The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
W ESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
JACQUELINE TUCKER,
Plaintiff,
v.
18-CV-812(HKS)
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
DECISION AND ORDER
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the parties have consented to have the
undersigned conduct any and all further proceedings in this case, including entry of final
judgment. Dkt. #15.
Jacqueline Tucker (“Plaintiff”), who is represented by counsel, brings this
action pursuant to the Social Security Act (“the Act”), seeking review of the final decision
of the Commissioner of Social Security (“the Commissioner”) denying her applications
for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). This
Court has jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Presently before
the Court are the parties’ motions for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Dkt. ##10, 13.
BACKGROUND
On June 12, 2014, Plaintiff filed applications for DIB and SSI alleging
disability beginning April 11, 2014. T. 161-73.1 Her initial application was denied, and a
hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Lynette Gohr on May 16,
2017, in Buffalo, New York. T. 31-68. On September 26, 2017, the ALJ issued a
decision finding Plaintiff not disabled. T. 18-40. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s
request for review on July 19, 2018, making the ALJ’s determination the final decision of
the Commissioner. T. 1-6. This action followed. Dkt. #1.
The ALJ’s Decision
In applying the familiar five-step sequential analysis, as contained in the
administrative regulations promulgated by the Social Security Administration (“SSA”),
see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; Lynch v. Astrue, No. 07-CV-249, 2008 WL
3413899, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2008) (detailing the five steps), the ALJ found that: (1)
Plaintiff did not engage in substantial gainful activity since April 11, 2014, the alleged
onset date; (2) she had the severe impairments of congestive heart failure, coronary
artery disease, obstructive sleep apnea, morbid obesity, and sarcoidosis; and (3) her
impairments did not meet or equal the Listings set forth at 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpt. P,
Appx. 1. The ALJ next found that Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity
(“RFC”) to perform sedentary work as defined in 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(a) and
416.967(a),2 except that she could occasionally climb ramps and stairs, could never
1 Citations to “T.__” refer to the pages of the administrative transcript. Dkt. #9-1 through 9-13.
2 “Sedentary work involves lifting no more than 10 pounds at a time and occasionally lifting or
carrying articles like docket files, ledgers, and small tools.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a). “Although a
climb ladders, ropes, and scaffolds; occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and
crawl; and occasionally reach overhead with the bilateral upper extremities. Additionally,
Plaintiff could not work at unprotected heights or around dangerous machinery; she
must avoid concentrated exposure to extreme heat, extreme cold, humidity, wetness,
dust, odors, fumes, and pulmonary irritants; and there could be no strict production
quotas. T. 24-27. Continuing to the fourth step of the disability analysis, the ALJ found
that Plaintiff could perform her past relevant work as an insurance clerk and
appointment clerk. T. 32. Accordingly, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not
disabled under the Act. T. 33.
DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
Scope of Judicial Review
42 U.S.C. § 405(g) grants jurisdiction to district courts to hear claims
based on the denial of Social Security benefits. Section 405(g) provides that the District
Court “shall have the power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a
judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social
Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
(2007). The section directs that when considering such a claim, the Court must accept
the findings of fact made by the Commissioner, provided that such findings are
supported by substantial evidence in the record.
sedentary job is defined as one which involves sitting, a certain amount of walking and standing
is often necessary in carrying out job duties.” Id. “Jobs are sedentary if walking and standing are
required occasionally and other sedentary criteria are met.” Id. “Occasionally” means occurring
from very little up to one-third of the time.” Diaz v. Astrue, No. 11-CV-317, 2012 WL 3903388, at
* 6 (D. Conn. Aug. 2, 2012) (citing Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 83-10)).
When determining whether the Commissioner’s findings are supported by
substantial evidence, the Court’s task is “‘to examine the entire record, including
contradictory evidence and evidence from which conflicting inferences can be drawn.’”
Brown v. Apfel, 174 F.3d 59, 62 (2d Cir. 1999), quoting Mongeur v. Heckler, 722 F.2d
1033, 1038 (2d Cir. 1983) (per curiam). “Substantial evidence is more than a mere
scintilla . . . . It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.” Brault v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 683 F.3d 443,
447 (2d Cir. 2012) (quotation marks and citations omitted). This standard is “very
deferential . . . even more so than the clearly erroneous standard . . . .” Id. at 447-48.
