Opinion

Rodriguez v. Chex Systems, Inc.

Court
District Court, W.D. New York
Filed
Apr 22, 2024
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 28.0%

dismissing the plaintiff’s claims under various sections of New York’s Penal Law, including under Section 190, and explaining that those laws “do not create a private right of action for any of the varied forms of relief plaintiff seeks”

How later courts described this case

  • dismissing the plaintiff’s claims under various sections of New York’s Penal Law, including under Section 190, and explaining that those laws “do not create a private right of action for any of the varied forms of relief plaintiff seeks”
  • explaining that motions for a more definite statement are not meant to be a substitute for the normal discovery process
  • “once a case is removed to federal court, federal not state rules of procedure govern”
  • “Rule 12(e) is designed to remedy unintelligible pleadings, not merely to correct for lack of detail.” (quotations and citation omitted)

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

ELIZABETH A. RODRIGUEZ,

Plaintiff, DECISION AND ORDER

v.

6:24-CV-06086 EAW

CHEX SYSTEMS, INC.,

Defendant.

INTRODUCTION

Pro se plaintiff Elizabeth A. Rodriguez (“Plaintiff”) filed this action in Rochester

City Court on December 15, 2023, against defendant Chex Systems, Inc (“Defendant”).

(Dkt. 1 at ¶ 1; Dkt. 1-2). Defendant was served with the summons and complaint on

January 19, 2024. (Dkt. 1 at ¶ 2). On February 8, 2024, Defendant timely removed the

case to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, on the grounds that Plaintiff’s complaint

includes claims arising under the federal Truth in Lending Act and the Equal Credit

Opportunity Act. (Id. at ¶¶ 6, 8).

Presently pending before the Court are Defendant’s motion for a more definite

statement (Dkt. 3) and Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 5). For the following

reasons, Defendant’s motion for a more definite statement is granted, and Plaintiff’s motion

for summary judgment is denied without prejudice as premature.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant impeded her ability to “enjoy and have safe and

ethical banking.” (Dkt. 1-2 at 1). She alleges that Defendant is a “credit consuming

agency,” that is “engaged in the business of banking consuming/approvals in New York

State . . .” (Id. at 2).

Plaintiff alleges that, between June 14, 2021, and August 2023, she “contacted and

confirmed identity, unauthorized bank activity and accounts and much more” with

Defendant, and that there were “many concerns of the conduct of” Defendant. (Id.).

Plaintiff states that on June 14, 2021, she attempted to add her 18-year-old son to her bank

account at “Family First of N.Y. F.C.U.,” but her request was declined and she received a

letter from Defendant alleging “account abuse” and a “charge off amount” of $154.02

unpaid, with a closure status date of October 1, 2018, at another bank. (Id.).

Thereafter, on August 24, 2022, following “some back and forth communication,”

Plaintiff received a response letter from Defendant, which “stat[ed] multiple inaccurate

addresses, phone numbers, and emails would be removed from their system,” but failed to

respond to other inaccurate information. (Id. at 2-3). Plaintiff further alleges that on

August 24, 2022, Plaintiff received a letter from Defendant alleging a “check return” dated

April 15, 2021, from her “business,” but Plaintiff did not have a business or use checks.

(Id. at 3).

Plaintiff received another letter from Defendant on August 25, 2022, stating that

“three inquiries” would be removed from her account, but the letter had “little

information.” (Id.). Plaintiff requested an investigation and that all inaccurate information

be removed from her account. (Id.). Plaintiff received another letter from Defendant on

September 14, 2022, stating that its “investigation was complete,” but that her account still

contained inaccuracies. (Id.).

Plaintiff alleges that “another concern” she has is that Defendant’s documentation

states that she “became available for issuance in 1990,” which is incorrect, since she was

only two years old at that time. (Id. at 3-4).

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant “failed to properly operate under ‘N.Y. Penal Law

190.55,’ unlawful use of a credit card, debit card, accounts, and more – (making false

statements of credit terms)” and also that Defendant failed to properly operate under “The

Consumer Credit Fairness Act in N.Y.,” “The National Credit Act,” “The Truth Lending

Act,” and “The Equal Credit Opportunity Act.” (Id. at 4). Plaintiff alleges that she sent

many letters and attempted emails, and made phone calls, to Defendant, and that Defendant

breached its contract. (Id.).

