Docket No. 49, Pl. Memo. at 16-17
How later courts described this case
- Docket No. 49, Pl. Memo. at 16-17
- race, gender, and age discrimination
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
NANCY KACZMAREK,
Plaintiff,
v. DECISION AND ORDER
20-CV-22S
D’YOUVILLE COLLEGE,
LORRIE CLEMO,
Defendants.
I. Introduction
This is an age and religion employment discrimination and retaliation action by
Plaintiff Sister Nancy Kaczmarek against her former employer, then known as D’Youville
College (now D’Youville University; hereinafter “D’Youville”) and its president Dr. Lorre
Clemo, Ph.D. (Docket No. 1, Compl.).
Sister Kaczmarek was a Professor of Education and archivist at D’Youville. In
2018, D’Youville decided to lay off (or as it termed “retrench”) the faculty of its Education
Department, leading to D’Youville firing Plaintiff from both positions. In January 2019,
D’Youville recommended establishing a Masters of Curriculum and Instruction program
but refused to reinstate retrenched Education Department faculty (including Sister
Kaczmarek).
Before this Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 441).
For the reasons stated herein, Defendants’ Motion (Docket No. 44) is granted in part,
1In support of their Motion, Defendants submit their Statement of Undisputed Material Facts,
Memorandum of Law, the Declaration of Dr. Lorrie Clemo with exhibits, Docket No. 44; and Defendants’
Reply Memorandum, Docket No. 52.
denied in part. Issue of fact remain for potential trial on whether Defendants discriminated
against Sister Kaczmarek in terminating her part-time position as archivist because of
religion.
II. Background
A. Facts Alleged in the Complaint (Docket No. 1)
Sister Kaczmarek is a member of the Grey Nuns of the Sacred Heart (Docket
No. 1, Compl. ¶ 1) and earned a Ph.D. in English Education (id. ¶ 16). She worked for
D’Youville since 1981, awarded tenure in 1995 as Professor of Education and (since
2016) also served as college archivist (id. ¶¶ 16, 26). Sister Kaczmarek had excellent
teaching evaluations and was involved in service and faculty activities at D’Youville (id.
¶ 16). Sister Kaczmarek also claims she was qualified to teach English and to teach in
the Education Leadership Program (id. ¶ 35) while also deemed highly thought of as an
archivist by the Head Librarian and library staff (id. ¶ 29). Sister Kaczmarek believed she
would continue as archivist even after retiring from full-time teaching as had her
predecessors as archivist. She obtained certification as a Certified Archivist. (Id.)
Sister Kaczmarek held those positions until September 7, 2018, when the
Education Department was “retrenched” and D’Youville eliminated the archivist position.
(Id. ¶ 12.)
In August 2018, D’Youville announced that it eliminated or “retrenched” the
Education Department due to diminished enrollment in its teacher education programs
and the availability of teachers’ education at other area colleges (id. ¶¶ 13-14). Sister
In response to this Motion, Plaintiff submits her original Memorandum of Law with exhibits, Docket
No. 48; her Statements of Fact, id.; her amended Memorandum of Law, Docket No. 49.
Kaczmarek claims, however, that the D’Youville Board of Trustees voted to stop enrolling
education students in Fall of 2016, ensuring that the Education Department would have
lower or no enrollment and D’Youville creating the condition for terminating Sister
Kaczmarek (id. ¶ 14). The Board directed the Education Department to develop other
programs to increase enrollment (id. ¶ 22). Dr. Clemo received various proposals from
the Education Department faculty to increase enrollment (including recruiting students
from India for a master’s program) but Dr. Clemo did not approve them (id. ¶¶ 22, 24).
Dr. Clemo did not sign or submit graduate certificate programs to the New York State
Education Department that would have allowed education students to begin studying in
2019, missing opportunities for potential graduate students from India or for those seeking
teaching certifications (id. ¶ 25).
D’Youville also eliminated the archivist position held by Sister Kaczmarek,
deeming that part of her duties as a Professor of Education (id. ¶ 26). She claims,
however, that the archivist was a part-time administrative position under the Head
Librarian and was held by a Grey Nun from its creation in 1965 (save for five years) (id.).
Sister Kaczmarek learned that the archivist position no longer existed and it was created
just for her (id. ¶ 27). The Head Librarian, however, was not consulted about the
termination of the archivist position; Sister Kaczmarek told Rand Bellavia, the Head
Librarian, of the removal (id. ¶ 28).
Sister Kaczmarek complained about her dismissals to Dr. Clemo and University
administration as the AAUP complained about the retrenchment of the Education
Department (id. ¶ 30).
In January 2019, D’Youville recommended conducting a Masters of Curriculum
and Instruction Program (“C&I Program”), a program Sister Kaczmarek and retrenched
faculty previously taught (id. ¶ 15; see Docket No. 44, Defs. Memo. at 7). Faculty at
D’Youville are represented by the American Association of University Professors
(“AAUP”). Upon learning of the University’s plan, the AAUP local president argued to
D’Youville that retrenched faculty should be reinstated for that program. (Docket No. 1,
Compl. ¶ 17.) D’Youville replied that it could not afford to reinstate the retrenched faculty
(id. ¶ 18). Sister Kaczmarek claims that D’Youville’s decision was based upon the age
and status of the faculty and not on the size of enrollment (id.).
Sister Kaczmarek next contends that she and the other retrenched faculty were
fired with less than two weeks’ notice (id.), with tenured faculty given only 10 days’ notice
while tenure-track faculty who were not renewed were given five months’ to one year’s
notice (id. ¶ 19). Sister Kaczmarek was tenured and was given only 10 days’ notice,
which she claims is contrary to the collective bargaining agreement with the AAUP (id.).
The firing in August 2018 precluded Sister Kaczmarek from searching for comparable
work in academia, with the search process usually taking a calendar year, timing
D’Youville administrators were well familiar with (id. ¶ 31). Thus, Sister Kaczmarek
suffered financial and emotional distress (id. ¶ 32). Meanwhile, many of the courses she
taught continued to be taught at D’Youville (id. ¶ 33).
In addition, D’Youville and the AAUP entered a Memorandum of Agreement that
provided if the Education Department were reinstituted, retrenched faculty would have a
right to be rehired (id. ¶ 20). Sister Kaczmarek, however, was not offered any other
position at D’Youville (id. ¶ 34) while the AAUP president and department heads at
D’Youville were not consulted about possible openings (id. ¶ 35). Further, she was not
considered for the then-open position of Chief Mission Officer, a position held by a Grey
Nun (id. ¶ 36).
On December 12, 2018, Sister Kaczmarek filed a charge of discrimination with the
New York State Division of Human Rights and cross-filed with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) (Docket No. 1, Compl. ¶¶ 6, 7; Docket No. 44, Clemo
Decl. ¶ 19, Ex. B). On June 12, 2019, the New York State Division of Human Rights
issued a Determination and Order after Investigation which found no probable cause,
dismissing the matter (Docket No. 1, Compl. ¶ 8; Docket No. 44, Clemo Decl. ¶ 19, Ex. C;
see Docket No. 44, Defs. Statement ¶ 19). On October 11, 2019, the EEOC issued its
Dismissal and Notice of Rights (Docket No. 1, Compl. ¶ 9; Docket No. 48, Pl. Ex. 10).
Plaintiff alleges that she commenced this action within 300 days of the State Division of
Human Rights’ action (Docket No. 1, Compl. ¶¶ 10-11).
B. Causes of Action
The Complaint alleges three causes of action. The First Cause of Action alleges
unlawful age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34, 623(a)(1) (“ADEA”) (id. ¶¶ 38-49). Sister Kaczmarek alleges that
she was over the age of 40, suffering from the adverse action of her termination on
September 7 2018 (id. ¶¶ 39, 40). She claims she was “exceptionally well qualified” for
her positions as professor and archivist (id. ¶ 46) while that work was still performed after
her termination (id. ¶¶ 47-49) by younger, lower-salaried, and less qualified persons (id.
¶ 49).
The Second Cause of Action claims that Defendants discriminated against Sister
Kaczmarek based on her religion, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m), as a Roman Catholic and a
member of religious order (id. ¶¶ 51-56). Sister Kaczmarek claims that Vice President of
Academic Affairs Dr. Mimi Steadman stated that “the nun must go” (id. ¶ 54). Sister
Kaczmarek now complains that she was fired as archivist despite this position being held
by a Grey Nun through almost all its existence (id. ¶¶ 26, 56). Her termination manifested
Defendants’ religious bias (id. ¶ 56).
Finally, the Third Cause of Action alleges that Defendants retaliated against Sister
Kaczmarek in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (id. ¶¶ 58-622). She alleges
D’Youville’s failure to investigate her complaints against her termination was retaliatory
(id. ¶¶ 59, 60, 61), see Cox v. Onondaga Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 760 F.3d 139, 146 (2d Cir.
2014).
C. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 44) and Facts
Asserted Therein
The parties stipulated to dismissal of Defendant Charles Urlaub, Chairman of the
Board of D’Youville (Docket No. 13; see Docket No. 1, Compl. ¶ 2). Remaining
Defendants D’Youville and President Clemo then answered (Docket No. 14).
Defendants then moved for summary judgment arguing that Sister Kaczmarek has
not established a prima facie case for her age discrimination claim and her remaining
claims fail as a matter of law (Docket No. 44).
2Defendants also argue that this claim is in retaliation for age discrimination, Docket No. 44, Defs.
Memo. at 9, although they later concede that Sister Kaczmarek has not alleged retaliation under the ADEA,
Docket No. 52, Defs. Reply Memo. at 9 & n.6; see also Docket No. 44, Defs. Memo. at 17-19 (arguing the
retaliation claim under Title VII fails).
Generally, Sister Kaczmarek admits (see Docket No. 48) the facts alleged in
Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (Docket No. 44). Material disputed
facts are noted below.
D’Youville, founded by the Grey Nuns (Docket No. 44, Lorrie Clemo Decl. ¶ 4),
offers degrees in various undergraduate, masters, post-graduate, and doctoral programs
(Docket No. 44, Defs. Statement ¶ 1). Dr. Clemo, herself a Catholic, is the first layperson
serving as President of D’Youville since January 2017 (id. ¶¶ 3, 4).
Although D‘Youville’s Education Department once enjoyed a robust student
enrollment, the numbers of enrolled students diminished over time due (for example) that
the Province of Ontario changed academic requirements for teaching there that made it
less attractive for Canadian students to enroll (id. ¶ 6). In 2002, D’Youville’s Education
Department had 1,142 students enrolled but in 2016 there were only 5 students enrolled
in that department’s 4 programs (Docket No. 44, Clemo Decl. ¶ 6, Ex. A). In the fall of
2016, there were concerns that the low enrollment would jeopardize accreditation of the
Education Department (Docket No. 44, Defs. Statement ¶ 7). In October 2016, D’Youville
suspended programs offered by the Education Department (id. ¶ 8).
In 2016, Sister Kaczmarek was assigned to perform part-time archivist duties for the
University Library (Docket No. 44, Defs. Statement ¶ 13). Although she lacked specific
archival training or a degree in library science, D’Youville appointed Sister Kaczmarek
archivist. According to Sister Kaczmarek, she was appointed to substitute for one of three
courses she no longer taught. (See Docket No. 44, Defs. Memo. at 6; Docket No. 44,
Defs. Atty. Affirm. Ex. A, Pl. EBT Tr. at 112-13; Docket No. 44, Clemo Decl. ¶ 15). She
believed to keep her employed during the suspension of the Education Department (see
Docket No. 49, Pl. Memo. at 5).
Defendants claim that the D’Youville administration hoped that suspension of
programs in the Education Department could be used to consider restructuring of
programs (Docket No. 44, Defs. Statement ¶ 9). Sister Kaczmarek, however, denies this
and she does not believe that D’Youville planned to restructure (Docket No. 48, Pl.
Statement ¶ 9). D’Youville’s administration, however, concluded that Education
Department programs could not be resuscitated and thus were discontinued due to the
lack of enrollment (Docket No. 44, Defs. Statement ¶ 10).
In August 2018, D’Youville discontinued the Education Department programs
(Docket No. 44, Clemo Decl. ¶¶ 9-12). D’Youville notified Sister Kaczmarek and other
faculty members of their termination (id. ¶ 12).
After discontinuance of the programs, Vice President Steadman negotiated with
AAUP president Dr. Marge Goodman the retrenchment and on whether there are suitable
vacant positions for members of the Education Department (Docket No. 44, Defs.
Statement ¶ 11). Looking at faculty vacancies, D’Youville’s administration concluded that
there were no suitable vacancies (id.). D’Youville argues that the AAUP also did not
identify suitable openings for the retrenched faculty (Docket No. 44, Clemo Decl. ¶ 14).
Sister Kaczmarek however disputes limited vacancies to faculty positions and
claimed that she was qualified to work in Campus Ministry or the Learning Center among
non-academic departments (Docket No. 48, Pl. Statement ¶ 11). Sister Kaczmarek never
spoke to anyone about any position aside from archivist or Chief Mission Officer (Docket
No. 44, Defs. Statement ¶ 12); she explains that she did not wish to overstep the union-
management reassignment process (Docket No. 48, Pl. Statement ¶ 12). Sister
Kaczmarek testified that she applied, but was not selected, for D’Youville’s Chief Mission
Officer position in September 2018 (Docket No. 44, Defs. Memo. at 6 n.6, citing Docket
No. 44, Defs. Atty. Affirm. Ex. A, Pl. EBT Tr. at 78-79).
Once D’Youville concluded that the Education Department would be discontinued,
the school then found that a dedicated archivist was unnecessary (Docket No. 44, Defs.
Statement ¶ 14), with President Clemo asserting that a small institution such as D’Youville
did not need an archivist, rather than what she termed “extremely large research
institutions such as Cornell University” (Docket No. 44, Clemo Decl. ¶ 15). D’Youville
abolished that position and to date have not filled it, using library staff to obtain
D’Youville’s historical materials (id. ¶ 16).
Sister Kaczmarek, however, denies that she could not have been retained part-
time in that position. She in fact anticipated staying on part-time. Further, Sister
Kaczmarek contends that the Education Department and archivist position are unrelated
(Docket No. 48, Pl. Statement ¶ 14). She argues that she and the Head Librarian were
never told about losing the archivist position (id.).
Defendants state that in January 2019, D’Youville offered an online Masters in
Curriculum and Instruction program (“C&I Program”) to three students in India (Docket
No. 44, Defs. Statement ¶ 15). Sister Kaczmarek, however, disputes the approval of this
program by the New York State Education Department, claiming that the application to
the state was made under false pretenses given D’Youville’s retrenchment at the same
time (Docket No. 48, Pl. Statement ¶ 15). Defendants represent that the C&I Program
was not for teacher preparation or credentialing students (Docket No. 44, Defs. Statement
¶ 16). They claim that they offered the C&I Program because of contracts D’Youville
entered with Indian entities to offering joint program to their students (id.). Sister
Kaczmarek denies this, asserting that the C&I Program was offered more broadly than to
contracted Indian students (see Docket No. 48, Pl. Statement ¶ 16). Defendants claim
that the C&I Program ran only in 2019 and served those three students. Defendants also
denied any obligation to have Education Department faculty return. (Docket No. 44, Defs.
Statement ¶ 17.)
Sister Kaczmarek disagrees. First, she questioned the qualifications of
administrators and adjunct faculty that taught the C&I Program. Second, she believes
the Memorandum of Agreement with the AAUP bound D’Youville to reinstate former
Education Department faculty regardless of the number of students in the program.
(Docket No. 48, Pl. Statement ¶ 17.) Third, Sister Kaczmarek claims that D’Youville
continued the C&I Program into 2022 (id.), although she later admits that the Program
was not offered after 2019 (Docket No. 44, Defs. Statement ¶ 18; cf. Docket No. 48, Pl.
Statement ¶ 18).
The AAUP filed a grievance seeking reinstatement of the retrenched faculty but
D’Youville prevailed in binding arbitration (Docket No. 44, Defs. Statement ¶ 18; cf.
Docket No. 48, Pl. Statement ¶ 18).
After extension of the briefing schedule (Docket Nos. 47, 51, 45, 48), responses
were due by January 9, 2023 (Docket No. 47), and replies by February 3, 2023 (Docket
No. 51). Upon timely briefing (Docket Nos. 48, 49, 52), the Motion is deemed submitted.
III. Discussion
A. Generally Applicable Standards
1. Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate if “the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under
the governing law,” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505,
91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). An issue of material fact is “genuine” if “the evidence is such that
a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party,” id.
The movant seeking summary judgment has the burden (through pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, affidavits, and other materials, Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)) to demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, Ford
v. Reynolds, 316 F.3d 351, 354 (2d Cir. 2003).
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the evidence and the inferences
drawn from the evidence must be “viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing
the motion,” Addicks v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d
142 (1970). “Only when reasonable minds could not differ as to the import of evidence is
summary judgment proper,” Bryant v. Maffucci, 923 F.2d 979, 982 (2d Cir. 1991). The
function of the Court is not “to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter
but to determine whether there is a genuine issue of fact for trial,” Anderson, supra,
477 U.S. at 249. “Assessment of credibility and choices between conflicting versions of
the events are matters for the jury, not for the court on summary judgment,” Rule v. Brine,
Inc., 85 F.3d 1002, 1011 (2d Cir. 1996).
But a “mere scintilla of evidence” in favor of the nonmoving party will not defeat
summary judgment, Anderson, supra, 477 U.S. at 252. A nonmoving party must do more
than cast a “metaphysical doubt” as to the material facts; it must “offer some hard
evidence showing that its version of the events is not wholly fanciful,” Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538
(1986). That is, there must be evidence from which the jury could reasonably find for the
nonmoving party, Anderson, supra, 477 U.S. at 252.
2. Federal Employment Discrimination
As for the First Cause of Action, it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate
against any individual with respect to her terms, conditions, or privileges of employment
because of her age, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). The Second Cause of Action alleges
discrimination based on Sister Kaczmarek’s religion. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, as amended, makes unlawful employment practice (including discharge) because
of the employee’s religion, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). An unlawful employment
practice “is established when the complaining party demonstrates that . . . religion, . . .
was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also
motivated the parties,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).
The ADEA and Title VII have the same standards for liability. Employment
discrimination is established either by direct evidence, Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121, 105 S.Ct. 613, 83 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985); Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 n.44, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977), see Haskell v.
Kaman Corp., 743 F.2d 113, 119 (2d Cir. 1984) (age discrimination), or proof of
circumstances through the burden shifting analysis of McDonnell Douglas v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 802-04, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), that an inference of
discrimination may be drawn, Haskell, supra, 743 F.2d at 119; see Delaney v. Bank of
America Corp., 766 F.3d 163, 167-68 (2d Cir. 2014) (age discrimination) (Docket No. 44,
Defs. Memo. at 9); Gorzynski v. JetBlue Airways Corp., 596 F.3d 93, 106 (2d Cir. 2010)
(same).
To state a prima facie case for age or religion discrimination, Sister Kaczmarek
must demonstrate that she is a member of a protected group (alleging either that she is
over 40 years old or practices a particular religion); that she qualified for her position; that
she was subject to an adverse employment action; and that this action occurred under
circumstances that give rise to an inference of discrimination, Grastorf v. Community
Bank, N.A., No. 19CV1627, 2023 WL 2266336, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2023) (Skretny,
J.), reconsideration denied, 2023 WL 3570437 (W.D.N.Y. May 19, 2023) (Skretny, J.);
Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 137-38 (2d Cir. 2003) (race, gender, and age
discrimination); Holcomb v. Iona College, 521 F.3d 130, 138 (2d Cir. 2008) (religion
discrimination); Aljarah v. Citigroup Inc., 450 F. Supp. 3d 329, 333 (W.D.N.Y. 2020)
(Geraci, C.J.) (religion discrimination). Further, she must establish that her age or religion
motivated D’Youville’s decision, Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610,
113 S.Ct. 1701, 123 L.Ed.2d 338 (1993) (id. at 10-11); University of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr.
v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 348-49, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 186 L.Ed.2d 503 (2013) (quoting
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)). This prima facie case standard is not onerous, Texas Dep’t of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981);
see Aljarah, supra, 450 F. Supp. 3d at 333 (de minimis standard, quoting Weinstock v.
Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 42 (2d Cir. 2000)).
Upon Sister Kaczmarek meeting this prima facie case burden, the burden of
persuasion shifts to Defendants to articulate some legitimate, non-discriminatory reason
for their action, McDonnell Douglas, supra, 411 U.S. at 802. Once Defendants meet this
burden, the burden shifts back to Plaintiff to show that the stated non-discriminatory
reason was pretext, id. at 807. The ultimate burden of persuasion remains with Plaintiff,
Burdine, supra, 450 U.S. at 253.
3. Title VII Retaliation
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer “to discriminate against an employee
‘because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter,’” Terry, supra, 336 F.3d at
140 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)).
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII for her Third Cause of
Action, Sister Kaczmarek must show (1) her participation in a protected activity known to
the employer, (2) an employment action disadvantaging her, and (3) a causal connection
between the protected activity and the adverse action, Terry, supra, 336 F.3d at 140-41
(quotation omitted). The protected activity must be the but-for cause of the adverse
action, Nassar, supra, 570 U.S. at 362 (id.).
One retaliatory employment action is the failure to investigate a complaint that can
dissuade an employee from filing a charge, see Cox, supra, 760 F.3d at 146 (Docket
No. 49, Pl. Memo. at 16-17).
B. Parties’ Contentions
Defendants first argue that Sister Kaczmarek’s First Cause of Action fails as a
matter of law because Sister Kaczmarek has not established her prima facie case
because there is no evidence showing circumstances giving rise to an inference of age
discrimination (Docket No. 44, Defs. Memo. at 9-13). They contend that Sister
Kaczmarek lacked evidence of discriminatory or retaliatory animus because D’Youville
laid off Plaintiff and other Education Department faculty pursuant to the AAUP collective
bargaining agreement retrenchment process (id. at 1, 2). Furthermore, her termination
was for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, the plummeting student enrollment in
Education Department programs (id. at 3, 13-14). Defendants next argue that Sister
Kaczmarek cannot show pretext for their reason for the termination (id. at 14-17).
Next, Defendants claim that Sister Kaczmarek’s religious discrimination (Second
Cause of Action) and retaliation (Third Cause of Action) claims fail to state a claim (id. at
17-19, 19-22).
Sister Kaczmarek responds that she was “an experienced, long serving and
eminently qualified individual from her position as a Professor of Education and her
position as an Archivist and her replacement by a far less qualified and much younger
individual,” (Docket No. 49, Pl. Memo. at 1). She states that issues of material fact exist
precluding summary judgment (id. at 14 (questions on extension of tenure in other
University programs)). She claims the established her prima facie case for age and
religious discrimination (id. at 12-14 (age), 14-16 (religion)) as well as her retaliation claim
(id. at 16-17).
Defendants reply that Sister Kaczmarek lacked admissible evidence to show an
issue of material fact (Docket No. 52, Defs. Reply Memo. at 2-4), for example she lacked
evidence for her claim that someone in the D’Youville administration said that the nun
had to go. They contend that Plaintiff did not clearly allege the basis for retaliation,
presumably for religious discrimination (id. at 9-10).
C. Age Discrimination
As for Sister Kaczmarek’s First Cause of Action and the prima facie case for age
discrimination, she does not allege direct evidence of age (or religion) discrimination.
Sister Kaczmarek was in the protected class and suffered an adverse employment action.
She established that she was qualified as a professor and became qualified as an
archivist, although she does not have a degree in library science.
Sister Kaczmarek, however, has not shown an inference of discrimination arising
from D’Youville’s retrenchment of the Education Department. Although she claims that
younger faculty were retained while she and older members were laid off, Sister
Kaczmarek does not provide the ages of the other faculty (both those retained and those
let go) to establish that claim. She does not point out that younger faculty members, for
example, were reassigned from the Education Department while she was not. She also
does not allege the age of the adjunct faculty or administrators that taught the three
students in 2019 in the University‘s C&I Program even if one assumes that program is
equivalent to the retrenched Education Department programs Sister Kaczmarek taught
in. She alleges (cf. Docket No. 1, Compl. ¶ 33) that Education Department programs she
taught continued after retrenchment but Sister Kaczmarek offers no proof of continued
teaching. Finally, she has not shown that her age was the but-for reason for her
termination. Sister Kaczmarek argues anecdotally that D’Youville retained four
employees in their thirties while letting her go (Docket No. 49, Pl. Memo. at 13) as well as
other, unnamed older employees (id., citing Docket No. 44, Defs. Atty. Affirm. Ex. A, Pl.
EBT Tr. at 166). She does not state the position these younger employees held and
whether they replaced older employees.
Sister Kaczmarek thus has not met her prima facie burden establishing an
inference of age discrimination and Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket
No. 44) dismissing the First Cause of Action is granted.
Even if Sister Kaczmarek somehow meets the not onerous prima facie burden,
Defendants proffered non-discriminatory reasons for her termination, which this Court
now accepts, see Escribano v. Greater Hartford Acad. of Arts, No. 3:08 CV 248, 2009 WL
10677574, at *4 (D. Conn. Aug. 28, 2009), aff’d, 449 F. App’x 34 (2d Cir. 2011) (summary
Order). D’Youville contends that enrollment in the Education Department decreased to
single figures thus for budgetary reasons the school had to retrench those programs.
Despite Sister Kaczmarek’s argument that enrollment is cyclical and she anticipated
increased enrollment in 2022-24 (cf. Docket No. 48, Pl. Statement ¶ 10), D’Youville had
decreased enrollment over the last two decades, much due to the changes in teaching
certification in Ontario, a prime source of the student population for D’Youville.
Even if D’Youville reduced enrollment two years before retrenching the Education
Department programs (cf. Docket No. 1, Compl. ¶ 14), Sister Kaczmarek has not shown
this decision was to further discriminate against her.
Defendants point out that this retrenchment applied to the entire Education
Department (Docket No. 44, Defs. Memo. at 15) and is not limited to the more senior
faculty members. Sister Kaczmarek was one of an entire faculty who was let go.
Similarly, in Escribano, Maria Escribano, a Hispanic teacher, alleged ethnicity
discrimination in her lay off while the defendant school argued that she was let go due to
budget cuts. The district court accepted the school’s proffered reasons that the program
Escribano taught in was cut due to budgetary constraints with evidence in that record of
at least one Caucasian teacher also losing her classes, Escribano, supra, 2009 WL
10677574, at *1, 4.
The diminished enrollment here without regard to the age of the faculty members
provides a non-discriminatory reason for eliminating Sister Kaczmarek’s faculty position.
The burden then would shift to Sister Kaczmarek to show that this reason was pretext.
She cannot meet that burden. Absent allegations of the age of the faculty or disputing
the enrollment figures, Sister Kaczmarek cannot show that diminishing enrollment was a
mere pretext for age discrimination.
Therefore, this Court grants Defendants’ Motion (Docket No. 44) for Summary
Judgment dismissing the First Cause of Action.
D. Religion Discrimination
For her Second Cause of Action and absent allegation of direct evidence of
discrimination, Sister Kaczmarek needs to establish her prima facie case for employment
discrimination based upon her religion. Despite suing D’Youville University, an institution
founded by the Grey Nuns, Sister Kaczmarek alleged membership in a protected class
as a Roman Catholic and a member of the Grey Nuns order. Her terminations as a
professor and archivist were adverse actions and (as stated for her age discrimination
claim) Sister Kaczmarek was qualified for either position.
As with her age claim, the issue here is the inference of discriminatory intent for
her religion. With her faculty position, Sister Kaczmarek has not established D’Youville’s
retrenchment of the Education Department manifested an inference of discriminatory
intent. Although she alleges that she was terminated because she was a Grey Nun,
D’Youville terminated the entire Education Department without regard to their faith or
membership in a religious order.
Termination of Sister Kaczmarek’s position as archivist, however, is problematic.
Sister Kaczmarek testified that she was the last Grey Nun employed by D’Youville
(Docket No. 44, Defs. Atty. Affirm. Ex. A, Pl. EBT Tr. at 172). She alleges that the archivist
was a position in the University Library and not the Education Department (Docket No. 48,
Pl. Statement ¶ 14; see Docket No. 49, Pl. Memo. at 5) while Defendants argue that she
was “assigned to perform part-time Archivist duties for the College library” (Docket No. 44,
Defs. Statement ¶ 14). This poses an issue of material fact as to which entity
administered Sister Kaczmarek’s archivist position, was it the Education Department or
the Librarian. If the archivist was under the Librarian, Defendants invoking student
enrollment in the Education Department to justify terminating the archivist position is
pretextual.
Historically, a Grey Nun served as D’Youville’s archivist, save for 5 years of the
last 58 years of the existence of that position. Sister Kaczmarek claims that D’Youville
Vice President Steadman said two things, that D’Youville reassigned Sister Kaczmarek
to the archivist position to keep her employed and stated that “the nun must go” (Docket
No. 1, Compl. ¶ 54; Docket No. 48, Pl. Memo. Ex. 5; Docket No. 49, Pl. [Amended] Memo.
at 15, Ex. 5). Plaintiff’s exhibit opposing Defendants’ Motion, however, is a note claiming
the President Clemo stated that “the nun has to go” (Docket No. 48, Pl. Ex. 5).
She also alleges that she was rejected when she applied for the Chief Mission
Officer position, a position traditionally held by a Grey Nun.
Drawing inferences form the evidence in her favor as opponent to the Motion for
Summary Judgment, Sister Kaczmarek thus meets the light prima facie burden that her
termination as part-time archivist was due to her religion and membership in an order.
The burden then shifts to Defendants to articulate a non-discriminatory reason for
terminating her as archivist.
President Clemo vehemently denies saying “the nun has to go,” claiming that
Sister Kaczmarek first attributed the statement to a now former Vice President
(Steadman) and later claimed that President Clemo said it (Docket No. 44, Clemo Decl.
¶ 20). Further, Defendants cite Sister Kaczmarek’s deposition testimony that (1) she
misidentified who said that; (2) that she did not hear the statement herself; and (3) she
learned of it from an unnamed colleague (Docket No. 44, Defs. Atty. Affirm., Ex. A, Pl.
EBT Tr. at 173-75). They also dispute the admissibility of the handwritten note (Docket
No. 48, Pl. Ex. 5) stating that “the nun has to go” which was not produced in discovery
and no provenance was given for it (Docket No. 52, Defs. Reply Memo. at 8 n.5).
This presents additional issues of material fact whether (or who) made the
statement that may have shown D’Youville or President Clemo’s religious bias despite
being from an institution established by a Catholic religious order. The statement that
“the nun has to go” undermines any non-discriminatory reason for terminating the
archivist position (and Sister Kaczmarek’s employment).
Unlike the enrollment losses in the Education Department programs, there is no
objective reason for ending the archivist position. D’Youville only argues that
administrators concluded that as a smaller institution it no longer needed an archivist.
D’Youville here merely implies (without alleging) the added costs for retaining a part-time
archivist, using the retrenchment of the Education Department as an opportunity to
eliminate an archivist for a small institution. D’Youville established and retained an
archivist in 1965 while being a smaller institution than Cornell the comparator President
Clemo now uses to disclaim D’Youville’s need for an archivist (cf. Docket No. 44, Clemo
Decl. ¶ 15).
There are issues of fact precluding judgment to Defendants. Defendants also fail
to meet their burden establishing a non-discriminatory reason for discontinuing the
archivist position (and terminating Sister Kaczmarek as a result). Therefore, this Court
need not reach the final McDonnell Douglas step of Sister Kaczmarek showing that
Defendants’ stated reason was pretext.
Thus, this Court grants in part (dismissing Sister Kaczmarek’s discrimination claim
for the retrenchment as professor in the Education Department) and denies in part
(retaining her claim for termination as archivist) Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment (Docket No. 44) dismissing the Second Cause of Action.
E. Retaliation for Complaints
For her Third Cause of Action retaliation claim in violation of Title VII (hence her
religion discrimination claim), Sister Kaczmarek alleges Defendants retaliated against her
for complaining about retrenchment of the Education Department by not investigating her
complaints. Her complaints about age discrimination, however, were not alleged are thus
not actionable.
Sister Kaczmarek first must exhaust this retaliation claim before the State Division
of Human Rights or the EEOC, see Terry, supra, 336 F.3d at 151; Hamzik v. Office for
People with Dev’al Disabilities, 859 F. Supp. 2d 265, 277 (N.D.N.Y. 2012). This Court
observes that Sister Kaczmarek did not indicate retaliation in her New York State Division
of Human Rights charge by checking the “retaliation” box on the charge but stated a claim
for retaliation for opposing discrimination in the narrative (Docket No. 44, Clemo Decl.
Ex. B, charge form at 2, addendum at 3). The State Division of Human Rights Charge
form frames retaliation only in assisting in filing a discrimination complaint, rather than a
more general retaliation contention.
One exception to this exhaustion requirement is if the administrative charge is
completed by the employee without assistance of counsel, Hamzik, supra, 859 F. Supp.
2d at 277, for the purpose of the EEOC or State Division of Human Rights Charge is to
alert the agency of the claimed discrimination with a focus upon the allegations made in
the charge itself and the description of the discriminatory conduct, Deravin v. Kerik,
335 F.3d 195, 201 (2d Cir. 2003); Hamzik, supra, 859 F. Supp. 2d at 277, often made in
the narrative attached to the Charge.
Here, Sister Kaczmarek exhausted her retaliation claims despite failing to check
the Charge form identifying that claim.
As for the substantive elements of her Title VII retaliation prima facie case, Sister
Kaczmarek needs to establish participation in a protected activity, an employment action
disadvantaging her, and causal connection between her protected activity and the
employment action.
Sister Kaczmarek claims the protected activity was her complaints about the
retrenchment and apparently her termination as archivist. In August 2018, the Education
Department was retrenched and Sister Kaczmarek was laid off (Docket No. 1, Compl.
¶¶ 13-14; Docket No. 44, Defs. Statement ¶ 10; see Docket No. 48, Pl. Ex. 1 (termination
letter)). Also at that time, D’Youville eliminated Sister Kaczmarek’s archivist position
(Docket No. 1, Compl. ¶¶ 26, 27), although the termination letter (Docket No. 48, Pl. Ex. 1)
does not expressly state the end of the archivist position. That letter merely terminated
Sister Kaczmarek while discussing the closing of the Education Department (id.).
Sister Kaczmarek complained about her dismissals on September 11 and October 2,
2018 (Docket No. 1, Compl. ¶¶ 30, 59). She also alleged communicating with the Board
of Trustees on September 5, 2018, also complaining about the retrenchment of the
Education Department (id.); this later complaint does not reach the end of the archivist
position and is not actionable here as a Title VII retaliation. These complaints, however,
are not included in this record. Sister Kaczmarek then filed her State Division of Human
Rights Charge dated December 10, 2018 (Docket No. 44, Clemo Decl. Ex. B).
As for the employment action disadvantaging Sister Kaczmarek, she has not
stated such an action. Sister Kaczmarek claims the failure to investigate her complaints
was the retaliatory employment action (Docket No. 1, Compl. ¶¶ 60-61), alleging that this
failure to investigate would dissuade a reasonable employee from making a charge of
discrimination (id. ¶ 62). She alleges this despite her later filing a discrimination claim
with the New York State Division of Human Rights.
First, Sister Kaczmarek has not shown how she was disadvantaged by Defendants
turning a deaf ear to her complaints. These complaints appear to seek reconsideration
of the retrenchment decision. Absent the text of her complaints, this Court cannot
determine whether it addressed the professorship (and her age discrimination claim,
where she did not allege a retaliation claim under the ADEA) or the archivist (and her
Title VII religion discrimination claim) or both. Sister Kaczmarek has not shown retaliatory
action in Defendants not investigating her complaints about her termination. Within
weeks of her complaints Sister Kaczmarek filed her New York State Division of Human
Rights charge (which led to this action) and evidence no harm from Defendants’ silence
to her complaints. She thus has not shown how she was disadvantaged by the
Defendants’ inaction on her complaints.
Sister Kaczmarek cites Cox for the proposition that failure to investigate a
complaint is an adverse employment action (Docket No. 49, Pl. Memo. at 16-17). Cox,
however, involved Deputies Steven Cox and others filing EEOC charges and the
Onondaga Sheriff’s Department not investigating that charge, 760 F.3d at 146. The
Second Circuit stated that “an employer’s failure to conduct an investigation when faced
even with an internal complaint, much less a charge to the EEOC, might be viewed as
evidence of an indifference” to discrimination “if not acquiescence in it,” id. The court held
that employees who complain of discrimination may not claim retaliation “simply because
the employer undertakes a factfinding investigation,” id. at 147. An employer’s
investigation “may constitute a cognizable retaliatory action if carried out so as to result
in a hostile work environment, constructive discharge, or other employment
consequences of a negative nature, or if conducted in such an egregious manner as to
‘dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination,’” id.
(quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 165
L.Ed.2d 345 (2006)).
The Second Circuit in Terry also recounted the Title VII standard for retaliation
because the employee made a discrimination charge, Terry, supra, 136 F.3d at 141-42.
There, Andrew Terry filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity office and
alleged retaliation for filing that charge, id. at 134, 135.
Here, Sister Kaczmarek complains about her retrenchment and termination and
argues that Defendants retaliated against her by not investigating her complaints before
she filed her State Division of Human Rights charge. This Court does not have the text
of these complaints (or D’Youville’s response). D’Youville’s investigation of these
complaints would revisit restoring Education Department programs or the archivist
position despite diminishing enrollment and budgetary constraints as well as determining
whether Sister Kaczmarek could return to the University in some capacity. Sister
Kaczmarek also does not allege that Defendants did not investigate her State Division of
Human Rights charge.
Considering the totality of circumstances and the alleged retaliatory acts, Sister
Kaczmarek has not established how she was disadvantaged by them. If Defendants
failed to respond to her complaints about the retrenchment and termination, Sister
Kaczmarek eventually filed her State Division of Human Rights charge without apparent
hinderance. There appears to have been no harm from Defendants not responding to
her complaints. Her claimed injuries (cf. Docket No. 49, Pl. Memo. at 17) arose from her
termination and not the failure of Defendants to investigate her complaints (which in
essence were to reconsider the termination decision).
Absent an employment action that disadvantaged Sister Kaczmarek, there is
nothing to connect with the alleged protected activity (her filing complaints). Therefore,
this Court grants Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 44) dismissing
the Third Cause of Action.
IV. Conclusion
Plaintiff Sister Nancy Kaczmarek has not met her prima facie case burden to assert
age discrimination against Defendants under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
in her First Cause of Action. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 44)
against this Cause of Action is granted.
As for the Second Cause of Action, Sister Kaczmarek fails to allege religion
discrimination in the retrenchment of her professorship in the Education Department but
she raises material issues of fact whether D’Youville terminated her as its archivist due
to religious bias or bias against a Grey Nun. Defendants’ Motion (id.) for Summary
Judgment is denied.
As for her Third Cause of Action, Sister Kaczmarek has not shown retaliatory
action from Defendants not investigating her complaints about her termination. Within
weeks of her complaints she filed her New York State Division of Human Rights charge
(which led to this action) and there is no evidence asserted of harm from Defendants’
silent response to her complaints. These complaints in fact sought reconsideration of the
retrenchment and termination that Sister Kaczmarek later challenged before the State
Human Rights Division and ultimately here before this Court. Defendants’ Motion (id.) is
granted.
Thus, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (id.) is granted in part and
denied in part.
Given the remaining claims in the Second Cause of Action, this Court renews
referral of mediation to Joseph Saeli (cf. Docket Nos. 26, 27), giving the parties until
August 15, 2023, to conduct a mediation session with Mr. Saeli. This Court then will
schedule a Status Conference to discuss resolution of this matter and (if necessary)
scheduling this case for trial.
V. Orders
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED, that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
(Docket No. 44) is GRANTED IN PART (dismissing the First and Third Causes of Action
and so much of the Second Cause of Action alleging religion discrimination in Plaintiff’s
layoff as a professor) and DENIED IN PART (retaining so much of the Second Cause of
Action alleging religion discrimination in terminating Plaintiff as archivist at D’Youville
University).
FURTHER, that the parties shall re-engage with Mediator Joseph Saeli, schedule,
and participate in good faith in a further mediation session on or before August 15, 2023.
FURTHER, that within 10 days of the mediation session and for any subsequent
sessions, the mediator shall file a Mediation Certification setting forth the progress of
mediation.
FURTHER, that this mediation process shall be completed by September 15,
2023.
FURTHER, that this Court shall separately schedule a Status Conference following
the mediator’s certification as described above.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: June 26, 2023
Buffalo, New York
s/William M. Skretny
WILLIAM M. SKRETNY
United States District Judge