Wilson v. L3 Harris

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

___________________________________

RUTH WILSON,

Plaintiff, DECISION AND ORDER

-v- 6:23-CV-06079 EAW

L3 HARRIS,

Defendant.

___________________________________

INTRODUCTION

Pro se plaintiff Ruth Wilson (“Plaintiff” or “Wilson”), a former employee of L3

Harris Technologies, Inc. (“Defendant” or “L3 Harris”), commenced this lawsuit on

January 30, 2023, alleging that Defendant violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

(“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act

of 1967 (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq. (Dkt. 1). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant

discriminated against her on the basis of her race and age and retaliated against her by

failing to employ her in a new position at L3 Harris after her existing position was

eliminated. (Id. at 13-15). Defendant has now moved to dismiss the complaint, or

alternatively, for summary judgment. The pending motion is based exclusively on the

argument that Plaintiff signed a release of all claims regarding her employment when she

left L3 Harris and, according to Defendant, the present claims are barred based on that

release. (Dkt. 12-2 at 4). Because Defendant has not established that the release operates

to bar the present claims being pursued by Plaintiff, the pending motion is denied.

BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from the complaint and its attached exhibits. (Dkt. 1).

As required on a motion to dismiss, the Court treats Plaintiff’s factual allegations as true

and draws all inferences in her favor.

Wilson was working in an administrative position with L3 Harris’ human resources

department in March 2021. (Id. at 12). On March 18, 2021, her position was eliminated.

(Id.). After she was terminated, L3 Harris paid Wilson $42,394.00. (See id. at 14). This

payment was in consideration of an agreement signed by Wilson on March 25, 2021, in

which she waived certain legal claims against L3 Harris in exchange for the payment (the

“Release of Claims”). (Dkt. 12-1 at 4-8).

After her termination, Wilson applied for multiple other positions with L3 Harris

performing administrative support work similar to her previous position. (Dkt. 1 at 12-14).

Wilson appears to have sent applications both before and after she signed the Release of

Claims. (Id. at 14; see Dkt. 14 at 3-51 (email communications pertaining to job applications

submitted between March 18, 2021, and September 7, 2021)). These applications were

denied, despite other similarly or less qualified white and younger applicants getting

interviews, job offers, or promotions. (See id. at 13). Wilson alleges that L3 Harris rejected

her applications because of her race and age. (Id. at 15). Wilson alleges that the

discrimination commenced on March 18, 2021, and was continuing at the time she

commenced this lawsuit. (Id. at 3).

On May 27, 2021, Wilson filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (“EEOC”) alleging race and age discrimination against L3 Harris. (Dkt. 12-

1 at 10-12). The EEOC issued a right to sue letter to Wilson on November 18, 2022. (Dkt.

1 at 7). Wilson then filed the instant action.

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standard

A court should consider a motion to dismiss by “accepting all factual allegations as

true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the [claimant].” Trs. of Upstate N.Y.

Eng’rs Pension Fund v. Ivy Asset Mgmt., 843 F.3d 561, 566 (2d Cir. 2016). To withstand

dismissal, a claimant must set forth “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial

plausibility when the [claimant] pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Turkmen v.

Ashcroft, 589 F.3d 542, 546 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009)).

“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need

detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his

entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation

of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal

quotations and citations omitted). “To state a plausible claim, the complaint’s ‘[f]actual

allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’” Nielsen

v. AECOM Tech. Corp., 762 F.3d 214, 218 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at

555).

While the Court is “obliged to construe [pro se] pleadings liberally,” McEachin v.

McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 2004), even pleadings submitted pro se must satisfy

the plausibility standard set forth in Iqbal and Twombly. See Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66,

72 (2d Cir. 2009) (“Even after Twombly, though, we remain obligated to construe a pro se

complaint liberally.”). “Specific facts are not necessary[,]” and a plaintiff “need only ‘give

the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’”

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555); see also

Boykin v. Keycorp, 521 F.3d 202, 216 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[E]ven after Twombly, dismissal of

a pro se claim as insufficiently pleaded is appropriate only in the most unsustainable of

cases.”).

II. Consideration of the Release of Claims on a Motion to Dismiss

In deciding a motion to dismiss, courts may consider “the facts alleged in the

complaint, documents attached to the complaint as exhibits, and documents incorporated

by reference in the complaint.” United States ex rel. Foreman v. AECOM, 19 F.4th 85,

106 (2d Cir. 2021) (internal quotation omitted), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 142 S. Ct. 2679

(2022). Courts may also consider documents “integral to [a] claim . . . .” L-7 Designs, Inc.

v. Old Navy, LLC, 647 F.3d 419, 422 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation omitted).

“Integral” documents include “instances where . . . the incorporated material is a

contract or other legal document containing obligations upon which the plaintiff’s

complaint stands or falls, but which for some reason—usually because the document, read

in its entirety, would undermine the legitimacy of the plaintiff’s claim—was not attached

to the complaint.” Foreman, 19 F.4th at 107 (internal quotation omitted); see L-7 Designs,

647 F.3d at 422 (“Plaintiffs’ failure to include matters of which as pleaders they had notice

and which were integral to their claim—and that they apparently most wanted to avoid—

may not serve as a means of forestalling the district court’s decision on a 12(b)(6) motion.”)

(internal alteration omitted); Barker v. Bancorp, Inc., 21 Civ. 869 (KPF), 2022 WL 595954,

at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2022) (“The Second Circuit has cautioned district judges to be

mindful of litigants who cherry-pick among relevant documents, and has clarified that

district courts may consider relevant documents that are fairly implicated by a plaintiff’s

claims, irrespective of whether they are part of the pleadings.”); Edrehi v. Brookhaven Sci.

Assocs., LLC, CV 15-5940 (SJF)(AYS), 2017 WL 4466501, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 30,

2017) (where “pleadings reference [an] investigation and underlying facts which led to the

terms of [an] [a]greement” and the agreement “contain[ed] an offer of settlement, and was

undoubtedly accepted and properly executed by [p]laintiff,” a plaintiff “may not avoid

consideration of the [agreement] . . . merely because such consideration may detract from

[p]laintiff’s claim . . . .”), adopted, 2017 WL 4381659 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2017).

Here, the Release of Claims is integral to the complaint because the complaint

“stands or falls” on its applicability, and if attached to the complaint it could have

“undermine[d] the legitimacy” of Plaintiff’s claims. Foreman, 19 F.4th at 107. Plaintiff

indisputably had notice of the Release of Claims because she signed it (Dkt. 12-1 at 8) and

references its payout in her complaint, although not the document itself (Dkt. 1 at 14).

Therefore, allowing Plaintiff to “forestall[] the district court’s decision on a [12(b)(6)]

motion” by omitting reference to the Release of Claims would be improper. L-7 Designs,

647 F.3d at 422. The Court will therefore consider the Release of Claims in its assessment

of Defendant’s motion to dismiss.

III. Scope of the Release of Claims

While the Release of Claims may be appropriately considered on this motion to

dismiss, Defendant has failed to establish that its consideration warrants the relief

requested. In other words, drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, the

complaint alleges conduct that falls outside the scope of the Release of Claims.

Congress has specifically barred individuals from waiving future claims under the

ADEA. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(C) (individuals may not waive “rights or claims that

may arise after the date the waiver is executed”); Moorning-Brown v. Bear, Stearns & Co.,

Inc., No. 99 CIV. 4130 JSR HBP, 2000 WL 16935, at *7 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2000) (“A

waiver is not considered knowing and voluntary if the individual waives rights or claims

that may arise after the date the waiver is executed.”) (internal quotation omitted). The

Release of Claims acknowledges this requirement, expressly stating that it applies to

ADEA claims arising “at any time prior to the effective date of this [a]greement but does

not include claims arising after [Plaintiff’s] execution of this [a]greement . . . .” (Dkt. 12-

1 at 4).

Here, drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, she has alleged ADEA

claims that may have arisen after the Release of Claims was executed. The EEOC filing

attached to the complaint enumerates five openings that Plaintiff applied for between

March 19, 2021, and April 27, 2021. (Dkt. 1 at 14). Plaintiff executed the Release of

Claims on March 25, 2021. (Dkt. 12-1 at 8). Moreover, in opposition to the motion to

dismiss, Plaintiff has cited to job applications through September 7, 2021. (Dkt. 14 at 47-

51). This Court may reasonably infer that the allegedly discriminatory decisions not to hire

Plaintiff occurred after the Release of Claims was executed, and therefore, could not have

been waived. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(C). Indeed, as Plaintiff contends in opposition to

the motion, the Release of Claims did not prevent her from searching for employment

within L3 Harris and, nonetheless, Defendant allegedly prevented her from obtaining

employment. (Dkt. 14 at 1).

To counter Plaintiff’s argument, Defendant cites to Blakeney v. Lomas Info. Sys., 65

F.3d 482, 485 (5th Cir. 1995), where the Fifth Circuit found that a failure to rehire claim

arising after a release of claims was signed was still subject to the release because the

“employees’ cause of action for failure to rehire [was] simply an attempt to revive claims

they were paid to release.” Id. at 485; see also Kellogg Co. v. Sabhlok, 471 F.3d 629, 635

(6th Cir. 2006) (also relied upon by Defendant, where the Sixth Circuit echoed the rule set

forth in Blakeney and concluded that the failure to rehire the plaintiff during the period

between the notice of his termination and his last day of work did not arise separately from

the decision to terminate his employment). However, at least one court has cautioned that

“Blakeney should not be read broadly and indiscriminately to make every subsequent

employment application a ‘rehire.’” Gustafson, Inc. v. Bunch, Civil Action No. 3:97-CV-

2102-D, 1999 WL 304560, at *3 n.7 (N.D. Tex. May 7, 1999). And while the Second

Circuit has stated in the statute of limitations context that failure to rehire allegations do

not allege discrete acts of discrimination so as to revive an untimely claim, see Riddle v.

Citigroup, 449 F. App’x 66, 71 (2d Cir. 2011), it has never directly endorsed the rule

enunciated in Blakeney. C.f. Pacheco v. Park S. Hotel, LLC, 2014 WL 292348, at *6

(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2014) (citing Riddle in support of the conclusion that a failure to rehire

claim based on the “hiring of new and younger employees in [plaintiff’s] position . . .

constitutes a new act of discrimination” separate from the plaintiff’s “untimely termination

claim”).

Notwithstanding the arguments advanced by Defendant, the Court cannot conclude

on this record that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the Release of Claims. Plaintiff has not

asserted a wrongful termination claim in the present litigation, and the Court is not

persuaded that it should link Plaintiff’s claims of failure to hire to the claims released upon

the termination of employment. In other words, it is not possible for the Court to conclude

on this record that Plaintiff’s pending claims are a mere attempt to revive or resurrect any

waived wrongful termination claim. Indeed, Plaintiff has alleged that several other white

and younger applicants were later hired and that she applied for several other completely

new positions with L3 Harris. These allegations support a conclusion that Plaintiff’s new

claims are distinct from her termination of employment.

Similar reasoning applies to Wilson’s Title VII claims. “The enforceability of [a]

release as to [a] Title VII claim is governed by federal law. Under Title VII, an employee

may validly waive a discrimination claim so long as the waiver is made knowingly and

voluntarily.” Long v. Corning, Inc., 847 F. App’x 74, 75 (2d Cir. 2021). Unlike the ADEA

and the Older Workers Benefits Protection Act (OWBPA), Title VII does not expressly bar

the waiver of future claims. See Tung v. Texaco, Inc., 150 F.3d 206, 208 (2d Cir. 1998)

(per curiam) (applying OWBPA requirements to ADEA claims and totality-of-the-

circumstances test to Title VII claims). However, courts still generally reject such waivers.

See Separ v. Nassau Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., No. 11-CV-2668 (PKC), 2014 WL

4437676, at *4 n.4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2014) (“[The] June 2008 settlement’s provision

barring [p]laintiff from prospectively suing [d]efendants for employment

discrimination . . . does not preclude [p]laintiff’s October 2008 non-promotion claims. It

is clearly established law that prospective waivers of an employee’s rights under Title VII

are void as a matter of public policy.”) (citing Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S.

36, 51 (1974));1 see also EEOC v. Allstate Ins. Co., 778 F.3d 444, 450 (3d Cir. 2015) (“But

even when particular requirements have not been imposed by statutes like the OWBPA,

releases . . . cannot waive future claims.”).2

As discussed above, considering the dates of Plaintiff’s applications and her

execution of the Release of Claims (Dkt. 1 at 14; Dkt. 12-1 at 8), it can be reasonably

inferred that she may have been discriminated against after she signed the Release of

Claims. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is denied.

1 The Second Circuit considers the relevant language from Gardner-Denver—“there

can be no prospective waiver of an employee’s rights under Title VII”—to be dicta. See

Richardson v. Comm’n on Hum. Rts. & Opportunities, 532 F.3d 114, 122 (2d Cir. 2008).

Still, the Second Circuit construes Gardner-Denver’s requirement that Title VII waivers

meet certain requirements “quite broadly.” Id. at 121.

2 Courts draw a distinction between “future claims” that arise after a waiver is signed

and those that are merely discovered after a waiver is signed. Compare Separ, 2014 WL

4437676, at *4 n.4 (waiver of claims based on discrimination occurring months after

waiver was signed would be unenforceable on public policy grounds), with Fay v. Petersen

Pub. Co., No. 88 CIV. 6499 MBM, 1990 WL 67397, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. May 17, 1990)

(waiver of claims based on discrimination occurring before waiver, but not discovered until

after, merely subjected to the general knowing and voluntary test).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s pending motion to dismiss or alternatively

for summary judgment based on the Release of Claims (Dkt. 12) is denied.

SO ORDERED.

hief Judge

United States District Court

Dated: November 2, 2023

Rochester, New York

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