The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
DERMAYNE HUGGINS, ) CASE NO. 1:20CV1273
)
Plaintiff, ) SENIOR JUDGE
) CHRISTOPHER A. BOYKO
vs. )
) OPINION AND ORDER
ANDREW WILLIAMS, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
CHRISTOPHER A. BOYKO, SR. J.:
This matter comes before the Court upon the First Motion (ECF DKT #19) of
Defendants Monte Roose, Scott Rachel and Travis Fox for Summary Judgment. For the
following reasons, the Motion is denied.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Dermayne Huggins filed this Complaint on June 20, 2020, alleging an
Excessive Force Claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Richland Correctional Institution
Officers Andrew Williams, Monte Roose, Travis Fox and Scott Rachel and a state law
Negligence Claim against the same Defendants.
Plaintiff alleges that on June 16, 2018, while incarcerated at Richland Correctional
Institution, he was involved in an altercation with correctional officers during which O.C.
(pepper) spray was twice deployed in his facial area. Defendant Roose arrived to escort
Plaintiff away from the cell block. During this escort, Roose called for assistance. Defendant
Williams arrived and the two officers threw Plaintiff to the ground. Williams allegedly beat
Plaintiff while he was handcuffed and defenseless. Defendants Roose, Rachel, and Fox
allegedly stood by, encouraged the beating, and failed to intervene. Subsequently, according
to Plaintiff, the officers provided false statements to investigators in order to cover up their
misconduct. (ECF DKT #1, ¶ 1).
The moving Defendants argue that they are entitled to judgment in their favor because
Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing suit as required by the
Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) and because the Negligence Claim is
barred by the Eleventh Amendment.1 In support, Defendants attach the Declaration of
Inspector Kelly Rose, Institutional Inspector at Richland Correctional. (ECF DKT #19-1).
In his Opposition Brief, Plaintiff contends that disputed issues of fact preclude
summary judgment on the issue of exhaustion. Also, Plaintiff states his intention to dismiss
his Negligence Claim. (ECF DKT #22 at fn.1). Plaintiff submits his own Affidavit in support
of his position. (ECF DKT #23-1).
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS
Standard of Review
Summary judgment shall be granted only if “the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The burden is on the moving party to conclusively show no
genuine issue of material fact exists. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986);
Lansing Dairy. Inc. v. Espy, 39 F.3d 1339, 1347 (6th Cir. 1994). The moving party must
1
Defendant and former corrections officer Andrew Williams is separately represented and does not join in the
instant dispositive motion.
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either point to “particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents,
electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations, admissions,
interrogatory answers, or other materials” or show “that the materials cited do not establish
the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce
admissible evidence to support the fact.” See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A), (B). A court
considering a motion for summary judgment must view the facts and all inferences in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Once the movant presents evidence to meet its burden, the
nonmoving party may not rest on its pleadings, but must come forward with some significant
probative evidence to support its claim. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Lansing Dairy, 39 F.3d at
1347.
This Court does not have the responsibility to search the record sua sponte for genuine
issues of material fact. Betkerur v. Aultman Hospital Ass 'n., 78 F.3d 1079, 1087 (6th Cir.
1996); Guarino v. Brookfield Township Trustees, 980 F.2d 399, 404-06 (6th Cir. 1992). The
burden falls upon the nonmoving party to “designate specific facts or evidence in dispute,”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986); and if the nonmoving party
fails to make the necessary showing on an element upon which it has the burden of proof, the
moving party is entitled to summary judgment. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Whether summary
judgment is appropriate depends upon “whether the evidence presents a sufficient
disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must
prevail as a matter of law.” Amway Distributors Benefits Ass 'n v. Northfield Ins. Co., 323
F.3d 386, 390 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52).
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Prison Litigation Reform Act ( PLRA)
Applicability of administrative remedies.
No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section
1979 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (42 U.S.C. 1983), or any
other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other
correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are
exhausted. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires that inmates exhaust available
administrative remedies prior to filing a claim under federal law. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a);
Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002) (holding “that the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement
applies to all suits about prison life,” including excessive force allegations); Lee v. Willey,
789 F.3d 673, 681 (6th Cir. 2015). This requirement is mandatory but not jurisdictional, and
applies to all federal claims seeking redress for prison circumstances or occurrences
regardless of the type of relief being sought. See Porter, 534 U.S. at 532; Booth v. Churner,
532 U.S. 731 (2001). The PLRA has been interpreted to require “proper exhaustion,”
meaning that a prisoner must “ ‘complete the administrative review process in accordance
with the applicable procedural rules,’... [as] defined not by the PLRA, but by the prison
grievance process itself.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007) (quoting Woodford v. Ngo,
548 U.S. 81, 88 (2006)). Proper exhaustion of the administrative grievance process, which
demands adherence to deadlines and critical procedural rules, is required. Woodford, 548
U.S. at 83-84. See also Pool v. Klenz, No. 17-3426, 2018 WL 1989637, at*2 (finding that
untimely grievances did not comply with Ohio Administrative Code and were
non-exhaustive).
Failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense; plaintiffs are not required to plead or
demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints. Jones, 549 U.S. at 21. When a defendant raises
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the affirmative defense of exhaustion under the PLRA, the burden is on the defendant to show
non-exhaustion. Mattox v. Edelman, 851 F.3d 583, 589 (6th Cir. 2017). Failure to exhaust
must be established by a preponderance of the evidence. Napier v. Laurel County, 636 F.3d
218, 255 (6th Cir. 2011). Summary judgment may be granted “if defendants establish the
absence of a ‘genuine dispute as to any material fact’ regarding nonexhaustion.” Risher v.
Lappin, 639 F.3d 236, 240 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a)). Claims that fail to
satisfy the exhaustion requirement should be dismissed without prejudice. Adams v. Smith,
166 F.App’x 201, 204 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Brown v. Toombs, 139 F.3d 1102, 1104 (6th
Cir. 1998) abrogated by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007) on other grounds).
Ohio Inmate Grievance Procedures
Ohio has a three-step inmate grievance process. Ohio Admin. Code § 5120-9-31(K).
See also Troche v. Crabtree, 814 F.3d 795, 799 (6th Cir. 2016). In the first step, an inmate
must file an informal complaint within fourteen days of the event from which the complaint
arose. Ohio Admin. Code § 5120-9-31(K)(1). If dissatisfied with the response to his informal
complaint, the second step of the grievance process requires the inmate to file a grievance
with the inspector of institutional services within fourteen days. Ohio Admin. Code §
5120-9-
31(K)(2). If dissatisfied with the response to this grievance, the third step requires the inmate
to file a grievance with the chief inspector within fourteen days. Ohio Admin. Code §
5120-9-
31(K)(3). The chief inspector may waive this time limit for good cause. Id.
Failure to Exhaust Excused
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An inmate’s failure to exhaust is excused “when improper actions of prison officials
render administrative remedies functionally unavailable.” Does 8-10 v. Snyder, 945 F.3d 951,
966 (6th Cir. 2019)(citing Himmelreich v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 766 F. 3d 576, 577 (6th
Cir. 2014)). An administrative remedy is unavailable when: (1) it “operates as a simple dead
end—with officers unable or consistently unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved
inmates,” (2) the grievance process is so incomprehensible that “no ordinary prisoner can
discern or navigate it,” or (3) “prison administrators thwart inmates from taking advantage of
a grievance process through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.” Ross v. Blake,
_ U.S. _, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1859-60 (2016).
A prisoner's lack of compliance may be excused if the administrative remedies are not
available; but the Sixth Circuit has required a prisoner to make “affirmative efforts to comply
with the administrative procedures before analyzing whether the facility rendered these
remedies unavailable.” Lee, 789 F.3d at 677; Napier, 636 F.3d at 223; see also Brock v.
Kenton Cnty., 93 F.App’x. 793, 798 (6th Cir.2004) (citing cases).
Defendants’ instant Motion for Summary Judgment is directed solely at whether
Plaintiff has met the threshold requirement to exhaust his administrative remedies as required
by the PLRA or whether he is entitled to an exception from this statutory requirement. In her
Declaration (ECF DKT #19-1), Inspector Kelly Rose states that she is employed with the
Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (“ODRC”) as an Institutional Inspector at
Richland Correctional Institution. ¶ 2. Her duties include handling inmate grievances. ¶ 2.
She reviewed the records and determined that Plaintiff did not submit an Informal Complaint
Resolution within fourteen days of the June 16, 2018 use-of-force incident – the first step of
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the grievance process. ¶¶ 9-10. She states that all persons in the custody of ODRC are
provided written and oral instructions on how to avail themselves of the grievance procedure.
¶ 4. In addition, the grievance procedure is available to all inmates at any ODRC institution,
regardless of their disciplinary status or security level. ¶ 5.
Plaintiff does not dispute that he did not comply with even the first-level grievance at
Richland Correctional Institution. However, he insists that his obligation to exhaust
administrative procedures is excused.
In his Affidavit (ECF DKT #23-1), Plaintiff declares that on the same day as his
assault at Richland Correctional, he was transferred to Mansfield Correctional on an
“emergency rideout waiver.” ¶ 6. Plaintiff was immediately placed in limited privilege
segregation housing or solitary confinement. ¶ 10. He remained there for approximately two
weeks. Plaintiff was denied privileges. ¶ 12. The officers at Mansfield knew what occurred
at Richland and Plaintiff was threatened and punched by an officer named “Terrence.” ¶¶ 22-
24. Plaintiff asked an officer, Lieutenant Wisdom, if he could use the computer kiosk and if
he could have paper and a pen. Lieutenant Wisdom denied those requests. ¶¶ 19-21.
Plaintiff was afraid to ask about filing a grievance and was afraid of retaliation if he
complained about treatment by correction officers. Plaintiff states that he was transferred to
Southern Ohio Correctional Facility on July 10, 2018. ¶ 30. Plaintiff spoke with an Inspector
Malhoun there about his fears for his safety and the attacks by officers. The Inspector showed
Plaintiff a stack of papers and said: “What do you think I’m going to do about it?” ¶¶ 33-35.
After these interactions, Plaintiff did not pursue his grievances because he believed such
attacks on prisoners were commonplace and that he would not be taken seriously by prison
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staff or inspectors. ¶¶ 36-39.
The Court finds that Defendants have not established the absence of a ‘genuine
dispute as to any material fact’ regarding nonexhaustion.” Risher, supra. Viewing the facts
and all inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Defendants have not
satisfied their burden of showing Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies by a
preponderance of the evidence. Plaintiff’s Affidavit identifies individuals by name who either
threatened him or refused to help him. He describes his transfer from one institution to
another and placement in restricted confinement within days of the assault that is the subject
of this Complaint. There is conflicting sworn testimony as to the availability of the grievance
process; as to the willingness to provide any relief to aggrieved inmates; and as to whether
prison inmates like Plaintiff were thwarted from “taking advantage of a grievance process
through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.” Ross, supra.
III. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the First Motion (ECF DKT #19) of Defendants Monte Roose,
Scott Rachel and Travis Fox for Summary Judgment is denied.
The docket reflects that the Fact Discovery Deadline is September 24, 2021.
Defendants have the burden of proof on the affirmative defense; but they still have time to
possibly secure evidence to refute Plaintiff’s assertions of unavailable grievance processes. A
dispositive motion may be re-filed if Defendants believe it is warranted following focused
fact discovery.
Per the representation in his Opposition Brief (ECF DKT #22), Plaintiff shall dismiss
his state law Negligence Claim within one week of this Order.
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The interim Telephone Status Conference set for July 22, 2021 at 2:00 p.m. and the
Settlement Conference set for September 28, 2021 at 2:00 p.m. remain.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATE: July 2, 2021
s/Christopher A. Boyko
CHRISTOPHER A. BOYKO
Senior United States District Judge
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