Meadows v. Buffalo Police Department

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

CAROLETTE MEADOWS,

Plaintiff,

21-CV-449-LJV-HKS

v. DECISION & ORDER

BUFFALO POLICE DEPARTMENT, et

al.,

Defendants.

On March 29, 2021, the pro se plaintiff, Carolette Meadows, commenced this

action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1983 and 1985-1986 and the Americans with

Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Docket Item 1. Meadows says that her neighbor, Rachel

Eckert, violated her rights under those statutes and the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) over

the course of a long-running feud between them. See Docket Item 44. And Meadows

says that local law enforcement and county prosecutors inadequately responded to her

complaints about Eckert while giving undue weight to Eckert’s grievances. See id.

On October 18, 2021, Eckert moved to dismiss the complaint. Docket Item 8. A

few weeks later, defendants Erie County, John Flynn, Milton Gordon, John Schoemick,1

and Ankur Singh (the “Erie County defendants”) also moved to dismiss. Docket Items

13, 16, 19, 22, 25. When Meadows responded to those motions in January 2022, she

also filed an amended complaint and “supplemental pleading.” Docket Items 42-46.

1 Although the complaint names “John Schoemic” as a defendant, his last name

apparently is spelled “Schoemick.” See Docket Item 56. The Clerk of the Court shall

correct the caption accordingly.

The parties disputed the timeliness of Meadows’s amended complaint, see

Docket Items 47 and 48, but this Court accepted the amended complaint as timely filed

and extended the defendants’ time to respond to it, see Docket Item 52. The Erie

County defendants then renewed their motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6), and Eckert moved for judgment on the pleadings under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c).2 Docket Items 54, 56, 58, 60, 62, 78. Both sides then

fully briefed those motions. Docket Items 77, 85, 88-92.

After the motions were fully briefed, Meadows moved to amend her complaint

once again. Docket Item 93. The Erie County defendants and Eckert opposed that

motion. Docket Items 95, 96, 102. Meadows then moved to amend her complaint still

again and filed numerous other “amended claims” and “supplemental pleadings.”

Docket Items 97, 106, 109, 111, 125.3 Meadows also moved to strike certain filings,

2 On April 18, 2022, Meadows moved to strike Eckert’s motion for judgment on

the pleadings “due to [Meadows] not having service and time to respond to the defense

request.” Docket Item 87. But Meadows responded to Eckert’s motion on April 13,

2022, see Docket Item 85, which suggests both that Meadows was served with the

motion and that she had sufficient time to respond to it. Nevertheless, to address

Meadows’s claim that she did not have enough time to respond to the motion, this Court

extended Meadows’s time so that she could further respond to Eckert’s motion. See

Docket Item 86. But Meadows did not file another response to the motion. Because

Meadows has responded to Eckert’s motion and was given an opportunity to respond

further, Meadows’s motion to strike is denied.

3 This Court never gave Meadows permission to file these supplemental

pleadings, and they do not appear to be permissible under the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. For example, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(d) permits a supplemental

pleading only “[o]n motion” and with “reasonable notice.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d).

And because many of Meadows’s allegations in those supplemental pleadings are

undated, this Court cannot conclude that the allegations in those pleadings are the sort

that are permissible under Rule 15(d). See id. (noting that supplemental pleadings must

“set[] out any transaction, occurrence, or event that happened after the date of the

pleading to be supplemented”).

requested a preliminary hearing, and asked to withdraw her claims against some

defendants. Docket Items 87, 119, 120, 125.

For the reasons that follow, the Erie County defendants’ motions to dismiss are

granted in part. And the remainder of the Erie County defendants’ motions to dismiss

as well as Eckert’s motion for judgment on the pleadings will be granted unless

Meadows files an amended complaint correcting the deficiencies noted below.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND4

Meadows and Eckert, who reside next door to each other in Buffalo, New York,

have a contentious relationship that has spawned numerous law enforcement

In any event, because Meadows may amend her complaint as provided below,

this Court declines to consider the allegations in Meadows’s supplemental pleadings

and denies Meadows’s motions to amend as moot. Because the only claims dismissed

below are those that “better pleading will not cure,” see Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d

99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting that leave to amend may be denied where amendment

would be “futile”), even if this Court considered those filings, nothing in them would

change the result here.

4 The following facts are taken from the amended complaint, Docket Item 44. In

deciding a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and a

motion for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), the

court “accept[s] all factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw[s] all reasonable

inferences in [the] plaintiff’s favor.” In re Thelen LLP, 736 F.3d 213, 218 (2d Cir. 2013).

In addition to her amended complaint, Meadows also submitted several videos

as exhibits. See Docket Item 45. Meadows does not describe those videos in her

amended complaint or say who or what is depicted in them; instead, she simply

attached them as “recordings.” See Docket Item 44 at 41. The Court therefore declines

to consider the video excerpts unless Meadows provides some further explanation of

their significance. Meadows may amend her complaint to explain how the exhibits she

submitted relate to the factual allegations in her complaint.

investigations, multiple state court cases, and now two lawsuits in this Court.5

Meadows’s and Eckert’s mutual discontent apparently was sparked by a dispute about

a pipe attached to Eckert’s house; that dispute in turn led to a protracted feud. Although

Meadows’s amended complaint covers a number of disparate incidents over the course

of more than a year, almost all those incidents follow a similar pattern: Meadows and

Eckert got into some dispute; one or both of them called local law enforcement; and

local law enforcement and county prosecutors either minimized Meadows’s grievances

or gave undue weight to Eckert’s.

I. THE INITIAL PIPE DISPUTE

In March 2020, Eckert “install[ed] piping on her home that blocked Meadows from

removing her car from the driveway.” Docket Item 44 at 7. After Eckert refused to

move the piping so that Meadows could access the driveway, Meadows “cut the pipe

and le[ft].” Id. at 8. Eckert then called 911 and falsely reported that Meadows was

“threatening” her. Id. Buffalo police officers responded to the scene, and Detective

McDermott ultimately “filed a warrant for Meadows [which] maintain[ed] that the pipe

was cut without cause.” Id.

Around that same time, Meadows “had washed and hung a tent out to dry which

was destroyed when she woke up the next morning.” Id. Meadows asked Eckert

whether “she knew anything about the tent”; in response, Eckert “threatened to hit

Meadows in the head with a pipe.” Id. at 9. Meadows called the police, but the

5 Eckert has filed a separate case in this Court, raising claims against Meadows

and various other state and municipal defendants related to similar disputes. See

W.D.N.Y. Case No. 22-cv-540.

responding officer “declined to file a report.” Id. After Eckert repeated similar threats on

Facebook that night, Meadows again called the police. Id. This time, Officer Brown

“wrote a complaint for harassment against Eckert for the threats,” although another

officer later changed that complaint to “a dispute form.” Id.

