Isaac v. Schiff

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

---------------------------------------------------------X

HALCYON ISAAC,

Plaintiff,

OPINION & ORDER

-against-

21-CV-11078 (PMH)

MICHAEL SCHIFF, et al.,

Defendants.

---------------------------------------------------------X

PHILIP M. HALPERN, United States District Judge:

Halcyon Isaac (“Plaintiff”) brings this action against Sullivan County Sheriff Michael

Schiff; Sullivan County Treasurer Nancy Buck; Town of Delaware Town Clerk, Tax Collector,

and Registrar Tess McBeath; Town of Delaware Town Justice Erik Nystrom (“Nystrom”); and

Town of Delaware Town Justice Court Clerk Sally Creegan (collectively, “Defendants”).

Plaintiff’s claims relate to eviction proceedings filed and held in State Court in Sullivan County,

New York, to remove her from a property located at 37 Serenity Drive, Town of Delaware, NY

(the “Property”). Plaintiff filed a Complaint on December 27, 2021: (i) alleging a deprivation of

her constitutional due process rights, which the Court construes as a claim brought under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 (“1983”); (ii) challenging the underlying eviction; and (iii) referencing various additional

inapplicable legal doctrines including relating to the sovereign citizen ideology. (Doc. 1,

“Compl.”). The Court previously denied Plaintiff’s application for a temporary restraining order

on May 25, 2022 (Doc. 34) and denied her application for a preliminary injunction and her motion

for reconsideration on August 11, 2022 (Doc. 43, “Prior Order”).1

1 The Prior Order is also available through commercial databases. Isaac v. Schiff, No. 21-CV-11078, 2022

WL 3290679 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2022). For ease of reference however, the Court will cite herein to the

version on the public docket.

Pending presently before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss under Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), filed on March 18, 2022. (Doc. 20; Doc. 21; Doc. 22,

“Def. Br.”). Plaintiff opposed Defendants’ motion on May 6, 2022 (Doc. 27, “Opp. Br.”) and the

motion was fully submitted upon the filing of Defendants’ reply brief (Doc. 32, “Reply”).

Given the previous adjudication of Plaintiff’s applications for a temporary restraining order

and a preliminary injunction, the Court assumes the parties’ familiarity of the facts and recites

them herein only to the extent necessary to decide the motion. For the reasons set forth below,

Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

I. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and Rule 12(b)(1) requires dismissal of

an action ‘when the district court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate

it.’” Schwartz v. Hitrons Sols., Inc., 397 F. Supp. 3d 357, 364 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (quoting Makarova

v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000)). “The party invoking the Court’s jurisdiction

bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction exists.” Hettler v. Entergy Enters., Inc., 15 F. Supp.

3d 447, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing Conyers v. Rossides, 558 F.3d 137, 143 (2d Cir. 2009)).

However, “[w]hen the Rule 12(b)(1) motion is facial, i.e., based solely on the allegations of the

complaint . . . the plaintiff has no evidentiary burden,” and “[t]he task of the district court is to

determine whether the [complaint] alleges facts that affirmatively and plausibly suggest that the

plaintiff has standing to sue.” Carter v. Healthport Techs., LLC, 822 F.3d 46, 56 (2d Cir. 2016).

Moreover, when deciding a rule 12(b)(1) motion, “the Court ‘must accept as true all material facts

alleged in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.’” Krausz v.

loanDepot.com, LLC (quoting Conyers, 558 F.3d at 143); see also Doe v. Trump Corp., 385 F.

Supp. 3d 265, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).

When a defendant seeks dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) “as well as on other grounds, the

court should consider the Rule 12(b)(1) challenge first since if it must dismiss the complaint for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the accompanying defenses and objections become moot and

do not need to be determined.” Saint-Amour v. Richmond Org., Inc., 388 F. Supp. 3d 277, 286

(S.D.N.Y. 2019) (quoting United States v. New York City Dep’t of Hous., Pres. & Dev., No. 09-

CV-06547, 2012 WL 4017338, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2012)).

II. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion enables a court to dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “The plausibility standard is

not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant

has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The factual allegations pled “must

be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

“When there are well-ple[d] factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and

then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

Thus, the Court must “take all well-ple[d] factual allegations as true, and all reasonable inferences

are drawn and viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff[].” Leeds v. Meltz, 85 F.3d 51, 53

(2d Cir. 1996). The presumption of truth, however, “‘is inapplicable to legal conclusions,’ and

‘[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice.’” Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 678 (alteration in original)). Therefore, a plaintiff must provide “more than labels and

conclusions” to show entitlement to relief. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

A complaint submitted by a pro se plaintiff, “however inartfully ple[d], must be held to

less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers . . . .” Estelle v. Gamble, 429

U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because pro se plaintiffs “‘are often

unfamiliar with the formalities of pleading requirements,’ courts must ‘apply a more flexible

standard in determining the sufficiency of a pro se [complaint] than they would in reviewing a

pleading submitted by counsel.’” Smith v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 218 F. Supp. 2d 357, 361 (W.D.N.Y.

2002) (quoting Platsky v. Cent. Intell. Agency, 953 F.2d 26, 28 (2d Cir. 1991)).

However, while “[p]ro se complaints are held to less stringent standards than those drafted

by lawyers, even following Twombly and Iqbal,” dismissal is “appropriate where a plaintiff has

clearly failed to meet minimum pleading requirements.” Thomas v. Westchester Cty., No. 12-CV-

06718, 2013 WL 3357171, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 3, 2013) (internal citations omitted); see also

Chavis v. Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Even in a pro se case . . . although a court

must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint, that tenet is inapplicable to legal

conclusions, and threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Therefore, while the

Court must “draw the most favorable inferences that [a plaintiff’s] complaint supports, [it] cannot

invent factual allegations that [a plaintiff] has not pled.” Chappius, 618 F.3d at 170. The Court

does, however, have a duty to interpret “the pleadings of a pro se plaintiff liberally and interpret

them ‘to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.’” McPherson v. Coombe, 174 F.3d 276,

280 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994)).

ANALYSIS

Defendants make six arguments in favor of dismissal: (i) Plaintiff lacks standing to bring

a due process claim because she has no interest in the property at issue; (ii) Plaintiff fails to allege

the personal involvement of each Defendant as required to bring a claim pursuant to § 1983; (iii)

Nystrom is entitled to judicial immunity; (iv) Plaintiff’s challenge of the underlying eviction is

barred by the Tax Injunction Act and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; (v) Plaintiff’s remaining

federal statutory claims fail; and (vi) Plaintiff’s constitutional claims fail. (Def. Br. at 6-17).2 The

Court agrees that Plaintiff lacks standing to raise a due process claim, that she is barred from

challenging the underlying eviction through an action in this Court, and that her remaining

statutory and constitutional arguments fail.3

I. Due Process Standing

Plaintiff argues that the eviction at issue in the Complaint violated the due process clause

of the Constitution. “Where a plaintiff sues a defendant ‘to enforce procedural due process rights,

a court must determine (1) whether a [liberty or] property interest is implicated, and if it is, (2)

what process is due before the plaintiff may be deprived of that interest.’” Antonio v. Neighborhood

2 Defendants argue separately that the Court ought to decline supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state

law claims and that Plaintiff should not be granted leave to amend. (Def. Br. at 17-19).

3 With respect to Defendants’ second and third arguments, the Court agrees that Plaintiff has not sufficiently

pled the personal involvement of any of the Defendants and that Nystrom is judicially immune. “To state a

claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts showing the defendants’ direct and personal involvement

in the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Rodriguez v. Burnett, No. 22-CV-10056, 2023 WL 1438720, at

*3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2023). Plaintiff’s Complaint is devoid of specific allegations of each Defendants’

conduct. With respect to Nystrom specifically, “Judges are absolutely immune from suit for damages for

any actions taken within the scope of their judicial responsibilities.” Kelsey v. Kessel, No. 22-CV-03774,

2022 WL 3362456, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2022). Nystrom is indisputably a judicial officer and to any

extent he was involved in Plaintiff’s eviction in his official capacity, he is immune from suit. Additionally

and for the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff’s claims fail on the merits.

Restore Hous. Dev. Fund Corp., No. 19-CV-11084, 2020 WL 1812669, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 8,

2020) (quoting Nnebe v. Daus, 644 F.3d 147, 158 (2d Cir. 2011)). As the Court noted when it

denied Plaintiff’s application for a preliminary injunction, “Plaintiff not only fails to allege that

she has any legally cognizable property interest in the Property, but readily admits that ‘I have no

ownership interest in the physical (real) property located at 37 Serenity Drive Sullivan County

New York State.’” (Prior Order at 3 (quoting Doc. 27 at 3)). This admission entirely forecloses

Plaintiff’s due process claim. Antonio, 2020 WL 1812669, at *5 (“[Plaintiff] has no legal right to

reside in the apartment, and therefore cannot assert a cognizable property interest in the continued

occupancy of the apartment that would implicate due process.”). Plaintiff has alleged no other

possessory interest in the Property at issue.4 Plaintiff’s due process claim is, accordingly,

dismissed.

II. Challenge to the Eviction

To the extent Plaintiff seeks to challenge the validity of the underlying eviction, that claim

fails. Plaintiff asks the Court to put a “stop to all eviction proceedings.” (Compl. at 3). As discussed

in the Prior Order, this Court is without authority to grant such relief. (Prior Order at 2). Defendants

submit as Exhibit B to their declaration in support of the motion a foreclosure Order of the County

Court of Sullivan County, dated December 19, 2019, for the Property from which Plaintiff was

evicted.5 (Doc. 21-2, “State Order”). Therein, the court “[o]rdered that all right, title and interest

into the [Property] is awarded to the County of Sullivan.” (State Order at 4). To stop and/or reverse

the eviction at issue here would require this Court to reconsider and invalidate the State Order.

4 Moreover, “even if Plaintiff had a [possessory] property interest that implicated due process concerns, the

state-court eviction action provided her with an adequate remedy to challenge the eviction.” Antonio, 2020

WL 1812669, at *5.

5 The Court takes notice of this document because “state court decision[s] . . . [are] appropriate for judicial

notice” as public records. Williams v. New York City Hous. Auth., 816 F. App’x 532, 534 (2d Cir. 2020).

Such an action is squarely foreclosed by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which “bars federal district

courts from hearing cases that in effect are appeals from state court judgments.” Dorce v. City of

New York, 2 F.4th 82, 101 (2d Cir. 2021). For Rooker-Feldman to apply, “(1) the federal-court

plaintiff must have lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff must complain of injuries caused by a state-

court judgment; (3) the plaintiff must invite district court review and rejection of that judgment;

and (4) the state-court judgment must have been rendered before the district court proceedings

commenced.” Id. (cleaned up). Each of these factors are met here. The State Order foreclosed the

Property, an action that was adverse to Plaintiff; the foreclosure led to the eviction, which is the

injury Plaintiff complains of here; Plaintiff asks this Court to reverse the eviction, which would in

turn require the rejection of the State Order; and the State Order preceded the instant action. See,

e.g. Morris v. Rosen, 577 F. App’x 41 (2d Cir. 2014) (affirming dismissal of a challenge to eviction

proceedings as precluded by Rooker-Feldman because such an action would require review of a

State Court foreclosure judgment.). Plaintiff is therefore barred from challenging the underlying

eviction.6 To the extent she raises such a claim, it is dismissed.

III. Remaining Theories

The remainder of Plaintiff’s Complaint raises incongruous legal theories: (i) the right to be

free from bills of attainder (as protected by “all four Federal Constitutions”); (ii) the Eleventh

Amendment (because “Americans are not subject to any foreign laws”); and (iii) Public Law 73-

10 and 12 U.S.C. § 411 (statutes suspending the gold standard and authorizing the printing of

6 Defendants also argue that the Tax Injunction Act (“TIA”) bars suit here. The TIA “prohibits district

courts from ‘enjoin[ing], suspend[ing] or restrain[ing] the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under

State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State.’” Dorce, 2

F.4th at 96 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1341). Defendants do not support their position that invalidating a state

court foreclosure judgment would enjoin the collection of a tax but, in any event, the Court need not

consider the TIA given its disposition with respect to Rooker-Feldman and dismissal of Plaintiff’s claim.

federal reserve notes, respectively).7 (Compl. at 1). These principles are inapplicable to Plaintiff’s

eviction and unexplained in the Complaint. Plaintiff fails to relate these theories to cognizable

claims for relief and “[n]either this Court, nor any party, should have to wade through endless

pages of narrative to discern the causes of action asserted and the relief sought” Azzarmi v.

Neubauer, No. 20-CV-09155, 2022 WL 4357865, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2022) (quoting Fisch

v. Consulate Gen. of Republic of Poland, No. 11-CV-04182, 2011 WL 3847398, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.

Aug. 30, 2011)).

Indeed, as to these theories, “Plaintiff’s complaint sounds in the familiar refrain of the so-

called sovereign citizen.” Aran v. Dep’t of Treasury & Internal Revenue Serv., No. 21-CV-04748,

2022 WL 377957, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2022). Plaintiff, for example, argues that Congress only

exercises legislative authority within the District of Columbia. (Compl. at 7). However, “[e]ven

when read with the ‘special solicitude’ due pro se pleadings . . . the conspiracy and legal revisionist

theories of ‘sovereign citizens’ are not established law in this court or anywhere in this country’s

valid legal system.” Adams v. United States, No. 19-CV-04665, 2019 WL 2491597, at *1

(S.D.N.Y. May 29, 2019). “[S]overeign citizens, like all citizens of the United States, are subject

to the laws of the jurisdiction in which they reside.” Paul v. New York, No. 13-CV-05047, 2013

WL 5973138, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 2013) (cleaned up). Plaintiff’s remaining federal

7 Plaintiff makes numerous additional arguments in her confusing 33-page opposition to this motion. (See,

e.g. Opp. Br. at 19 (discussing how the U.S. Coast Guard was founded at the request of Alexander Hamilton

in 1790 but is now by itself the world’s 12th largest naval force)). The Court, however, fails to see the

import of those arguments to this case. Thus, to the extent Plaintiff’s opposition brief raises additional legal

theories under the sovereign citizen ideology, such theories “have been consistently rejected by federal

courts as frivolous and a waste of court resources” Santana v. United States, No. 13-CR-00536, 2017 WL

2470834, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 6, 2017) (internal citation and quotation marks removed).

constitutional and statutory claims are, accordingly, dismissed.°

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED and Plaintiff's

Complaint is dismissed. While “[d]istrict courts should frequently provide leave to amend before

dismissing a pro se complaint ... leave to amend is not necessary when it would be futile.” Reed v.

Friedman Mgmt. Corp., 541 F. App’x 40, 41 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d

99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000)). Leave to amend is inappropriate here because “the defects in Plaintiff's

complaint [are] substantive, better pleading will not cure [them,] and repleading would thus be

futile.” Adams v. United States, No. 19-CV-04665, 2019 WL 2491597, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 29,

2019).

The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to: (1) terminate the motion sequence pending

at Doc. 20; (ii) mail a copy of this Order to Plaintiff; and (111) close this case.

SO ORDERED:

Dated: White Plains, New York

February 16, 2023

Philip M. Halpern

United States District Judge

* To the extent Plaintiffs Complaint can be read to include claims for relief brought under State law, the

Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those claims. See, e.g., McLeod v. Jewish Guild

for the Blind, 864 F.3d 154, 158 n.6 (2d Cir. 2017) (“Of course, a district court may decline to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over state and local law claims if it has dismissed all claims over which it has

original jurisdiction.”’).