Rubin v. New York City Board of Education

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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:

LISE RUBIN, :

Plaintiff, :

: 20 Civ. 10208 (LGS)

-against- :

: ORDER__

NEW YORK CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al., :

Defendants. :

:

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LORNA G. SCHOFIELD, District Judge:

WHEREAS, on March 3, 2023, the Report and Recommendation at Dkt. No. 255 was

adopted in full, and Defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint was granted for failure to

comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 (the “Order”).1

WHEREAS, the Order stated that “by March 31, 2023, Plaintiff may file a letter, not to

exceed three pages, requesting leave to file an amended complaint and explaining how the

proposed amended complaint cures the deficiencies identified [in the Order].” Plaintiff was

advised that “no extensions will be granted to the deadline absent extraordinary circumstances”

and that “the purpose of her letter is to seek permission to file the proposed amended complaint

in compliance with Rule 8. If she does not file the letter and proposed amended complaint by

March 31, 2023, she will not be allowed to file it, and the case will be dismissed.”

WHEREAS, on March 31, 2023, Plaintiff moved for reconsideration of the Order

pursuant to Rules 52(b), 59(e), 60(b) and, construed liberally, Local Rule 6.3 (the “Motion”).2

1 Familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history is assumed. See Rubin v. N.Y.C.

Bd. of Educ., No. 20 Civ. 10208, 2023 WL 2344731, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2023).

2 The Motion is brought “under Rule 52(a)(3) & (6), (b); Rule 59(e); Rule 60(b)(1), (4), (5), &

(6); Rule 55[;] Rule 8(b)(6).” However, Rules 8(b)(6), 52(a) and 55 are not vehicles for seeking

reconsideration.

The Motion asserts that the Court “violated the FRCP pertaining to applying individual rules and

Ordering actions for which there is no basis in law, and which is contrary to the FRCP and

substantial case law.”

WHEREAS, the “standards governing motions for amendment of findings under Rule

52(b), motions to alter or amend a judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e), and motions for

reconsideration pursuant to Local Rule 6.3 are the same.” Elghourab v. Vista JFK, LLC, No. 17

Civ. 911, 2019 WL 13218564, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. July 31, 2019), aff’d, 818 F. App’x 63 (2d Cir.

2020); see City of Hartford v. Chase, 942 F.2d 130, 133 (2d Cir. 1991) (“Motions for

reconsideration under [the local rule], however, are as a practical matter the same thing as

motions for amendment of judgment under [Rule 59(e)] -- each seeks to reopen a district court’s

decision on the theory that the court made mistaken findings in the first instance.”). “Any kind

of motion that draws into question the correctness of the district court judgment is considered to

be a motion ‘to alter or amend the judgment’ under Civil Rule 59(e). Such a motion may

variously be styled a motion to reconsider, a motion for rehearing, a motion to reargue, a motion

to vacate, or a motion to set aside the judgment.” City of Hartford, 942 F.2d at 133 (internal

quotation marks omitted); accord A Royal Flush, Inc. v. Arias, No. 18 Civ. 1206, 2020 WL

3619332, at *2 n.1 (D. Conn. July 2, 2020), aff’d, 855 F. App’x 23 (2d Cir. 2021).

WHEREAS, a motion for reconsideration should be granted “only when the [party

seeking reconsideration] identifies an intervening change of controlling law, the availability of

new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” Cho v.

Blackberry Ltd., 991 F.3d 155, 170 (2d Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). The

standard “is strict, and reconsideration will generally be denied unless the moving party can

point to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked -- matters, in other words, that

might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court.” Id. (internal

quotation marks omitted). A motion for reconsideration is not “a vehicle for relitigating old

issues, presenting the case under new theories, securing a rehearing on the merits, or otherwise

taking a second bite at the apple.” Analytical Survs., Inc. v. Tonga Partners, 684 F.3d 36, 52 (2d

Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Dill v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No.

19 Civ. 10947, 2021 WL 3406192, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2021). The decision to grant or

deny a motion for reconsideration rests within “the sound discretion of the district court.” Aczel

v. Labonia, 584 F.3d 52, 61 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Strougo v.

Barclays PLC, 334 F. Supp. 3d 591, 595 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).

WHEREAS, the Motion does not identify “an intervening change of controlling law, the

availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.”

Cho, 991 F.3d at 170 (internal quotation marks omitted). The lone argument specific to the

Order suggests “it was error for the District Court to issue specific instructions mandating the

content and format of the amended complaint,” citing Ferran v. Off. of Dist. Att’y of Cnty. of

Rensselaer, 351 F. App’x 508 (2d Cir. 2009) and Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d

185 (2d Cir. 2008). The argument is unpersuasive. In both Ferran and Sealed Plaintiff, the

district court ordered the plaintiff to file an amended complaint that stated in numbered

paragraphs: “(i) the alleged act of misconduct; (ii) the date on which such misconduct occurred;

(iii) the names of each and every individual who participated in such misconduct; (iv) where

appropriate, the location where the alleged misconduct occurred; and (v) the nexus between such

misconduct and Plaintiff’s civil and/or constitutional rights.” Sealed Plaintiff, 537 F.3d at 187

(internal quotation marks omitted). This was error only because “a complaint need not contain

detailed factual allegations -- such as the dates of misconduct and the names of each and every

individual involved in the misconduct.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Ferran,

351 F. App’x at 509.

Here, the requirements imposed by the Order concern only length, i.e., the proposed

amended complaint was not to exceed twenty-five pages or include exhibits. See, e.g., Domnez

v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Consumer Affs., No. 20 Civ. 5586, 2022 WL 11961384, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.

18, 2022) (20-page limit); Harden v. Doe, No. 19 Civ. 3839, 2019 WL 2578157, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.

June 24, 2019) (same); West v. Goord, 423 F. App’x 66, 67 (2d Cir. 2011) (summary order) (15-

page limit). The Order, in an effort to assist Plaintiff, otherwise “suggests that the proposed

amended complaint focus on” a subset of claims, lists the elements of each such claim and, in

fact, makes clear that the complaint “should allege only enough facts to support each element of

the asserted claims.” (emphasis added). Ferran and Sealed Plaintiff are therefore inapposite, and

reconsideration pursuant to Rules 52(b), 59(e) and Local Rule 6.3 is denied.

WHEREAS, nor does the Motion satisfy Rule 60(b). Rule 60(b) provides that a district

court may relieve a party from a final judgment, order or proceeding for the following reasons:

“(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence that,

with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under

Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or

misconduct by an opposing party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied,

released, or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or

applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or (6) any other reason that justifies relief.”

“Motions under Rule 60(b) are addressed to the sound discretion of the district court and are

generally granted only upon a showing of exceptional circumstances.” Mendell ex rel. Viacom,

Inc. v. Gollust, 909 F.2d 724, 731 (2d Cir. 1990); accord Holmes v. City of New York, No. 19

Civ. 1628, 2023 WL 2631967, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2023). The Court has considered the

Motion’s arguments, and even assuming a final judgment and a liberal interpretation of the

Motion, the Motion fails to demonstrate any of the six listed grounds for relief. Suggestions, for

example, that the Court failed to recognize Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions, that the Magistrate

Judge “repeatedly made unauthorized dispositive orders” and that previously vacated certificates

of default should be reinstated are not supported by the record or applicable law. See United

States v. Int’l Bhd. Of Teamsters, 247 F.3d 370, 392 (2d Cir. 2001) (“The party seeking relief

from judgment has an onerous standard to meet [under Rule 60(b)].”). For the foregoing

reasons, it is hereby

ORDERED that the Motion is DENIED. It is further

ORDERED that, because Plaintiff did not file the letter and proposed amended

complaint by the March 31, 2023, deadline, the case is dismissed.

The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to close the motion at Dkt. No. 279, to close

the case and to mail a copy of this Order to the pro se Plaintiff.

Dated: April 12, 2023

New York, New York «

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE