Opinion

Briggs v. City of Wadsworth, Ohio

Court
District Court, N.D. Ohio
Filed
Oct 25, 2021
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 28.0%

dismissing complaint against a local government for failing to allege that a constitutional right violation occurred pursuant to a municipal custom, usage, or official policy

How later courts described this case

  • dismissing complaint against a local government for failing to allege that a constitutional right violation occurred pursuant to a municipal custom, usage, or official policy
  • holding that to state a claim, a plaintiff must make sufficient allegations to give a defendant fair notice of the claim
  • citing, among authority, Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 64–65 (1986)

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

REV. DENNIS BRIGGS, ) Case No. 1:21-cv-01568

)

Plaintiff, ) Judge J. Philip Calabrese

)

v. ) Magistrate Judge Thomas M. Parker

)

CITY OF WADSWORTH, OHIO, )

)

Defendant. )

)

OPINION AND ORDER

On August 12, 2021, pro se plaintiff Rev. Dennis Briggs filed this civil rights

action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against “City of Wadsworth, Ohio.” (Doc. No. 1). For

the following reasons, the Court DISMISSES this action.

BACKGROUND

It appears that Plaintiff’s complaint is an attempt to seek criminal charges

against Sergeant Elchlinger for his purported involvement in Plaintiff’s arrest in

January 2021. Plaintiff states in his complaint that on January 11, 2021, he was

leaving a store, and Sergeant Elchlinger arrested him for public indecency and stole

his phone. Plaintiff states that the charge was later dismissed But as he left the jail,

he received a letter from “Medina County” indicating that he was disqualified from

HUD Housing because of the public indecency charge. He states that he “request[s]

this court to file charges against Sgt. Elchlinger for theft, conspiracy with HUD, hate

crimes against a Christian, kidnapping, and unlawful detainment.” (ECF No. 1.)

Plaintiff also seeks monetary relief.

GOVERNING LEGAL STANDARD

By separate order, the Court granted this pro se plaintiff leave to proceed in

forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Accordingly, because Plaintiff is

proceeding in forma pauperis, and seeks relief from a government defendant, his

complaint is before the Court for initial screening under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and

1915(e)(2)(B). These statutes require district courts to screen all in forma pauperis

complaints filed in federal court, and all complaints in which prisoners seek redress

from governmental entities, officers, or employees, and to dismiss before service any

such complaint that the court determines is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant

who is immune from such relief. See Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir.

2010).

Although a complaint filed by a pro se plaintiff is “liberally construed” and

“held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Erickson

v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.

97, 106 (1976)), a pro se complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted

as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face’” to avoid a dismissal for

failure to state a claim. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); Hill, 630 F.3d at 470–71 (holding that

the “dismissal standard articulated in Iqbal and Twombly governs dismissals for

failure to state a claim” under §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)).

ANALYSIS

Upon review, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed

under §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B).

First, the complaint is subject to dismissal because it fails to meet basic

pleading requirements by identifying how the defendant City of Wadsworth was

personally involved in an alleged rights violation. It is a basic pleading requirement

that a plaintiff must attribute specific factual allegations to particular defendants.

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (holding that to state a claim, a plaintiff must make

sufficient allegations to give a defendant fair notice of the claim). And the Court is

not required to conjure unpleaded facts or construct claims against defendants on

behalf of a pro se plaintiff. See Bassett v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 528 F.3d

426, 437 (6th Cir. 2008).

Where, as here, the City of Wadsworth is named as a defendant without

allegations of discernible specific conduct relating to Plaintiff’s purported claim, the

complaint is subject to dismissal even under the liberal construction afforded to pro

se complaints. “Merely listing names in the caption of the complaint and alleging

constitutional violations in the body of the complaint is not enough to sustain recovery

under § 1983.” See Gilmore v. Corrections Corp. of Am., 92 F. App’x 188, 190 (6th Cir.

2004).

Second, to the extent Plaintiff alleges that the City of Wadsworth is liable for

the alleged misconduct of Sergeant Elchlinger, a purported employee, Plaintiff’s claim

fails. There is no respondeat superior liability for constitutional rights violations

under Section 1983, and Plaintiff has not alleged facts in his complaint sufficient to

demonstrate that an official policy or custom of the City of Wadsworth caused a

violation of his constitutional rights. See Moniz v. Hines, 92 F. App’x 208, 211 (6th

Cir. 2004) (dismissing complaint against a local government for failing to allege that

a constitutional right violation occurred pursuant to a municipal custom, usage, or

official policy). Therefore, the complaint fails to allege a plausible claim against the

City of Wadsworth.

Finally, to the extent Plaintiff seeks criminal charges against Sergeant

Elchlinger, he lacks standing. A private citizen “has no authority to initiate a federal

criminal prosecution [against] defendants for their alleged unlawful acts.” Williams

v. Luttrell, 99 F. App’x 705, 707 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing, among authority, Diamond v.

Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 64–65 (1986)). “A private citizen has no authority to initiate a

federal criminal prosecution; that power is vested exclusively in the executive

branch.” Saro v. Brown, 11 F. App’x 387, 388 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing U.S. v. Nixon,

418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974)). And in the absence of a private right of action, Plaintiff

lacks standing to commence a federal criminal action against Defendants. See Profit

v. City of Shaker Hts., No. 1:18CV1223, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10873, at *5 (N.D.

Ohio Jan. 23, 2019); see also Poole v. CitiMortgage, Inc., No. 14-CV-10512, 2014 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 135488, 2014 WL 4772177, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 24, 2014) (a private

citizen lacks standing to initiate criminal proceedings) (citing, among authority,

Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973)). Therefore, Plaintiff cannot obtain

the relief he seeks—criminal charges against the arresting sergeant.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DIMISSES Plaintiff's complaint

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, the Court certifies,

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision may not be taken

in good faith.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 25, 2021

J.Philip Calabrese”

United States District Judge

Northern District of Ohio

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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