The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
ARMANDO ARCE,
Plaintiff,
v. 17-CV-696
DECISION AND ORDER
JUDGE DAVID L. TURNBULL, et al.,
Defendants.
In July 2017, the pro se plaintiff, Armando Arce, filed a complaint asserting
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Docket Item 1 at 3-4.1 Arce’s claims stem from various
proceedings in the Chautauqua Family Court involving the custody of his children.
On May 7, 2018, Arce filed an emergency motion for a temporary restraining
order and/or preliminary injunction. Docket Item 8. On October 8, 2018, Chautauqua
County moved to dismiss the complaint. Docket Item 18. The next day, the other
defendants (“State Defendants”) followed suit. Docket Item 20. On October 23, 2018,
Arce responded to Chautauqua County’s motion, Docket Item 21; and on October 30,
2018, Chautauqua County replied, Docket Item 22. On November 20, 2018, Arce
responded to the State Defendants’ motion. Docket Item 25.
On December 17, 2018, Arce moved for sanctions, Docket Item 27; and on
December 18, 2018, he moved to strike the defendants’ affirmative defenses, Docket
Items 29, 30. On January 11, 2019, the defendants moved to stay Arce from making
1 Arce amended this complaint in February 2018. Docket Item 6.
any additional filings, Docket Item 32; but on January 14, 2019, Arce moved for
judgment on the pleadings, Docket Item 33.
For the reasons that follow, the defendants’ motions to dismiss are granted and
Arce’s motion for sanctions is denied. This Court need not address the various other
pending motions.2
BACKGROUND
A liberal reading of the complaint tells the following story.
On November 25, 2009, Arce and his ex-wife agreed to an order of custody and
visitation in Chautauqua County Family Court. Docket Item 23 at 3. The order granted
Arce fifty percent joint physical placement and fifty percent custody of his son, Armando
Arce, Jr. Id. Arce and his ex-wife also agreed to a settlement of their divorce
proceeding in Chautauqua County Family Court. Id. One clause of the settlement
agreement provided that neither parent could relocate their children outside
Chautauqua County without the other parent’s written approval or a court order. Id.
In November 2014, Arce’s ex-wife moved their son out of New York State without
Arce’s knowledge or approval and without a court order. Docket Item 8-1 at 1. Arce
then sued in Chautauqua County Family Court. See Docket Item 23 at 3. Magistrate
David L. Turnbull presided over Arce’s case in 2014 and permitted Arce’s ex-wife to
2 Without leave of the court, Arce filed several amended complaints, the last—the
fourth amended complaint—on November 5, 2018. Docket Item 23. On December 4,
2018, Chautauqua County submitted a “memorandum of law in opposition to plaintiff’s
attempt to amend his complaint.” Docket Item 26. Even if leave of the Court were not
required for Arce to submit the fourth amended complaint, the complaint still fails to
state a claim, and this Court therefore need not address the County’s arguments in its
memorandum, Docket Item 26.
move their son outside New York. Id. In doing so, Magistrate Turnbull denied Arce due
process of law, “access to the courts[,] and equal protections.” Id. And he did that
under a “long-standing policy” with respect to New York Family Court Act § 439(c). Id.
Magistrate Michael K. Bobseine presided over Arce’s case after Magistrate
Turnbull recused himself. Id. Like Magistrate Turnbull, Magistrate Bobseine used
Chautauqua County Family Court’s “long-standing policy” to deny Arce “equal
protections” and due process. Id. Magistrate Bobseine also “concluded matters outside
his subject matter jurisdiction.” Id.
The Honorable Michael Sullivan presides over Chautauqua Family Court and
made several decisions regarding Arce’s appeal. Id. at 3-4. Judge Sullivan reviews
support magistrate decisions to ensure that they are within their subject matter
jurisdiction. Id. at 3. Judge Sullivan also enforced the “long-standing policy” which
ignored Arce’s “equal protections” and due process. Id. at 4.
The Honorable Michael F. Griffith is the supervisor of the Family Courts for the
Eighth Judicial District of New York. Id. Chautauqua County Family Court enforces its
“long-standing policy” at Judge Griffith’s direction. Id. Further, Judge Griffith affirmed
the magistrates’ decisions to deny Arce’s requests. Docket Item 8-1 at 4. Therefore,
Judge Griffith has interfered with Arce’s relationship with his son. Docket Item 23 at 4.
