Prude v. Russell

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

Frank Prude, Case No. 3:19-cv-1055

Plaintiff

v. MEMORANDUM OPINION AND

ORDER

Melvin Russell, et al.,

Defendants

Pro se Plaintiff Frank Prude filed this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and

1986 against Melvin Russell, an employee of the City of Toledo, Jane Doe Police Officers, and the

City of Toledo (collectively “Defendants”). (Doc. 1). Plaintiff has also filed a motion to proceed

with this action in forma pauperis. (Doc. 2).

I grant Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis. For the reasons set forth below, I

dismiss this action.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges that on January 3, 2017, at around 3:30 p.m., he was driving in Toledo, Ohio,

when the driver of a black truck tried to cut Plaintiff off, causing Plaintiff to make a sudden and

complete stop. According to the Complaint, the drive of the black truck started to exit the vehicle

and Plaintiff feared for his life and drove off. Plaintiff states that the driver of the black truck

returned to his vehicle and drove across the road in front of Plaintiff and tried to run Plaintiff off

the road. Plaintiff drove home, followed by the black truck. When Plaintiff entered his garage and

closed the door, the drive of the black truck exited the vehicle and entered onto Plaintiff’s property.

(Doc. 1 ¶¶ 6-10).

ordered him onto the porch. The police officers asked the driver of the black truck, who was

wearing a jacket with a Toledo Police patch, “is this the boy” and they proceed to terrorize Plaintiff

and racially profile him because he was black. (Id. ¶¶ 11-13).

The driver of the black truck was an off-duty Toledo Police Officer, defendant Melvin

Russell, and he issued a traffic ticket to Plaintiff. As a consequence, Plaintiff was subject to a “sham

legal process” from January 2017 to April 19, 2017, when his case was dismissed from Toledo

Municipal Court. (Id. ¶¶ 14-17). Plaintiff claims that the City of Toledo was responsible for its

police officer’s conduct. (Id. ¶ 23). Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants’ conduct between January 3,

2017 and April 19, 2017, violated his rights under federal law, the United States Constitution, and

State law. (Id. ¶ 5). Plaintiff claims that as a consequence of Defendants’ conduct, he required

medical and psychiatric treatment between June and October 2017. (Id. ¶ 20). Plaintiff seeks

compensatory and punitive damages. (Id. ¶¶ 22, 24).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982)

(per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), I am required to dismiss an in forma pauperis

action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or if it

lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989); Lawler v. Marshall, 898

F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990); Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996). A claim

lacks an arguable basis in law or fact when it is premised on an indisputably meritless legal theory or

when the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. A cause of action fails to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it lacks “plausibility in the complaint.” Bell Atl.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564 (2007).

A. Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1986 Claims are Dismissed

The statute of limitations for a § 1983 action arising in the State of Ohio is two years. See

Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 275–76 (1985) (holding that federal courts must apply the state statute

of limitations for personal injury actions to § 1983 claims); Browning v. Pendleton, 869 F.2d 989, 991

(6th Cir. 1989) (Ohio’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims applies to § 1983

actions). The accrual date of a § 1983 action is a question of federal law. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S.

384, 388 (2007). Under federal law, a § 1983 cause of action accrues when a plaintiff knew or should

have know of the injury “which is the basis of his action.” Roberson v. Tennessee, 399 F.3d 792, 794

(6th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted); Ruff v. Runyon, 258 F.3d 498, 500 (6th Cir. 2001). “The relevant

inquiry is ‘what event should have alerted the typical lay person to protect his or her rights.’” Filer v.

Polston, No. 3:11-CV-170, 2012 WL 1694588, at *4 (S.D. Ohio May 15, 2012) (quoting Roberson, 399

F.3d at 794 (quoting Hughes v. Vanderbilt Univ., 215 F.3d 543, 548 (6th Cir. 2000))).

Here, Plaintiff’s allegations make clear that he knew the injury which forms the basis of his

action took place on January 3, 2017. Plaintiff alleges that on that date, Defendants conspired to

racially profile Plaintiff and terrorized him because of his race. Certainly, by the time his “sham”

legal case was dismissed by the Toledo Municipal Court on April 19, 2017, Plaintiff was aware of the

claimed injuries he sustained as a consequence of Defendants’ conduct.

Plaintiff did not file his complaint until May 10, 2019. Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims, therefore,

are time-barred by the two-year statute of limitations and are dismissed for that reason pursuant to §

1915(e)(2)(B). See Fraley v. Ohio Gallia Cnty., No. 97-3564, 1998 WL 789385, at *1 (6th Cir. Oct. 30,

1998) (affirming sua sponte dismissal of pro se § 1983 action filed after two-year statute of limitations

for bringing such an action had expired).

Plaintiff also asserts claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1986. (Doc. 1 ¶ 5). The same

two-year statute of limitations applied to § 1983 claims also applies to § 1981 claims. The statute of

1985, is one year. Mickey v. McFaul, No. 1:10CV1350, 2010 WL 3221921, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 13,

2010) (citations omitted); 42 U.S.C. 1986 (“But no action under the provisions of this section shall

be sustained which is not commenced within one year after the cause of action has accrued.”).

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s § 1981 and 1986 claims are also time-barred and dismissed pursuant to §

1915(e)(2)(B).

B. Plaintiff’s State Law Claim are Dismissed without Prejudice

Plaintiff asserts numerous state law claims. (Doc. 1 ¶ 5). A district court may decline to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when the claims supporting original

jurisdiction are dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Plaintiff asserts federal subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1334.

(Doc. 1 ¶ 5). But for the reasons set forth above, I have dismissed Plaintiff’s federal claims. Having

dismissed all of Plaintiff’s federal claims, and there being no other basis for federal subject matter

jurisdiction, I decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims and

dismiss those claims without prejudice. Musson Theatrical, Inc. v. Federal Express Corp., 89 F.3d 1244,

1255 (6th Cir. 1996) (when all federal law claims are dismissed before trial, the balance of

considerations usually point to dismissing the state law claims) (collecting cases).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, I dismiss Plaintiff’s federal claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e). I dismiss Plaintiff’s state law claims without prejudice.

I grant Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis.

taken in good faith.

So Ordered.

s/ Jeffrey J. Helmick

United States District Judge