Section 405(g) limits the scope of the Court’s review to two inquiries:
whether the Commissioner’s findings were supported by substantial evidence in the
record as a whole and whether the Commissioner’s conclusions were based upon an
erroneous legal standard. See Green–Younger v. Barnhart, 335 F.3d 99, 105–106 (2d
Cir. 2003).
Judgment on the Pleadings
The parties have cross-moved for judgment on the pleadings. Dkt. ## 10,
13. Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s determination on the grounds that: (1) the RFC was
unsupported by substantial evidence because the ALJ inappropriately relied upon gaps
in the medical evidence “to make negative inferences;” and (2) her evaluation of
Plaintiff’s subjective complaints was unsupported by substantial evidence. Dkt. #10-1 at
1, 14-30.
The Commissioner requests that his determination be affirmed as the
ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and is free of legal error. Dkt.
#13-1. Plaintiff filed a thorough reply brief (Dkt. #14), which the Court has also
considered.
For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s motion is denied and the
Commissioner’s motion is granted.
The ALJ’s Formulation of the RFC
Plaintiff first contends that the ALJ relied solely on her lay opinion in
reaching the RFC determination, and that “there lacks any medical opinion supporting
the RFC finding.” Dkt. #10-1 at 14.
It is well-settled that “[a]n ALJ is not qualified to assess a claimant’s RFC
on the basis of bare medical findings, and as a result[,] an ALJ’s determination of RFC
without a medical advisor’s assessment is not supported by substantial evidence.”
Wilson v. Colvin, No. 13-CV-6286, 2015 WL 1003933, at *21 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2015)
(citation omitted). Where, however, ‘the record contains sufficient evidence from which
an ALJ can assess the [claimant’s] residual functional capacity,’ a medical source
statement or formal medical opinion is not necessarily required . . . .” Monroe v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 676 Fed. Appx. 5, 8 (2d Cir. 2017) (citing Tankisi v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
521 Fed. Appx. 29, 34 (2d Cir. 2013) (summary order)).
In this case, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff could perform sedentary
work with significant additional limitations. T. 27. To support this conclusion, the ALJ
engaged in a lengthy discussion of the record evidence, including a physical
consultative examination of Plaintiff and medical source opinion by Dr. Hongbiao Liu.
The results of that evaluation revealed that Plaintiff was obese, but walked normally and
did not use an assistive device, could rise from a chair without difficulty, and get on and
off the examination table without assistance. T. 29; 377. Plaintiff had normal neck
movement, some lower back movement limitations, normal range of motion in her arms
and legs, no sensory deficits, normal (5/5) strength, and her joints were nontender. T.
378. Her hand and finger dexterity was intact, and her grip strength was 5/5 on both
sides Id. Significantly, as noted by the ALJ, Plaintiff’s lungs were clear to auscultation
with normal diaphragmatic motion, and her heart rhythm was regular without any
audible murmurs, gallops, or rubs. T. 29. Dr. Liu diagnosed Plaintiff with history of heart
attack; history of hypertension; history of diabetes; history of gastric reflux disease;
history of sarcoidosis; history of sleep apnea; and morbid obesity. He opined that
Plaintiff’s prognosis was “stable,” and that Plaintiff “should avoid moderate exercise
activity because of cardiac condition.” T. 379. He did not identify any other functional
limitations. Id. The ALJ afforded this opinion significant weight due to his personal
examination of Plaintiff, his familiarity with the SSA’s disability program, and the
consistency with his own findings as well as other evidence in the record. T. 31. She
then discussed the opinion’s consistency with the formulated RFC:
Dr. Liu, a physical consultative examiner, opined only that
the claimant should avoid moderate exercise due to her
cardiac condition . . . . This opinion is amply accommodated
by the above [RFC], which limits the claimant to less than a
full range of sedentary work and includes the provision that
there can be no strict production quotas.