Plaintiff alleges that she has been damaged in the amount of $71,284, and for

“mortgage inaccuracies” in an amount of over $100,000. (Id. at 4-5). She asks for $15,000

from Defendant, as well as a “stipulation or two” from the Court and from Defendant. (Id.

at 5).

ANALYSIS

I. Motion for More Definite Statement

Defendant moves pursuant to Rule 12(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for

an order requiring Plaintiff to file a more definite statement. (Dkt. 3). Specifically,

Defendant asks that Plaintiff clarify her claims brought under the New York Penal Law

and the National Credit Act, the latter of which is a law engaged in March 2005 in the

Republic of South Africa. (Dkt. 3-1 at 4). Defendant further requests that Plaintiff identify

which provisions of the New York Consumer Credit Fairness Act, the Truth in Lending

Act, and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act she contends were violated. (See Dkt. 3-1 at 4-

5). Plaintiff did not respond to the motion; rather, on March 22, 2024, she filed a motion

for summary judgment, to which she attaches various documents she contends support her

claims. (See Dkt. 5). Defendant filed a reply in further support of its motion for a more

definite statement on March 28, 2024. (Dkt. 7).

Rule 12(e) states:

Motion for a More Definite Statement. A party may move for a more

definite statement of a pleading to which a responsive pleading is allowed

but which is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare

a response. The motion must be made before filing a responsive pleading

and must point out the defects complained of and the details desired. If the

court orders a more definite statement and the order is not obeyed within 14

days after notice of the order or within the time the court sets, the court may

strike the pleading or issue any other appropriate order.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e).

Defendant’s motion is made in response to a pleading to which a responsive

pleading is permitted—that is, Plaintiff’s complaint—and it was made before any

responsive pleading was filed. Accordingly, the motion is procedurally proper.

Under Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure1, a complaint must include

“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “Where a defendant cannot reasonably respond to a complaint because

of the latter’s vagueness or ambiguity, a court may grant the defendant’s motion for [a]

more definite statement.” Clayton v. City of Middletown, 237 F.R.D. 538, 539 (D. Conn.

1 Because Plaintiff’s case was removed to federal court, the federal procedural rules

apply to her claims. See Breedlove v. Cabou, 296 F. Supp. 2d 253, 268 (N.D.N.Y. 2003)

(“once a case is removed to federal court, federal not state rules of procedure govern”).

2006). However, “[a] motion for a more definite statement should not be granted if the

allegations in the complaint comply with Rule 8,” and “Rule 12(e) motions are generally

disfavored because of their dilatory effect.” ProBatter Sports, LLC v. Sports Tutor, Inc.,

246 F.R.D. 99, 101 (D. Conn. 2007) (internal quotations and citation omitted). “The

preferred course is to encourage the use of discovery procedures to apprise the parties of

the factual basis of the claims made in the pleadings. . . . Rule 12(e) is meant to rectify

incomprehensible or confused pleadings, not to add detail or substitute for the discovery

process.” Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted); see also Pelman v. McDonald’s

Corp., 396 F. Supp. 2d 439, 443 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“Rule 12(e) is designed to remedy

unintelligible pleadings, not merely to correct for lack of detail.” (quotations and citation

omitted)).

“A motion for [a] more definite statement is not a motion to dismiss and therefore

does not require the Court to assess the viability of the claims.” Clayton, 237 F.R.D. at

540. The granting of such a motion is within the discretion of the district court. Id. at 539.

Viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, her allegations suggest that she is

the victim of identity theft, and Defendant did not adequately respond to her notifying them

of the alleged fraud. While Plaintiff cites to some specific dates and correspondence she

allegedly engaged in with Defendant, the complaint lacks clarity with respect to the legal

violations allegedly committed by Defendant.

Plaintiff has failed to articulate, and it is not otherwise clear from the complaint,

what actions by Defendant violated the statutes to which Plaintiff cites. Plaintiff simply

broadly asserts that Defendant violated certain statutes, making boilerplate reference to

these statutes without further explanation. (See, e.g., Dkt. 1 at 4 (stating that Defendant

“failed to properly operate under ‘The Consumer Credit Fairness Act in N.Y.’, ‘The

National Credit Act’, The Truth Lending Act’, [and] ‘The Equal Credit Opportunity Act’.

. .”)). As pointed out by Defendant, the “National Credit Act” appears to be a South African

law, and it is unclear from the complaint how this law would entitle Plaintiff to relief.

Further, with respect to the remaining statutes—which are highly complex laws—Plaintiff

fails to cite which specific sections of these laws Defendant allegedly violated by its

conduct.2

This is not a case where Defendant is seeking to obtain information that is typically

borne out by the discovery process. Cf. Columbia Ins. Co. v. Brown Shoe Co., 233 F.R.D.

250, 251 (D. Conn. 2005) (explaining that motions for a more definite statement are not

meant to be a substitute for the normal discovery process). Rather, Plaintiff’s allegations

are vague and confusing, and they are not sufficient for Defendant to prepare a response to

the complaint. Courts have granted motions for a more definite statement in similar

situations. See, e.g., Porter v. Duval Cnty. Sch. Bd., 406 F. App’x 460, 461-62 (11th Cir.

2010) (affirming the district court’s granting a motion for a more definite statement because

the plaintiff’s original complaint was “vague and ambiguous,” including because the

2 Plaintiff also alleges a violation of N.Y. Penal Law § 190.55. Although the Court

is not required to assess the viability of Plaintiff’s claims on this motion, Plaintiff is advised

that generally violations of criminal law may not serve as the basis for a private right of

action. See, e.g., Christian v. Town of Riga, 649 F. Supp. 2d 84, 90-91 (W.D.N.Y. 2009)

(dismissing the plaintiff’s claims under various sections of New York’s Penal Law,

including under Section 190, and explaining that those laws “do not create a private right

of action for any of the varied forms of relief plaintiff seeks”), reconsideration denied,

2010 WL 4116785 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2010).

complaint “included numerous claims against multiple defendants stated in lengthy,

unnumbered paragraphs,” and also because the plaintiff’s identified basis for her claims

was a blanket reference to “article 9 of the Florida Constitution of due process and the

United States Constitution of the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause etc.”);

Wisconsin Province of Soc’y of Jesus v. Cassem, No. 3:17-cv-1477 (VLB), 2018 WL

9801769, at *3 (D. Conn. May 24, 2018) (granting motion for a more definite statement

where the complaint alluded to a cause of action, but did not actually allege such a claim,

and ordering that the amended complaint “shall list each specific claim, the facts in support

of that claim, and the Defendants against whom the claim is raised, in a separate,

enumerated count”).

Because it is not clear from the allegations in the complaint how Plaintiff is entitled

to relief, her pleading does not comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion is granted, and Plaintiff is hereby directed to file an

amended complaint. The amended complaint shall clearly identify each claim, cite to the

specific statutory or other authority supporting each claim, and include supporting factual

allegations for each claim—in other words, a short, plain statement as to how Defendant

violated a legal obligation to Plaintiff and the harm she suffered. Plaintiff’s allegations

need not be extensive—however, they must satisfy the requirements of Rule 8.

Although Rule 12(e) provides for a 14-day time period for compliance, considering

Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court will enlarge that time period. Accordingly, Plaintiff is

directed to file an amended complaint clarifying her claims within 30 days of receipt of

this Decision and Order. Plaintiff is hereby warned that her failure to comply with this

Decision and Order by filing an amended complaint as specified herein may result in the

Court striking her pleading or taking some other appropriate action.

II. Motion for Summary Judgment

Also pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. (See

Dkt. 5). Plaintiff filed her case against Defendants in December 2023, and the parties have

not conducted any discovery in this matter. As explained above, the Court finds that

Plaintiff must clarify her claims, so that Defendant has adequate notice of them and can

respond to them.

Given the procedural posture of this case, consideration of Plaintiff’s motion for

summary judgment would be premature. See, e.g., Toussie v. Allstate Ins. Co., 213 F. Supp.

3d 444, 445 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (“Rule 56(b) allows a summary judgment motion to be made

‘at any time.’ But courts routinely deny motions for summary judgment as premature when

discovery over relevant matters is incomplete.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for

summary judgment (Dkt. 5) is denied without prejudice.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendant’s motion for a more definite statement

(Dkt. 3) is granted, and Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 5) is denied without

prejudice.

SO ORDERED.

________________________________

ELIZABETH A. WOLFORD

Chief Judge

United States District Court

Dated: April 22, 2024

Rochester, New York

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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