Eckert “remove[d] Meadows’[s] gate,” which a Buffalo police officer “made her

put back.” Id. Eckert also claimed that much of Meadows’s property belonged to her,

“threaten[ed] Meadows numerous times,” and “push[ed] [Meadows].” Id. Although

Meadows tried to show a video of the incident to a Buffalo police officer, he “declar[ed]

that he wasn’t looking at any videos.” Id. No charges were filed regarding this incident.

Id. at 10.

Eckert then took to social media, where she “ma[de] several racially charged

statements . . . claiming the dispute was because Eckert ‘was white’ and [] Meadows

‘doesn’t like white women.’” Id. Meadows also attached various social media posts to

her amended complaint that show additional interactions between herself and Eckert.6

For example, Eckert posted that Meadows was “really messing w[ith] the wrong one.”7

Id. at 54. Eckert also remarked that Meadows’s life would “go to shit”—if it had not

already after Meadows’s “husband left her for a white woman.” Id. Meadows

responded that Eckert should “just keep going with the slander.” Id.

Eckert also posted that Meadows “is racist af [sic]” and “doesn’t like [Eckert]”

because “[Eckert is] white.” Id. at 58. Eckert “declar[ed] ‘neighbor war’” on Meadows

6 The attached social media posts were not made by an account with the name

“Rachel Eckert.” See, e.g., Docket Item 44 at 54. Based on the context, the Court

presumes that the posts are from Eckert.

7 The posts are undated.

and said that “she ‘would not stop,’ and would[] ‘destroy [Meadows’s] whole life.’”8 Id. at

10. Others “respond[ed] to Eckert’s racially charged comments by saying that Meadows

should be spit on, shot, beat with a bat, [or have] other violence inflicted upon her.” Id.

Meanwhile, the dispute over the pipe remained unresolved. Buffalo city

employees “asked [] Meadows to let Eckert reconnect the pipe so it wouldn’t cause

[carbon monoxide]” emissions. Id. Eckert also “posted on social media that she took

her kids to the [emergency room] and they tested positive for [carbon monoxide]” and

that she therefore “wanted Meadows arrested for attempted murder.” Id. at 11. But

Eckert was to blame because she had not “repair[ed] the cut pipe that was supposed to

be a [carbon monoxide] risk.” Id. So Meadows “called [Child Protective Services]” on

Eckert,9 and Eckert then fixed the pipe. Id.

Although that should have ended the matter, sometime in April 2020 Meadows

“noticed [that she had] difficulty breathing while in the driveway.” Id. at 13. Meadows

informed a Buffalo city inspector about this, but the inspector responded that “the fumes

were ‘only 5% [carbon monoxide].’” Id. After Meadows protested that this level of

carbon monoxide was still too high, “Eckert was informed that she would need to move

the pipe.” Id. But Eckert “push[ed ]back” and the city “gave in[].” Id.

8 Meadows also alleges that Eckert has made other “social media posts” that

“attack[] Meadows[’s] disability status and question[] her medical history.” Docket Item

44 at 12. Meadows “does not know how Eckert obtained her medical information.” Id.

9 Meadows called the police three other times between March 28 and April 1,

2020. Docket Item 44 at 11. Each time, the responding officers rebuffed Meadows’s

complaints and instead “directed [Meadows] to cease and desist” calling law

enforcement. Id.

About four months later, Meadows “reached out to the Erie County Health

Department regarding the furnace pipe and the fumes.” Id. at 23. Defendant Singh

“responded to her and informed [her] that despite the health department[’s] being

responsible for public health and air quality, they would not get involved with Eckert’s

pipe []or any possible ill effects from it.” Id.

II. THE RESULTING PHYSICAL ALTERCATION

The dispute between Eckert and Meadows subsequently devolved into physical

violence. On May 23, 2020, Meadows was “crouching near the ground[]” on the

“disputed boundary between her property and Eckert’s property.” Id. at 15. Eckert then

“walked up behind [Meadows], pushed the fence on top of her, and struck [Meadows]

on the back of her head . . . and in the middle of [her] back with a cast iron skillet.” Id.

Meadows went to the hospital where she was treated for her injuries. Id. Although

Buffalo police officers were called to the scene, they initially “declined to press charges

against” Eckert and maintained that Eckert was “protecting her property.” Id. at 16.

After Meadows protested, an officer charged Eckert with assault and Meadows with

trespassing and harassment. Id.

In July 2020, Meadows “went to Buffalo City Court to file the Felony Assault

warrant card” for this incident. Id. at 18. Meadows obtained the card and left, but “the

warrant clerk [then] called Meadows and told her to return to the court.” Id. At that

point, Meadows learned that “the [Assistant District Attorney (“ADA”)] changed Eckert’s

charge from a felony to a misdemeanor.” Id. Meadows “went upstairs” to protest this

decision, but defendant Schoemick, the ADA then assigned to the case, told her that

Eckert’s assault “can’t be that serious” because Eckert “wasn’t arrested.” Id. Meadows

“declined to accept the decreased charges.” Id. at 19.

Upset with Schoemick’s decision, Meadows staged a “daily protest of the [Erie

County District Attorney’s] office” during the first week of August 2020. Id. Meadows

then was “called up to the [District Attorney’s] office and met with Erie County

investigators,” who “refer[red] her case for prosecution to a new ADA.” Id.

On August 13, 2020, defendant Gordon “reached out, via email, to inform

Meadows that he was the new ADA” assigned to her case. Id. at 21. Meadows sent

additional information about her issues to Gordon, but Gordon “never responded to

[Meadows’s] inquiry on [possible] charges against Eckert.” Id. After Meadows

“questioned Gordon about the racial bias being displayed by the [Erie County District

Attorney’s Office],” Gordon “told Meadows to ‘be courteous’ if she wanted to be deemed

‘credible.’” Id. Meadows then filed a complaint about the Erie County District Attorney’s

Office with the New York State Attorney General. Id. Eckert ultimately was charged

with a misdemeanor “despite Meadows[’s] protest[s].” Id. at 22.

Meadows also “reached out to [Erie County District Attorney] John Flynn . . .

numerous times in 2020 and 20[21] to inform him of the disparate/differential treatment”

between Eckert’s and Meadows’s complaints about each other. Id. at 22. Meadows

likewise repeatedly reached out to Flynn and Gordon in 2020 and 2021 in an attempt to

“obtain their assistance in getting the [Buffalo Police Department] to follow through on

the complaints she was making about Eckert.” Id. at 28. Neither Flynn nor Gordon

responded to Meadows’s inquiries. Id. at 22, 28.

