holding district courts have a duty to “screen out” petitions lacking merit on their face under Section 2243
How later courts described this case
- holding district courts have a duty to “screen out” petitions lacking merit on their face under Section 2243
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
DEREK BURRIS, ) CASE NO. 4:20-cv-229
)
PETITIONER, ) JUDGE SARA LIOI
)
) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
vs. ) ORDER
)
MARK WILLIAMS, WARDEN, )
)
RESPONDENT. )
Pro se petitioner Derek Burris (“Burris” or “petitioner”) filed the above-captioned Petition
for a Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Petitioner is currently incarcerated in Elkton
Federal Correctional Institution (“FCI Elkton”), however the incident in question took place while
he was incarcerated in the United States Penitentiary in Marion, Illinois (“USP Marion”). Burris
challenges a disciplinary hearing at USP Marion that resulted in the loss of good time credit,
claiming he was denied due process. He seeks a new disciplinary hearing and restoration of his
good time credits.
I. Background
On September 18, 2018, a USP Marion corrections officer was searching the common area
of the cubicles housing Burris and inmate Courter. Burris was sitting his desk. The officer
confirmed with Burrsi that the desk was assigned to him and the foot locker attached to the desk
was also his property. The officer then noticed the bookshelf attached to the desk and footlocker
appeared to be detached at the back. The officer removed the back of the bookshelf and discovered
a black Apple iPhone, a charger, and ear buds. The officer wrote an incident report charging Burris
with possession of a hazardous tool (cellphone).
Burris was provided a copy of the incident report on September 18, 2018. His counselor
notified him of his rights at the hearing on September 19, 2018. Burris offered the defense that the
cellphone was found in a common area and was not his. He stated he wanted to call inmate Courter
as a witness. The Disciplinary Hearing Officer (“DHO”) indicated on the report, however, that
Courter declined to testify. The hearing was conducted on October 16, 2018. Based on the
testimony of the officer, the location of the phone, petitioner’s admission that the desk and the
footlocker were assigned to him and the photographs taken of the cellphone, the DHO found Burris
guilty of the charges, and sanctioned him to loss of privileges and loss of 41 days of good time
credit.
Burris appealed that decision to the Bureau of Prisons Regional Director. He indicated in
his appeal that inmate Courter did not refuse to testify but was never called to testify by the DHO.
Burris attached a statement from Courter to support his assertion. Based on this representation, the
Regional Director overturned the finding of guilt and instructed the DHO to conduct a new hearing.
Petitioner’s counselor reminded him of his rights at the hearing on March 28, 2019. Once
again, Burris indicated he wanted to call inmate Courter as a witness. Courter refused to testify,
stating he had declined to testify the first time and did not read the statement petitioner had given
him on appeal prior to signing it. Courter stated the cellphone was found in petitioner’s area.
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A second disciplinary hearing was conducted on March 28, 2019. Burris continued to deny
ownership of the cellphone, indicating that it was found in a common area. Relying on the
testimony of the corrections officer, the petitioner’s admission to his assignment of the desk and
the footlocker, and the photographs, the DHO again found Burris guilty of the charge.
Burris appealed these decisions to the Regional Director and to the National Inmate
Appeals Administrator. Both of them denied his appeal.
Burris has now filed this habeas action under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 claiming he was denied due
process. Specifically, he contends that the cellphone was found in a common area and could not
be linked to him exclusively. Burris asserts that this does not meet the “some evidence” standard
needed to satisfy basic due process. He seeks a new hearing and restoration of his lost good time
credits.
II. Standard of Review
Writs of habeas corpus “may be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the
district courts and any circuit judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a).
Section 2241 “is an affirmative grant of power to federal courts to issue writs of habeas corpus to
prisoners being held ‘in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.’” Rice
v. White, 660 F.3d 242, 249 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Section 2241(c)). Because Burris is appearing
pro se, the allegations in his petition must be construed in his favor, and his pleadings are held to
a less stringent standard than those prepared by counsel. Urbina v. Thoms, 270 F.3d 292, 295 (6th
Cir. 2001). However, this Court may dismiss the petition at any time, or make any such disposition
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as law and justice require, if it determines the petition fails to establish adequate grounds for relief.
Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 775, 107 S. Ct. 2113, 95 L. Ed. 2d 724 (1987); see also Allen
v. Perini, 424 F.2d 134, 141 (6th Cir. 1970) (holding district courts have a duty to “screen out”
petitions lacking merit on their face under Section 2243).
IV. Analysis
The Court’s ability to review prison disciplinary proceedings is limited. District courts have
no authority to review a disciplinary committee’s resolution of factual disputes, or to make a
redetermination of an inmate’s innocence or guilt. Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. at Wolpole v.
Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455, 105 S. Ct. 2768, 86 L. Ed. 2d 356 (1985). The only question for the Court
to determine is whether the hearing complied with the basic requirements needed to satisfy due
process. The standard is not a difficult one to meet. To comply with the requirements of the Due
Process Clause, prison officials need only provide a prisoner facing loss of good time credits with:
(1) a written notice of the charges at least 24 hours prior to any hearing, (2) an opportunity to call
witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense when permitting him to do so will not
be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals, and (3) a written statement by the
fact-finders as to the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action. Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564-66, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 41 L. Ed. 2d 935 (1972). Prisoners do not have
a due process right of confrontation and cross-examination, or a right to counsel, in prison
disciplinary proceedings. Id. at 569-70.
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Furthermore, due process requires only that disciplinary findings resulting in the loss of
good time credits be supported by “some evidence” in the record. Superintendent, Mass. Corr.
Inst. at Wolpole, 472 U.S. at 454-56. This standard is satisfied where “there is any evidence in the
record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” Id. The DHO is not
required to base findings on overwhelming or irrefutable proof of guilt. Even where the evidence
is contradictory or partially exculpatory, a DHO may base a finding of guilt on only “some
evidence” that indicates the prisoner is guilty. Id. at 457.
In this case, although Burris attempts to characterize his claim as a denial of due process,
he simply attacks the result of the disciplinary hearing. He received a written notice of the charges
at least 24 hours prior to any hearing. He had the opportunity to call witnesses and present
documentary evidence in his defense. His witness declined to testify and, in fact, indicated the
cellphone was found in petitioner’s part of the common area. The DHO provided Burris with a
written statement that detailed the evidence the DHO relied on to make its decision and the reasons
for the disciplinary action. Moreover, there is some evidence to support the finding of guilt. While
there is not conclusive proof that the cellphone belonged to Burris, there is some evidence to
suggest it was his phone, including the location in which it was found, and petitioner’s admission
that the pieces of furniture in which it had been concealed belonged to him. Burris has not
sufficiently demonstrated he was denied due process.
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V. Conclusion
For all the foregoing reasons, this action is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), the Court certifies that an appeal from this decision could not
be taken in good faith.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: July 10, 2020 bt & *
HONORABLE SARA LIOI
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE