskingum County
Court of Common Pleas in September 2003 and sentenced to 4 years on the
aggravated robbery, concurrent with 2 years on the theft, and consecutive to 3 years
on the firearm specification, plus up to 5 years mandatory postrelease control “as well
as the consequences for violating conditions of postrelease control imposed by the
parole board[.]” (Case No. CR2003-0039.) It appears that Mr. Jefferson was convicted
of aggravated robbery with a firearm specification and aggravated theft in the
Pickaway County Court of Common Pleas in October 2003, also while on parole, and
sentenced to 9 years on the aggravated robbery, concurrent with 3 years on the
aggravated theft, and consecutive to 3 years on the firearm specification and the
sentence from Muskingum County. (Case No. 2002-CR-237.)
In his petition, Jefferson asserts four grounds for relief: (1) the Ohio Adult
Parole Authority continued his parole two years past his maximum sentence; (2) the
Authority failed to hold a Kellogg mitigation hearing within 60 days; (3) the Authority
never initiated a revocation proceeding; and (4) the Authority failed to hold an on-site
hearing within 10 days.
Promptly after the filing of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, a federal
district court must undertake a preliminary review of the petition to determine “[i]f
it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is
not entitled to relief” in the district court. Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Habeas
Corpus Cases Under Section 2254 (applicable to petitions under Section 2241
pursuant to Rule 1(b)). If so, the petition must be summarily dismissed. See Allen v.
Perini, 424 F.2d 134, 141 (6th Cir. 1970) (the district court has a duty to “screen out”
habeas corpus petitions that lack merit on their face). No response is necessary where
a petition is frivolous, obviously lacks merit, or where the necessary facts can be
determined from the petition itself without consideration of a response. Id. The
principle of liberal construction generally afforded pro se pleadings applies to habeas
petitions. See Urbina v. Thoms, 270 F.3d 292, 295 (6th Cir. 2001).
Although Mr. Jefferson labels his petition as one brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241, he is challenging his State court sentence; therefore, his petition must meet
the requirements and standards of 28 U.S.C. § 2254. It is a well-established rule of
statutory construction that, where two statutes cover the same situation, the more
specific statute takes precedence over the more general one. See Edmond v. United
States, 520 U.S. 651, 657 (1997). The Sixth Circuit has noted that “numerous federal
decisions . . . support the view that all Petitions filed on behalf of persons in custody
pursuant to State court judgments are filed under section 2254” and are subject to
the various restrictions imposed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act for obtaining habeas relief from a State conviction. See Rittenberry v. Morgan,
468 F.3d 331, 337 (6th Cir. 2006); see also Allen v. White, 185 F. App’x 487, 490 (6th
Cir. 2006). Therefore, regardless of the statutory label Petitioner placed on his
habeas petition, the petition is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Byrd v. Bagley, 37
F. App’x 94, 95 (6th Cir. 2002).
A federal district court may entertain a habeas petition filed by a person in
State custody only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). But before a federal court
will review the merits of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, a person must exhaust
his State remedies. Manning v. Alexander, 912 F.2d 878, 880–81 (6th Cir. 1990)
(citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c)); see also Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982)).
Exhaustion is fulfilled once a State supreme court provides a convicted person
a full and fair opportunity to review his claims on the merits. Id. (citing, among other
authorities, Justices of Boston Mun. Court v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 302–03 (1984)).
Exhaustion requires “fair presentation” of the federal claim “to the state courts,
including the state court of appeals and the state supreme court.” Bray v. Andrews,
640 F.3d 731, 734–35 (6th Cir.2011); see O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845
(1999). To fairly present a federal claim, a petitioner must present the State courts
with “both the legal and factual basis” for the claim. Williams v. Anderson, 460 F.3d
789, 806 (6th Cir. 2006); Williams v. Mitchell, 792 F.3d 606, 613 (6th Cir. 2015). In
the context of parole, a petitioner may exhaust his State remedies by raising his
claims challenging a parole board decision in a State habeas corpus petition under
Section 2725.01 of the Ohio Revised Code or a writ of mandamus under
Section 2731.01. See Papenfus v. Tibbals, 289 F. Supp. 2d 897, 900–01 (N.D. Ohio
2003) (a claim of improper parole revocation is unexhausted where the petitioner
failed to attempt to raise his claim in Ohio courts through mandamus or State habeas
proceedings); see also Hansen v. Coleman, No. 3:16 CV 2147, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
141878, at *9 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 13, 2016) (to exhaust a claim in Ohio that the denial of
parole violated his constitutional rights, a petitioner may file a declaratory judgment
action or mandamus action).
The petitioner bears the burden of establishing that he has properly and fully
exhausted his available State court remedies with respect to his habeas claims for
relief. See Nali v. Phillips, 681 F.3d 837, 852 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Rust v. Zent, 17
F.3d 155, 160 (6th Cir. 1994)).
Here, for each ground for relief asserted, Mr. Jefferson indicates on the face of
the petition that he did not seek further review by a higher State court. Because
Mr. Jefferson has not given the State courts a fair opportunity to consider the merits
of the claims he has presented in this petition, he has not properly exhausted his
State court remedies. Therefore, the Court must dismiss Petitioner’s petition under
Section 2254.
Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules
Governing Section 2254 cases. Further, the Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(a)(8), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith and
there is no basis upon which to issue a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253;
Fed. R. App. P. 22(b).
SO ORDERED.
Dated: November 8, 2021
J.PhilipCalabrese
United States District Judge
Northern District of Ohio