The Eighth Judicial District (the “District”) is where Arce’s child custody case was
venued. Id. The District is responsible for the “supervision, training, and culture of all
counties” within the District. Id. Therefore, with the blessing of the District, Chautauqua
County Family Court enforced the “long-standing policy” that ignored Arce’s “equal
protections” and due process. Id. The District allowed the family court to ignore the
settlement and therefore substantially interfered with Arce’s relationship with his son.
Id.
Chautauqua County defers to its family court for all family court matters. Id. For
that reason, Chautauqua County conspired to deny Arce his right to enforce the
settlement and has fostered the discriminatory practices in Chautauqua County Family
Court. Id. So Chautauqua County also has “substantially interfered” with Arce’s
relationship with his son. Id.
Arce sued Chautauqua County, Chautauqua County Family Court, the Eighth
Judicial District, Turnbull, Bobseine, Sullivan, and Griffith under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at
2. He alleges that the defendants “intentionally, maliciously, and tortuously interfered
with [his] relationship with [his] son by denying [him] equal protections under law for due
process.” Id. at 4. The “long-standing policy” created a barrier to the court and
“erroneously grants the illusion” of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. Arce asks this Court
to grant a judgment in his favor that the defendants deprived him of his natural right to
raise his son, to grant injunctive relief in his favor, and to award compensatory and
punitive damages. Id. at 5.
DISCUSSION
The defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint. Docket Items 18, 20.
Arce has moved for sanctions. Docket Item 27. The Court addresses each in turn.
I. MOTION TO DISMISS
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Geffner
v. Coca-Cola Comp., 928 F.3d 198, 199 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff pleads factual
conduct that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Hu v. City of N.Y., 927 F.3d 81, 88 (2d Cir. 2019)
(quoting Progressive Credit Union v. City of N.Y., 889 F.3d 40, 48 (2d Cir. 2018)).
A. Judicial Immunity
The State Defendants argue that Arce’s claims against defendants Turnbull,
Bobseine, Griffith, and Sullivan must be dismissed because those defendants are
immune from suit. Docket Item 20-1 at 13-18. “It is well settled that judges generally
have absolute immunity from suits for money damages for their judicial actions.” Bliven
v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 204, 209 (2d Cir. 2009). Judicial immunity is not simply immunity
from damages, however; it is immunity from suit altogether. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S.
9, 11 (1991) (internal citations omitted). This is to ensure “that a judicial officer, in
exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions,
without apprehension of personal consequences to himself.” Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S.
335, 347 (1871). Judicial immunity therefore does not give way even to allegations of
bad faith or malice. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11.
Judicial “immunity is overcome in only two sets of circumstances.” Id. “First, a
judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in the
judge’s judicial capacity.” Id. “Second, a judge is not immune for actions, though
judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Id. at 12.
1. Judicial Actions
In determining whether a judge’s actions are “judicial,” the Second Circuit has
taken a “functional approach.” Bliven, 579 F.3d at 209. The relevant factors include the
nature of the judge’s action, whether the action is ordinarily performed by a judge,
whether the parties expect the judge to take such action, and whether the parties dealt
with the judge in his judicial capacity. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978).
“[A]cts arising out of, or related to, individual cases before the judge are considered
judicial in nature.” Bliven, 579 F.3d at 210.
a. Magistrate David L. Turnbull
Magistrate Turnbull presided over Arce’s case in Chautauqua Family Court.
Docket Item 23 at 3. As established in Bliven, any act “arising out of, or related to” a
case before a judge is judicial in nature. 579 F.3d at 210. As a family court judge,
Magistrate Turnbull acted in his judicial capacity when he presided over Arce’s case.
He is therefore immune from suit. Bliven, 579 F.3d at 210.
b. Magistrate Michael K. Bobseine
After Magistrate Turnball was recused, Magistrate Bobseine presided over Arce’s
case and Arce’s “attempts to [obtain] redress.” Docket Item 23 at 3; Docket Item 8-1 at
3. Thus, Magistrate Bobseine also acted in his judicial capacity when he did the things
alleged in the complaint and is likewise immune from suit. Bliven, 579 F.3d at 210.
c. The Honorable Michael Sullivan
Judge Sullivan also presided over Arce’s child custody lawsuit. Docket Item 23
at 3-4. Specifically, he affirmed Magistrate Bobseine’s decision to deny Arce’s request.
Id.; Docket Item 8-1 at 4. Judge Sullivan’s decision was made in his capacity as a
family court judge, and he also is immune from suit. Bliven, 579 F.3d at 210.
d. The Honorable Michael F. Griffith
Judge Griffith also presided over Arce’s child custody lawsuit. Docket Item 8-1 at
4. Specifically, Judge Griffith affirmed Magistrate Bobseine’s decision to deny Arce’s
requests. Id. Judge Griffith did so in his judicial capacity as a family court judge.
