The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
ve ee □□□
W.D., on behalf of his minor children, A. & J.;
J.J., on behalf of her minor child, R.;
L.V.G., on behalf of his four minor children;
P.J. and M.O., on behalf of his minor child, A.,
K.K., on behalf of her minor children M. & G.;
L.K., on behalf of his minor child, L.;
M.K. on behalf of his minor child, A.;
V.L., on behalf of her two minor children A. & M.;
T. and M.M., on behalf of their minor children Y., N. & S.;
K.M. and W.M, on behalf of her minor children S., B., & L. ORDER
M.P., on behalf of his minor children, Tr. and Te.;
L.P., on behalf of her minor child, M.; 19 Civ. 2066 (JCM)
MLR., on behalf of her minor children R. & E.;
J.R., on behalf of her minor child, C.;
T.T., on behalf of his minor child, M.;
Y.T., on behalf of her minor child, Y.,
Plaintiffs,
-against-
ROCKLAND COUNTY; DR. PATRICIA SCHNABEL
RUPPERT, COMMISSIONER, ROCKLAND COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH; ED DAY, COUNTY
EXECUTIVE, COUNTY OF ROCKLAND, both sued
in their individual and official capacities,
Defendants.
no ee eee eee neem K
At the January 19, 2024 Final Pretrial Conference, the Court requested briefing on
whether the jury should be instructed that the sincerely held religious belief element of Plaintiffs’
First Amendment Free Exercise claim has been satisfied. The parties filed letter briefs on the
issue on January 22, 2024. (Docket Nos. 135, 136).
Plaintiffs urge the Court to instruct the jury that this element is “satisfied as to
[P]laintiffs’ Free Exercise claim” since: (1) the relevant school authorities have already
“recognized” that “[P]laintiffs had sincerely held religious beliefs that prohibited them from
vaccinating their children;” (2) “[t]he fact that these beliefs provided [P]laintiffs with a
recognized exemption from a vaccination requirement in one realm (school) does not mean that
these same exact beliefs were any less religious or any less sincere” in other realms; and (3) “it
would be inconsistent and confusing to the jury to disaggregate their claim by place of
exclusion.” (Docket No. 135 at 1-2). In contrast, Defendants argue that “(t]he fact that the
school granted Plaintiffs the exemption is irrelevant in public places outside of school, as the
repealed statute upon which Plaintiffs’ cause of action is based only references the schoo]
setting.” (Docket No. 136 at 1). Neither party cites to any caselaw in support of their position.
The Second Circuit has long recognized that the State’s Commissioner of Health has the
authority to delegate to school officials the power to determine whether a student has
demonstrated a sincerely held religious belief warranting exemption from vaccination
requirements. See Friedman v. Clarkstown Cent. Sch. Dist., 75 F. App’x 815, 819 (2d Cir. 2003).
In Friedman, the Second Circuit held that “the Commissioner clearly has a rational basis for
allowing individual school districts the autonomy to determine how to implement the regulations
in light of the varying populations that live within different districts and the consequential
variations in local health concerns.” Jd. This is based on settled Supreme Court precedent that “a
state may . . . delegate to a municipality authority to determine under what conditions health
regulations shall become operative and that the municipality may vest in its officials broad
discretion in matters affecting the application and enforcement of health law.” Doe v. Zucker,
520 F. Supp. 3d 217, 257 (N.D.N.Y. 2021) (quoting Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176 (1922)),
aff'd sub nom. Goe v. Zucker, 43 F Ath 19 (2d Cir. 2022).
Here, it is undisputed that school officials granted Plaintiffs exemptions from New
York’s mandatory vaccination requirements because they demonstrated sincerely held religious
beliefs against immunization. N.Y. Public Health Law § 2164(2) requires that “[e]very person in
a parental relation to a child in [New York] shall have administered to such child an adequate
dose or doses of an immunizing agent against . .. measles.” However, in 2018 the regulation
implementing this statute allowed for religious exemptions from this requirement, and delegated
authority to grant such exemptions to schools. See N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 10, § 66-
1.3 (2018). Nothing in the statute or regulation limits its reach only to schools. Moreover, it
would be confusing to instruct the jury that Plaintiffs have established sincerely held religious
beliefs for schools, but that they must nevertheless determine if Plaintiffs also had sincerely held
religious beliefs that extended outside the school’s four walls. In sum, the school’s decision to
grant Plaintiffs religious exemptions under § 66-1.3 is enough to satisfy the sincerely held belief
requirement of their First Amendment Free Exercise claim. In addition, since Defendants did not
challenge these exemptions when they were issued, they may not do so now.
Accordingly, the Court will instruct the jury that Plaintiffs have established the sincerely
held religious belief requirement of their First Amendment Free Exercise claim.
Dated: January 30, 2024
White Plains, New York
SO ORDERED:
C Vttatewn ¢ JP) Cn with
JUDITH C. McCARTHY
United States Magistrate Judge
| Nothing in this Order shall be construed to limit or modify the Court’s prior Bench Order on Defendants’ motion
in limine. Defendants may still “raise the sincerity of Plaintiffs’ religious beliefs in the context of whether Plaintiffs
suffered damages from the Exclusion Order and Emergency Declaration by impinging on their ability to practice
their religion.” (January 19, 2024 Minute Entry; Docket No. 133).