III. MEADOWS’S OTHER CONFRONTATIONS WITH ECKERT

In addition to the pipe dispute and physical altercation, Meadows and Eckert had

several other confrontations about their property boundary.10 Id. at 14, 20-21. Eckert

also falsely accused Meadows of “cut[ting] the lock off her shed, st[ealing] her grill, and

st[ealing] hundreds of dollars[’] worth of tools.” Id. at 17. A Buffalo police officer then

“g[ave] Eckert a warrant for Meadows for theft, trespass, and mischief even though

Eckert had no proof” of the incident. Id. at 18. In August 2020, Eckert filed two more

false complaints, now alleging that Meadows had cut the fence that divided their

properties. Id. at 20-21.

In November 2020, “Meadows observed Eckert pouring epoxy out of her window

and onto the driveway.” Id. at 25. About a month later, a responding police officer who

was called to the area “refused to intervene” when Eckert “took Meadows’[s] panels and

broke them.” Id. at 27. About a month after that, Eckert stole two eight-foot wooden

posts in Meadows’s driveway. Id. at 32. And at one point in March 2021, Eckert

“dump[ed] a bag of dog feces at the property line.” Id. at 34.

Eckert also installed multiple cameras that recorded Meadows’s property. Id. at

12, 14, 22, 25. Meadows then discovered that Eckert had posted numerous videos of

Meadows on Facebook and YouTube, including videos in which Meadows was only

partially clothed. Id. at 22, 30, 31, 33. In December 2020, Meadows “erect[ed] a pole

with a sheet as a partition to prevent Eckert’s roof cam[era] from peering into the

10 Meadows also alleges that Buffalo police officers inadequately responded to

her complaint about a damaged electrical line near her home. Docket Item 44 at 17. It

is unclear whether Meadows claims that Eckert was responsible for that damage.

backyard.” Id. at 26. Eckert then stole the sheet. Id. Although the police “did a report

for petit larceny,” Meadows “was not given a warrant for Eckert’s crime.” Id.

Meadows’s and Eckert’s disputes extend beyond their houses. For example,

Eckert “ma[de] numerous complaints to the [United States Department of Veterans

Affairs,] alleging [that] Meadows would kill the president.” Id. at 13. Eckert also “tr[ied]

to get [Meadows’s] nursing license revoked,” accused Meadows of food stamp and

Social Security fraud, made “false child abuse allegations against Meadows,” and called

a crisis services emergency phone line in an attempt to have Meadows “involuntarily

committed to a psychiatric facility.” Id. at 13, 20. And Eckert “file[d] fraudulent

insurance claims against” Meadows’s insurance policies. Id. at 29-30.

When Meadows once found a “loose dog” in her yard, she took it to the Buffalo

animal shelter. Id. at 28. Apparently, the dog that Meadows took to the shelter was

Eckert’s, although Meadows was “unaware” of that. Id. at 29. Meadows then received

“a summons . . . to appear in court for dog theft.” Id.

In connection with nearly all these incidents, Meadows called local law

enforcement. But local law enforcement, by and large, refused to press charges that

Meadows thought were appropriate.

LEGAL PRINCIPLES

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”11

11 The standard for deciding a Rule 12(c) motion is “the same standard [that

applies] to dismissals pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).” L-7 Designs, Inc. v. Old Navy, LLC,

647 F.3d 419, 429 (2d Cir. 2011) (alterations omitted).

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “The

plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a

sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 556).

DISCUSSION

I. THE ERIE COUNTY DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND ECKERT’S

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

A. Claims Against Erie County Prosecutors

Meadows brings claims against Erie County District Attorney John Flynn, as well

as Assistant District Attorneys John Schoemick and Milton Gordon, related to their

failure to bring sufficiently severe criminal charges against Eckert. See, e.g., Docket

Item 44 at 28. Meadows also challenges the Erie County prosecutors’ decisions to

“press the most insignificant and often untrue charges” against her. Id. at 35. Both of

those sets of allegations fail to state viable claims.12

12 Although Meadows generally alleges that “all governmental defendants”

violated 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1983 and 1985-1986, the ADA, and the FHA, see Docket

Item 44 at 7, 35, the only factual allegations related to the Erie County prosecutors’

conduct involves their charging decisions. This Court accordingly analyzes those

claims below.

1. Official-Capacity Claims

As an initial matter, Meadows brings claims against the Erie County prosecutors

in their official capacities. Id. at 6. “[I]t is well established that New York prosecutors

act on behalf of the state, not the county in which they serve, when prosecuting a

criminal matter.” Schnitter v. City of Rochester, 556 F. App’x 5, 9 n.4 (2d Cir. 2014)

(summary order) (citing Baez v. Hennessy, 853 F.2d 73, 77 (2d Cir. 1988)). “Thus, if a

district attorney or an assistant district attorney acts as a prosecutor, [he] is an agent of

the State, and therefore immune from suit in [his] official capacity.” D’Alessandro v. City

of New York, 713 F. App’x 1, 8 (2d Cir. 2017) (summary order). On the other hand, if a

suit “centers ‘on the administration of the district attorney’s office’—that is, on the ‘office

policy’ that the district attorney sets—then the district attorney is ‘considered a municipal

policymaker,’ and the Eleventh Amendment does not immunize him from suit.” Id.

(quoting Ying Jing Gan v. City of New York, 996 F.2d 522, 536 (2d Cir. 1993)).

For those reasons, Meadows’s official-capacity claims against the Erie County

prosecutors that do not relate to any office policy are dismissed without leave to amend

because those claims are barred by sovereign immunity. And Meadows’s claims

related to an alleged Erie County District Attorney’s Office policy are subject to

dismissal for the reasons stated below.

2. Claims Related to Eckert’s Prosecution

Meadows also alleges that the Erie County prosecutors violated her

constitutional rights by declining to investigate Meadows’s allegations against Eckert

and refusing to charge Eckert with sufficiently severe crimes. See, e.g., Docket Item 44

at 28. But any claim related to the prosecutors’ alleged failure to investigate is not

viable because Meadows “has no constitutional right to have [another person] criminally

investigated.” Baltas v. Rivera, 2021 WL 3023240, at *1 (D. Conn. July 16, 2021).

Meadows likewise has no viable claim related to the prosecutors’ failure to adequately

charge Eckert because “a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the

prosecution or nonprosecution of another.” Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619

(1973). And that is so even when the private citizen is the victim of a crime because “[a]

crime victim who sues to force the prosecution of the person who did [her] wrong was

injured by that person, not by the failure to prosecute that person.” Brady v.

Schneiderman, 2016 WL 3906737, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2016), aff’d, 714 F. App’x 60

(2d Cir. 2018).

Because Meadows has no viable claim related to the failure to investigate or

prosecute Eckert, any such claim is dismissed without leave to amend.