Therefore, Judge Griffith is also immune from suit. Bliven, 579 F.3d at 210.
2. Actions Taken in the Complete Absence of All Jurisdiction
Arce argues that at least some of the family court judges are not immune from
suit because they “only had subject matter jurisdiction for matters concerning child
support and had a clear absence of all jurisdiction for matters pertaining to visitation and
custody of [his] son.” Docket Item 21 at 14. “[B]ecause [those judges] lacked subject
matter jurisdiction,” Arce argues, they “could not have allowed any deviation from
[Arce’s] already established Stipulation of Settlement MM-2007-103 or [his] Order of
Custody/Visitation V-04134-02/09E.” Id.
“[T]he scope of a judge’s jurisdiction must be construed broadly where the issue
is the immunity of the judge.” Stump, 435 U.S. at 356. “A judge will not be deprived of
immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in
excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in
the ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction.’” Id. at 356-56 (quoting Bradley, 80 U.S. at 351).
The Supreme Court has
illustrated the distinction between lack of jurisdiction and excess of
jurisdiction with the following examples: if a probate judge, with jurisdiction
over only wills and estates, should try a criminal case, he would be acting
in the clear absence of jurisdiction and would not be immune from liability
for his action; on the other hand, if a judge of a criminal court should convict
a defendant of a nonexistent crime, he would merely be acting in excess of
his jurisdiction and would be immune.
Id. at 357 n.7 (citing Bradley, 80 U.S. at 352).
“Because scrutiny of a judge’s state of a mind would hinder the adjudicatory
process in the very manner that the judicial immunity doctrine is designed to prevent, a
judge will be denied immunity only where it appears, first, that the judge acted in the
clear absence of jurisdiction, and second, that the judge must have known that he or
she was acting in the clear absence of jurisdiction.” Maestri v. Jutkofsky, 860 F.2d 50,
53 (2d Cir. 1988).
In light of those standards, Arce’s complaint does not plausibly allege facts that
permit the court to draw the reasonable inference that any of the judicial defendants
acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. In fact, the various iterations of the
complaint actually allege that the family court had jurisdiction over the precise issue
about which Arce complains and that the judicial defendants acted as judges or judicial
supervisors in connection with those issues. See Docket Item 14 (third amended
complaint) at 2-4; see also Docket Item 23 (fourth amended complaint) at 2-4.
Therefore, Arce’s claims against the judicial defendants—Turnball, Bobsein, Sullivan,
and Griffith—are dismissed.
B. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
The State Defendants argue that the Eleventh Amendment bars Arce’s claims
against the Eighth Judicial District and the Chautauqua County Family Court. Docket
Item 20-1 at 9-10. States are immune from suit in federal court. U.S. Const. amend. XI.
This immunity extends beyond the states themselves to state agents and
instrumentalities that are “arms of a state.” Woods v. Rondout Valley Cent. Sch. Dist.
Bd. of Educ., 466 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 2006). Therefore, individuals cannot sue a
state, its agencies, or its officials without the state’s consent or an express statutory
waiver of immunity. See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 670 (1999).
New York has not consented to being sued in federal court, and there are no
statutes upon which Arce relies that provide an express statutory waiver.3 Furthermore,
the New York State Unified Court System, which includes the Eighth Judicial District, is
“unquestionably an arm of the State, . . . and is entitled to Eleventh Amendment
sovereign immunity.” Gollomp v. Spitzer, 568 F.3d 355, 368 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal
citations omitted). The same holds true for the Chautauqua County Family Court.
Notwithstanding its name, the family court “is a part of the New York State Unified Court
system and is, therefore, also protected by the State’s sovereign immunity from suit in
federal court.” McKnight v. Middleton, 699 F. Supp. 2d 507, 521 (E.D.N.Y. 2010); see
also N.Y. Family Court Act § 113 (“The family court of the state of New York is
established in each county of the state as part of the unified court system for the
3 Arce argues that New York State courts indeed have waived their sovereign
immunity “through their receipt of federal funds under Title IV-D of the Social Security
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 651.” Docket Item 21 at 20. “When providing funds from the federal
purse, Congress may require as a condition of accepting those funds that a state agree
to waive its sovereign immunity from suit in federal court.” Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health
Scis. Ctr. of Brooklyn, 280 F.3d 98, 113 (2d Cir. 2001). “[I]f Congress desires to
condition the States’ receipt of federal funds, it ‘must do so unambiguously, enabling the
States to exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their
participation.’” South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (quoting Pennhurst
State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)). But nothing about § 651
has anything to do with waiving sovereign immunity. And Arce cites nothing that
suggests otherwise.
state.”). Therefore, Arce’s claims against the Eighth Judicial District and the
Chautauqua County Family Court are dismissed.4
C. Chautauqua County
The personal involvement of a defendant is an essential element of a § 1983
claim. Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1994). So a plaintiff must allege a
“tangible connection” between the plaintiff’s injuries and the actions of a defendant to
state a viable claim under § 1983. Bass v. Jackson, 790 F.2d 260, 263 (2d Cir. 1986).
Moreover, there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983. Richardson v. Goord,
347 F.3d 431, 435 (2d Cir. 2003). So municipal liability must be based on constitutional
deprivations caused by an officially promulgated, or de facto, governmental custom or
policy. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479-80 (1986); see also Monell v.
Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of the City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Thus, a municipality
will be liable for a § 1983 violation only where the municipality itself was “the ‘moving
force’ behind the plaintiff’s deprivation of federal rights.” See Bd. of the Cty. Comm’rs of
Bryan Cty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 400 (1997). In other words, “a municipality
cannot be held liable [under § 1983] solely because it employs a tortfeasor.” Monell, 436
U.S. at 691 (emphasis in original).
4 Under “the limited exception of Ex parte Young” to the state’s sovereign
immunity, that immunity does “not bar actions seeking only prospective injunctive relief
against state officials to prevent a continuing violation of federal law because a state
does not have the power to shield its officials by granting them ‘immunity from
responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States.’” In re Dairy Mart
Convenience Stores, Inc., 411 F.3d 367, 371 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Ex parte Young,
209 U.S. 123, 160 (1908)). But in this case, Arce sues no state officials except judges
who, for other reasons described earlier, have immunity from suit.
Given the fact that the Chautauqua County Family Court is “part of the unified
court system for the state,” N.Y. Family Court Act § 113, neither the family court nor its
employees are agents of Chautauqua County. The two entities have no relationship
other than occupying the same jurisdictional territory. Yet Arce’s claim against
Chautauqua County is premised on the county’s non-existent control over the court.
See Docket Item 23 at 4 (“Chautauqua County has fostered the discriminatory practices
concluded in Chautauqua County Family Court, and has substantially interfered with my
Father-Child Relationship.”).
Arce also alleges that the county “through either their [sic] own policy makers
created a policy or custom or allowed the continuance of the policy . . . that denies
equal protections under the law for due process.” Id. But notwithstanding his four
amended complaints, Arce fails to plead any facts—other than those involving the family
court proceedings in which Arce’s ex-wife was granted permission to take his son out of
state—supporting his conclusory allegations regarding an unspecified “policy or
custom.” Indeed, in his submissions, Arce elaborates on the “long-standing policy” that
he complains of: “the use of Support Magistrate[s]” for “screen[ing] or hear[ing] any part
of visitation or custodial matters.” Docket Item 21 at 16. Again, Arce’s issue is with the
court, not the county. Arce therefore fails to state a plausible claim that Chautauqua
County is responsible for any of his claims, and his claim against the county is
dismissed.
II. MOTION FOR SANCTIONS
On December 17, 2018, Arce moved for sanctions. Docket Item 27. Arce
argues that Chautauqua County’s opposition to his filing a fourth amended complaint
was designed only to harass him. Docket Item 28 at 3-4. He also argues that the
defendants’ motions to dismiss are an attempt “to deprive the court of jurisdiction by
acts of fraud.” Id. at 6.
“Sanctions should be sparingly imposed, . . . and care should be taken to avoid
chilling creativity or stifling enthusiasm.” Guzzello v. Venteau, 789 F. Supp. 112, 118
(E.D.N.Y. 1992). Here, no defendant has violated Rule 11 or engaged in any other
misconduct. Arce’s motion for sanctions is denied.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the defendants’ motions to dismiss, Docket Items 18
and 20, are granted. Arce’s motion for sanctions, Docket Item 27, is denied. The
defendants’ motion to stay, Docket Item 32, Arce’s motion for judgment on the
pleadings, Docket Item 33, Arce’s motions to strike the defendants’ affirmative
defenses, Docket Items 29 and 30, and Arce’s motion for injunctive relief, Docket Item
8, are denied as moot. The Clerk of Court shall close the file.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: September 17, 2019
Buffalo, New York
s/ Lawrence J. Vilardo
LAWRENCE J. VILARDO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE