Smith v. Stack

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

JAHMAL AHMED SMITH,

Plaintiff,

1:23-CV-9451 (LTS)

-against-

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

EILEEN STACK; MELVIN C. DALERE,

Defendants.

LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Jahmal Ahmed Smith, of Jacksonville, Florida, who is appearing pro se, filed

this action invoking the court’s diversity jurisdiction.1 He sues: (1) Eileen Stack, Deputy

Commissioner of New York State’s Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance, who

oversees the administration of that office’s Division of Child Support Services; and (2) Melvin

C. Dalere, a Support Magistrate of the New York Family Court, Bronx County.

The Court understands Plaintiff’s complaint as asserting, under the court’s federal

question jurisdiction, claims of federal constitutional violations, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as

well as claims under state law, under the court’s diversity and supplemental jurisdiction.

By order dated October 27, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in

forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons discussed below, the

Court dismisses this action.

1 Under Rule 5.2(a)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, court submissions that

refer to the name of a minor child must do so by using only the child’s name’s initials. See Fed.

R. Civ. P. 5.2(a)(3). Under Rule 5.2(a)(2), court submissions that refer to a person’s date of birth

must refer only to the person’s birth year and not to the exact date of birth. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

5.2(a)(2). Plaintiff has attached to his complaint documents that reveals a child’s full name and

that child’s complete date of birth. Accordingly, in an abundance of caution, the Court has

directed the Clerk of Court to restrict electronic access to the complaint to a “case participant-

only” basis.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is

frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see

Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also

dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to

construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret

them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470

F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted, emphasis in

original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits –

to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.

Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is

plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially

plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that

the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In

reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Id.

But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,”

which are essentially just legal conclusions. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). After

separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine

whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief.

Id. at 679.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, who alleges that the events that are the bases for his claims occurred in

Jacksonville, Florida, between June 30, 2009, and September 30, 2022, asserts that he “has been

victimized for years by a corrupt system of judicial misconduct [by] New York family courts.”

(ECF 1, at 5.) Plaintiff also alleges that the defendants “have used deceptive [and]

unconscionable schemes to criminally defraud the United States government by sending illegal

wage with[holding] . . . document[s] to [his] place of business demanding . . . [m]oney that is not

owed to the [G]overnment of the United States.” (Id.) Plaintiff criticizes Title IV-D of the Social

Security Act as “a non positive law” that “has given officers of the court the incentive to abuse

their power under color of law to cause irreversible harm to [Plaintiff] and [his] family.” (Id.) He

further alleges that the defendants “have conspired to commit fraud by and through the

establishment and enforcement of fraudulent child support orders that [were] . . . created with

complete disregard of evidence and facts.” (Id.)

Plaintiff has attached to his complaint a copy of an Order Terminating an Order of

Support on Consent, issued on June 8, 2022, and entered on June 16, 2022, by Support

Magistrate Melvin C. Dalere, of the New York Family Court, Bronx County. (Id. at 9.) That

order referenced a January 10, 2019 order of that same court in which Plaintiff was directed to

pay child support. (Id.) It also states that on April 21, 2022, Plaintiff filed a petition in that court

to modify that court’s January 10, 2019 order. (Id.) After noting that there had “been a change of

circumstances . . . which makes . . . modification . . . necessary and proper,” and that there had

been an “examination and inquiry into the facts and circumstances of the case, and [a] . . .

hearing [of] the proofs and testimony offered in relation thereto, and upon consent of the

parties,” Support Magistrate Dalere terminated the January 10, 2019 order, effective April 21,

2022, “without prejudice to arrears.” (Id. at 9-10.) In that same order, Support Magistrate Dalere

also directed the appropriate Support Collection Unit “to adjust the arrears accordingly.” (Id. at

10.)

Plaintiff alleges that, on September 30, 2022, he “received an [i]ncome with[holding] . . .

letter at [his] place of business,” which appears to have then been in Wisconsin.2 (Id. at 6-7.) The

director of human resources of his employer (“the HR director”) informed him “that she [would]

start garnishing [his] compensation to pay a debt to the child support enforcement agency.” (Id.

at 6.) Plaintiff states that he sent “a [c]ease and [d]esist [letter] and demanded proof of this debt,”

and that the HR director also requested a copy of a court order for this garnishment but [officials]

. . . never sent one” (Id.) He also alleges that the withholding document directed withholding

$950 per month from his wages, but that it was not accompanied by a court order.3 (Id. at 7.)

