state prison “medical departments are not ‘persons’ under § 1983 . . .”
How later courts described this case
- state prison “medical departments are not ‘persons’ under § 1983 . . .”
- holding that the dismissal standard articulated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) governs dismissals under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
MATTHEW S. TOLER, ) CASE NO. 1:19 CV 1538
)
Plaintiff, ) JUDGE JOHN R. ADAMS
)
v. )
) MEMORANDUM OF OPINION
RICHLAND CORRECTIONAL ) AND ORDER
INSTITUTION, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
Background
Pro se plaintiff Matthew S. Toler, a prisoner incarcerated in the Richland Correctional
Institution (RCI), has filed an in forma pauperis civil rights complaint in this matter against RCI
and its “Mental Health Staff.” (Doc. No. 1.) In his complaint, he complains of treatment he has
received for his mental health and other general jail conditions. The plaintiff alleges he was
diagnosed with anxiety disorder and depression before he came to prison, and although he
acknowledges he seen by “Mental Health” at RCI, he complains he was not given medicine as he
desired. Instead, he was seen by a psychologist who he contends failed to adequately treat his
issues. (Id. at 3-4.) Additionally, he complains there are “problems with the water . . . being brown
for long periods of time,” “black mold in the showers,” and “birds in the chow hall” which leave
“feces on the tables and pipes above our heads.” (Id. at 4.)
The plaintiff does not allege any specific legal claim or claims, but seeks two million dollars
in damages for his “mental & physical pain” and an order that the institution be made safe for all.
(Id. at 5.)
Standard of Review
Although federal courts are obligated to construe pro se complaints liberally, see Williams
v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011), such principles are not without limits. See Young Bok
Song v. Gipson, 423 F. App’x 506, 510 (6th Cir. 2011). Plaintiffs proceeding pro se must still meet
basic pleading requirements, and courts are not required to “conjure allegations on [their] behalf.”
Erwin v. Edwards, 22 F. App’x 579, 580 (6th Cir. 2001).
The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires a district court to dismiss before service any
prisoner action seeking redress from “a governmental entity or officer or employee of a
governmental entity” that the Court determines is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on
which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. To survive a dismissal for failure to state a claim under § 1915A, “a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the
dismissal standard articulated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) governs dismissals under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A).
Discussion
Upon review, the Court finds that the plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed pursuant to
§ 1915A.
Prison conditions are subject to constitutional scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment, but
in order to make out a claim, a plaintiff must show that a prison official acted with deliberate
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indifference to his health or safety. This requires a plaintiff to show a culpable state of mind on the
part of prison officials. See Wilson v. Seiter, U.S. 294, 294 (1991). A prisoner must show that a
prison official “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official
must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837
(1994).
Plaintiff has named only RCI, and RCI’s “Mental Health Staff,” as defendants in his
complaint. He makes no allegations whatsoever about the knowledge or intent of any jail official
concerning the conditions to which he is subjected, or his mental health or treatment. Accordingly,
the plaintiff has failed to allege any plausible deliberate indifference claim under the Eighth
Amendment. Neither RCI, nor RCI’s “Mental Health Staff,” is an capable of being sued for
constitutional rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See, e.g, Marbry v. Corr. Med. Servs., No.
99–6706, 2000 WL 1720959, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 6, 2000) (a county jail “is not an entity subject
to suit under § 1983”); Hix v. Tenn. Dept. of Corrs., 196 F. App'x 350, 355 (6th Cir. 2006) (state
prison “medical departments are not ‘persons’ under § 1983 . . .”).
Additionally, § 1983 does not permit an imposition of liability solely on the basis of
respondeat superior. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). A local
governmental entity or subdivision, such as Richland County, may be held liable under § 1983 only
where its own policy or custom causes a constitutional rights violation. See id. at 694. The plaintiff
has not alleged any facts plausibly suggesting that an unconstitutional policy of Richland County
itself caused a violation of his constitutional rights.
Conclusion
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Accordingly, the plaintiff’s complaint fails to state any plausible claim upon which he may
be granted relief and is dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. In light of this dismissal, the plaintiff’s
remaining motions to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. No. 2) and for pro bono counsel (Doc. No.
3) are denied as moot. The Court further certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an
appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: November 7, 2019 /s/ John R. Adams
JOHN R. ADAMS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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