3. Prosecutorial Immunity

At the end of her amended complaint, Meadows alleges that the Erie County

prosecutors violated her rights by “press[ing] the most insignificant and often untrue

charges” against her. Docket Item 44 at 35. And in Meadows’s response to the Erie

County defendants’ motions to dismiss, she says that she “would like to add malicious

prosecution and prosecutorial misconduct” claims against the Erie County prosecutors

challenging their conduct in three state court criminal cases.13 Docket Item 77 at 1-2.

13 Meadows is warned that a court generally “will not consider [] factual

allegations raised for the first time in a brief in opposition to a motion to dismiss.”

Harrell v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 2019 WL 3817190, at *2 n.3

(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2019). So Meadows should include any factual allegations in a

second amended complaint, not in papers responding to a motion.

Although Meadows may amend her complaint to include those claims, any such claim

may well be barred by prosecutorial immunity.

Prosecutors are absolutely immune from suit, and that immunity “appl[ies] with

full force” to activities that are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the

criminal process.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976). Prosecutorial

immunity

encompasses not only [prosecutors’] conduct of trials but all of their

activities that can fairly be characterized as closely associated with the

conduct of litigation or potential litigation, including presentation of evidence

to a grand jury to initiate a prosecution, activities in deciding not to do so,

and conduct of plea bargaining negotiations.

Barrett v. United States, 798 F.2d 565, 571-72 (2d Cir. 1986) (citations omitted); see

also Ogunkoya v. Monaghan, 913 F.3d 64, 72 (2d Cir. 2019) (explaining that

prosecutors have absolute immunity for decisions and acts that “constituted an exercise

of their prosecutorial discretion in preparing a case for indictment and deciding when,

where, and how to prosecute”). But such immunity does not include “those aspects of

the prosecutor’s responsibility that cast him in the role of an administrator or

investigative officer rather than that of advocate.” Warney v. Monroe County, 587 F.3d

113, 121 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430-31). And a prosecutor who

“proceeds in the clear absence of all jurisdiction” is not immune from suit. Shmueli v.

City of New York, 424 F.3d 231, 237 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Barr v. Abrams, 810 F.2d

358, 361 (2d Cir. 1987)).

To the extent that Meadows alleges that the Erie County prosecutors violated her

constitutional rights by bringing criminal charges against her, those are precisely the

sort of claims that are barred by prosecutorial immunity. See Giraldo v. Kessler, 694

F.3d 161, 167 (2d Cir. 2012) (noting that prosecutors are absolutely immune from

claims challenging “legal decisions at the core of the prosecutorial function,” including

the “pursuit of [] charges”). And even though “racially invidious . . . prosecutions,

pursued without probable cause, are reprehensible, [] such motives do not necessarily

remove [a prosecutor’s] conduct from the protection of absolute immunity.” See

Bernard v. County of Suffolk, 356 F.3d 495, 504 (2d Cir. 2004). So any claims against

any Erie County prosecutor challenging their charging decisions are not viable.

In light of her pro se status, Meadows may amend her complaint to state viable

claims against the Erie County prosecutors. See Cuoco, 222 F.3d at 112. But if she

does, she must allege facts showing why those claims are not barred by absolute

prosecutorial immunity.

B. Monell Claims

Meadows also brings claims against Erie County related to an alleged policy of

failing to prosecute “Black complaints against White[]” individuals while over-prosecuting

“when the complainant is White and the accused is Black.”14 See Docket Item 44 at 22.

She seeks relief for that unlawful policy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See id. at 2.

“To state a valid claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege that the

challenged conduct (1) was attributable to a person acting under color of state law, and

(2) deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or

laws of the United States.” Whalen v. County of Fulton, 126 F.3d 400, 405 (2d Cir.

1997) (citing Eagleston v. Guido, 41 F.3d 865, 875-76 (2d Cir. 1994)). A municipality

cannot be held liable under section 1983 unless the challenged action was undertaken

14 The Court construes Meadows’s official-capacity claims against Erie County

prosecutors as municipal liability claims for the reasons stated above.

pursuant to a municipal policy or custom. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. To state a

claim under Monell, a plaintiff must plead three elements: “(1) an official policy or

custom that (2) causes the plaintiff to be subjected to (3) a denial of a constitutional

right.” Zahra v. Town of Southold, 48 F.3d 674, 685 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Batista v.

Rodriguez, 702 F.2d 393, 397 (2d Cir. 1983)).

As noted above, Meadows has no constitutional right to have her complaints

against Eckert investigated by Erie County prosecutors or to have those prosecutors

charge Eckert with a crime. So any Monell claim related to those allegations is not

viable and is dismissed without leave to amend. See Est. of M.D. by DeCosmo v. New

York, 241 F. Supp. 3d 413, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (“If a plaintiff alleges no constitutional

violation, or a district court finds that the plaintiff has inadequately alleged one, the

Monell claim fails.”).15

Any claim against Erie County based on Meadows’s own prosecution also is not

viable. “Monell liability attaches only where an infringement of constitutional rights is

caused by a local government policy,” not some policy attributable to the state. See

Bellamy v. City of New York, 914 F.3d 727, 757 (2d Cir. 2019). Although “the actions of

county prosecutors in New York are generally controlled by municipal policymakers for

purposes of Monell” liability, see id. at 759, the Second Circuit has “consistently held

that ‘inherently prosecutorial functions (i.e., decisions whether to prosecute) are

controlled by state policies for purposes of Monell,’” see Kellner v. City of New York,

2021 WL 4251343, at *17 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2021) (quoting Bellamy, 914 F.3d at 758).

15 For that reason, and for the reasons stated below, Meadows has not alleged a

viable Monell claim based on Singh’s conduct. See Est. of M.D. by DeCosmo, 241 F.

Supp. 3d at 430.

For that reason, “a prosecutor’s decision whether to prosecute an individual may not

form the basis for Monell liability.” Id. In other words, a prosecutor’s charging decision

is attributable to the state, not the county, and therefore cannot provide the basis for a

section 1983 claim against a municipality. So Meadows’s allegations that the Erie

County prosecutors unlawfully charged her by “press[ing] the most insignificant and

often untrue charges,” see Docket Item 44 at 35, do not and cannot state a viable

Monell claim against Erie County.

Meadows’s claims against Erie County therefore are subject to dismissal.

Nevertheless, in light of her pro se status, see Cuoco, 222 F.3d at 112, she may amend

her complaint to state a viable claim under Monell. But for the reasons stated above,

any such claim cannot be based on the Erie County prosecutors’ failure to charge

Eckert or their decisions to charge Meadows.

C. Claims Against Singh

Meadows also brings claims against Singh, an employee of the Erie County

Department of Health, for his failure to investigate Meadows’s complaints about the pipe

on Eckert’s property. See Docket Item 44 at 23. But “there is no constitutional or

otherwise enforceable right to an investigation by government officials.” Vazquez v. City

of New York, 2021 WL 1966397, at *9 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. May 17, 2021) (citing DeShaney v.

Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195-96 (1989)); see also

Bernstein v. New York, 591 F. Supp. 2d 448, 460 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“Courts within the

Second Circuit have determined that there is no constitutional right to an investigation

by government officials.” (alterations, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted)).

Because Meadows’s claims against Singh relate to his purported failure to adequately

investigate her complaints, those claims are not viable and are dismissed without leave

to amend because any amendment would be “futile.”16 See Cuoco, 222 F.3d at 112. If

Meadows can plead other factual allegations showing that Singh is liable to her under

some other theory of liability, she may do so in a second amended complaint.

D. Claims Against Eckert

Meadows alleges that Eckert violated her rights under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1983

and 1985-1986, the ADA, and the FHA. Docket Item 44. For the reasons that follow,

none of those claims are viable as pleaded.

1. 1981 Claim

“To establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, a plaintiff must establish the

following elements: (1) she is a member of a racial minority; (2) the defendant intended

to discriminate against her on the basis of race; and (3) the discrimination concerned

‘one of the statute’s enumerated activities.’” Gatling v. West, 850 F. App’x 91, 96 (2d

Cir. 2021) (summary order) (quoting Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 339 (2d

Cir. 2000)). “The enumerated activities include the rights ‘to make and enforce

contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws

and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white

citizens.’” Id. at 96-97 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)). “To prevail” on a claim under

section 1981, “a plaintiff must initially plead and ultimately prove that, but for race, [she]

16 Because this Court finds that Meadows’s claims against Singh are not viable, it

does not reach Singh’s alternative argument that those claims are barred by res

judicata. See Docket Item 89.

would not have suffered the loss of a legally protected right.” Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l

Ass’n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009, 1019 (2020).

Although the amended complaint does not identify the protected right that Eckert

allegedly deprived Meadows of, Meadows seems to rely on section 1981’s “full and

equal benefit” clause. See Docket Item 85 at 3 (suggesting that Eckert violated

“Stephanie’s Law, The Backyard Camera Bill[,] and Penal Code [sections] 250.00 and

250.05”).17 “Few cases in this circuit or elsewhere arise under the ‘equal benefit’ clause

of [section] 1981.” Benzinger v. NYSARC, Inc. N.Y.C. Chapter, 385 F. Supp. 3d 224,

235 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (quoting Pierre v. J.C. Penney Co., 340 F. Supp. 2d 308, 310

(E.D.N.Y. 2004)). “To establish a violation of [section] 1981’s guarantee of ‘full and

equal benefit’ of laws, a plaintiff must ‘[(1)] allege racial animus; [(2)] identify a relevant

law or proceeding for the security of persons and property; and [(3)] allege that [the]

defendants deprived [her] of the full and equal benefit thereof.’” Id. (alterations and

internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bishop v. Toys “R” Us-NY LLC, 414 F. Supp.

2d 385, 393 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)).

Even if this Court very liberally reads the allegations in Meadows’s response to

the motion for judgment on the pleadings, see supra at 13 n.13, Meadows does not say

how Eckert deprived her of her rights under those laws, nor does she say how her race

was a but-for cause of that deprivation. And without those allegations, Meadows’s

section 1981 claim is not viable. See Williams v. Calderoni, 2012 WL 691832, at *7

(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2012) (dismissing section 1981 claim because a conclusory allegation

17 Sections 250.00 and 250.05 of the New York Penal Law prohibit unauthorized

eavesdropping. See N.Y. Penal Law §§ 250.00, 250.05.

that a challenged action was taken because of race, “without a fact-specific allegation of

a causal link between [the] defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s race[,] is too

conclusory to survive a motion to dismiss”), aff’d, 529 F. App’x 89 (2d Cir. 2013).

Although Meadows’s claim under section 1981 therefore is not viable as currently

pleaded, she may amend her complaint to state a viable section 1981 claim.

2. 1983 Claims

Meadows also brings claims against Eckert under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and asserts

that Eckert violated her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Docket Item 44. But

Meadows has not sufficiently alleged that Eckert is a state actor subject to liability under

42 U.S.C. § 1983, and her claims therefore are subject to dismissal.

Generally, the “United States Constitution regulates only the [g]overnment, not

private parties.” Grogan v. Blooming Grove Volunteer Ambulance Corps, 768 F.3d 259,

263 (2d Cir. 2014); see also Phillips v. Sage Colls., 83 F. App’x 340, 341 (2d Cir. 2003)

(summary order) (“With the exception of the Thirteenth Amendment prohibition against

slavery, the United States Constitution regulates only government action, not that of

private parties.”). So when a plaintiff “alleges that her constitutional rights have been

violated,” she “must first establish that the challenged conduct constitutes state action.”

Grogan, 768 F.3d at 263 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

The Second Circuit has “identified three main tests to determine” whether an

otherwise private entity has engaged in state action:

“(1) when the entity acts pursuant to the coercive power of the state or is

controlled by the state (‘the compulsion test’); (2) when the state provides

significant encouragement to the entity, the entity is a willful participant in

joint activity with the state, or the entity’s functions are entwined with state

policies (‘the joint action test’ or ‘close nexus test’); and (3) when the entity

has been delegated a public function by the state (‘the public function test’).”

Barrows v. Becerra, 24 F.4th 116, 135 (2d Cir. 2022) (alterations omitted) (quoting

Fabrikant v. French, 691 F.3d 193, 207 (2d Cir. 2012)). “The fundamental question

under each test is whether the private entity’s challenged actions are ‘fairly attributable’

to the state.” Fabrikant, 691 F.3d at 207 (quoting Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830,

838 (1982)).

The only allegations in the amended complaint that might possibly bear on

whether Eckert was a state actor relate to Eckert’s calling law enforcement on

Meadows.18 In other words, Meadows may be alleging that Eckert is liable under

section 1983 because she has invoked the assistance of law enforcement on numerous

occasions. But a “call to the police does not amount to ‘willful collaboration’ giving rise

to [section] 1983 liability.” Johns v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 221 F.R.D. 400, 405

(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (collecting cases). Nor does a private individual’s invocation of legal

process necessarily transform her into a state actor. See Vazquez v. Combs, 2004 WL

2404224, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 2004) (“[M]erely filing a complaint with the police,

reporting a crime, requesting criminal investigation of a person, or seeking a restraining

order, even if the complaint or report is deliberately false, does not give rise to a claim

against the complainant for a civil rights violation.”). And that is true even if Eckert

allegedly “supplied the police with false information.” See Johns, 221 F.R.D. at 405.

18 While Meadows suggests in her response to Eckert’s motion for judgment on

the pleadings that Eckert was a state actor because she “unlawfully surveill[ed]”

Meadows using the house-mounted video cameras and provided that video to law

enforcement, Docket Item 85 at 3, nothing in the amended complaint indicates that law

enforcement encouraged Eckert to do this. Likewise, Meadows’s conclusory assertion

in her response that local law enforcement “deputized” Eckert into some governmental

role, see id., finds no support in the amended complaint.

Finally, Meadows has not alleged any sort of “plan, prearrangement, conspiracy,

custom, or policy” shared by Eckert and any state actor. See Ginsberg v. Healey Car &

Truck Leasing, Inc., 189 F.3d 268, 272 (2d Cir. 1999). Instead, Meadows alleges

throughout the amended complaint that local law enforcement simply reacted to

whatever true or false information Eckert provided, not that they directed her to do

anything or conspired with her. And that is not enough to raise a viable claim.

Because there is no plausible basis in the amended complaint to find that Eckert

was a state actor, Meadows’s claims against her under section 1983 are not viable.

Nevertheless, and again in light of her pro se status, see Cuoco, 222 F.3d at 112,

Meadows may amend her complaint to allege how Eckert was a state actor who

violated Meadows’s constitutional rights and therefore is subject to liability under section

1983.

3. 1985 and 1986 Claims

Meadows also asserts claims against Eckert under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986.

Docket Item 44 at 2. To bring a claim under section 1985, a plaintiff must allege

1) a conspiracy; 2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly,

any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of

equal privileges and immunities under the laws; and 3) an act in furtherance

of the conspiracy; 4) whereby a person is either injured in his person or

property or deprived of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States.

Britt v. Garcia, 457 F.3d 264, 269 n.4 (2d Cir. 2006). “A section 1985(3) conspiracy

must also be motivated by some racial or [] otherwise class-based, invidious

discriminatory animus behind the conspirators’ action.” Id. (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted). A claim under section 1986, which “imposes liability on an

individual who has knowledge of discrimination prohibited under [section] 1985,” is

“contingent on a valid [section] 1985 claim.” Graham v. Henderson, 89 F.3d 75, 82 (2d

Cir. 1996).

The amended complaint details a series of encounters when Eckert or Meadows

called the police and the police responded to the scene. The amended complaint

further alleges that Meadows spoke with Erie County prosecutors who inadequately

handled her complaints about Eckert. But nothing in those allegations suggests that

Eckert conspired with law enforcement, county prosecutors, or anyone else to deprive

Meadows of any protected right.

Because Meadows has not alleged that Eckert conspired with anyone, her claims

under section 1985 and 1986 are not viable. But in light of her pro se status, see

Cuoco, 222 F.3d at 112, Meadows may amend her complaint to state viable claims

under those sections.

4. ADA Claim

Meadows also alleges that Eckert violated Meadows’s rights under the ADA.

Docket Item 44 at 2. The basis of Meadows’s ADA claim against Eckert is not entirely

clear, although Meadows may be alleging that Eckert violated the ADA when she

assaulted Meadows with a skillet. See id. at 15 (alleging that Eckert struck Meadows

while “ha[ving] full, prior knowledge that Meadows is disabled”). Troubling as that sort

of private violence may be, it does not give rise to a viable ADA claim. See generally

Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 516-17 (2004) (“[The ADA] forbids discrimination

against persons with disabilities in three major areas of public life: employment, which is

covered by Title I of the statute; public services, programs, and activities, which are the

subject of Title II; and public accommodations, which are covered by Title III.”); see

generally Wilshire v. L&M Dev. Partners, 2022 WL 847067, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22,

2022) (“To prevail on a claim under the ADA, a plaintiff must establish, among other

things, that [the] defendants are subject to one of the titles of the ADA.”). Although

Meadows’s ADA claim does not appear to be viable in any form, the Court nevertheless

grants her leave to amend this claim to show how Eckert violated her rights under the

ADA.

5. FHA Claim

Meadows also alleges that Eckert violated the Fair Housing Act.19 Docket Item

44 at 35. Section 3617 of the Fair Housing Act “provides that ‘it shall be unlawful to

coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of,

or on account of [her] having exercised or enjoyed, or on account of [her] having aided

and or encouraged any other person in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted

or protected by section 3603, 3604, 3605, or 3606 of this title.’” Birch Fam. Servs.,

2021 WL 2312852, at *5 (alterations omitted) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3617).20 “To prevail

19 Meadows does not say which section of the FHA that Eckert purportedly

violated, but other courts have applied section 3617 to similar neighbor-on-neighbor

disputes. See, e.g., Birch Family Servs., Inc. v. Wlody, 2021 WL 2312852, at *5

(E.D.N.Y. June 7, 2021), aff’d, 2022 WL 1468160 (2d Cir. May 10, 2022). So at this

stage, the Court declines to grant Eckert’s motion for judgment on the pleadings simply

because Eckert “is not [Meadows’s] landlord.” See Docket Item 78-1 at 4.

20 Although section 3617 refers specifically to other sections of the FHA, courts

“within and outside of the Second Circuit have held that [section] 3617 can serve as a

separate and independent basis for an FHA claim” challenging conduct that occurred

after the sale or lease of a dwelling “even if there is no predicate for liability” under the

other sections referenced in section 3617. Birch Family Servs., 2021 WL 2312852, at

*6; see also Francis v. Kings Park Manor, Inc., 992 F.3d 67, 88 (2d Cir. 2021) (Lohier,

J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (“[T]he plain language of [section] 3617

creates a separate cause of action that more comprehensively prohibits post-acquisition

discriminatory conduct barred by [section] 3604(b).”); but see id. at 80 n.50 (majority

opinion leaving open the extent to which “the FHA’s prohibition of discrimination

on a [section] 3617 claim, a plaintiff must show that: (1) she is a member of a protected

class under the FHA, (2) she was engaged in the exercise or enjoyment of her fair

housing rights, (3) [the] defendants were motivated in part by an intent to discriminate,

and (4) [the] defendants coerced, threatened, intimidated[,] or interfered with [the]

plaintiff on account of her protected activity under the FHA.” Id. (alterations, citation,

and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Watters v. Homeowners’ Ass’n at Pres.

at Bridgewater, 48 F.4th 779, 785 (7th Cir. 2022) (same).

Not “every quarrel among neighbors” gives rise to a viable FHA claim. See

Halprin v. Prairie Single Fam. Homes of Dearborn Park Ass’n, 388 F.3d 327, 330 (7th

Cir. 2004). “After all, isolated acts of racial animus are not enough; there must be some

nexus between a stray remark and the challenged action.” Watters, 48 F.4th at 786

(alterations, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, “even the

worst behavior toward one’s neighbors requires some nexus to an adverse housing

action; otherwise, the claim is not actionable under the FHA.” Id. at 791 (St. Eve, J.,

dissenting in part).

Meadows has not alleged such a nexus between any racial animus and an

adverse housing action here. Instead, Meadows alleges that sometime after the first

dispute over the pipe, Eckert posted on social media that “the dispute was because

Eckert ‘was white’ and [because] Meadows ‘doesn’t like white women.’” Docket Item 44

at 10. It is unclear how those statements had an effect on any challenged housing

reaches conduct engaged in after a tenant acquires [a] dwelling”). This Court therefore

assumes without deciding that Meadows’s claims against Eckert, which all relate to

conduct that occurred after Meadows moved into her home and do not arise out of any

real estate transaction, relate to the sort of conduct that is protected under section 3617

of the FHA.

action; in fact, after Eckert made those statements, the pipe issue appeared to have

been voluntarily resolved. See id. at 11 (“Eckert had the pipe fixed one week later.”).

Moreover, Meadows does not otherwise tie those “stray remark[s]” to any other

challenged action. See Watters, 48 F.4th at 786. Instead, the remainder of Meadows’s

amended complaint is devoted to the sort of neighborhood quarrels that do not give rise

to a viable FHA claim. See Halprin, 388 F.3d at 330. So there does not appear to be

any connection between race and any issue under the FHA.

For those reasons, Meadows has not raised a viable FHA claim. Nevertheless,

and again in light of her pro se status, see Cuoco, 222 F.3d at 112, Meadows may

amend her complaint to allege how Eckert violated her fair housing rights and how that

violation was connected to racial animus.

6. 1982 Claim

Section 1982 provides that “[a]ll citizens of the United States shall have the same

right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit,

purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.” 42 U.S.C. § 1982.

“To prevail on a section 1982 claim, [a] plaintiff[] must show that (1) [she is a] member[]

of a racial minority; (2) the defendant intended to discriminate against [her] on the basis

of race; and (3) the discrimination involved one or more activities enumerated in the

statute.” Okudinani v. Rose, 779 F. App’x 768, 771 (2d Cir. 2019) (summary order). So

“[a] plaintiff states a viable cause of action under [section] 1982 only by alleging a

deprivation of [her] rights on account of [her] race, ancestry, or ethnic characteristics.”

Zemsky v. City of New York, 821 F.2d 148, 150 (2d Cir. 1987); see also Comcast, 140

S. Ct. at 1016 (“[The Supreme Court] has repeatedly held that a claim arises under

[section] 1982 when a citizen is not allowed to acquire property because of color.”

(emphasis in original) (alterations, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted)).

As mentioned above, the only factual allegations in Meadows’s amended

complaint that could show that Eckert acted with racial animus are Eckert’s social media

posts. But Meadows alleges that those posts were made after the pipe incident that

spurred Meadows’s and Eckert’s dispute, and Meadows does not otherwise tie those

posts to Eckert’s subsequent conduct or provide any further link between racial animus

and Meadows’s ability to “purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal

property.” 42 U.S.C. § 1982. So Meadows has not sufficiently alleged a link between

any challenged conduct and alleged racial animus.21 See Grimes v. Fremont Gen.

Corp., 785 F. Supp. 2d 269, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“[F]act-specific allegations of a causal

link between the defendant’s actions and the plaintiff’s race are required” for a claim

under section 1982, “and conclusory or naked allegations will not suffice.” (alterations,

citation, and internal quotation marks omitted)). Nevertheless, and again in light of her

pro se status, see Cuoco, 222 F.3d at 112, Meadows may amend her complaint to state

a viable claim under section 1982.

21 Eckert asserts that Meadows’s section 1982 claim is not viable because

“[Meadows] has not alleged that [] Eckert in any way interfered with [Meadows’s] ability

to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.” Docket

Item 78-1 at 4 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Because this Court

concludes that Meadows’s section 1982 claim is subject to dismissal for the reasons

stated above, it does not reach whether any of the conduct alleged in the amended

complaint is the sort that would interfere with Meadows’s “freedom to hold property, a

right protected by section 1982.” Okudinani, 779 F. App’x at 772; see also id. (noting

that other courts have considered section 1982 claims involving the “detonat[ion of] a

flash simulator near the plaintiff’s vehicle while she was driving; throwing a Molotov

cocktail onto the plaintiffs’ porch; and burning a cross on the plaintiffs’ lawn”).

E. Leave to Amend

As repeatedly noted above, because Meadows is proceeding pro se and

therefore is entitled to heightened deference, she is granted leave to amend her

complaint. See Shibeshi v. City Univ. of N.Y., 531 F. App’x 135, 136 (2d Cir. 2013)

(summary order) (“[D]istrict courts should generally not dismiss a pro se complaint

without granting the plaintiff leave to amend.”). But Meadows’s claims related to

Eckert’s non-prosecution, her Monell claims against Erie County challenging

prosecutorial charging decisions and Singh’s failure to investigate, and her claims

against Singh related to his failure to investigate are dismissed without leave to amend

because any amendment would be “futile.” See Cuoco, 222 F.3d at 112.

Meadows is advised that an amended complaint is intended to completely

replace the prior complaint and thus “renders [any prior complaint] of no legal effect.”

Int’l Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 556 F.2d 665, 668 (2d Cir. 1977). Meadows also is

advised that she must follow the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure if she seeks to amend

her complaint again and cannot continue to file “supplemental pleadings” that do not

comply with those rules. Supplemental filings that do not comply with the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure or this Court’s orders will not be considered. Meadows therefore

should include any allegations that she wants the Court to consider in a second

amended complaint.

II. MEADOWS’S REMAINING MOTIONS

A. Voluntary Dismissal

On September 29, 2022, Meadows filed an “amended claim w[ith] supplemental

pleadings.” Docket Item 125. In that filing, Meadows said that she “wish[ed] to

withdraw the following ‘lesser actors’ of the [Buffalo Police Department] from this claim”:

Officer Dixon, Officer Otwell, Officer Salazar, Officer Casey, Officer Reed, Officer

Antonio, Officer George, Lieutenant Harrison, Officer Brown, Officer Rachuna, Officer

Keenan, Officer Cullen, Officer Hayden, Officer Creahan, John Flynn, Lieutenant

Danner, Officer Maryanski, Officer Santiago, Officer Domoros, Officer Raye, Officer

Kline, and Officer Nowak. Id.

Most of those defendants have not answered the complaint, moved for summary

judgment, or even appeared in this case. So Meadows may voluntarily dismiss her

claims against them under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a). See Fed. R. Civ. P.

41(a)(1)(A)(i); see also Frank v. Trilegiant Corp., 2012 WL 214100, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan.

24, 2012) (noting that “district courts within the Second Circuit have [] adopted the

approach of the majority of courts in other circuits—that is, that Rule 41(a) does not

require dismissal of the action in its entirety”). Based on Meadows’s representation that

she wishes to “remov[e] [those defendants] from liability,” Docket Item 125, the Court

interprets Meadows’s filing as a notice of voluntary dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 41(a)(1)(A) and dismisses all claims against all defendants listed above

except John Flynn.

Because Flynn may have been erroneously included in that list—the list

otherwise includes only police officers and does not include any other Erie County

prosecutor—Meadows may inform this Court whether she intends to pursue her claims

against him within 45 days of the date of this order. See Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90,

95 (2d Cir. 1983) (noting the “obligation on the part of the court to make reasonable

allowances to protect pro se litigants from inadvertent forfeiture of important rights”).

That filing may be made at the same time any second amended complaint is filed.

B. Motion to Strike

On August 4, 2022, Meadows filed another “amended claim.” Docket Item 111.

Eckert and the Erie County defendants objected to and rejected that filing, arguing that

it did not comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Docket Item 111, 114.

Meadows has moved to strike the Erie County defendants’ objection, Docket Item 120,

apparently on the grounds that this Court gave her leave to amend her complaint when

the Court “respon[ded]” to one of Meadows’s filings asking this Court to enter a default

against certain defendants who had not been served. See Docket Items 110, 120.

On August 8, 2022, this Court denied Meadows’s request that this Court direct

the Clerk of the Court to enter a default. Id. In that order, this Court also extended the

time for Meadows to serve the remaining defendants who had not yet been served.

See id. That order said nothing about granting Meadows leave to amend her complaint.

So while Meadows says that she believed that this Court granted her leave to amend

when it “respon[ded]” to one of her filings, Meadows’s filing was not a motion to amend

and this Court never granted leave to amend.22

22 What is more, Meadows filed her amended claim before this Court issued the

order that she claims authorized that supplemental pleading. Compare Docket Item 111

(Meadows’s amended claim filed on August 4, 2022), with Docket Item 112 (this Court’s

order filed on August 8, 2022). So Meadows could not have plausibly relied on that

order in filing her amended claim. Although Meadows is proceeding pro se and her

submissions “must be construed liberally,” see Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons,

470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006), that latitude is not boundless.

For those reasons, Meadows’s motion to strike is denied. And this Court again

advises Meadows that her failure to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or

this Court’s orders may result in this Court’s not considering her filings. See Roberts v.

Blowers, 2022 WL 10068263, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2022) (“[Pro se] litigants have an

obligation to comply with a court’s orders, and when they fail to do so, they, like all

litigants, must suffer the consequences of their actions.” (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted)); Wilson v. Gantert, 2004 WL 1591400, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. July 12, 2004)

(“[E]ven pro se litigants must abide by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”

(italicization added)).

C. Motion for a Preliminary Hearing

Finally, Meadows’s motion for a preliminary hearing, Docket Item 119, is denied.

No hearing was necessary to decide these motions. See Whitnum v. Town of

Woodbridge, 833 F. App’x 924, 925 (2d Cir. 2021) (summary order) (“[A] district court’s

decision whether to permit oral argument rests within its discretion.”). As stated above,

Meadows may file a second amended complaint within 45 days of the date of this order,

and Eckert and the Erie County defendants may answer, move against, or otherwise

respond to the second amended complaint within 30 days of its filing. If oral argument

is necessary to decide any motions made in response to a second amended complaint,

this Court will schedule it at a later time.

III. SERVICE ON THE REMAINING DEFENDANTS

Although Meadows has voluntarily dismissed her claims against several

defendants, she still has not effected service on several others. This Court previously

extended Meadows’s time to effect service and advised her that if she could not effect

service within 90 days of the date of that order, she should request an extension of time

to do so. See Docket Item 112. On September 27, 2022, Meadows filed an affidavit of

service asserting that the “City of Bflo, BPD, et al [sic]” were served with the summons

and complaint. Docket Item 121. But the Buffalo Police Department and the City of

Buffalo already had appeared and answered the amended complaint, see Docket Item

118, and this Court has no idea to which of the remaining defendants “et al” refers. So

the City of Buffalo and the Buffalo Police Department need not be served again, and

this Court has no way of knowing whether Meadows has served any of the remaining

defendants who had not been served already.

Meadows’s time to effect service is extended another 90 days from the date of

this order. The Court reminds Meadows that while she may rely on the United States

Marshals Service to effect service, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3), she must inquire of the

Marshals at 716-348-5300 as to whether service has been made and, if necessary,

request an extension of time to effect service. See Meilleur v. Strong, 682 F.3d 56, 63

(2d Cir. 2012). If Meadows has not effected service within 90 days of the date of this

order or requested an extension of time to do so, this Court may order her to show

cause why her claims against the unserved defendants should not be dismissed for

failure to effect service.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Erie County defendants’ motions to dismiss,

Docket Items 54, 56, 58, 60, and 62, are GRANTED in part. Meadows’s claims related

to Eckert’s non-prosecution, her Monell claims against Erie County challenging

prosecutorial charging decisions and Singh’s failure to investigate, and her claims

against Singh related to his failure to investigate are dismissed without leave to amend.

And the remainder of the Erie County defendants’ motions to dismiss, as well as

Eckert’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, Docket Item 78, will be granted unless

Meadows files an amended complaint correcting the deficiencies noted above within 45

days of the date of this order. Eckert and the Erie County defendants may renew their

motions or otherwise respond to any amended complaint within 30 days of its filing. If

Meadows does not file an amended complaint within 45 days of the date of this order,

then her claims against Eckert and the Erie County defendants will be dismissed and

the Clerk of the Court shall terminate Eckert, Schoemick, Flynn, Gordon, Erie County,

and Singh as defendants in this case.

Meadows’s motions to strike, Docket Items 87 and 120, are DENIED.

Meadows’s motions to amend, Docket Items 93 and 109, are DENIED as moot, and

Meadows’s motion for a preliminary hearing, Docket Item 119, is DENIED without

prejudice. Meadows’s motion to withdraw certain defendants, Docket Item 125, is

GRANTED. The Clerk of the Court shall terminate the following defendants from this

case: Officer Dixon, Officer Otwell, Officer Salazar, Officer Casey, Officer Reed, Officer

Antonio, Officer George, Lt. Harrison, Officer Brown, Officer Rachuna, Officer Keenan,

Officer Cullen, Officer Hayden, Officer Creahan, Lt. Danner, Officer Maryanski, Officer

Santiago, Officer Domoros, Officer Raye, Officer Kline, and Officer Nowak. Meadows

may inform this Court within 45 days of the date of this order if she also wishes to

withdraw her claims against John Flynn. Meadows’s time to effect service on the

unserved defendants is extended another 90 days from the date of this order.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 30, 2023

Buffalo, New York

/s/ Lawrence J. Vilardo

LAWRENCE J. VILARDO

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE