Quintanilla Mejia v. Barr

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

RICARDO QUINTANILLA MEJIA,

Petitioner,

Case # 20-CV-6434-FPG

v.

DECISION AND ORDER

WILLIAM P. BARR, Acting Attorney General, et al.,

Respondents.

INTRODUCTION

Pro se Petitioner Ricardo Quintanilla Mejia, a civil immigration detainee detained at the

Buffalo Federal Detention Facility, has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2241. ECF No. 1. He argues that his continued detention is unconstitutional. The

government opposes the petition. ECF No. 6. Having reviewed the record and the briefing, the

Court finds that a hearing is unnecessary to resolve the petition. For the reasons that follow, the

petition is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

BACKGROUND

The following facts are drawn from the record. Petitioner is a citizen and native of El

Salvador. Respondents indicate that Petitioner has repeatedly entered the United States

unlawfully, most recently on October 3, 2016. ECF No. 6-3 at 3-4. Agents with Customs and

Border Protection apprehended Petitioner near the border on that date, and he has since been in

the custody of immigration authorities.

On July 27, 2017, an immigration judge denied Petitioner’s requests for relief from

removal. ECF No. 6-1 at 27. On December 26, 2017, the Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed

Petitioner’s appeal. Id. at 31-33. Petitioner thereafter sought review with the Second Circuit Court

of Appeals, where his case remains pending. The Second Circuit has entered a stay of removal in

connection with the petition for review. See Quintanilla-Mejia v. Barr, No. 18-67, Dkt. No. 41

(dated Oct. 22, 2018).

Respondents claim that Petitioner’s custody status has been reviewed seven times. See

ECF No. 6-3 at 4. In addition, on July 27, 2017, an immigration judge issued a custody

determination under the standards prescribed by Lora v. Shanahan, 804 F.3d 601 (2d Cir. 2015).

See ECF No. 6-1 at 28. Under Lora, immigration authorities were required to provide immigrants

detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) “a bail hearing before an immigration judge within six months

of [their] detention.” Lora, 804 F.3d at 616. In addition, immigrants were entitled to bail “unless

the government establishe[d] by clear and convincing evidence that the immigrant poses a risk of

flight or a risk of danger to the community.”1 Id. In Petitioner’s case, the immigration judge

denied bond, finding that he was a flight risk. ECF No. 6-1 at 28.

On November 20, 2018, Petitioner filed a habeas petition in this district. On October 28,

2019, District Judge Elizabeth A. Wolford denied the petition without prejudice. See Quintanilla-

Mejia v. Sessions, No. 18-CV-6830, ECF No. 13 (dated Oct. 28, 2019). Judge Wolford rejected

Petitioner’s claim that his prolonged detention violated his substantive due process rights and

merited immediate release. See id. at 10-11. Judge Wolford also rejected Petitioner’s procedural

due process claim, as he had failed to allege a change in circumstances. See id. at 12-13. She

indicated that Petitioner could refile his petition should he “undergo a material change in

circumstances.” Id. at 13 n.2.

1 In March 2018—after Petitioner’s bond hearing—the Supreme Court vacated Lora in light of its decision

in Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018). See Shanahan v. Lora, 138 S. Ct. 1260 (2018).

Petitioner has been detained for approximately four years in total, for more than three years

since his Lora bond hearing, and for approximately one year since the disposition of his previous

habeas petition.

DISCUSSION

Under several theories, Petitioner argues that his continued detention without a bond

hearing is unconstitutional. See ECF No. 1 at 8-9. However, because it is dispositive, the Court

need only address Petitioner’s procedural due process claim.2

In several provisions, the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) authorizes the

detention of aliens pending removal. Relevant here is 8 U.S.C. § 1226, which gives immigration

officials the authority to arrest and detain an alien “pending a decision on whether the alien is to

be removed from the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). In other words, “section 1226 governs

the detention of immigrants who are not immediately deportable.” Hechavarria v. Sessions, 891

F.3d 49, 57 (2d Cir. 2018). This includes aliens, like Petitioner, whose removal is stayed pending

appeal. See id. The default rule is that officials may release aliens on bond or conditional parole

while removal proceedings are pending. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 837 (2018).

“Section 1226(c), however, carves out a statutory category of aliens who may not be released . . . .”

Id. The parties agree that Petitioner falls within the ambit of Section 1226(c). See ECF No. 6-3 at

9; ECF No. 7 at 5.

2 To the extent Petitioner raises a substantive due process claim, he is not entitled to relief. Courts have

recognized that an alien’s detention may continue for such a long period as to violate his substantive due

process rights, “regardless of the procedural protections afforded.” Fallatah v. Barr, No. 19-CV-379, 2019

WL 2569592, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. June 21, 2019). While the length of Petitioner’s detention—approximately

four years—is undoubtedly long, it does not meet that onerous standard. See Sanusi v. INS, 100 F. App’x

49, 51 (2d Cir. 2004) (summary order) (six-year detention did not violate due process); Hemans v. Searls,

No. 18-CV-1154, 2019 WL 955353, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2019) (detention lasting more than two years

and three months insufficient to violate substantive due process).

By its plain terms, Section 1226(c) “mandates detention of any alien falling within its

scope” and does not contemplate periodic bond hearings for said aliens. Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at

842, 847. But this Court has held that “mandatory detention under Section 1226(c) may violate

an alien’s [procedural] due process rights if the alien is held for an unreasonably long period.”

Frederick v. Feeley, No. 19-CV-6060, 2019 WL 1959485, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. May 2, 2019). To

determine whether an alien’s procedural due process rights have been violated as a result of his

continued detention under Section 1226, the Court first evaluates whether the “alien [has been]

held for an unreasonably long period.” Id.; see also Hemans v. Searls, No. 18-CV-1154, 2019 WL

955353, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2019). If the alien has been detained for an unreasonably long

period, the Court proceeds to analyze whether the alien has received sufficient process to justify

such detention. Hemans, 2019 WL 955353, at *5.

Furthermore, this Court has held that, as a matter of procedural due process, immigration

detainees must receive periodic bond hearings. See Thomas v. Whitaker, No. 18-CV-6870, ECF

No. 19, at 4-6 (dated Aug. 7, 2019). In Thomas, this Court held:

An immigration judge’s one-time finding that [a detainee] was a flight and danger

risk does not prove that he will remain such a risk in the future. It therefore does

not obviate the need—as a matter of basic procedural due process—for some

method of periodically reviewing the grounds for [the detainee’s] continued

detention. . . .

In the Court’s view, the same standards that apply to a procedural due process claim

where an alien has not received any bond hearing ought to apply in this context:

first, the Court considers whether the alien’s detention has been unreasonably

prolonged since the last bond hearing, and second, if it has, the Court determines

whether the government has provided constitutionally adequate procedural

safeguards. If the government has not done so, the alien may be entitled to relief,

including the right to a bond hearing with appropriate procedural safeguards. It

makes sense to consider, as a threshold issue, the length of an alien’s detention

since the last bond hearing, because periodic review is premised on the notion that

the circumstances justifying detention may grow stale with the passage of time. If

the alien had a bond hearing within a few months of his habeas petition, it is

unlikely that circumstances will have so dramatically changed as to justify a second

hearing. But as the length of detention increases, so does the likelihood of changed

circumstances and the need for a fresh examination of the risks the alien poses.

Once his detention has been unreasonably prolonged, an alien has a right to a new

bond hearing. The standards governing the second hearing should be the same as

those governing the first: the government bears the burden of proving by clear and

convincing evidence that the alien is a flight risk or danger to the community.

Id. at 6-7 (internal citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted).

Applying this standard, Petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing.3 First, Petitioner’s

detention since his last bond hearing has been unreasonably prolonged: the bond determination in

his Lora hearing was made in July 2017, more than three years ago. That fact weighs heavily in

Petitioner’s favor. See, e.g., Hemans, 2019 WL 955353, at *6 (noting that detention lasting two

years and three months “weigh[ed] heavily in [the petitioner’s] favor”); see also Dutt v. Nielsen,

No. 19-CV-155, ECF No. 21 at 4 (W.D.N.Y. May 7, 2019) (collecting cases for proposition that

fifteen-month detention is “beyond the point at which courts find detention unreasonably

prolonged”).

Contrary to Respondents’ argument, Petitioner cannot be faulted for the delays attendant

to the normal administrative and appeals process, as he has not abused the processes available to

him or otherwise maliciously delayed proceedings. See Hechavarria, 891 F.3d at 56 n.6

(distinguishing between aliens who have “substantially prolonged [their] stay by abusing the

processes provided to [them]” and those who have “simply made use of the statutorily permitted

appeals process”); Brissett v. Decker, 324 F. Supp. 3d 444, 453 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (concluding that

pursuit of relief from removal “does not, in itself, undermine a claim that detention is unreasonably

3 While Judge Wolford employed a different analysis in resolving Petitioner’s previous petition,

Respondents do not argue that this Court is compelled, as a matter of law, to employ Judge Wolford’s

standards in lieu of those it generally uses to resolve immigration-habeas petitions.

prolonged”). Accordingly, Petitioner’s detention has been unreasonably prolonged, and he has

passed the first step.

Second, Petitioner has not received sufficient process to justify his continued detention.

This Court has repeatedly held that due process requires the government, not the alien, to prove by

clear and convincing evidence that continued detention is justified. Petitioner last received such

process in July 2017—at his Lora bond hearing. The fact that Petitioner later received a number

of constitutionally inadequate “custody reviews” is irrelevant.

In short, because Petitioner’s detention has been unreasonably prolonged since his last

bond hearing, and because he has not received sufficient process since that last bond hearing, the

Court concludes that Petitioner’s continued detention violates his procedural due process rights.

He is entitled to relief in the form of a bond hearing with proper procedural safeguards, as set forth

below.

However, purely as a procedural matter, the Court notes that the only proper respondent is

Jeffrey Searls, the Assistant Field Office Director of the ICE Buffalo Field Office. As the person

with direct control over Petitioner’s detention, he is the proper respondent given Petitioner’s

requested relief. See Hassoun v. Sessions, No. 18-CV-586, 2019 WL 78984, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. Jan.

2, 2019) (“The majority view in the Second Circuit requires the immediate custodian, generally

the prison warden, to be named as a respondent in core immigration habeas proceedings—i.e.,

those challenging present physical confinement.” (quotation omitted)).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, Petitioner is entitled to habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. §

2241 and the petition (ECF No. 1) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The petition

is granted against Respondent Searls and is denied with respect to the remaining respondents.

By October 20, 2020, Respondent Searls shall hold a bond hearing for Petitioner before an

immigration judge, at which the government bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing

evidence that Petitioner’s continued detention is justified based on his present risk of flight or

danger to the community. To conclude that detention is justified, the immigration judge must also

find that no less restrictive alternative to detention that could reasonably assure Petitioner’s

appearance and the safety of the community exists. If a bond hearing is not held by October 20,

2020, Respondent Searls shall release Petitioner immediately with appropriate conditions of

supervision. By October 23, 2020, Respondent Searls shall file a notice with this Court certifying

either (1) that a bond hearing was held by the applicable deadline, and the outcome thereof, or (2)

that no bond hearing was held and that Petitioner was released with appropriate conditions of

supervision. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment and close the case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 6, 2020

Rochester, New York

Chief Judge

United States District Court