Plaintiff further alleges that Eileen Stack, Deputy Commissioner in charge of the New York

State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance’s Division of Child Support Services, “is

practicing law by sending [w]age withholding documents to [his] place of labor without an

agreement or a signature from a judge with authority.” (Id.) He additionally alleges that “[t]here

is no contract between [him] and the agency that . . . Stack sent this document from.” (Id.)

Plaintiff states that “[w]ith this garnishment in place, [he] cannot support [his] family or pay [his]

2 Plaintiff has also attached to his complaint a letter from a Support Enforcement Unit in

New York, dated September 30, 2022, which informed what appears to be Plaintiff’s then-

Wisconsin-based employer that, as of that date, Plaintiff was $30,337.64 in arrears as to child

support he owed, originating from a child support determination in a New York State court in the

Bronx, New York. (ECF 1, at 11-15.)

3 The letter from a New York Support Enforcement Unit that is attached to the complaint

directs garnishment of Plaintiff’s income in the amount $940.50 per month. (ECF 1, at 12.)

bills, [and] because of this[,] [his] credit score has dropped and [he] cannot get loans or credit

cards.” (Id.)

Plaintiff claims that multiple federal statutes, including criminal statutes, have been

violated. In addition, he claims that “[t]his action against [him] is clearly [a] bill attainder.” (Id.)

In the relief section of his complaint, he seeks:

[a]ll money returned to me that [was taken] . . . using fraudulent wage

with[holding] . . . documents. [He] also ask[s] the court to find that[,] [due] . . . to

the los[s] of freedoms by this action[,] . . . the court award[] [him] . . . 1,000,000

US dollars for the suffering this has caused [him] and [his] family.

(Id. at 6.)

DISCUSSION

A. Claims on behalf of others

To the extent that Plaintiff asserts claims on behalf of members of his family, or anyone

else, the Court must dismiss those claims. The statute governing appearances in federal court, 28

U.S.C. § 1654, “allow[s] two types of representation: ‘that by an attorney admitted to the

practice of law by a governmental regulatory body, and that by a person representing himself.’”

Lattanzio v. COMTA, 481 F.3d 137, 139 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Eagle Assocs. v. Bank of

Montreal, 926 F.2d 1305, 1308 (2d Cir. 1991)). A nonlawyer cannot bring suit on behalf of

another person. See United States ex rel. Mergent Servs. v. Flaherty, 540 F.3d 89, 92 (2d Cir.

2008); Iannaccone v. Law, 142 F.3d 553, 558 (2d Cir. 1998).

Plaintiff does not allege that he is an attorney. Thus, any claims that he asserts on behalf

of members of his family, or anyone else, are dismissed without prejudice.

B. Private prosecution

Plaintiff seems to seek the criminal prosecution of the defendants and/or others. If that is

the case, the Court must dismiss his claims for such relief. Plaintiff cannot initiate a prosecution

in this court because “the decision to prosecute is solely within the discretion of the prosecutor.”

Leeke v. Timmerman, 454 U.S. 83, 86-87 (1981). Neither Plaintiff nor the Court can direct

prosecutors to initiate a criminal proceeding against anyone because prosecutors possess

discretionary authority to bring criminal actions and they are “immune from control or

interference by citizen or court.” Conn. Action Now, Inc. v. Roberts Plating Co., 457 F.2d 81, 87

(2d Cir. 1972). Accordingly, because Plaintiff lacks standing to cause the criminal prosecution of

others, see Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 618-19 (1973), the Court dismisses, for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction, any claims in which Plaintiff seeks the criminal prosecution of

anyone, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); Mahon v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 683 F.3d 59, 62 (2d Cir.

2012) (“If [a] plaintiff[ ] lack[s] Article III standing, a [federal] court has no subject matter

jurisdiction to hear [his] claim.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

C. Bill of attainder

Plaintiff seems to assert that his obligation to pay child support arrears (child support

owed that should have been paid earlier) is a bill of attainder. “A bill of attainder is ‘a law that

legislatively determines guilt and inflicts punishment upon an identifiable individual without . . .

the protections of a judicial trial.’” Shenandoah v. Halbritter, 366 F.3d 89, 92 (2d Cir. 2004)

(quoting Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 468 (1977)). For example, courts consider

laws “sentencing a named individual or identifiable members of a group to death, . . .

imprisonment, [or] banishment, [or directing] . . . the punitive confiscation of property” as bills

of attainder. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 473 (footnotes omitted).

Plaintiff appears to allege that he is subject to a bill of attainder because, without any

judicial review, his wages are being garnished to pay his child support arrears. But he points to

no legislation that has been “directed at him.” See Stone v. Pamoja House, 111 F. App’x 624,

626 (2d Cir. 2004) (summary order); Stevenson v. de Blasio, No. 21-CV-5965 (AT) (JLC), 2022

WL 1763362, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2022) (holding that a local law was not a bill of attainder

because it did not identify the plaintiff or any other individual for punishment), report &

recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 3445728 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2022), appeal dismissed, No.

22-2032 (2d Cir. Oct. 5, 2022) (dismissed effective Oct. 26, 2022). Rather, it seems that

Plaintiff’s wages are being garnished because of previous judicial proceedings, in the New York

Family Court, Bronx County, that resulted in that court issuing a January 10, 2019 order

directing Plaintiff to make child support payments. It also seems that Plaintiff fell into arrears

with respect to approximately $30,337.64 of those payments, and that the Family Court, in June

2022, discontinued Plaintiff’s obligation to make prospective child support payments, effective

April 21, 2022, but without prejudice to any child support arrears he still owed. (See ECF 1, at

9-10.) The Court therefore dismisses any claim that Plaintiff has been subjected to a bill of

attainder, for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

D. Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Support Magistrate Dalere

The Court must dismiss the claims for damages and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 that Plaintiff asserts against Support Magistrate Dalere. Judges are absolutely immune

from suit for damages for any actions taken within the scope of their judicial responsibilities.

Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9-11 (1991). Generally, “acts arising out of, or related to, individual

cases before the judge are considered judicial in nature.” Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 204, 210 (2d

Cir. 2009). “Even allegations of bad faith or malice cannot overcome judicial immunity.” Id. at

209. This is because, “[w]ithout insulation from liability, judges would be subject to harassment

and intimidation.” Young v. Selsky, 41 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1994). In addition, Section 1983, as

amended in 1996, provides that “in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or

omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a

declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Judicial immunity does not apply when the judge takes action “outside” his or her judicial

capacity, or when the judge takes action that, although judicial in nature, is taken “in absence of

jurisdiction.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11-12; see also Bliven, 579 F.3d at 209-10 (describing actions

that are judicial in nature). But “the scope of [a] judge’s jurisdiction must be construed broadly

where the issue is the immunity of the judge.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978).

New York Family Court Support Magistrates, as New York State judicial officers, enjoy

this judicial immunity, when presiding over child support proceedings. See Acre v. Turnbull, No.

21-642, 2021 WL 5816687 (2d Cir. Dec. 8, 2021) (summary order); Chris H. v. New York, 764

F. App’x 53, 55 (2d Cir. 2019) (summary order); Legister v. Radowitz, No. 20-CV-9330 (LLS),

2020 WL 7405672, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2020); Charles v. Lopez, No. 19-CV-8706 (CM),

2019 WL 5261154, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2019); Roger of the Fam. Forest v. 45 C.F.R. § 75.2

IV-D Contractor Steve Banks, No. 18-CV-10866 (CM), 2019 WL 4194332, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.

Aug. 30, 2019) (collecting other district court cases within the Second Circuit).

Plaintiff seems to assert claims for damages and injunctive relief, pursuant Section 1983,

against Support Magistrate Dalere, arising from: (1) an order that he issued before June 2022,

including one issued on January 10, 2019, directing Plaintiff to pay child support; and (2) an

order that he issued in June 2022, discontinuing Plaintiff’s prospective child support payments,

effective April 21, 2022, but without prejudice to Plaintiff’s continuing obligation to pay child

support debt that, as of April 21, 2022, he owed but had not yet paid. Plaintiff, however, fails to

allege any facts showing that, in issuing those orders, Support Magistrate Dalere acted beyond

the scope of his judicial responsibilities or outside his jurisdiction. See Mireles, 509 U.S. at 11-

12.

Because Plaintiff sues Support Magistrate Dalere for “acts arising out of, or related to,

individual cases before him,” Dalere is immune from suit for damages as to such claims. Bliven,

579 F.3d at 210. The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s claims under Section 1983 for

damages against Support Magistrate Dalere because they seek monetary relief against a

defendant who is immune from such relief, see § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii), and, consequently, are

frivolous,4 § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i); see Mills v. Fischer, 645 F.3d 176, 177 (2d Cir. 2011) (“Any

claim dismissed on the ground of absolute judicial immunity is ‘frivolous’ for purposes of [the

IFP statute].”).

E. The Younger abstention doctrine

Inasmuch as Plaintiff’s child support proceedings are pending in the New York Family

Court, Bronx County, this Court may not intervene in them. In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37

(1971), the Supreme Court of the United States held that a federal court may not enjoin a

pending state criminal proceeding in the absence of special circumstances suggesting bad faith,

harassment, or irreparable injury that is both serious and immediate. See Gibson v. Berryhill, 411

U.S. 564, 573-74 (1973) (citing Younger, 404 U.S. 37). Application of the Younger abstention

4 The amendment to Section 1983, allowing for injunctive relief against a judge only if a

state court declaratory decree was violated or state-court declaratory relief is unavailable,

precludes Plaintiff from seeking injunctive relief against Support Magistrate Dalere. This is so

because Plaintiff can seek review, by a Family Court Judge, of a Support Magistrate’s rulings

and, if unsuccessful, appeal a Family Court Judge’s decision in the New York State appellate

courts. See N.Y. Family Court Act §§ 439(e), 1112; N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 5602(a)(1), (b)(2); see

generally Berlin v. Meijia, No. 15-CV-5308, 2017 WL 4402457, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2017)

(“Here, no declaratory decree was violated and declaratory relief is available to plaintiffs through

an appeal of the state court judges’ decisions in state court.”), appeal dismissed, No. 17-3589 (2d

Cir. Apr. 18, 2018) (effective May 18, 2018).

doctrine has been extended to the three following categories of state court proceedings: (1) state

criminal prosecutions; (2) civil enforcement proceedings that are “akin to criminal prosecutions”;

and (3) civil proceedings “that implicate a State’s interest in enforcing the orders and judgments

of its courts.” Sprint Commc’n, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72-73 (2013) (“Sprint”). Courts have

held that pending state child support proceedings involve at least one of the circumstances

mentioned in Sprint in which the Younger abstention doctrine should be applied. See Francis v.

Dep’t of Soc. Servs., No. 22-CV-6860, 2023 WL 5096145, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2023) (“The

merits of that appeal – challenging both the Family Court order and Francis’s need to exhaust

administrative remedies through [the Department of Social Services] – implicate New York’s

state interest in managing and enforcing child support payments.”); Perso v. Perso, No. 19-CV-

2858, 2019 WL 4415399, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2019) (same as to ongoing divorce and child

support proceedings); Tomczyk v. N.Y. Unified Court Sys., No. 19-CV-2753, 2019 WL 2437849,

at *3 (E.D.N.Y. June 10, 2019) (same); Bowman v. Morris, No. 8:19-CV-0097, 2019 WL

5150196, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2019) (“[T]o the extent that the child support issues are

continuing in Family Court, the Court should abstain from interfering with that process.”), report

& recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 3759174 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2019); Gravagna v.

Eisenpress, No. 19-CV-0700 (CM), 2019 WL 1469289, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2019) (“[T]his

Court must abstain under Younger from interfering in Plaintiff’s ongoing state-court

proceedings[] involving . . . child support issues and ‘implicat[ing] a State’s interest in enforcing

the orders and judgments of its courts.’” (citation and second alteration omitted)); Brock v. City

of New York, No. 19-CV-0957, 2019 WL 438356, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2019) (applying

Younger abstention to a claim in which the plaintiff asked the federal district court “to enjoin [a

New York City official] from continuing to prosecute [the plaintiff’s] child support obligations

in New York family court” because “actions to enforce child support orders implicate important

state interests”).

Plaintiff has not alleged any facts showing bad faith, harassment, or irreparable injury

that is both serious and immediate has occurred with respect to his child support proceedings that

are pending in the New York Family Court, Bronx County. Thus, to the extent that Plaintiff asks

this Court to intervene in those pending proceedings, the Court dismisses his claims under the

Younger abstention doctrine.5

F. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine

To the extent that Plaintiff asks this Court to overturn a final order or judgment issued in

his concluded child support proceedings in the New York Family Court, Bronx County, the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine requires the dismissal of his claims for such relief. Under the Rooker-

5 In 1990, in American Airlines, Inc. v. Block, the United States Court of Appeals for the

Second Circuit instructed federal district courts to abstain from exercising federal question

jurisdiction of claims involving domestic relations issues, so long as those claims could be fully

and fairly determined in the state courts. See 905 F.2d 12, 14 (2d Cir. 1990). For example, a

federal district court should abstain from exercising its federal question jurisdiction of claims in

which it is “asked to grant a divorce or annulment, determine support payments, or award

custody of a child.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Two years after the

Second Circuit issued its decision in American Airlines, the Supreme Court of the United States

held, in Ankenbrandt v. Richards, that a previously recognized exception to the federal district

courts’ subject matter jurisdiction “divests the federal courts of power to issue divorce, alimony,

and child custody decrees” in actions brought under a federal district court’s diversity

jurisdiction. 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992); see id. at 705 (allowing for the possibility that such an

exception to jurisdiction could be extended to “elements of the domestic relationship even when

the parties do not seek divorce, alimony, or child custody”); see also Donohue v. Pataki, 28 F.

App’x 59, 60 (2d Cir. 2002) (summary order) (“We agree with the district court’s conclusion that

it lacked jurisdiction to invalidate or otherwise review the state court’s decision affirming the

modification of Donohue’s child support payments.” (citing, inter alia, Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at

703)). More recently, the Second Circuit, in Deem v. DiMella-Deem, held that regardless of the

Supreme Court’s holding in Ankenbrandt, its own previous holding in American Airlines remains

good law. 941 F.3d 618, 621 (2d Cir. 2019). Thus, notwithstanding whether this Court is

considering this action under its original federal question or diversity jurisdiction, it must either

abstain from considering, or lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider, any request by Plaintiff

to issue a decision determining whether he owes child support.

Feldman doctrine, a federal district court lacks authority to review a final state court order or

judgment where a litigant seeks relief that invites the federal district court to reject or overturn

such a final state court order or judgment. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.,

544 U.S. 280, 291-92 (2005); see also Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 535 U.S. 635,

644 n.3 (2002) (“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine . . . recognizes that 28 U.S.C. § 1331[,] [the

statute granting federal district courts’ federal question jurisdiction,] is a grant of original

jurisdiction, and does not authorize district courts to exercise appellate jurisdiction over state-

court judgments. . . .”); Dorce v. City of New York, 2 F.4th 82, 101 (2d Cir. 2021) (The Rooker-

Feldman doctrine “bars federal district courts from hearing cases that in effect are appeals from

state court judgments, because the Supreme Court [of the United States] is the only federal court

with jurisdiction over such cases.” (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1257))); Kropelnicki v. Siegel, 290 F.3d

118, 128 (2d Cir. 2002) (“The [Rooker-Feldman] doctrine reflects the principle set forth in 28

U.S.C. § 1257 that the Supreme Court [of the United States] is the only federal court that has

jurisdiction to review state court judgments, unless otherwise provided by Congress, see, e.g., 28

U.S.C. § 2254 (habeas corpus review).” (citation omitted)). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine

“precludes a United States district court from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction.” Exxon

Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 291. This includes when a litigant seeks relief that invites a federal

district court to reject or overturn a final decision of a New York Family Court as to a child

support dispute brought in that state court. See, e.g., Legister, 2020 WL 7405672, at *3 (“A

plaintiff’s challenge in a federal district court to ‘the validity or enforcement of [a] child support

order itself’ is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.” (quoting Sykes v. Bank of Am., 723 F.3d

399, 404 (2d Cir. 2013))).

District court review of claims is barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine when four

requirements are met: (1) the litigant lost in state court; (2) the litigant complains of injuries

caused by a final state court order or judgment; (3) the litigant invites district court review and

rejection of the final state court order or judgment; and (4) the final state court order or judgment

was rendered before the district court proceedings commenced. Dorce, 2 F.4th at 101 (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted).

Inasmuch as Plaintiff criticizes any final child support decision of the New York Family

Court, Bronx County, in an effort to request that this Court overturn that final decision, the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars this Court from granting Plaintiff such relief. The Court therefore

dismisses any claims that essentially challenge a final decision of the New York Family Court,

Bronx County, arising from Plaintiff’s concluded child support proceedings in that court, under

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3);

Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 291.

G. Claims under Section 1983 alleging violations of procedural due process

The Court also understands Plaintiff’s complaint as asserting claims, under Section 1983,

that the defendants have violated Plaintiff’s right of procedural due process by illegally

garnishing his wages to pay his child support arrears debt without providing him with a hearing

or other means to challenge such garnishment.

The right of procedural due process only protects “against deprivations without due

process of law.” Rivera-Powell v. N.Y. City Bd. of Elections, 470 F.3d 458, 464 (2d Cir. 2006)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “The fundamental requisite of due process of law

is the opportunity to be heard . . . at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Goldberg v.

Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Determining

whether the process provided is adequate requires a weighing of: (1) the private interest affected;

(2) the risk of erroneous deprivation and the probable value of further safeguards; and (3) the

governmental interest at issue. See Rivera-Powell, 470 F.3d at 466 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge,

424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).

Generally, some kind of predeprivation process must be provided before a person’s

property rights are infringed upon. See Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc.,

452 U.S. 264, 299 (1981); DiBlasio v. Novello, 344 F.3d 292, 302 (2d Cir. 2003). Where that

person is deprived of a property right because of a random and unauthorized act, rather than

through the operation of established state procedures, however, the right of procedural due

process is satisfied if the State provides an adequate postdeprivation remedy. See Hudson v.

Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984); Rivera-Powell, 470 F.3d at 465.

In the State of New York, a child support debtor is entitled to the administrative remedies

outlined in Article 52 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (“Article 52”). For example,

when a local social services district’s Support Collection Unit issues an execution for

enforcement of current child support or child support arrears, but there is “an error in the

amount” purportedly owed, the debtor may assert that error as a “mistake of fact” and challenge

it administratively. See N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 5241(a)(8), (e). If the agency does not agree with the

debtor’s objection, the debtor may seek judicial review of the agency’s determination in a

proceeding brought in a state court under Article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Law and

Rules (“Article 78”). Beattease v. Washington Cnty. Support Collection Unit, 92 A.D.3d 1037,

1038 (2d Dep’t 2012); see Phillips v. Wagner, No. 22-CV-0833, 2022 WL 17406092, at *3

(N.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2022), report & recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 17403441 (N.D.N.Y.

Dec. 2, 2022), appeal dismissed, No. 23-68, 2023 WL 4445323 (2d Cir. Apr. 25, 2023); Ketan v.

Lopez, No. 20-CV-1626 (LLS), 2020 WL 3871209, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 2020); Basciano v.

Child Support Enf’t Mt. Vernon Off., No. 19-CV-11797 (CM), 2020 WL 550569, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.

Feb. 4, 2020); Smith v. N.Y. Child Support Process Ctr., No. 19-CV-9266 (CM), 2019 WL

6312178, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2019), appeal dismissed, No. 20-26, 2020 WL 3643569 (2d

Cir. May 7, 2020).

Here, while Plaintiff alleges that state officials have illegally garnished his wages without

giving him an opportunity to challenge the garnishment, those facts alone do not give rise to a

claim of a procedural due process violation. State law, specifically, Articles 52 and 78, provides

procedural due process to child support debtors facing garnishment. If state officials failed to

comply with state law, such an omission would constitute a random and unauthorized deprivation

of property. That deprivation does not, however, constitute a violation of procedural due process

so long as the state provides an adequate postdeprivation remedy.

Plaintiff cannot assert that he was denied procedural due process if he never sought

Article 52 administrative review or Article 78 judicial review. Basciano, 2020 WL 550569, at *4

(citing Vialez v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 783 F. Supp. 109, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), and Smith, 2019 WL

6312178, at *3). He has alleged no facts showing that he has sought Article 52 administrative

review or Article 78 judicial review, or that either remedy is inadequate. In fact, the complaint

shows that Plaintiff successfully sought some sort of judicial review, and suggests that he was

aware that he was in arrears as to child support that he already owed, when, in June 2022,

Support Magistrate Dalere granted his petition to discontinue prospective child support

payments, effective April 21, 2022, without prejudice to his pre-existing child support arrears.

Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff asserts claims under Section 1983 that the defendants have

violated his right to procedural due process with regard to his child support arrears obligations,

the Court dismisses such claims for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

H. Title IV-D of the Social Security Act

The Court also construes Plaintiff’s complaint as asserting claims, under Section 1983,

arising from the defendants’ allegedly incorrect enforcement of Title IV-D of the Social Security

Act (“Title IV-D”). That statutory provision underwrites States’ child support collection efforts,

and requires States “to establish . . . comprehensive system[s] to establish paternity, locate absent

parents, and help families obtain support orders.” Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 333-34

(1997).

The Supreme Court of the United States has made clear, however, that “Title IV-D does

not give individuals a federal right to force a state agency to substantially comply with Title IV-

D.” Id. at 333. “Title IV-D contains no private remedy – either judicial or administrative –

through which aggrieved persons can seek redress. The only way that Title IV-D assures that

States live up to their child support plans is through the . . . oversight” of the Secretary of the

United States Department of Health and Human Services. Id. at 348; see D.D.. ex rel. V.D. v.

N.Y.C. Bd. of Educ., 465 F.3d 503, 511 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Because the requirement that a State

operate its child support program in substantial compliance with Title IV-D was not intended to

benefit individual children and custodial parents the provision did not create a federal right and,

therefore, was not enforceable via § 1983.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see

also Simmons v. N.Y.S. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., No. 19-CV-3633 (CM), 2019 WL 1988673, at *3

(S.D.N.Y. May 3, 2019) (“Because there is no private right of action for an individual to bring

any claim based on an alleged failure to comply with Title IV-D, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s

claim invoking Title IV-D of the Social Security Act.”). Thus, because Plaintiff does not have a

private right of action to sue the defendants for their allegedly incorrect enforcement of Title IV-

D, the Court dismisses these claims for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.

See § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

I. Remaining claims under state law under the court’s diversity jurisdiction

Plaintiff invokes the court’s original diversity jurisdiction but, as the Court has explained

above, most of his claims are asserted under federal law, under the court’s original federal

question jurisdiction. To the extent that Plaintiff asserts any remaining claims under state law

that the Court has not dismissed pursuant to the domestic relations exception to the court’s

subject matter jurisdiction, see supra note 5, the Court understands that such claims are raised

under the court’s original diversity jurisdiction.

The original subject matter jurisdiction of the federal district courts is limited and is set

forth generally in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332. Under these statutes, a federal district court has

original subject matter jurisdiction only when a “federal question” is presented or, if the plaintiff

is asserting claims under state law under the court’s diversity jurisdiction, when the plaintiff and

the defendants are citizens of different States and the amount in controversy exceeds the sum or

value of $75,000. “‘[I]t is common ground that in our federal system of limited jurisdiction any

party or the court sua sponte, at any stage of the proceedings, may raise the question of whether

the court has subject matter jurisdiction.’” United Food & Com. Workers Union, Loc. 919, AFL-

CIO v. CenterMark Prop. Meriden Square, Inc., 30 F.3d 298, 301 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting

Manway Constr. Co., Inc. v. Hous. Auth. of the City of Hartford, 711 F.2d 501, 503 (2d Cir.

1983)); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-

matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”); Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526

U.S. 574, 583 (1999) (“subject-matter delineations must be policed by the courts on their own

initiative”).

To establish the court’s diversity jurisdiction, a plaintiff must first show that he and the

defendants are citizens of different States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1); Wis. Dep’t of Corr. v.

Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 388 (1998) (“A case falls within the federal district court’s ‘original’

diversity ‘jurisdiction’ only if diversity of citizenship among the parties is complete, i.e., only if

there is no plaintiff and no defendant who are citizens of the same State.”). For diversity

purposes, an individual is a citizen of the State where he or she is domiciled, which is defined as

the place where a person “has his [or her] true fixed home . . . and to which, whenever he [or

she] is absent, he [or she] has the intention of returning.” Palazzo ex rel. Delmage v. Corio, 232

F.3d 38, 42 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). An individual “has

but one domicile.” Id.

Moreover, for diversity jurisdiction, the plaintiff must also allege to a “reasonable

probability” that his claims are in excess of the sum or value of $75,000, the statutory

jurisdictional amount. See § 1332(a); Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc., 438 F.3d 214,

221 (2d Cir. 2006) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The sum claimed by the

plaintiff will control if the amount is claimed in good faith. See St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v.

Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288 (1938). It is the Court’s duty, however, to dismiss an action

where it is “convinced to a legal certainty that the plaintiff cannot recover an amount in excess of

the [minimum statutory jurisdictional amount.]” Tongkook Am., Inc. v. Shipton Sportswear Co.,

14 F.3d 781, 784 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Deutsch v. Hewes St. Realty Corp., 359 F.2d 96, 98 (2d

Cir. 1966)) (alteration in original, internal quotation marks omitted).

Plaintiff alleges that he is a citizen of the State of Florida, and that Deputy Commissioner

Stack is a citizen of the State of New York (ECF 1, at 2-3); he does not specify the state

citizenship of Support Magistrate Dalere. In addition, and more importantly, even if Plaintiff did

specify the state citizenship of Support Magistrate Dalere and alleged facts showing that the

parties are diverse, Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to show that his claims under state

law exceed the sum or value of $75,000, the statutory jurisdictional amount for the court’s

original diversity jurisdiction.

In the relief section of his complaint, Plaintiff requests that an unspecified amount of

money be returned to him that, he alleges, was taken from him due to “fraudulent wage

with[holding] documents,” and he seeks an additional $1,000,000 in damages, yet his claims

appear to arise from only $30,337.64 in child support arrears. (See id. at 6, 11-15.) Accordingly,

to the extent that Plaintiff asks this court to consider any remaining claims under state law not

dismissed above, under the court’s original diversity jurisdiction, the Court dismisses such

claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

J. Remaining claims under state law under the court’s supplemental jurisdiction

While the Court cannot consider Plaintiff’s remaining claims under state law under the

court’s original diversity jurisdiction, the Court could consider them under its supplemental

jurisdiction. A federal district court may, however, decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

of claims under state law when it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original

jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Generally, “when the federal-law claims have dropped out

of the lawsuit in its early stages and only state-law claims remain, the federal court should

decline the exercise of [supplemental] jurisdiction.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S.

343, 350 (1988) (footnote omitted). In addition, “[i]n the absence of diversity jurisdiction,

because the Court has dismissed the federal claims brought in this action, it may decline to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to . . . [Section] 1367(c)(3).” Golub v. Berdon LLP,

No. 19-CV-10309 (JGK), 2021 WL 637974, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2021). Having dismissed

the claims of which the Court has original jurisdiction, the Court declines to exercise its

supplemental jurisdiction of any remaining claims under state law that Plaintiff may be asserting.

See Kolari v. New York-Presbyterian Hosp., 455 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Subsection (c)

of § 1367 ‘confirms the discretionary nature of supplemental jurisdiction by enumerating the

circumstances in which district courts can refuse its exercise.’” (quoting City of Chicago v. Int’l

Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997))).

K. Leave to amend

Federal district courts generally grant a pro se plaintiff an opportunity to amend a

complaint to cure its defects, but leave to amend is not required where it would be futile. See Hill

v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d

Cir. 1988). Because the defects in Plaintiff’s complaint cannot be cured with an amendment, the

Court declines to grant Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint.

CONCLUSION

The Court dismisses this action for the reasons set forth in this order.

The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would

not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See

Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).

The Court directs the Clerk of Court to enter a judgment dismissing this action.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 2, 2024

New York, New York

/s/ Laura Taylor Swain

LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN

Chief United States District Judge