The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
Judith O. Nagy, ) CASE NO. 1: 21 CV 1140
)
Plaintiff, ) JUDGE PATRICIA A. GAUGHAN
)
v. )
) Memorandum of Opinion and Order
State of Ohio, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
Background and Introduction
Plaintiff Judith O. Nagy, an Ohio prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a fee-paid civil
rights complaint in this case against the State of Ohio “ex rel. David Yost, Ohio Attorney
General,” the Cuyahoga County Board of Developmental Disability “ex rel. Jerry Cannon,
Forensic Auditor,” and her criminal defense lawyer Michael Mahoney. (Doc. No. 1.)
Her complaint pertains to her state criminal conviction in State of Ohio v. Nagy, No. CR-
17-614893 (Cuyahoga Cty. Ct. of Comm. Pls.). Plaintiff was indicted by the grand jury on 16
counts in the case, including aggravated theft, grand theft, theft, telecommunications fraud,
passing bad checks, and money laundering. Plaintiff ultimately pled guilty to one count of
aggravated theft and one count of theft, and the trial court sentenced her to 36 months on each
count to be served consecutively, as well as $5,000 restitution for one victim and $15,000 for
another victim. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the validity of her plea agreement on the ground
the trial court’s $15,000 restitution order was inconsistent with the terms of the plea agreement.
The Ohio Court of Appeals reversed only the $15,000 part of trial court’s restitution order, with
instructions that the trial court modify the order to reflect the amount ($7000) specified in the
plea agreement. The Court of Appeals otherwise affirmed plaintiff’s convictions and sentence
“in all other respects.” See State v. Nagy, 2018 -Ohio- 1513, ¶10, 2018 WL 1877906 (Ohio
App. 8th Dist. Apr. 19, 2018).
After the trial court modified the restitution portion of her sentence, plaintiff again
appealed, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel and that the trial court erred in not
recording the pretrial conferences and not investigating statements of prosecution witnesses.
This appeal, however, was dismissed for untimeliness in 2019. State v. Nagy, 2019-Ohio- 2319,
¶ 1, 2019 WL 2473753, at *1 (Ohio App. 8th Dist., June 11, 2019).
Plaintiff filed this civil action on June 7, 2021, seeking damages from the defendants for
constitutional violations she alleges occurred in her criminal case and asking the Court vacate
her guilty plea and the judgment of conviction imposed on her. (Doc. No. 1 at 10-11.) She
alleges civil rights claims against the defendants under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, and Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, contending the defendants violated her
rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments and conspired against her by
pressuring her to plead guilty when there was insufficient evidence to convict her. (Id.. at 2-6,
¶¶ 4-15.) And she contends she was discriminated against in the case on the basis of her
national original (Eastern European). (Id. at 7, ¶ 16.)
Plaintiff has filed a motion to compel discovery (Doc. No 12), which several of the
defendants have opposed, and all of the defendants have answered her complaint or moved for
extensions of time to respond to it.
The Court does not find it necessary to determine plaintiff’s pending motion to compel,
or to consider any responsive pleading filed by any defendant, because the Court finds upon its
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own review that plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed.
Standard of Review and Discussion
Although the standard of review for pro se pleadings is liberal, Williams v. Curtin, 631
F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011), the lenient treatment generally accorded pro se pleadings “has
limits” and pro se plaintiffs are “not automatically entitled to take every case to trial.” Pilgrim
v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996).
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction have a duty to police the boundaries of
their jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). “A district court may, at any time, sua sponte
dismiss a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when the allegations of [the] complaint are totally implausible,
attenuated, unsubstantial, frivolous, devoid of merit, or no longer open to discussion.” Apple v.
Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir. 1999). Sua sponte dismissal of even a fee-paid complaint is
appropriate without affording the plaintiff an opportunity to amend where the plaintiff’s claims
“lack the legal plausibility necessary to invoke federal subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. at 480.
Upon review, the Court finds that plaintiff’s complaint warrants dismissal pursuant to
Apple v. Glenn. Even liberally construed, her alleged claims are implausible, without merit, or
no longer open to discussion.
First, to the extent plaintiff asks the Court to vacate her guilty plea or her state
conviction, her claims are implausible and without merit. It is well-established that a civil rights
action is not the appropriate vehicle for a person in state custody to challenge the legality of her
conviction or sentence. “The proper vehicle to challenge a [state] conviction is through the
state’s appellate procedure and, if that fails, habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.” Jackim v.
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City of Brooklyn, No. 1: 05 CV 1678, 2010 WL 4923492, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 29, 2010). As
the Supreme Court has made clear, where a person in state custody challenges “the very fact or
duration” of her physical imprisonment in connection with a criminal conviction or sentence,
and the relief she seeks is immediate release or a speedier release, her sole federal remedy is a
writ of habeas corpus. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). Accordingly, to the
extent plaintiff wishes to challenge the constitutional validity of her state criminal conviction,
she must do so through a petition for a writ of habeas corpus after full exhaustion of her state
remedies. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Second, plaintiff’s claims under §§ 1983 and 1985 for damages are implausible under
the Supreme Court’s decision in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). In Heck, the
Supreme Court held that
in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or
imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would
render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must [first] prove that
the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by
executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such
determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship
to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable
under § 1983.
Id. at 486-87.
Heck has been extended to apply to conspiracy claims under § 1985. Dotson v. Lane,
360 Fed. Appx. 617, 619–20, 2010 WL 22326, at *2 (6th Cir. 2010) (“Under Heck and its
progeny, a state prisoner cannot state a cognizable claim under sections 1983 or 1985 if a ruling
on his claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction and confinement until such
time that the conviction is reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared
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invalid by a state tribunal, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus.”) (internal citation omitted).
All of plaintiff’s civil rights claims here necessarily imply the invalidity of her state
criminal conviction. Accordingly, because she has not demonstrated or alleged that her plea or
conviction has been set aside or invalidated in any of the ways articulated in Heck,1 her civil
rights claims for damages under §§ 1983 and 1985 are simply not cognizable.2
Finally, plaintiff’s allegations are totally implausible and without merit to the extent she
alleges a claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. That statute applies
solely to discrimination in employment, and the existence of an employer/employee relationship
is a necessary prerequisite for sustaining such a claim. Collier v. Austin Peay State University,
616 F.Supp.2d 760, 769–70 (M.D. Tenn. 2009). Plaintiff’s allegations regarding national origin
discrimination have no connection whatsoever to an employer/employee relationship.
Conclusion
For all of the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s complaint lacks the legal plausibility
necessary to invoke federal subject-matter jurisdiction and is dismissed pursuant to the Court’s
authority established in Apple v. Glenn. In light of this dismissal, plaintiff’s motion to compel
discovery (Doc. No. 12) is denied as moot. The Court further certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith.
1Indeed, the Ohio Court of Appeals upheld her conviction. See State v. Nagy, 2018 -Ohio- 1513,
2018 WL 1877906.
2Her § 1983 claims are without merit for other reasons as well, including that her criminal
defense lawyer Michael Mahoney is not state actor subject to suit under that statute, see Jordan v.
Kentucky, No. 3: 09 CV 424, 2009 WL 2163113, at *4 (W.D. Ky. July 16, 2009), and the Eleventh
Amendment bars damages in federal court against a State and state officials acting in their official
capacities, see Maben v. Thelen, 887 F.3d 252, 270 (6th Cir. 2008).
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Patricia A. Gaughan
PATRICIA A. GAUGHAN
United States District Court
Dated: 10/5/21 Chief Judge
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