The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
Debra A. Heimberger, Case No. 3:19-cv-2430
Plaintiff
v. MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
Mark Repp, et al.,
Defendants
Introduction
Pro se plaintiff Debra Heimberger has filed an in forma pauperis civil complaint in this matter
against the Tiffin-Fostoria Municipal Court and Municipal Court Judge Mark Repp. (Doc. No. 1.)
Her complaint pertains to a fine ($100) and court costs ($186) she was ordered to pay as a
result of a traffic conviction in Tiffin-Fostoria Municipal Court. She contends Judge Repp, who
presided in the case, violated her constitutional rights under 28 U.S.C. § 1983 by requiring her to pay
the fine without allowing her a “meaningful opportunity” to present a defense regarding her inability
to pay, and that he violated 20 C.F.R. 404.970 by “attempt[ing] to attach and levy” her social security
disability income for payment. (Id. at ¶¶ 11-14, 17-18).
She sues the Tiffin-Fostoria Municipal Court for “allowing its judges to pressure parties
receiving SSI income benefits for the disabled.” (Id. at ¶ 21.)
For relief, the plaintiff seeks damages and a declaratory judgment that her rights were
violated and that she is exempt from the state court order requiring her to pay her traffic fines.
The Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis is granted, but I must dismiss her
complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). That statute requires federal district courts to
review all in forma pauperis complaints filed in federal court, and to dismiss before service any such
complaint that the court determines is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief
may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See Hill
v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 471 (6th Cir. 2010).
The plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a plausible claim for relief against the defendants and
seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune.
Judges are entitled to absolute immunity from suit based on their judicial acts even if they
acted erroneously or in bad faith. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991). Absolute judicial immunity
is overcome in only two sets of circumstances, if the judge’s actions were “nonjudicial” in nature or
were “taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Id. at 11–12. The plaintiff has not alleged
facts plausibly suggesting that Judge Repp took any action falling outside of the scope of his judicial
immunity, and he is immune from the plaintiff’s damages suit.
The plaintiff has not alleged a plausible claim against the Tiffin-Fostoria Municipal Court.
Courts are not sui juris and “can neither sue nor be sued in [their] own right.” Arbino v. Ohio, No. 1:
12 CV 203, 2012 WL 1756856, at *2 (S. D. Ohio Apr. 2, 2012).
Further, the plaintiff has no cognizable § 1983 claim relating to her state traffic sentence
under the Supreme Court’s decision in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994). Heck held
that a claim is not cognizable under § 1983 if a ruling on the claim would necessarily imply the
invalidity of a state criminal conviction or sentence until or unless the conviction or sentence has
been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or
called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. See Gorenc v. City of
Westland, 72 F. App’x 336, 339, 2003 WL 21782610, at *2 (6th Cir. 2003) (applying Heck to § 1983
sentence has been overturned or invalidated in any of the ways articulated in Heck. Accordingly,
she has no cognizable § 1983 claim pertaining to the sentence.
Finally, to the extent the plaintiff asks this court to reverse the traffic court sentence
imposed on her, this court lacks jurisdiction to grant her such relief as federal district courts do not
have jurisdiction over challenges to state court decisions, even if those challenges allege that a state
court's action was unconstitutional. See Dakota v. Brown, Case No. 3: 12 CV 2110, 2012 WL
5378733, at *5 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 31, 2012), citing Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S.
462, 483 n. 16 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415–16 (1923). The Rooker–Feldman
doctrine bars a party from seeking in federal court what in substance would be appellate review of a
state judgment.
Conclusion
For all of the foregoing reasons, I am dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint in accordance with
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). I further certify, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from
this decision could not be taken in good faith.
So Ordered.
s/ Jeffrey J. Helmick
United States District Judge