T. 32.
Thus, contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, the ALJ did rely on a medical
opinion in reaching her determination, see Dkt. #10-1 at 15, and while the opinion did
not contain a function-by-function analysis, an ALJ’s RFC finding need not directly
mirror any one medical opinion. See Matta v. Astrue, 508 Fed. Appx. 53, 56 (2d Cir.
2013) (summary order). Rather, an ALJ weighs and synthesizes all evidence available
to render an RFC finding consistent with the record as a whole. Id. As discussed below,
the ALJ fulfilled her obligation in this respect.
While the ALJ thoroughly summarized the treatment notes, T. 28-30, it
cannot be said that she simply interpreted the raw medical data in reaching the RFC
determination. The ALJ initially discussed the medical evidence relating to Plaintiff’s
congestive heart failure and “significant” coronary artery disease. She acknowledged a
series of hospitalizations relating to chest pain coinciding with the onset date. T. 28. The
ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s treatment for congestive heart failure and coronary heart
disease as well as her noncompliance with treatment.3 T. 28. She also discussed the
abnormalities documented in an October, 2014, echocardiogram, and Plaintiff’s stenting
procedures between 2009 and 2013. T. 29. Subsequent testing in October 2015
revealed no evidence of myocardial ischemia and normal left ventricular ejection
3 Plaintiff’s noncompliance in managing her symptoms will be discussed more fully in the
following section.
fraction. Id. The ALJ observed, “[i]nterestingly, the results of the nuclear stress test
raised the possibility that the residual diagonal stenosis had been overestimated and
was not hemodynamically significant . . . .” Id.
On January 23, 2017, treating cardiologist Brian Page, M.D., wrote a letter
in support of Plaintiff’s disability claim:
She mentions that she was told that she can work a full time job if it
involves desk work only. Of note, her previous position was in a call
center as a patient representative. Due to the emotional stress
place on her with this type of job, she had multiple emergency room
visits which decreased when she stopped working. I discussed with
her that returning to this type of job could provoke worsening
symptoms and more frequent emergency room encounters. For
this reason it may be best for her to avoid returning to this type of
work.
T. 883. The ALJ also considered this opinion, albeit according it little weight for a
number of reasons. T. 31.4 Thus, with respect to Plaintiff’s cardiac impairments, they
were expressly accounted for in the RFC, which limited Plaintiff to a reduced range of
sedentary work with no strict production quotas. T. 28-29.
As to Plaintiff’s chronic sleep apnea, the ALJ noted that this condition was
diagnosed a number of years before the alleged onset date, with little indication that it
worsened around that time. T. 29. In October, 2014, Plaintiff’s sleep apnea was
characterized as stable. Id. She was noncompliant with her CPAP machine. T. 29-30,
32. Additionally, Plaintiff had a number of pulmonary abnormalities, such as moderate
4 Plaintiff does not otherwise challenge the ALJ’s evaluation of the opinion evidence in the
present motion.
tricuspid regurgitation, moderate left atrium dilation, mild pulmonary hypertension, mild
aortic regurgitation, and mild aortic valve thickening, diminished left ventricular systolic
function. T. 413, 381-82, 393-94, 441. Despite Plaintiff’s diagnosis of sarcoidosis (an
inflammatory disease affecting the lungs), the ALJ noted that the condition was
characterized as being in its first stage, and Plaintiff’s pulmonary studies typically
resulted in limited findings. T. 30-31. Due to Plaintiff’s pulmonary impairments, the ALJ
limited her exposure to environmental and pulmonary irritants. T. 32.
The ALJ also assessed Plaintiff’s functional limitations in light of her
obesity, noting that obese individuals may have limitations in sitting, standing, walking,
lifting, carrying, pushing, and pulling, and obesity may reduce climbing, balancing,
stooping, and crouching. She observed that the treatment notes “suggest that difficulty
breathing caused by bending was likely due to obesity,” and concluded that Plaintiff’s
obesity contributed to her symptoms. T. 30. Plaintiff’s restrictions in climbing, balancing,
stooping, crouching, crawling are expressly set forth in the RFC. T. 27.
The ALJ assessed Plaintiff’s testimony at the administrative hearing,
which indicated that bending and reaching for an extended period of time caused chest
pain; she did not endorse any limitation in the ability to sit; she could stand for 15 to 20
minutes before needing to sit down; and could not lift over 10 pounds. T. 28; 48-49, 52-
53, 56, 61. She testified that she lived alone, but received assistance from her adult
children. She performed tasks and activities as tolerated, and could attend to personal
care, prepare food for herself, and perform some household chores such as washing
dishes and vacuuming. Id. Plaintiff could drive on occasion, attend medical
appointments, shop, attend church about once per month, sometimes go out to eat, and
spend time with her grandchildren. Id. Plaintiff’s own testimony suggested relatively
normal levels of daily activity. T. 32.5 It appears that the ALJ, giving Plaintiff the benefit
of the doubt, credited at least some of her allegations to the extent that they were
consistent with sedentary work (lifting no more than 10 pounds) and limited her to
occasional overhead reaching. T. 27.
In addition, the Court notes that the medical records contain sufficient
evidence of Plaintiff’s functional abilities for the ALJ to properly formulate the RFC.
Plaintiff’s examination records documented that she was “neurologically intact,” with
normal gait and station were normal. T. 263, 828. Her extremities had no abnormalities,
she had no focal deficits, could enter the examination room without assistance, was
alert, fully oriented, and breathed easily at rest. T. 276, 312-13, 329, 422, 888, 964. On
examination, Plaintiff’s joints, bones, muscles, and range of motion were largely
normal/unremarkable. T. 455, 461, 479, 497. The treatment notes also indicate benign
findings with respect to her cardiovascular and pulmonary ailments. See, e.g., T. 276
(dyspnea and wheezing upon exertion; no acute distress, clear lungs); 312-313 (normal
5 More specifically, Plaintiff testified that she could do no pulling, not too much walking, and she
performed daily chores in moderation. She drove, shopped, went out to eat, and visited with her
mother, children, and grandchildren. She told the ALJ that her prior job as a medical claims
representative was too fast-paced (high volume calls, quotas), and the stress caused her to
have chest pains and suffer shortness of breath resulting in her hospitalizations. She had
episodes of chest pains a couple of times per month, which passed after a few minutes, after
which she would require a period of rest. Likewise, Plaintiff testified upon questioning by her
attorney that she suffered shortness of breath, due to sarcoidosis, a couple of times per month.
She reiterated that the major issue she had in returning to her previous job was the stress level.
Her physicians told her not to lift over 10 pounds, to avoid bending forward due to her heart
condition, and that she could not reach overhead for periods of time. T. 41-64.
review of symptoms, no new complaints); 329 (no murmur/gallop of heart, clear lungs);
395 (normal chest x-ray).
In summary, the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s medical treatment notes, her
subjective complaints, self-reports, activities of daily living, and testimony regarding her
limitations. Simply because the ALJ did not obtain a function-by-function analysis from
one of the medical sources was not legal error:
The question is not whether the ALJ obtained such assessments or
statements from any particular clinician or as to any particular
condition . . . Rather, a medical source statement is not necessarily
required to fully develop the record where “the record contains
sufficient evidence from which an ALJ can assess the [claimant’s]
residual functional capacity.” Likewise, “remand is not necessary
merely because an explicit function-by-function analysis was not
performed.”
Crespo v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 18-CV-00435, 2019 WL 4686763, at *3 (D. Conn.
Sept. 25, 2019) (quoting Tankisi, 521 Fed. Appx. at 34, and Cichocki v. Astrue, 729
F.3d 172, 177 (2d Cir. 2013)).
In this case there was sufficient evidence in the record from which the ALJ
could assess Plaintiff’s RFC: voluminous medical records, which included treatment
notes and objective test results; a consultative examiner’s report; a treating physician
opinion letter; and Plaintiff’s own testimony and reported daily activities. The ALJ did not
rely on her own lay opinion in formulating the RFC, but formulated the RFC based on
the record as a whole, as she was obligated to do. Trepanier v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.
Admin., 752 Fed. Appx. 75, 79 (2d Cir. 2018); but see Sherry v. Berryhill, 2019 WL
441597, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 2019) (“The Court cannot conclude that there was
substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s RFC determination that [the] plaintiff was
capable of light work with restrictions and is left without a clear indication of how the ALJ
reached the RFC determination without resorting to impermissible interpretation of raw
medical data.”).
The RFC was therefore supported by substantial evidence, and the ALJ
did not commit legal error by failing to utilize a medical opinion with a function-by-
function analysis.
The ALJ’s Evaluation of Plaintiff’s Subjective Complaints
Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ did not apply the appropriate legal
standard in discounting her allegations of disabling symptoms. Dkt. #10-1 at 24.
“When determining a claimant’s RFC, the ALJ is required to take the
claimant’s reports of pain and other limitations into account.” Genier v. Astrue, 606 F.3d
46, 49 (2d Cir. 2010). The ALJ must “‘carefully consider’” all the evidence presented by
claimants regarding their symptoms, which fall into seven relevant factors including
‘daily activities’ and the ‘location, duration, frequency, and intensity of [their] pain or
other symptoms.’” Del Carmen Fernandez v. Berryhill, 18-CV-326, 2019 WL 667743, at
*9 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2019) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3); SSR 16-3p)).
SSR 16-3p provides that the evaluation of symptoms involves a two-step
process. 2017 WL 5180304, at *2. The SSA “will first consider whether there is an
underlying medically determinable physical or mental impairment(s) that could
reasonably be expected to produce an individual’s symptoms.” Id. at *3. “[O]nce an
underlying physical or mental impairment(s) that could reasonably be expected to
produce an individual’s symptoms is established, [SSA will then] evaluate the intensity
and persistence of those symptoms to determine the extent to which the symptoms limit
an individual’s ability to perform work-related activities . . . . .” Id. If SSA cannot make a
disability determination or decision that is fully favorable based solely on objective
medical evidence, it will “carefully consider other evidence in the record in reaching a
conclusion about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of an individual’s
symptoms.” Id. at *6.
In evaluating the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of an
individual’s symptoms, factors to be considered include: (1) claimant’s daily activities;
(2) location, duration, frequency, and intensity of claimant’s symptoms; (3) precipitating
and aggravating factors; (4) type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any
medication taken to relieve symptoms; (5) other treatment received to relieve
symptoms; (6) any measures taken by the claimant to relieve symptoms; and (7) any
other factors concerning claimant’s functional limitations and restrictions due to
symptoms. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3); SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *7-8.
The ALJ applied the two-step process, finding that Plaintiff’s medically
determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause her alleged
symptoms, but her statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects
of these symptoms were not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other
evidence in the record. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s “statements have been found to affect
[her] ability to work only to the extent they can reasonably be accepted as consistent
with the objective and other evidence.” T. 28.
In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ observed that Plaintiff’s clinical
functional examinations were essentially normal. T. 29-31; 377-78, 263, 276, 282, 312-
13, 328-29, 442, 455, 461, 479, 497, 888, 964. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(4) (an ALJ
considers the objective evidence in evaluating a claimant’s complaints); Lewis v. Colvin,
548 Fed. Appx. 675, 678 (2d Cir. 2013) (unpublished) (the ALJ’s decision to discount a
claimant’s subjective testimony regarding his symptoms was appropriate where that
testimony was not supported by the objective medical evidence).
The ALJ also noted “evidence of significant medical noncompliance” with
treatment, citing several examples from the record. T. 27, 28, 31-32; see 20 C.F.R. §
404.1529(c)(4). For example, Plaintiff was regularly noncompliant with her CPAP
machine, even though she reported that she felt better when using it. T. 29-30, 32; 440,
475, 890, 902, 979). Additionally, Plaintiff was not compliant with her heart medication,
even when it helped her feel better. T. 28, 32; 885, 890, 902, 961, 979. The ALJ
therefore reasonably considered Plaintiff’s noncompliance with treatment in evaluating
her subjective complaints. Wilson v. Colvin, No. 16-CV-6509, 2017 WL 2821560, at *6
(W.D.N.Y. June 30, 2017) (unpublished) (an ALJ may reasonably consider a pattern of
noncompliance to be a negative factor in considering subjective complaints); Lee v.
Colvin, No. 13-CV-1151, 2015 WL 3505791, at *6, (W.D.N.Y. June 3, 2015) (an ALJ is
permitted to “consider plaintiffs noncompliance with treatment as a factor weighing
against [her] credibility”).6
The ALJ also considered Plaintiff’s activities of daily living in her analysis.
T. 32; see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(i). She observed that Plaintiff lived alone,
attended to her personal care, prepared food, performed some household chores,
handled a savings account, paid bills, drove on occasion, attended medical
appointments, went shopping, attended church once a month, ate out occasionally, and
spent time with her grandchildren. T. 48-56, 61. The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff
attended an Italian Heritage Festival, and also went to the Erie County Fair, activities
which involve a good deal of walking. T. 32. She acknowledged that Plaintiff testified
that she had bad days, on which she had difficulty standing and walking and that her
adult children helped her. T. 27-28. Overall, the ALJ properly considered Plaintiff’s
activities of daily living and concluded that they were inconsistent with her allegations of
disabling symptoms. See Rusin v. Berryhill, 726 Fed. Appx. 837, 840 (2d Cir. 2018)
(severe limitations claimed by the plaintiff were inconsistent with the plaintiff’s report that
he “cooked simple meals daily, left the house daily, can drive, and shopped for
groceries every two weeks”). While it is true that the capability to perform activities of
6 In making this assessment, the ALJ also necessarily considered the factors of medications and
other treatments. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3); SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *7-8.
daily living is not inherently inconsistent with a finding of disability, “[t]he law is clear that
the ALJ may consider . . . [a claimant’s] purported activities of daily living for the
purposes of a credibility determination.” Cahill v. Astrue, No. 11-CV-148, 2012 WL
3777072, at *5 (D. VT. Aug. 29, 2012).7
Finally, Plaintiff claims that the ALJ overlooked her long-standing work
history of 23 years. Dkt. #10-1 at 25-26. Contrary to this assertion, the ALJ recognized
that Plaintiff had a “long-term job as a patient representative” that ended when she had
chest pain and shortness of breath while working. T. 27-28. It is thus clear from the
face of the decision that the ALJ was aware of Plaintiff’s work history and factored it,
along with several other considerations, into her disability determination and the
analysis of Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. See, e.g., Campbell v. Astrue, 465 Fed.
Appx. 4, 7 (2d Cir. 2012) (summary order) (“Although it is true that a good work history
may be deemed probative of credibility, it remains just one of many factors appropriately
considered in assessing credibility.”) (quotations omitted).
In sum, the ALJ’s evaluation of Plaintiff’s subjective complaints is
supported by substantial evidence and remand is not warranted on this ground.
The Court understands that Plaintiff may disagree with the ALJ’s
assessment of the evidence. However, it bears repeating that it is not the Court’s role to
7 SSR 16-3p eliminated the use of the term “credibility” from the agency’s sub-regulatory policy,
and “clarif[ied] that subjective symptom evaluation is not an examination of an individual’s
character.” Id. The standard for evaluating a claimant’s subjective symptoms has not changed in
the regulations.
“decide facts, reweigh evidence, or substitute its judgment for that of the
Commissioner.” Cushman v. Saul, No. 19 CV 344, 2020 WL 1466220, at *6 (D. Conn.
Mar. 26, 2020). “[W]hether there is substantial evidence supporting the [plaintiff’s] view
is not the question here; rather, we must decide whether substantial evidence supports
the ALJ’s decision” Bonet ex rel. T.B. v. Colvin, 523 Fed. Appx. 58, 59 (2d Cir. 2013)
(unpublished) (citations omitted)). “If the evidence is susceptible to more than one
rational interpretation, the Commissioner’s conclusion must be upheld.” McIntyre v.
Colvin, 758 F.3d 146, 149 (2d Cir. 2014). Reviewing all of the above evidence under
this lens, the Court finds the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and
free of legal error.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the
pleadings, Dkt. #10, is DENIED, and the Commissioner’s cross-motion, Dkt. #13, is
GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is ordered to close the file.
SO ORDERED.
DATED: Buffalo, New York
March 27, 2020
s/ H. Kenneth Schroeder, Jr._
H. KENNETH SCHROEDER, JR.
United States Magistrate Judge